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“It’s a nice story – what a shame nobody has written about it fully,” Cuban dictator 
Fidel Castro wrote near the twentieth anniversary of the battles near Cuito Cuanavale.1 
Despite the passage of another decade, a ‘full history’ of the Angolan conflict has yet to 
appear. Before the end of this century, it might. But today, although almost thirty years 
have elapsed since the war ostensibly ended, the emotion stirred, the wounds caused, 
and the problems left unresolved are too heated, too deep, and too complex, for any 
historian to produce one objective narrative that might find general acceptance. But 
that should come as no surprise. After all, we had to wait almost eight decades for the 
first single-volume history of the Anglo-Boer War to generally satisfy all shades of 
historical opinion over its origins, nature, and consequences.2
The ‘Border War’ – the nomenclature remains problematic – involved every state in 
Southern Africa and the nationals of several more. In several instances, most notably 
in Angola, Mozambique, and Rhodesia, insurgent movements fought guerrilla 
campaigns. The wars fought may have had their characteristics. Through common 
purpose, however, regional cooperation and the sharing of resources, they were also in 
many respects inseparably connected. The liberation wars in Angola and Mozambique 
(1961-1975) and the post-independence wars that followed 1975, the Rhodesian 
‘Bush War’ (1964-1980), South Africa’s Border War (1966-1989), and the ‘armed 
struggle’ for South Africa, are all perhaps campaigns of a larger, thirty-year Southern 
African War. Some states were directly involved in hot proxy wars of the Cold War. 
Host countries, providing succour and materiel to one or more insurgent movements, 
became at times targets of cross-border raids, as in the case of Swaziland, Lesotho, 
and Botswana, or targets for economic and political destabilisation by Rhodesia and 
then South Africa. Some Southern African states maintained strong links with former 
colonial masters, while Cuba, China, the USSR, and the USA courted others. While 
the ‘War’ escapes neat or easy positioning in both space and time, it is also true that 
there were no true neutrals in the region.3
Over the past fifty years, dozens of books, several special issues of journals, and more 
than 118 academic journal articles were written, and, more recently, tens of thousands 
of pages of documents declassified.4 Scholarly military histories of the Angolan 
conflict have taken a long time to emerge. Writing the first rough drafts of history,5 
war correspondents and journalists produced the first accounts in South Africa6 and 
abroad.7 Feeding the demand for popular, ‘instant’ history, these appeared from 1976 
and culminated more recently with The SADF in the Border War (2013) by Leopold 
Scholtz8 and the reprint of  Willem Steenkamp’s South Africa’s Border War (2016).9 Many 
publications by official historians appeared as the Border War ended, but this official 
response, like the work of the journalists, satisfied neither the veteran participants nor 
an academic community seeking deeper reflection.10 An academic phase began with 
the presentation of theses and dissertations at several universities in South Africa11 and 
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N a flood of personal accounts ensued, starting with Jacqui Thompson’s An Unpopular 
War.13  The personal narratives and memoirs reached a high point in 2009, which seems 
to have been something of a ‘golden year’, although from an early stage this genre 
included unit, regimental and formation history.14 The Border War has therefore gone 
through the familiar cycle of military historiography: journalism and war reportage, 
followed by official history, then the personal and regimental accounts, all leading to 
studies that are academic and more critical in approach.15
MAP 1 Southern Africa and the cordon sanitaire
In another vein, what is surprising, is that whereas wars usually provide rich material 
for subsequent political movements to manipulate for their own purposes, often in 
printed form, this was for the most part not the case for the “Border War”. In part, 
this can probably be explained by the increasing fragmentation of Afrikaner society 
after 1990 and the thought to harness the “Border War” in a new dispensation, where 
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Afrikaner history in its old format is given a wide berth, would not have made much 
sense. Neither can the current African National Congress (ANC) government lay 
much claim to the memory of the war (though occasionally they wish to as far as 
Cuito Cuanavale is concerned) for the simple reason that they were largely absent 
from the fighting. 
While we now know a great deal more about this war, answers to many fundamental 
questions remain elusive. Why, for example, did South Africa make such a vast 
commitment in an area of seeming so questionable strategic importance? What did 
it attempt to do during the twenty-three years of its involvement in Angola? Why, 
despite the expenditure of billions of Rands, the loss of many lives, the application 
of growing and increasingly sophisticated armed forces, and the enlistment of the 
flower of its youth, did the region’s only power fail to achieve its ostensible objectives 
in a war that was deeply frustrating and divisive? At a deeper level, how was this 
war waged, and what was its nature? And then what was the soldiers’ experience – 
from the ‘humiliations’ of basic training and the development of unit cohesion to 
the fear, loneliness, and exhaustion of battle? And, not in the least, what have been 
the consequences for all South Africans, Angolans, Namibians, from this, the region’s 
longest war?
This book seeks to provide some answers to some of these questions and to specifically 
place South Africa’s involvement in Angola in a more nuanced, historical perspective. 
On 26 August 2016, the Department of History (Arts) and the Department of 
Military History (Military Sciences) of Stellenbosch University held a symposium on 
the topic of  “The War for Southern Africa; a quinquagenarial reflection”. Prominent 
historians were invited to reflect on their experiences, in several cases as both veterans 
and scholars. The two keynote speakers were Brig Gen McGill Alexander (retired), a 
soldier-scholar who completed a PhD on the airborne concept in the South African 
armed forces in 2016,16 and Professor Gary Baines, author of a reflective, recent 
book on the Border War.17 The event gained traction, and others joined; some were 
colleagues from related fields, some were past and present postgraduate students. The 
result is this collection of chapters. The date, 26 August, was chosen as it marked 
the fiftieth anniversary of the SADF attack on Ongulumbashe in 1966. Those in 
attendance came from Angola, Namibia, the Russian Federation, and South Africa. 
That 26 August is also Namibia’s national day was duly noted.18
The papers offered and those selected for presentation at the symposium were, as 
expected, diverse in approach and methodology, and this edited collection reflects 
this diversity of views and approaches. Significantly, the contributions range all 
three approaches in military history writing: the traditional military history, the new 
military history, and the war-and-society method. The contributors also base their 
findings on a variety of sources. Several delved deeply in often newly available, archival 
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N part elsewhere. Much of this archival material arrived in 1989 at the Department 
of Defence Archives, where it was sorted, arranged, catalogued, and has since been 
rendered steadily accessible. However, too many scholars, working on the Border War 
and the related conflicts, notably excuse their neglect of this material with claims of 
inaccessibility, destruction, or loss.19 But the material is rich and extensive. In 1992, 
the Department of Defence Archives held some 35  linear kilometres of files, of 
that approximately 31.33 linear kilometres, or ninety per cent of the holding at the 
time, was generated during the period of the Cold War (Figure  1).20 With a growing 
number of scholars following the public access to information route, more and more 
of this documentation is steadily becoming available. Some scholars, influenced 
by postmodernist theory, adopt the ‘linguistic turn’ and contribute to discourses 
that connect to global trends. These combined efforts, in pursuit of more nuanced 
understandings of the pervasive and enduring impact of this period of conflict on the 
processes of political and social change in southern Africa, give us a more complex 
picture of the dynamics of this war and its legacies.
FIGURE 1  Total holding of the Department of Defence Archives (SANDF Documentation Centre),  
Pretoria, 1993
This book is organised in three parts, each comprising four chapters, a structure that 
reflects something of the diversity in the approaches of the twelve contributions. In 
South Africa, much of the history written on this war has a definite focus on the 
military side of the warfighting. This writing assumed, as much of it continues to do, 
a traditional approach to military history with a keen interest in diplomacy, military 
organisation, strategy and tactics, battlefield performance, and, as the matter of Cuito 
Cuanavale so ably demonstrates, in explaining victory or defeat. Part 1, called ‘Places 
and Events’, takes more of this traditional approach.
In Chapter 1, Chris Saunders addresses the question of ‘borders’. There were several 
borders: the old ‘imperial border’ between the German and Portuguese empires; 
the international border settled in 1927 between South Africa and Portugal; the 
veterinary border or ‘Red Line’ and the so-called kaplyn. These ‘borders’, always 
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porous, meant different things to different people. Saunders concentrates specifically 
on ‘what happened on, along, and across that border during the war’. In Chapter 2, 
McGill Alexander draws the focus to the events of 26 August 1966, when members of 
the South African Police (SAP) and SADF attacked an ostensibly insignificant South 
West Africa People’s Organisation (Swapo) base at Ongulumbashe. This clash marks 
the start of the twenty-three-year conflict. He concludes with some thoughts on the 
implications of the action at Ongulumbashe for the South African government of 
the day and their Swapo adversaries, in terms of the widening war and the changing 
international landscape. The effect of this widening war, specifically on the South 
African armour, is addressed by Jean-Pierre Scherman in Chapter 3. He argues that, 
although the SADF won the battles, at a strategic level the decision to escalate the 
conflict at the end of 1975 was ill-considered and the operation itself – SAVANNAH 
– was poorly planned and badly timed. These ideas are taken further on the strategic 
level by James Jacobs.  In Chapter 4, he explains the strategic considerations confronting 
the South African government and the apparent need to manage domestic political 
reform alongside the creation of a secure environment in which negotiations might 
take place. He questions whether the escalating war created the buffer zone necessary 
for the South African government to negotiate the political settlement inside the 
country. In the end, Jacobs concludes that the Border War was perhaps little more than 
an expensive foreign adventure. These chapters remind us that victory is a complex 
business. Victory demands good leadership and command, adequate material resources, 
and well-trained and resilient troops, who, as a campaign progresses, gain experience 
and battle-hardiness. And, most of all, victory requires viable political objectives 
and outcomes.
There are no systematic studies on South African society, and the nature and extent 
of the social changes brought about by any war in which South Africans fought. The 
interests of  War and Society historians are ranging. As Michael Neiberg has noted, 
these interests include ‘such subjects as the relationships between home fronts and 
fighting fronts; the differences between history (what happened) and memory (a 
socially constructed and generally accepted version of that history); tensions between 
localism and nationalism; and the interactions between war, class, gender and race’.21 
This approach, in a broader sense, incorporates war as a catalyst of socio-political 
change. The second part of this volume that emphasises societal systems and the 
mutually reciprocal impacts between those systems and the experience of the Border 
War opens up a number of these themes. 
One of these themes is the development of nationalism and how communities are 
imagined and socially-constructed during times of conflict.22 Pretoria, realising that 
the widening war would demand increasing calls on society, and particularly the youth 
and the national treasure, implemented a sophisticated propaganda programme to 
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N foreign public opinion. Rodney Warwick tackles this question of the militarisation 
of ‘white’ South African society in Chapter 5. The mobilisation of consent, growing 
rapprochement between English and Afrikaans-speaking white South Africans, and the 
development of a ‘white South African’ nationalism were critical pillars underpinning 
the war effort. However, as Evert Kleynhans explains in Chapter 6, these mechanisms 
to mobilise support for the war and consent for the changes it would bring were 
implemented well beyond the imagined limits of  ‘white society’.  A youth movement, 
constructed on ethnic lines, was created for the Kavango in 1975 ‘to prevent the 
spread of communist propaganda, foster a sense of Kavango nationalism, and limit the 
political influence of … Swapo amongst the local Kavango youth’. Pretoria harnessed 
the resources of, amongst other things, the Institute for African Studies at the then 
Potchefstroom University in their effort to implement a total national strategy that 
extended beyond the purely military domain into the social, political, economic, and 
cultural spheres.
A second theme that emerges in part two is society’s response to the war and the 
government programmes associated with it. One of these responses came from the 
Progressive Federal Party (PFP), the official parliamentary opposition. Chapter  7 
addresses this heretofore neglected dimension. The PFP was small, fractured, and lacked 
substantial power. The party, at times painted as unpatriotic and un-South African, 
was forced to steer a middle course when it came to many of the controversial and 
contentious issues of the day, including conscription and the implementation of the 
tenets of total national strategy. Caught in the crossfire between the government and 
organisations taking a more active stand against conscription, the PFP had to perform 
the usual functions of the parliamentary opposition, namely keeping the government 
accountable. This chapter clearly shows the importance of the oppositional parties, and 
the roles they played, in deepening our understanding of the impact of this war. 
Anneke van Heerden, in Chapter 8, addresses a societal response of an entirely 
different kind. The Southern Cross Fund (SCF), a civilian, nationwide organisation, 
was set up and run by mothers and other women concerned about the welfare of the 
troops. It grew steadily from 1968 to become the largest civilian donor to the SADF. 
At its height, the SCF had 260 branches, with some 90 per cent of its funds allocated 
directly to the welfare of soldiers. The SCF was active and visible – at the time some 
83 per cent of the white population was familiar with its objectives – and, averaging 
an annual income of R9 million, it became the second largest welfare organisation in 
the country.  As  Van Heerden shows, SCF activities served to unite white society, and 
particularly white women, as part of a responsive home front. 
Part  3 views the war through a third lens – termed ‘the soldiers’ experience’, an 
approach that has gained in popularity in South Africa as it has done elsewhere. 
Taking a cue from John Keegan23 and Richard Holmes,24 these scholars share interests 
with more traditional military historians, but, markedly, they embrace different 
9
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methodologies and ask different questions. They want to understand the conduct of 
war and, adopting a ‘bottom-up’ view, focus on the recruitment and maintenance of 
soldiers, on how they fight, and on the experience of battle, and the consequences of 
that experience on themselves as individuals and their societies.
The four chapters – Chapters 9 to 12 – making up part three open up a number 
of these themes. Gary Baines, in Chapter 9, articulates the relationship between his 
younger self as a SADF conscript and his present self as both a veteran and a historian 
of the Border War. His contribution here, that almost takes the form of a life story, 
traces his personal development as a historian and particularly as a historian of the 
Border War. Not only did the National Service experience shape his views of and 
approaches to his writings on the Border War, but the war itself, and his writing about 
it have come to fashion his identity as an individual, as a veteran, and as a historian. 
In this way, he argues as a soldier-author, he has perhaps also come to terms with his 
‘embodiment as a veteran’. 
Ian Liebenberg, in Chapter 10, addresses the socialisation of the approximately half 
a million young, white men, most of whom were conscripted and saw service in 
Namibia and Angola. Some of the questions resonate with those asked by Warwick 
in Chapter 5. However, taking an auto-ethnographic and sociological approach, 
Liebenberg’s view is firmly ‘from the bottom up’. Using his own experience as a 
veteran National Serviceman, he describes the process of socialisation and the creation, 
by a government requiring a reservoir of human resources, of ‘a ready warehouse of 
willing (young) white men available for national defence’. In this way, Liebenberg 
attempts a wider understanding of the ‘militarisation’ of state and society. 
Again, this went well beyond ‘white South Africa’. In Chapter 11,  Will Gordon set the 
context and describes the creation from 1975 of 32 Battalion. Starting as a faction of 
the FNLA, they were deployed as Bravo Group during Operation SAVANNAH and 
subsequently incorporated into the regular structures of the SADF as 32 Battalion. 
From the start, the unit, that comprised soldiers and their extended families, had a 
distinct character that remained until its disbandment in March 1993. In many ways, 
‘32’ was, and perhaps remains, an imagined community of a different kind. Gordon 
explains how the non-racial training and command methods, which were unusual for 
the time, innovative leadership and adaptability, and the development of strong small-
unit cohesion, made an extremely effective fighting force. However, confronted with 
the ending of the Border War and then the tedium of township duties in South Africa, 
the battalion was disbanded, and its members integrated in 1994 into the new South 
African National Defence Force (SANDF).
The final chapter in the collection, Chapter 12, addresses the matter of leisure, 
comforts, and military canteens in the SADF. Leisure and consumption are further 
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N Force Institute (SADFI), perhaps better known by its Afrikaans contraction – SAWI 
(Suid‑Afrikaanse Weermaginstituut), was embedded within the SADF. Staffed partly with 
military personnel, it ran shopping malls on military bases and plied mobile canteens 
in training and operational areas and provided recreational facilities for members of 
the SADF from small permissible profits margins. SAWI, therefore, performed other 
functions of military value for they were one of the mechanisms used to contain and 
control troops and break the boredom of base life through the donation of sporting 
facilities and games equipment. The Border War brought rapid growth to what had 
been a floundering organisation and, in a few years, SAWI had become the primary 
organisation that managed shops and canteens and sponsored the building and 
maintenance of recreational facilities.
In Different Times is the first attempt to bring together diverse scholars, using different 
lenses, to study this Southern African conflict.  As a book, it focuses specifically on the 
SADF experience of the war.  Although South Africa is a vastly different country today, 
the study of the Border War opens a range of questions, also relevant to contemporary 
deployments such as in Lesotho (1998) and the Central African Republic   (2013). 
It  also includes the debate on participation in foreign conflicts; the development, 
design and preparation of appropriate, modern, armed forces and their use as foreign 
policy instruments in far-off theatres; on military planning; and, as the historical 
controversies regarding the battles at Cuito Cuanavale and Bangui illustrate, on the 
interface between foreign campaigning and domestic politics.
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The war fought in northern Namibia and southern Angola from 1966 to 1989, now 
sometimes called the ‘Namibian war for independence’,1 was fought across the border 
between Namibia and Angola. While the term ‘border’ is often used for a boundary 
line on a map, it may also be an area adjacent to that line, sometimes also called 
a ‘border region/zone’, ‘borderland’ or ‘frontier’, the extent of which often remains 
vague.2 In this case, it can arbitrarily be said to be the area stretching, say, twenty 
miles north and south of the boundary line itself. The line that divides Namibia and 
Angola was, and is, a long one, made up of different parts. In the west, it begins at the 
Atlantic Ocean and runs to present-day Zambia, with several distinct geographical and 
demographic features along the way. In the sparsely populated west, the boundary line 
passes through what is largely semi-desert. In the central, relatively densely populated 
portion there is no river to form a natural barrier to movement, and the boundary 
line separates Oshivambo-speaking people north and south of it. In the east, where the 
boundary with Angola ends and that with Zambia begins, the border then runs along 
the area known until recently as the Caprivi, the strip of land that joins the rest of 
Namibia to the Zambezi River.3 A fundamental point about the Namibian/Angolan 
boundary line is that it was demarcated arbitrarily, drawn by colonial authorities on 
maps in Europe,4 initially to separate Portuguese territory to the north from German 
territory to the south. In places, the line ran along the Kunene and Kavango Rivers, 
but elsewhere it was merely drawn along a line of latitude. This line was only finally 
agreed upon between South Africa, as the country occupying Namibia in terms of a 
League of Nations mandate, and Portugal in 1927. The line divided people living on 
both sides, who spoke the same language and shared common allegiances, and it cut 
through a complex and integrated ecosystem.5
This chapter will not explore the history of how the Namibia-Angola border has been 
defined, nor focus on its geographical and environmental features, except concerning 
the movement of people across the border during the liberation war. While there are 
sociological studies of particular places along the border between occupied Namibia 
and Angola, the history of what happened on, along, and across that border during 
the war remains largely unexplored, especially in the scholarly literature.6 Important 
questions, such as how much such movement there was, north to south and south 
to north, remain to be analysed. To the extent that the border area has almost always 
been looked at from one side in the relevant literature on the war, that of South 
Africa’s involvement in the war.7 As the historian must view the past as dispassionately 
as possible, that means, in the study of any border, viewing it from both sides. In this 
preliminary survey, I will first sketch some aspects of the role of the border area mainly 
from the side of South African-occupied Namibia, then from that of Angola, before 
proceeding to some concluding thoughts about the role of the border in the war and 
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MAP 1.1 The zone of contention along the Angolan-Namibian border
We lack a detailed study of the history of the Namibian/Angolan border similar to 
one recently completed on another semi-barrier, one to the south of the Namibian/
Angolan border, the so-called Red Line, a veterinary fence that demarcated Namibia’s 
white-owned farming land from African-occupied land to the north. The Red Line, 
unlike the Namibian/Angolan boundary, did not divide two countries. Its historian, 
Giorgio Miescher, nevertheless calls it ‘an imperial border’, suggesting that it marked 
the extent of South Africa’s imperial reach into Namibia and he goes on to claim that 
the Red Line had ‘a greater symbolic and practical significance than any international 
border’.8 That did not remain the case once the liberation war had begun, though 
the Red Line did, in a sense continue to demarcate the zone of the ‘Border War’, as 
white South Africans referred to the war that took place north of it. A recent book 
of reflections by South African soldiers on their involvement in the Border War 
is therefore titled, North of the Red Line.9 However, it was the international border 
between Namibia and Angola, which South African troops called the ‘cut-line’ that 
increasingly became a key line of division, as this chapter will try to show.
The use of the term ‘Border War’ to refer to the war fought in northern Namibia and 
southern Angola in the 1970s and 1980s was of course deliberately vague, for it did not 
specify which border was involved. As Gary Baines has explained, the term was ‘used 
by the apartheid state to perpetuate the fiction that SADF troops were protecting 
South Africa’s border and not fighting on foreign soil’.10 When those troops went into 
Angola in 1975, the entire operation was kept secret for as long as possible because 
the government needed parliamentary approval to send troops into a foreign country. 
Some of the South Africans fighting in southern Angola were surprised to hear on the 
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In the white South African imagination, the Namibian/Angolan border became a war 
against the forces of communism and terrorism, especially after the Popular Movement 
for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) came to power in Angola in November 1975. 
The liberation movement, the South West Africa People’s Organisation (Swapo), 
embodied these ‘evil’ forces that were both committing acts of violence to try to 
end the South African occupation of Namibia and seen as Soviet puppet.12 To many 
in Swapo, on the other hand, the political border itself may have been viewed as an 
artificial and colonial construct. Their goal was the removal of what they saw as a racist 
and foreign occupation of the country south of the line of territorial division between 
the country that was hosting them in exile, Angola, and their own country, Namibia.
In the late 1960s, South African military personnel stationed in Angola in support of 
the Portuguese regime there, were part of a secret military alliance between the South 
African and Portuguese governments.13 After protracted negotiations with Portugal, 
the white minority South African government signed an agreement in 1969 to build 
the Ruacana hydro-electric scheme on the Kunene River, with an associated dam at 
Calueque in Angola.14 A pipeline was to be built to deliver water from the Kunene at 
that point to Ovamboland in northern Namibia. The South African Defence Force 
(SADF), having taken over responsibility for security in Namibia from the South 
African Police the year before, initially invaded Angola from northern Namibia in 
August 1975 to protect its investment in the Ruacana-Calueque scheme, not yet 
completed, and in particular to secure the Calueque Dam. Then in October that year, 
South African troops rapidly moved much further north into Angola and in November 
found themselves up against Cuban forces not far from the Angolan capital, Luanda. 
Faced with fierce resistance led by the Cubans, the South African forces retreated, and 
the last of them withdrew back across the border into Namibia in late March 1976. 
It was then, on the border at Ruacana that secret meetings took place between South 
African and Angolan officials from mid-1976 onwards, meetings to discuss matters of 
mutual interest, including continued work on the Calueque Dam.15 
The next turning point in the war came in May 1978, when the SADF carried out 
a massive raid into southern Angola, not only by air on the Swapo camp at Cassinga 
way beyond the border area but also overland across the boundary line to destroy 
Swapo’s nearby Vietnam camp at Chetequera. From that camp, over two hundred 
Namibian prisoners, only some of whom were members of Swapo’s armed wing, 
the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), were taken back into Namibia 
and held incommunicado for years at Mariental in the south of the country. They 
were eventually released in 1984, in part thanks to pressure by the International 
Red Cross on the South African authorities.16 For a decade after the so-called 
Cassinga Raid, the SADF, South West African Territorial Force (SWATF) troops, 
Battalions  31 and  32  and  the militarised police counterinsurgency unit known as 
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TS the border.17 A  soldier who served in 32 Battalion, which consisted of ex-Angolan 
guerrillas under white leadership, reported in 1980 as follows: 
Our main job is to take an area and clear it. We sweep through it, and we kill 
everything in front of us … And Swapo still get[s] by us and cross the cut-line 
between Angola and Namibia. It’s not as if we are stopping them.18
From 1975, the South African authorities tried to prevent movement across the border 
between Ovamboland and Angola by replacing the existing fence with a 450 km long 
two-metre-high fence topped with barbed wire. Land on either side of the fence, 
up to a kilometre wide, was cleared of homesteads, in the process destroying some 
farming activity.19 But all attempts to make the so-called cut-line impenetrable 
proved ineffective. As movement across the borderline continued, from 1981 South 
African forces occupied a strip of territory north of it in southern Angola to try 
to prevent Swapo from operating from Angola into northern Namibia. Occasionally, 
the SADF negotiated with the Angolans on ways to prevent Swapo operations into 
northern Namibia. An agreement to that end, reached by the South African and 
Angolan governments in February 1984 and brokered by the United States, set up a 
joint monitoring commission: South African troops would withdraw from southern 
Angola, and in return the Angolan army would prevent Swapo entering the so-called 
‘area in question’, which extended south to the Namibian-Angolan border.  After long 
delays, the last South African troops withdrew from Angola in April 1985, over the 
border into Namibia as they had in March 1976, but this time with more ceremony. 
“Led by a brass band playing Clementine”, it was reported at the time that: 
… 450 South African soldiers and a big white dog that became their mascot left 
Angola … General Constand Viljoen, Chief of the South African Defence Force, 
saluted his men as they rumbled by in dusty, mine-proof vehicles.20
From the late 1970s, the SADF supplied weapons and other support to its ally Unita, 
whose headquarters were at Jamba in Angola, not far north of the border, and Unita 
effectively controlled the whole eastern section of the Namibian-Angolan border, 
preventing Swapo from operating there.21 When Unita appeared threatened by the 
advance of the Angolan army, the SADF struck hard across the border, with troops 
and from the air, first in 1985 and then again in October 1987, when the Angolan 
army suffered massive losses near the Lomba River. But then in 1988, negotiations 
between Cuba, Angola and South Africa began that led to the agreement that brought 
the war to an end. In part, because of what happened near Cuito Cuanavale (the 
battle there is not addressed here, because it took place beyond the border area), and 
because of the Cuban forces moving south for the first time, close to the Namibian 
border.22 At the end of August 1988, the last South African troops moved south from 
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so, and iconic photographs of the withdrawal show vehicles passing under a banner 
that proclaimed them as ‘winners’ as ratels of South Africa’s 61st Mechanised Brigade 
crossing a pontoon over the Kavango River.23 The following April, on and after the 
day on which a ceasefire came into effect, South African forces, military and police, 
were again involved in operations just south of the border against Swapo forces that 
had crossed the border from Angola.24
There was a massive movement of South African troops and their auxiliaries, including 
San trackers and those conscripted into SWATF, across the Namibian-Angolan border 
in 1975/76 and again from 1978 to 1988, with troops stationed in bases along the 
border. Some South African forces – most notoriously Koevoet, whose members 
were rewarded financially for every Swapo guerrilla they killed25 – terrorised the 
local population. Massive quantities of ivory and rhino horn were brought across the 
border from Angola, mostly illegally.26 These forces caused enormous destruction to 
the environment, and much of the infrastructure that existed in the border area in 
southern Angola. Though South African troops had withdrawn from the border area 
north of the cut-line by the end of August 1988, Koevoet continued to be active 
in chasing after PLAN combatants across the boundary-line, and that para-military 
force was only disbanded shortly before the first democratic election in Namibia in 
November 1989.27
If we now turn our attention to the ‘other side’ in the war, we can turn our focus to 
Swapo guerrillas in 1965 who, having moved into northern Namibia through the 
Caprivi, established a base at Ongulumbashe, a little way south of the Angolan border. 
That base, including its underground tunnels, occupied by only sixteen guerrillas at 
the time, was destroyed by a South African police unit, aided by military helicopters, in 
August 1966.28 Until 1975, the war in the border area south of the cut-line remained 
very low-key, with occasionally lobbing mortars at South African facilities. The border 
itself remained very porous, with people moving easily across it in both directions.29 
Swapo and Unita were allies at this time, and people easily shifted allegiances between 
the two movements.30 
The single most important turning point in the entire liberation war came with the 
decision of the government of Portugal, after the April 1974 coup d’etat in Lisbon, 
to withdraw from Angola. Once news of this reached northern Namibia, thousands 
moved across the border into Angola to escape the oppressive South African 
occupation and to join Swapo in exile. Marion Wallace writes in her general history 
of Namibia:
With the end of Portuguese rule in Angola, Namibia’s northern border with 
Angola effectively opened in mid-1974, making it possible to send fighters of 
… PLAN directly into the Swapo heartland of Ovambo, where military action 
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TS From 1976, Swapo was able to establish bases in southern Angola, some not far from the 
Namibian border. Taking their orders from the main military headquarters of PLAN 
at Lubango in southern Angola, guerrillas crossed the border on foot into northern 
Namibia in platoons. Sometimes they hid amongst cattle driven across the border.32 
Most PLAN activities took place in the wet season, from December to March, when 
water was available, and tracks were less easy to follow, and there was more cover 
from the sparse bushes.33 Some PLAN fighters mobilised the local population in 
Kavango and elsewhere in northern Namibia before returning to Angola,34 but most 
of the combatants who crossed the border to move southwards were either killed 
or captured. Some of those captured by the SADF were if they refused to switch 
sides and fight for South Africa, drugged, put on planes and dropped into the sea to 
their deaths, in what was known as Operation BARNACLE.35 From the early 1980s, 
Swapo could not send its fighters into Namibia via south-eastern Angola because of 
the presence of Unita there, heavily supported by the South Africans. Instead, elite 
PLAN units Volcano, then Typhoon, mainly operated into Ovamboland, from where 
they sometimes moved further south into the white farming areas.36
The area immediately north of the Namibia-Angola boundary was transformed 
in April/May 1988 by the arrival, for the first time, of Cuban forces, who, moving 
southwards towards the border, quickly rebuilt and expanded the airfields at Xangongo 
and Cahama, allowing the Cubans to win air-superiority over the entire border area. 
It was from these airfields that a dozen MIG-23s took off on 27 June 1988 to bomb 
the South African forces at the Ruacana-Calueque Dam site, in retaliation for a South 
African offensive against Cuban forces in southern Angola. In this attack, the bridge 
and sluice-gates at the dam site were severely damaged, along with the pipeline to 
Ovamboland, while the last bomb dropped killed eleven South African conscripts 
who were watching the attacking planes.37 This incident, and the possibility of further, 
more deadly clashes, concentrated the minds of the South African, Angolan and 
Cuban government representatives then involved in negotiating a settlement. That led 
to the agreements signed between August and December 1988 that provided for the 
implementation of the process leading to the independence of Namibia.38
On l April 1989, the day that process began, hundreds of PLAN combatants 
infiltrated across the Angolan/Namibian border to try to set up bases in northern 
Namibia, hopefully under the auspices of the United Nations Transition Assistance 
Group, that was supposed to be in place by that date. Instead, the PLAN combatants 
found themselves being attacked by South African forces, whom the head of the UN 
mission in Namibia, Martti Ahtisaari, agreed should be allowed to leave their bases. 
Over three hundred PLAN fighters were killed and buried in mass graves. Once the 
settlement process was back on track, from June 1989 tens of thousands of refugees 
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Commission for Refugees. While most travelled by air, some were transported across 
the border by land. Amongst the over forty thousand who returned to Namibia were 
those who had been detained and tortured in the notorious Swapo prison camp 
at Lubango in southern Angola. Finally in April 1990, the month after Namibia’s 
independence, the last PLAN forces, with their weaponry, crossed the border from 
Angola back into Namibia in triumph.39
We can conclude this section of the chapter by noting that while PLAN activity 
across the border from Angola into Namibia waxed and waned during the years of 
war, it continued despite all South Africa’s efforts to prevent it, such as the presence of 
tens of thousands of South African troops in the border area. The militarisation of the 
border zone increased throughout the 1980s, with South African bases being placed 
deliberately adjacent to schools in northern Namibia. Support for Swapo amongst 
the local population remained strong, despite the terror meted out by the occupying 
forces. They showed this through the school boycotts of 1988 in Ovamboland, that 
began with a demand that the SADF move the South African bases away from the 
schools, and also by the overwhelming support given to Swapo by those in the border 
area who voted in Namibia’s first democratic election in November 1989.40
With military bases in southern Angola at the time, Swapo carried the war southwards 
across the border to try to end the South African occupation of Namibia. They wanted 
to bring about that country’s independence, while the SADF and its allies repeatedly 
crossed the border northwards into Angola in its efforts to defeat the Swapo liberation 
struggle and prevent Swapo from coming to power in an independent Namibia. 
This chapter has sought to show how, over 23 years, the border area was central to 
the war fought between South African and Namibian forces. Throughout the war 
it remained contested terrain: the outstretched border was never a total barrier to 
movement, despite the South African efforts to restrict the movement of people across 
it and to create an effective barrier. Though much of the relevant literature see it from 
the South African/Namibian side, people moved across it in both directions, and it 
remained relatively porous. In 1979 to 1980, there were extensive discussions between 
the South African government, Swapo, the Frontline states, including Angola, and the 
Western Contact Group, on the modalities of creating a Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) 
to extend up to 50 km on either side of the border fence, but could not reach an 
agreement on how to effect such a DMZ. Despite the fence built along the central 
portion of the border, the situation along even that section of the border remained 
fluid, with South African forces unable to prevent Swapo incursions. On numerous 
occasions, South African forces carried the war into southern Angola, at vast cost in 
devastation and destruction there.41 Though the Swapo attempts to establish ‘liberated 
zones’ or bases in northern Namibia failed, in the end, South Africa withdrew from 
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TS The border never became an impermeable barrier to movement: family and ethnic 
ties ensured that remained the case, as did refugee flows and cross-border traffic in 
people and goods, but at a much-reduced level when war raged in the area. While 
those fighting in the war crossed the border, in both directions, for relatively short 
periods, Namibian refugees spent decades in Angola before returning to Namibia, 
while perhaps an equal number of Angolan refugees settled in Namibia.42 Though the 
colonial political boundary was an arbitrary one, it socialised people as members of a 
territorial entity, and the very fact that Swapo was a nationalist movement, fighting 
for national independence, helped make the boundary between the two countries a 
key divisive symbol in the consciousness of the local people, who knew it as onhaululi, 
meaning ‘the divide’.43 The boundary would anyway have imposed a sense of national 
identity and exclusivity, based in part on the different colonial languages spoken in 
the two countries, English and Afrikaans to the south of the border and Portuguese 
to the north, despite the same indigenous language spoken both north and south 
of the boundary line. The war for Namibian independence emphasised the sense of 
difference created by that line.
With the re-igniting of the civil war in Angola from 1992, the border remained 
unstable, with refugees again crossing from southern Angola, as the Namibian 
government allowed Angolan forces to operate against Unita immediately north of 
its territory.44 An armed attempt at secession in the Caprivi in 1999 caused further 
instability in the eastern border area.45 After the end of the Angolan civil war in 2002, 
however, the border remained peaceful, with much-increased interchange across it, 
more than across any other of Namibia’s national borders.46 With a new majority 
government in power in South Africa from 1994, Angola hoped for reparations from 
that country for the destruction it had caused in southern Angola in the 1980s,47 but, 
to date, none has been forthcoming. Some of the consequences of the war remain 
visible in the border area to this day, but reconstruction continues, with a new hydro-
electric power scheme on the Kunene River planned to go ahead, not at Epupa, as was 
originally planned, but at Baynes, 200 km downstream of Ruacana. If built, Namibia 
and Angola will equally share its 600 Megawatts.48 With increasing cross-border trade, 
there is ever-greater cooperation between the two governments on border issues, 
some within the context of the Southern African Development Community’s Trans-
Kunene Corridor initiative, for SADC’s goal is freer movement of people and goods. 
That the war is not forgotten in the era of peace, can be seen in the discovery of more 
mass graves in northern Namibia,49 the erection of war memorials,50 and the various 
forms of what some now call ‘war tourism’ from Namibia and South Africa across the 
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There is a growing tendency to refer collectively to the liberation struggles that took 
place in southern Africa during the second half of the 20th century as the Southern 
African Thirty-Year War.1 Although the belligerents were not part of formal military 
alliances, the nationalist movements in the various states all had the same aim of 
casting off the yoke of white oppression, while the security forces in those countries, 
as instruments of white hegemony, shared the objective of preserving white privilege. 
So certainly, they were, in a very real sense, all engaged in the same war. Aggressive 
resistance to white rule reared its head in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
in 1959, the Mpondo Revolt in South Africa commenced in 1960, and the violent 
uprising in northern Angola erupted the following year. Complicated by proxy Cold 
War foreign involvement, the long war reached levels of high-intensity conventional 
combat in south-east Angola. But it finally faded out with a bewildered whimper with 
the internecine strife in the townships of South Africa during the early 1990s. The 
Armed Struggle in Southern Africa, therefore, was indeed encompassed by a period of 
a little more than 30 years.
However, if the conflict between the South African Defence Force (SADF) and the 
South African Police (SAP), and the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), 
armed wing of the South West African People’s Organisation (Swapo), is seen as one of 
the campaigns of this war, then it could have commenced on 26 August 1966 – more 
than fifty years ago. This campaign ended with the blood-shedding that followed the 
disastrous attempt to implement UN Security Council Resolution 435 in Namibia 
on 1 April 1989 – twenty-two and a half years later.
In this chapter, an attempt is made to explore what happened on 26 August 1966, based 
on recently declassified documents in the South African military and police archives, 
and interviews with some of the paratroopers who participated. The author could not 
interview any Swapo survivors or South African police officers who participated. The 
chapter concludes with some impressions of the strategic implications of the action 
for both the South African government at the time, and for their adversaries, Swapo.
SOUTH WEST AFRICA AND THE WORLD COURT DECISION
South Africa’s trusteeship of  South West Africa (SWA) in terms of the mandate that 
had been awarded at the end of the First World War by the League of Nations, was 
challenged in 1960. Ethiopia and Liberia had brought a charge to the International 
Court of Justice (the World Court) that South Africa had violated its mandate and 
should be compelled to relinquish its trusteeship. It was the same year that Swapo was 
established – to become the major liberation movement in the struggle for Namibian 
independence. In 1966, the court finally ruled that the complainants had no legal 
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TS By then, Swapo had already embarked on its armed struggle. According to SADF 
and SAP intelligence reports, the first six armed insurgents entered Ovamboland 
in northern SWA in July/August 1965.3 Swapo, however, claims that it had already 
infiltrated fighters into the territory in 1964,4 but the year 1965 was subsequently 
confirmed by one of the insurgents who infiltrated the following year.5 Swapo had 
been making contingency plans should the World Court decision be unfavourable 
towards them, and this infiltration was a part of these plans. The insurgents lay low 
inside South West Africa and did not resort to violence, but were in the position to act 
if things ‘did not go well’ at the Hague.6 The first group established a base in a remote 
part of Ovamboland (often spelt Owamboland) at a spot called Ongulumbashe (also 
spelt Ongulumbashe and sometimes rendered as Omugulu gwOmbashe, Omugulu-
gOmbashe or Omugulugwombashe). From this base, concealed on the sandy, sparsely 
forested plain and undetected by the thinly scattered SAP elements in the territory, 
they recruited several local youths whom they trained in the basic skills of guerrilla 
war.7 Swapo intended to be ready to launch an armed struggle by targeting all 
whites, police officers and tribal chiefs who were working with the South African 
authorities, as soon as they receive the order. When intercepting the second group 
of ten insurgents, nine of them were arrested, taken to Pretoria and interrogated in 
March and April  1966, the South African authorities learnt that between 900 and 
1 200 people had left SWA for military training as members of Swapo. Many of those, 
according to the captured insurgents, were already on their way back to establish 
operational bases in various parts of northern SWA.8
If Sam Nujoma, the President of Swapo, had foreseen the outcome of the case 
considered by the World Court, the South African government had not. In terms of the 
League of Nations Mandate, South Africa could not maintain any military bases inside 
the territory of South West Africa.9 It was for this reason that the only permanent 
military base was at the Port of Walvis Bay, considered a part of the former Cape 
Colony and not SWA. Expecting the worst while they waited for the announcement 
on 18 July 1966, the South African government placed various elements of the 
Defence Force on standby, ready to be flown to SWA in the event of international 
military intervention. At 1 Parachute Battalion, the trained senior company had been 
placed on alert but were ordered to stand down when the court’s surprise ruling in 
South Africa’s favour became known.10
THE DECISION TO ATTACK THE ONGULUMBASHE BASE
The band of insurgents at Ongulumbashe was well advanced in their preparations 
to launch a campaign of violence. But the SAP Security Branch had ‘turned’ the 
captured leader of the second band of insurgents, and he had cooperated with them 
on a two-month-long undercover operation in Ovamboland. They discovered the 
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would have to be attacked and destroyed.11 The highest level must have discussed the 
situation, and there can be no doubt that the Justice, Police and Prisons Minister, 
Advocate B.J. Vorster, was directly involved in the decision to mount an operation. 
Els implies that Prime Minister Dr H.F.  Verwoerd himself gave certain guidelines12 
and an operation of that nature must have had his approval, particularly as the Defence 
Force came to be involved. South Africa did not want to ‘transgress’ the terms of the 
League of Nations Mandate that she was claiming to still uphold.  A military presence, 
let alone a military action, in SWA could be a significant embarrassment. Ultimately, 
therefore, Police Headquarters in Pretoria was tasked to carry out this mission.13
PREPARATIONS:  
PARATROOPERS AND POLICEMEN
The SAP planned to utilise its Riot Unit (also known as the Mobile Unit) to carry out 
the operation. However, they were neither equipped nor trained for such an action. At 
a conference between police and military generals in Cape Town, the Commandant 
General of the SADF, Rudolph Hiemstra, decided that the policemen would need 
substantial assistance for the operation to succeed.14
Accordingly, with political approval, it was agreed that the SADF would provide eight 
Alouette III helicopters and their crews, three C-130 Hercules transport aircraft and 
their crews, six three-ton Bedford 4x4 vehicles, three .303 Bren light machineguns, 
19  Uzi   9 mm submachineguns, binoculars, radios, maps, aerial photographs and eight 
paratroopers to train the policemen and accompany them into action. Besides 
providing a medical officer (doctor) and medical orderly (both paratroopers), a senior 
paratrooper officer, Commandant15 Tommy Renfree was appointed as the SADF 
liaison officer to the police.16 Renfree, at the time an Intelligence Officer at Army 
Head Quarters, was the senior Army officer involved in the operation and the only 
one with experience in the use of helicopters. Experience gained during Operation 
SWIVEL, the SADF action to suppress the Mpondo Revolt in 1960/1961. It had 
been the first tactical employment of helicopters by the SADF.17 Renfree had also 
seen action as a special force paratrooper with the British in the Second World War.18 
According to Breytenbach, it was Renfree’s idea to use helicopters for the operation.19
Renfree, another Army officer and an Air Force officer, accompanied the senior police 
officers to SWA to conduct aerial reconnaissance and to collect more information. 
The other ten paratroopers, under the command of Captain Jan Breytenbach, spent 
almost two weeks training the policemen from the Riot Unit at the SA Police College 
in Pretoria and a training facility in nearby Elandsfontein. According to Breytenbach, 
the paratroopers all had to attest as policemen for the duration of the operation.20 
Even the helicopters of the SAAF had SAP badges painted on their fuselages, together 
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TS FINAL STAGING FOR THE OPERATION
The ten paratroopers and 35 riot policemen were then flown to Rooikop Military 
Airfield at Walvis Bay, together with three Bedford trucks, in the C-130 aircraft. There 
they waited with the eight helicopters and their crewmen, for the signal to move 
closer.22 On 25 August, the force was flown to the airstrip at Ruacana on the northern 
border with Angola.23
Final orders were issued, and preparations made, but despite the substantial and crucial 
military involvement, it remained a police action, which meant that suggestions and 
inputs from the paratroopers were frequently overridden or ignored by the strong 
personalities amongst the police commanders. But police officers were not trained to 
carry out military operations, and the paratroopers subsequently admitted to being 
very frustrated and unhappy with the unprofessional and slapdash way orders were 
given and preparations made, and particularly with certain aspects of the plan.24
Els, who has done considerable research into the operation, unfortunately, produced 
a somewhat confusing account of what took place.25 He appears not to have had 
access to the reports written by Renfree, which provide essential and comprehensive 
information. Instead, Els seems to have relied heavily on the memories of some 
participants in their re-telling of events several decades after the operation. Similarly, 
the technical inaccuracies of Stiff ’s account compromised its credibility.26
In overall command of the operation was a police officer, Colonel Pat Dillon, the 
commander of the SAP Riot Unit. A heliborne force of 30 men, divided into six 
sticks of five men each, with each stick in a helicopter, carried out the assault. The 
flight engineers were left behind at Ruacana to make room for an extra soldier or 
policeman in each aircraft. Paratrooper officers Captains Jan Breytenbach and Kaas van 
der Waals commanded two of these sticks. A seventh stick, commanded by Renfree, 
remained airborne to act as ‘grabbers’ should any of the Swapo insurgents get away. 
The eighth helicopter was used for air control and carried the senior Air Force officer, 
Colonel Jan Blaauw, a Second World War and Korean War veteran. With him was the 
police officer who had run the undercover operation, Captain ‘Rooi Rus’ Swanepoel 
and an observer from the Army, Major Hans Paetzold.27
A reserve force of 14 police officers, four paratroopers (including the medical officer 
and medical orderly) and an Air Force radio operator travelled off-road in Bedford 
trucks to a position approximately eleven miles (17.5 km) east of the Ongulumbashe 
insurgent base. It seems that the initial plan for this group was to move on foot to 
the base and form a cordon around it before the helicopters arrived,28 but this was 
certainly not done. Instead, three helicopters would position stop-groups to the 
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north, but very close to the base, to carry out the sweep through it.29 Of these three, 
Dillon would command the centre stick, Breytenbach the one on the left flank and 
Van der Waals the one on the right. Each stick included a paratrooper Bren gunner, 
several individuals carrying 9 mm submachineguns and at least one in each helicopter 
used an FN assault rifle.30 Breytenbach claims that the helicopters “put down three 
assault sticks of paratroopers and about four sticks of stoppers filled with cops”.31 
Breytenbach’s claim implies that the paratroopers under his command carried out 
the attack and that the policemen were merely there to provide back up. His account 
does not accord with the official documentation, including the passenger lists for the 
helicopters and the report written by Renfree, who was Breytenbach’s superior.32 The 
reverse was true: the paratroopers provided back up for the police.
The police officers reasoned that the insurgents, surrounded, would lay down their 
arms and surrender. The intention was to give each insurgent a formal warning and 
arrest him according to SAP procedure. For the policemen, this was simply another 
police raid on a gang of criminals and the extra hardware provided by the military 
merely served to cow the crooks into quicker surrender. The paratroopers, trained 
to deal with insurgents in a very different manner, were sceptical. Dillon reminded 
everyone that they were not to shoot at anyone without first warning them and that 
their priority was to arrest the insurgents so that they could appear in court. The 
paratroopers made no sense of the arrest priority, as it would be quite impossible 
during a firefight. The doctrinal differences between the police and the military were 
sharply evident.33
According to available intelligence, there were about 16 insurgents in the base, seven of 
whom trained abroad, and one who was a political commissar. Those using the base at 
the time of the operation numbered 18, although close to another 30 had already been 
trained from amongst the youths of the local Ovambo population and had returned 
to their kraals to await further instructions. Two of the foreign-trained insurgents, 
however, had left Ongulumbashe to go to the town of Ondangwa for a meeting 
with Herman Ja-Toivo (also called Andimba Toivo ya Toivo) of Swapo, who owned a 
shop there. So there were indeed 16 in the base, eleven of them locally recruited and 
trained.34 It transpired that the local population had warned the insurgents that an 
attack was imminent because the locals had become aware of the suspicious activities 
of the security policemen posing as civilians during the undercover operation. But 
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TS THE HELICOPTER ASSAULT
Almost inevitably, the operation did not go as planned. To start with, the insurgents 
immediately began firing on the helicopters with their PPSh submachineguns. 
These shots fired by Swapo were the first in a conflict that was to last almost 23 years. 
On this occasion, the insurgent reaction immediately put an end to the police notion 
that they would walk in and arrest the insurgents. As the paratroopers had expected, 
the sweeper group turned into an assault group that encountered resistance even 
before it had disembarked from the helicopters. As there had been no rehearsal for this 
contingency, and because the policemen were not properly versed in military tactics 
and techniques such as fire and movement and because they lacked battle discipline, 
the whole operation quickly deteriorated into chaos. The helicopter pilots, nervous 
of the fire directed at them, placed all six groups down too far away from the base to 
be able to carry out an immediate attack and made it impossible to throw an effective 
cordon around the base. Command and control disintegrated as Dillon became 
embroiled in the fighting rather than running the battle.36 But the insurgents realised 
they had no chance against such a force, and their confusion and disarray exceeded 
that of the South African security forces. The outcome was a foregone conclusion, and 
the results documented in the SADF files, particularly the reports by Renfree.37 
One insurgent was killed (by a paratrooper), ten were captured (one of them seriously 
wounded), and five escaped.38 In the meantime, the helicopters had brought in the 
reserve force, and in subsequent searches of the area using the helicopters shot dead 
another insurgent from the air, and captured one. Three got away, all of them foreign 
trained, with their weapons. There were no casualties amongst the security forces 
(paratroopers and police officers). Those captured were mostly recruits. It appeared 
that one of those killed and one of the captured were from the foreign-trained group 
that had infiltrated,39 explaining the recovery of only two submachineguns and two 
pistols. Only members of this group of six or seven would have had weapons, and three 
of them escaped, while two were at Ondangwa at the time of the attack. One of the 
insurgents, desperate and with nothing else at hand, had even shot at a helicopter with 
a bow and arrow!40  The report by Renfree lists an assortment of items collected in the 
base by the police. This included a large number of documents; over a thousand rounds 
of ammunition; knives; assegais; bows and arrows; two cameras; a portable typewriter; 
37 staves used for rifle drill; flattened poles used for excavating; a pick and spade; two 
axes; blankets; bags; food; eating utensils; and six bicycles. The base was carefully laid 
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THE RIPPLES OF RETROSPECT
Swapo responded to the attack by claiming that their forces had clashed with the 
SADF on 26 August 1966 and that the SADF had suffered 15 dead and numerous 
wounded.42 This sparked a propaganda war between Swapo and South Africa that 
became a concurrent feature of the armed conflict, reflecting the essence of an 
insurgency, that revolves around the perceptions and support of the people. It was 
significant that the Swapo propaganda focused on the SADF rather than the police. 
Though it is unlikely that they would have known of the SADF role, this was irrelevant 
in propaganda. A battle with the military afforded the insurgents far greater status than 
a skirmish with the police: it told the world that they were at war. For the same reason, 
the South Africans preferred to conceal the military involvement; to admit it would 
indicate an escalation of the situation by Swapo and desperation on the part of the 
occupying power.
On arrival back at Air Force Base Waterkloof in Pretoria, a senior Security Police 
officer, the sinister Major General ‘Lang Hendrik’ van den Bergh, who later headed 
up the notorious Bureau of State Security (BOSS), met the South Africans who 
had participated in the operation.43 He greeted and congratulated every police 
officer individually, but pointedly and openly ignored the paratroopers.44 Operation 
BLOUWILDEBEES was regarded as a police action, and henceforth the SAP went 
out of their way to play down and even ignore the role of the SADF. But without 
the SAAF aircraft, Army weapons, paratrooper training and leadership on the ground 
the operation would have been impossible. Furthermore, including all the aircrew 
from the C-130s, helicopters and light aircraft as well as the paratroopers and other 
individuals such as communications experts, there were about 50 SADF personnel 
involved – approximately the same number as there were policemen.
The scope of the operation was never made public by the South African government, 
and it was played down in press releases as a mere clash between policemen and a 
small group of men, leading to the arrest of most of the ‘communist-inspired 
dissidents’. Details to the effect that the encounter had been a helicopter operation 
were not even released45 and, the SADF went so far as to deny SAAF involvement 
when asked.46 The Army, although it could claim no credit for the operation in public, 
did a comprehensive analysis of what had gone wrong, and the paratroopers applied 
themselves to correcting the faults in their training.47 
The report by Renfree also expressed the disillusionment of the paratroopers at the 
inability of the police to achieve the required level of battle proficiency. Their battle 
discipline was non-existent; they were unable to use maps, compasses or protractors, so 
they could not navigate; they had not mastered helicopter drills during the two weeks 
of training; they did not know first aid, and they were unfit and overweight.48 In short, 
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TS The police, unfortunately, did not share the paratroopers’ zeal for self-examination 
and improvement. Instead, they felt self-satisfied, even smug, with their performance 
in the operation. Captain Swanepoel went on to become recognised in police circles 
as a leading expert in guerrilla war and eight years later wrote a paper on the abilities 
of the SAP as guerrilla fighters. In that essay, he made a highly questionable case for 
police officers, praising their training and skills, which he claimed, made them far 
better guerrilla fighters than soldiers.49
STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE
The action at Ongulumbashe, though messy, confused and exposing the inexperience 
of both the South African security forces and the Swapo insurgents, contained many 
of the elements that would, ten years later, be called a ‘fire-force’ operation. By its 
offensive nature, it was certainly an advancement on the employment of helicopters in 
Pondoland during Operation SWIVEL; but was its value merely tactical, or had there 
been a strategic side to the operation?
There can be no doubt that Operation BLOUWILDEBEES played a major role in 
the early refinement of tactical thinking regarding airborne operations. Despite its 
shortcomings, its relatively small force levels and the diminutive size of the objective 
in terms of the numbers of insurgents it housed, the operation had definite strategic 
importance, as the height of the level of approval and the maintenance of radio 
contact throughout the action with the political decision makers in Pretoria and Cape 
Town showed.50
Swapo had established a base inside SWA,51 a strategic victory for the liberation 
movement, regardless of how small and insignificant that base was. But it was not 
merely a symbolic achievement: Swapo recruited and trained local people from that 
base, and soon acts of insurrection would have been carried out from it. In terms 
of the tenets of revolutionary war as propagated by Mao and others, this was an 
advanced stage of insurgency. The presence of a Swapo base in Ovamboland gave the 
movement credibility in the eyes of the local population and would lend status to its 
image internationally. It sent a signal to both the inhabitants of the territory and the 
outside world that South Africa did not control South West Africa (at the time, the 
UN had still not recognised the name Namibia). And as with any insurgent war, it is 
the perceptions and sympathies of the population that determine ultimate victory or 
defeat, the reason why the primitive and rudimentary base at Ongulumbashe became 
a strategic target. It thus became of vital strategic importance to the South African 
government to destroy the base and to terminate the activities of the insurgents. 
In annihilating this threat, and mindful of ensuring security, the government had 
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military airfield at Walvis Bay.  The employment of helicopters to carry out a vertical 
envelopment manoeuvre achieved surprise. Had the attack had been carried out 
by land forces, chances are that the local people could have warned the insurgents 
of their approach and the insurgents might well have escaped before the attacking 
force arrived. Destroying an empty base would have been a hollow victory for 
the South African government and the insurgents could have regrouped and built 
another base. While it is true that those few men who escaped from Ongulumbashe 
did regroup with others, and one month later, on 27 September 1966, attacked the 
homes of administration officials at the border settlement of Oshikango, at no stage 
did Swapo succeed in establishing another base inside the territory.52 Throughout the 
remainder of the war, the insurgent movement was compelled to operate from bases in 
sympathetic neighbouring countries and could never in all honesty lay claim to have 
‘liberated’ areas of SWA/Namibia and to have set up an alternative administration. 
In sharp contrast, in the war in the Portuguese colonies, there were parts, especially 
in Mozambique, that became ‘no go’ areas for the security forces.53 Even the iKongo 
movement, during the Mpondo uprising, succeeded in replacing the government 
administration for a brief period in most of Eastern Pondoland in 1960, but there is 
no evidence that Swapo ever accomplished this. 
Nevertheless, for Swapo, in one of the ironies so often apparent in insurgency wars, 
the tactical defeat became a strategic victory. Dobell regards the skirmish, small and 
one-sided as it was, as a decisive propaganda victory for Swapo.54 In October 1966, 
two months after the Ongulumbashe attack, the United Nations General Assembly 
voted by 114 to 2 (South Africa and Portugal) in favour of revoking the League of 
Nations Mandate and South Africa’s right to administer South West Africa. The UN 
thereby assumed sovereign responsibility for the territory, effectively negating the 
decision of the World Court. South Africa reacted by simply ignoring the Resolution 
(2145 [XXI]) that the UN was neither willing nor able to enforce. However, the 
Resolution did, by implication, absolve South Africa from having to adhere to the 
terms of the mandate. Six months later, on 19 May 1967, the General Assembly 
created the Council for South West Africa, mandated to administer the territory until 
it gained its independence.55 In practical terms, this meant nothing because as before, 
South Africa ignored the resolution and continued to govern the territory; but the 
acrimonious debate raised the Swapo case to prominence on the international stage.
This prominence was a major diplomatic setback for Pretoria because Swapo gained 
considerable international status from the UN decision, further enhanced on 
12 June 1968, when the General Assembly passed Resolution 2372 (XXII), changing 
the territory’s name to Namibia.56 In 1971, the International Court of Justice ruled 
that the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia was illegal and that South 
Africa was under an obligation to withdraw from Namibia immediately. It also ruled 
that all member states of the United Nations should refuse to recognise as valid any 
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TS Predictably, South Africa ignored these decisions, and the insurgency war that had 
been initiated by the attack on Ongulumbashe continued, albeit initially at a 
deficient level of intensity. It was on the diplomatic level that Swapo was able to 
drive its campaign most effectively because of the high profile that South Africa had 
inadvertently bestowed upon it by the clash at Ongulumbashe. With the image of a 
heroic, downtrodden people fighting against impossible odds,58 Swapo next scored 
a major diplomatic victory in 1972 when it was recognised as the “sole legitimate 
representative” of Namibia’s people and granted UN observer status by the UN General 
Assembly.59 Ongulumbashe, therefore, for Swapo became an iconic turning point in 
the liberation war. The post-independence Namibian government has venerated the 
site of the action to perpetuate its strategic significance to Swapo, with a monument 
commemorating “the opening engagement of the armed liberation struggle”.60 
After Ongulumbashe, there was a South African crackdown in northern SWA, with 
a marked expansion of police numbers and activities. Swapo did carry out further 
infiltrations in 1966, and there were cases of attacks on civilians and intimidation 
of the local population, while politicisation and recruitment were ongoing. But the 
Security Police were ruthless in their actions and by April 1967 as many as 200 people, 
including the entire internal leadership of Swapo, were in detention in Pretoria. 
These included Eliaser Tuhadeleni, the political commissar who had escaped at 
Ongulumbashe.61 In May 1967, Tobias Hainyeko, Commander in Chief of PLAN, was 
shot dead when police intercepted the boat in which he was crossing the Zambezi 
River from Zambia into the Caprivi Strip.62 These setbacks led to a military retreat 
by Swapo and a decrease and almost complete curtailment of insurgent activity for 
several years. Growing cooperation between the South Africans and the Portuguese 
made it impossible for PLAN guerrillas to continue crossing Angola from their 
haven in Zambia to reach the population of Ovamboland. Effectively, the attack on 
Ongulumbashe and its immediate results ended the war in Ovamboland for the next 
nine years, making Operation BLOUWILDEBEES an action of strategic importance 
to South Africa. But it did not end the insurgency – it merely moved it away from the 
highest concentration of people, thereby handicapping its progress. During those nine 
years, the focus of the Swapo insurgency shifted to the Caprivi.63 For Swapo, this was 
the only part of Namibia contiguous to a friendly host-country: Zambia.
CONCLUSION
There were political changes taking place both inside South Africa and internationally, 
and these impacted further on the war. Ten days after the attack on Ongulumbashe, 
South African Prime Minister H.F. Verwoerd was assassinated in parliament by 
Dimitri Tsafendas, a man who was said to be mentally deranged. Fearing that internal 
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on one-hour standby for deployment anywhere in the country, but the anticipated 
unrest did not take place.64 John Vorster, the hard-line Police Minister who had 
overseen Operation BLOUWILDEBEES, succeeded Verwoerd. Giving heed to the 
police generals, and particularly Hendrik van den Bergh, Vorster, who retained the 
Police portfolio, increased the role of the SAP in combating the growing insurgency, 
including the deployment of police units to Rhodesia towards the end of 1967.65
But in Namibia, the intensification of the insurgency had to wait for the Portuguese 
revolution of 1974 and the termination of Portuguese military operations in Angola. 
The accession to power of the MPLA in that country provided Swapo with the 
host-country it so sorely needed to enable it to operate in Ovamboland, where close 
to 80 per cent of the population of Namibia lived. For insurgency to flourish, the 
insurgents had to gain access to the population from their bases.66
Ultimately, the action at the apparently insignificant Swapo base at Ongulumbashe, 
though untidy and reflecting the inexperience of both sides, signalled the start of an 
ostensibly local conflict that was to reach unforeseen levels of intensity and involve the 
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INTRODUCTION
The South African Armoured Corps’ (SAAC) philosophy for conventional armour 
warfare was based on aggressive, offensive actions over a wide front in order to achieve 
two main aims: firstly, to deny the enemy its freedom of action and manoeuvre and, 
secondly, to stop and destroy the enemy (especially its armour forces) via direct 
armour firepower.  To achieve these two aims, the SAAC developed two opposite but 
complementary doctrines that were labelled high-intensity operations (HIO) and 
high-mobility operations (HMO). Generally, but not exclusively, HIO involves the 
utilisation of main battle tanks to stop and destroy the enemy at a pre-determined 
time and place. HMO is considered the domain of the armoured car regiments of the 
SAAC and as stated above, aim to deny the enemy its freedom of action and space to 
manoeuvre.1 
Certain types of missions must be carried out to achieve the goal of denying the 
enemy its freedom. Firstly, covering large areas while observing from a mobile or 
static role. Secondly, rapidly concentrating forces in a determined area to bring down 
effective fire. Thirdly, covering key areas with fire to deny the enemy free use thereof. 
Fourthly, breaking up and exhausting enemy armoured forces. Fifthly, attacking and 
destroying selected objectives such as command and control installations, logistical 
installations, air defence installations, artillery positions and airfields.2 The above theory 
is important to remember as it played a vital role in the decision-making process of 
the armoured car commanders, utilised during Operation SAVANNAH. 
The SAAC on the eve of Operation SAVANNAH consisted of three regular force 
units: The School of Armour, based in Bloemfontein, was responsible for all leader 
group training of the SAAC (both Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer or 
Warrant Officer) up to the rank of Major and Warrant Officer Class 1. The other two 
regiments of the SAAC, 1 Special Service Battalion (1 SSB, based in Bloemfontein) 
and 2 Special Service Battalion (2 SSB, based in Zeerust), provided all the training 
for the bi-annual National Service intake Troopers on the Eland Mk  5 Armoured 
Car and the Centurion Mk 5A (Semel)3 Tanks. They also provided all the operational 
Armoured Car and Tank squadrons for the South African Defence Force (SADF). 
An important addition to this organogram was the armoured car squadron that was 
permanently detached from 2 SSB and placed under the command and control of 
2 South African Infantry Battalion Group (2 SAI), located within the South African 
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In 1967, in direct response to repeated Portuguese Armed Forces requests, the 
headquarters of the Joint Combat Forces, authorised the deployment, codenamed 
Operation BOMBAY, of various South African Air Force (SAAF) assets, both fixed 
wing and helicopter,4 to deploy to two remote airfields in northern SWA. One at 
Rundu the capital of the Kavango-East Region, located on the banks of the Kavango 
River on the border with Angola and the other one at the town of Katima Mulilo, 
situated in the Caprivi Strip and located on the banks of the Zambezi River.5
The absolute remoteness of both these airfields and their proximity to the border 
soon resulted in an urgent request from the SAAF that ground troops be deployed 
to protect the airfields. Thus, the Officer Commanding 2  SAI, located within the 
South African exclave of Walvis Bay, detached two infantry platoons,6 northwards to 
the border. These and subsequent replacement Platoon Commanders’ reports soon 
showed that it was impossible to execute the tasks allocated to them with their 
allocated force strengths. By 1968, both airfields were protected by a company of 
infantry from 2 SAI.7 
OPERATION CRACKER BOX
But this was still deemed inadequate for the sufficient defence of the airfields. 
Consequently, on 23 October 1968, Operational Directive No 1/68, instructed the 
Officer Commanding 1 SSB to place an armoured car troop on standby to support a 
company from 1 Parachute Battalion, to be deployed to Katima Mulilo.8 Codenamed 
Operation CRACKER BOX, the aim was to protect an electronic eavesdropping 
station at Katima Mulilo (codenamed Brush), to provide support to the South African 
Police (SAP) in its counterinsurgency role and to form a mobile reserve within the 
Caprivi operational area. The force was also to train in the area, in the process getting 
to know the terrain, and make friendly contact with locals to become conversant with 
their customs.9
1 SSB readied two troops and moved them to Pretoria to take over new Elands at 
81 Technical Stores Depot, two VA ‘Nineties’ and two VA ‘Sixties’ each. One troop was 
to be airlifted to the Caprivi along with a parachute platoon, while the other was to 
travel by rail to Grootfontein with the rest of the parachute company for deployment 
at the Rundu base in the Kavango tribal region.10
The armoured car troop, commanded by Second Lieutenant Pretorius, with Sergeant 
(later Warrant Officer Class 1) I.J. Prinsloo as his second-in-command, arrived at 
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platoon from 2  SAI, a signals element manning the ‘Brush’ station and a couple 
of medical orderlies serving at a mission hospital. Pretorius and his crews set up a 
temporary camp and waited there for the rest of the force – the parachute company 
headquarters, the third platoon of paratroopers and a section of 81 mm M3 mortars.11
The armoured car troop’s main task was to protect the town at Katima Mulilo, that 
was laid out in a semi-circle alongside the Zambezi River. For this purpose, they built 
a usable road for the Elands within the semi-circle, and four guard posts were erected 
to which the armoured cars were deployed at night, using their searchlights to scan 
the surrounding area. The troop also carried out area patrols, especially in the vicinity 
around a shop a few kilometres upstream from Katima Mulilo. They also secured the 
two local airfields, one for small aircraft at the little town itself and the other for larger 
craft at Mpacha; this included sweeping the landing strip for mines before the arrival 
of an aircraft and providing protection while it was on the ground. Convoy protection 
for the paratroopers or official visitors on the roads around Katima Mulilo was also an 
SSB task and, on occasion, a sandbagged 3-ton Bedford lorry had to be pressed into 
service if an Eland was not available (this was, of course, long before the first mine-
protected vehicles appeared).12
Less than two months after the deployment, on 27 November 1968, the armour’s first 
death in an operational area since the Second World War occurred when an armoured 
car overturned while negotiating a tricky piece of road between Katima Mulilo and 
Mpacha, killing its commander, Trooper D.S. Dyer.13
After six weeks at Katima Mulilo, Second Lieutenant Pretorius’s armoured car troop 
was relieved in December 1968 by a new armoured car troop, whose members 
included their energetic Troop Sergeant, Sergeant W.J. Burger, who would later 
achieve some notoriety within the SAAC. It was from such inconspicuous beginnings 
that the SAAC involvement in the Border War began.
THE RUACANA-CALUEQUE HYDRO-ELECTRIC  
WATER SCHEME CRISIS
On 25 April 1974, in response to the events following the Carnation Revolution 
in Lisbon, the Portuguese Army Commander in Angola, General Joaquim Franco 
Pinheiro, withdrew all his forces from the Ruacana-Calueque hydro-electric water 
scheme and confined them all to base, before their return to Portugal.14 An unacceptable 
move to the South African government, who had invested a huge amount of time 
and public funds in the scheme’s construction. Consequently, on 7 August 1975, the 
Officer Commanding 2  SAI, Lieutenant Colonel (Commandant) Boy du Toit, was 
ordered to mobilise his entire Battalion Group for military operations. Four days later, 
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TS The Eland Armoured Car crews of Delta Squadron, 2  SAI, under the command 
of Major Toon Slabbert, had also been activated by the Warning Order, dated 
7  August  1975, for deployment to Ruacana. At that stage, the troopers were still 
on a seven-day pass. The Squadron headquarters immediately began the process 
of contacting everyone to order them to report back as soon as possible – not an 
easy task considering that only half the squadron lived in SWA, the rest resided in 
South Africa. Nevertheless, with the men to arrive, the vehicles were prepared, and 
by 12 August 1975, the entire squadron in their twenty-two Eland Mk V Armoured 
Cars left Walvis Bay for Ruacana, a road trip of just more than 1 000 km, that they 
completed by 18:00 the following day.16
Upon their arrival at the airfield in Ruacana, the crews were ordered to maintain their 
vehicles and weapons. Unfortunately, in a moment of poor concentration, an Eland 
gunner attempting to unload his co-axially mounted machinegun pulled the trigger 
at the incorrect stage of the sequence. A burst of fire exploded out of the barrel, 
with multiple rounds striking Corporal M.C.E. Potgieter, the Crew Commander of 
the Eland parked next to them. Upon hearing the gunfire, the Troop Commander, 
Lieutenant André Venter rushed over to assist. As he bent over the seriously wounded 
Potgieter, the gunner now totally panicking, in an attempt to make his weapon safe 
again pulled the trigger. A single round shot out, striking and seriously wounding 
Lieutenant Venter in his lower back. In a matter of a mad minute, Delta Squadron had 
experienced its first operational casualties, with Corporal Potgieter passing away from 
his wounds,17 and a seriously wounded Lieutenant Venter on his way to the hospital. 
Command of the Troop now fell upon the shoulders of the Troop Sergeant, Corporal 
Tank Fourie.18 
While 2 SAI was still mobilising in Walvis Bay, reports from Calueque arrived that 
members of Unita were harassing the six South African families still stationed at 
Calueque. In response, Lieutenant Colonel Gert van Niekerk, the commander of 
the Owambo Sub Sector, ordered Captain W. Strydom, the commander of Bravo 
Company, 3 South African Infantry Battalion,19 on 9 August 1975 to go and retrieve 
the South Africans. Captain Strydom, in turn, sent Second Lieutenant Joe Lamprecht, 
accompanied by two infantry sections (20 men) and two Eland Armoured Cars,20 the 
50 km north into Angola to Calueque. After a brief exchange of gunfire, which left 
two Unita soldiers killed, the dam reverted to South African control. With the arrival 
of 2  SAI in the area on 12 August, headquarters dispatched a Combat Team from 
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DANIEL CHIPENDA AND THE RDL
The prospect of a Marxist MPLA (Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola – 
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) victory was unacceptable to the 
South Africans. So, when Daniel Chipenda (15 May 1931 to 28 February 1996) the 
leader of the Revolta do Leste – RDL (The Eastern Revolt) sent a delegation southward 
asking for South African assistance in their fight against the MPLA, he found a willing 
audience. By pure coincidence, the South African Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha, was 
on a fact-finding mission in the Operational Area when the RDL request arrived. He 
immediately ordered the SADF to begin assisting the RDL in absolute secrecy with 
both logistical aid (weapons, ammunition, food, etc.) and with training. Consequently, 
SADF headquarters issued Operational Instruction 8/75 on 28  August  1975, that 
instructed 1 Military Area to execute the abovementioned mission. After completing 
their tactical battle appreciation, 1 Military Area headquarters at Rundu issued 
Operational Order 2/1975, whereby direct SADF aid was authorised to the RDL. 
The first training group under the command of Lieutenant Colonel J.D. Breytenbach, 
established on 14 September 1975, 75 km north-east of Rundu at a small former 
Portuguese marine base called M’pupa,22 would train a battalion of RDL soldiers.23
THE WAR AGAINST SWAPO
While the SADF Focus of Main Effort (FME) had switched to the civil war in 
Angola, the war against the Swapo (South West Africa People’s Organisation)) 
cadres were not forgotten. Part of Operational Order 2/1975 as issued by 1 Military 
Area headquarters, ordered the SADF to launch a series of cross-border raids into 
southern Angola targeting Swapo bases and troop concentrations. They would execute 
these raids under the command and control of the three subsector headquarters of 
1 Military Area located at Oshakati, Rundu and Katima Mulilo. During the night of 
25/26 August 1975, the SADF launched Operation SAUSAGE II. These forces (that 
included the Eland Armoured Cars from Bravo Squadron 1  SSB, who had deployed 
with two armoured car troops at Ondangwa and a third at Etale), attacked four suspected 
Swapo camps south of the Angolan hamlet of Caiundo, situated on the western bank 
of the Cubango River.24 Simultaneously two infantry companies from 2 SAI along 
with Delta Squadron in their Elands crossed the border to protect Calueque. From 
Calueque, elements of this force spread out northwards along the Kunene River up to 
Naulila, while a third grouping attacked and conquered the Angolan town of Pereira 
d’Eça (Ondjiva), the administrative capital of the Cunene Province located only 42 km 
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TS Around mid-September 1975, after the completion of the operation, Bravo Squadron, 
1 SSB (excluding a troop of four vehicles whose personnel had volunteered to remain 
behind), returned to Bloemfontein, thinking that they had seen the last of SWA for 
1975.26 Bravo Squadron was replaced on the border by members from Alpha Squadron, 
1 SSB, who consequently participated in all the post-Operation SAUSAGE  II 
missions such as Operation HANS I (8-16 October 1975), Operation CUBANGO 
GALLOP (16-19  October  1975), Operation ROVER ASTEC (20-26  October  1975) 
and Operations KAREN I and II (November 1975).27 It was during Operation HANS I 
that the SAAC suffered its first National Servicemen fatality due to enemy action on 
the border. On 12 October 1975, an Eland 60 travelling on the Luiana River Road 
in south-eastern Angola detonated a landmine. The force of the blast propelled the 
Crew Commander, Trooper Koos van Zyl and his Gunner, Trooper Lourens Kriel, out 
of the turret. While badly hurt, both survived and were CASEVAC-ed back to South 
Africa, for medical treatment. Unfortunately, the force of the blast was so powerful 
that it flipped the 6-ton armoured car over, killing the driver, Trooper David le Roux, 
in the process.28
THE MISIÓN MILITAR CUBANA EN ANGOLA (MMCA)
Cuba’s military relationship with the MPLA had commenced in the late 1950s with a 
series of informal contacts between members of both groups. By 1963, Cuban military 
instructors were providing training to MPLA recruits in Algiers. The first high-level 
discussions took place on 5 January 1965 in Brazzaville, the capital city of the Republic 
of the Congo, who had received full independence from France on 15 August 1960.29 
In attendance was MPLA leader Agostinho Neto and Cuban guerrilla commander 
Che Guevara. It was during this meeting that the Cubans agreed to assist the MPLA 
and their ongoing operations against the Portuguese army in the enclave of Cabinda 
and the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola – The National Front for the 
Liberation of Angola) in northern Angola.30
In 1972, Cuban Major Manuel Piñeiro Lozada delivered an MPLA memorandum to 
Raúl Castro, wherein the MPLA reiterated their requests for more training assistance. 
After the events surrounding the Carnation Revolution, the MPLA’s requests became 
larger and more urgent, seeking economic aid, military training and arms. In early 
October 1974, the next MPLA request reached Havana, this one asking for five Cuban 
military officers who could assist in organising the MPLA’s armed wing, Fapla (Forças 
Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola – People’s Armed Forces for the Liberation 
of Angola). In response to all these requests, two Cuban officials were sent on a fact-
finding mission to Africa to assess the situation. On 31 December 1974, an MPLA 
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Cadelo (representative for Castro’s Central Committee for Angola) and Major Alfonso 
Pérez Morales ‘Pina’. The Major served with the PAIGC (Partido Africano para a 
Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde – African Party for the Independence of Guiné and 
Cape Verde) in Guiné. Upon their return to Cuba, they delivered to their superiors 
a letter dated 26 January 1975, written by Neto. In the correspondence, Neto asked 
Cuba to assist the MPLA in establishing, organising and maintaining a military school 
for cadres. Furthermore, the MPLA needed a Cuban ship to transport war materials 
from Dar es Salaam to Angola, uniforms and military equipment for 10 000 men and 
financial assistance while the MPLA established and organised themselves.31
Cuba dispatched a second fact-finding mission to Angola on 3 August 1975, tasked 
with assessing the situation in the country, drawing up plans for the training programme 
as requested by Neto, and handing over 100 000  US  Dollars.32 In a memorandum 
dated 11 August 1975, the mission leader, Major Raúl Diaz Argüelles, explained the 
reasons for the visit to Raúl Castro and briefed him of the contents of the talks. He 
highlighted the military situation facing the MPLA and the development of future 
actions that could take place until 11 November 1975, the agreed date at which 
point Portugal would grant Angola its independence. Lastly, Argüelles urged Castro to 
approve a 94-man military mission to assist the MPLA.33
After evaluating the threat against the MPLA, especially the occupation of the 
Ruacana-Calueque hydro-electric complex by the SADF, the Cubans decided to 
establish the MMCA (Cuban Military Mission in Angola), under the command of 
Raúl Díaz Argüelles. He answered to the First Deputy Minister of the FAR (Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias – Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces), General Abelardo 
Colomé Ibarra, known by his childhood nickname, ‘Furry’, Ibarra was in overall 
command of the operation.34 Instead of deploying the requested 94-man team, 
Castro sent 480 Cubans, 390 instructors (of which 284 were officers)35 and seventeen 
doctors. Personnel were supplemented by a small contingent of civilian pilots to fly 
the MPLA’s aircraft and several air-traffic control and cargo handling specialists. The 
instructor’s mission was to train about 4 800 Fapla recruits into 16 infantry battalions, 
25 mortar batteries and various anti-aircraft units in three to six months.36 
The MMCA would be subdivided into a headquarters element based in Luanda and 
amongst four CIR (Centro de Instrução Revolucionária – Centre for Revolutionary 
Instruction) or military training camps situated in Cabinda, Benguela, Henrique de 
Carvalho (Saurimo) and at Salazar (N’Dalatando). The CIR in Cabinda accounted 
for almost half of the total, 191  men, due to the perceived threat posed to it by 
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By early September 1975, the MPLA, having consolidated their grip on the towns 
located along the Atlantic coastline, began to march inland. Their objective – to take 
control of the Benguela Railway Line and the Unita-controlled city of Nova Lisboa 
(Huambo) located in the mountainous central area of Angola. Simultaneous to these 
developments, a series of meetings took place between Jonas Savimbi, the leader of 
Unita (União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola – the National Union for 
the Total Independence of Angola) and various South African government officials. 
Savimbi was quick to emphasise the threat posed to Unita by the deployment of the 
MPLA’s Soviet-supplied armour and the fact that Unita had virtually no armour or 
anti-armour weapons of their own.38 
On 24 September 1975, the South African Government, after deliberations, decided to 
intervene in the Angolan Civil War directly. It approved a four-phase plan of support 
for both Unita and the FNLA.
  Phase 1 – to provide assistance to maintain control of areas already held by the 
opposition forces FNLA and Unita.
  Phase 2 – to gain control over the south-eastern corner of Angola, including the 
towns of Sá da Bandeira (Lubango) and Moçâmedes.
  Phase 3 – to take Benguela, Lobito and Novo Redondo.
  Phase 4 – a major push against Fapla.39
The first South Africans to arrive into the Angolan town of Silva Porto (Cuito), on 
24 September 1975, was a five-person SADF-Unita Liaison Team under the command 
of  Lieutenant Colonel Wim van der Waals, who would act as the SADF Liaison officer 
to the Unita top leadership. A specialist infantry training team, under the command 
of Major Nic Visser, were the next to arrive – their task to train over 1 000 Unita 
recruits at an old Portuguese prison in Capolo, 62 km to the south of Silva Porto 
(Cuito).40 The final SADF elements to arrive were a mixed armour-infantry training 
team. The twelve armoured corps members included four Permanent Force soldiers 
and eight National Servicemen (four Eland drivers and four Eland Gunners) of the 
January 1975 intake. The Troopers, all from Alpha Squadron, 1 SSB, had just completed 
a three-and-a-half-month deployment at Mpacha in the Caprivi. Instead of going 
on their scheduled post-deployment seven days leave; the eight Troopers along with 
their four leaders travelled to Pretoria in a Douglas C-47 Dakota. After receiving a 
briefing at SADF headquarters in Potgieter Street, the twelve had to wait until special 
parliamentary approval for their deployment, granted on 30 September 1975. The 
following night, the 12 armour soldiers accompanied by a nine-man infantry training 
team, along with four SADF Land Rovers armed with Entac anti-tank missiles,41 
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Porto (Cuito).   The twelve SAAC soldiers, under the leadership of  Lieutenant Nel van 
Rensburg, were tasked to inspect and maintain the four Panhard armoured cars that 
Unita had on their inventory,43 while simultaneously giving the Unita armoured car 
crews some refresher training. It soon became clear that not only were the vehicles in 
a terrible condition, but Unita had no trained crews whatsoever to operate them.44 
THE CLASH AT NORTON DE MATOS,  
5 OCTOBER 1975
At the beginning of October, word arrived in Silva Porto (Cuito), that the MPLA 
had resumed its march towards Nova Lisboa. Eight days after arriving, the 19 South 
Africans,45 including Lieutenant van Rensburg and his men, who had now been 
ordered to crew the Unita Panhards themselves, went from trainers to active 
participants. Leaving Silva Porto (Cuito) in a convoy that included: only three Panhards 
(the 4th cannibalised for spare parts); a SADF Land Rover armed with a 12.7 mm 
machinegun; and four SADF supplied Jeeps, armed with the French Entac anti-tank 
missile systems.46 Also on board was a 20-ton cargo vehicle, carrying the entire teams 
A1 Echelon supplies, and accompanied by two Unita Land Cruisers, armed with 
12.7 mm machineguns and between 300 to 500 Unita infantry. The convoy reached 
the town of Nova Lisboa, 140 km west of Silva Porto (Cuito), on 3 October 1975. 
Unfortunately, the Panhard 90 of Lieutenant van Rensberg,47 suffered a major 
mechanical breakdown and was abandoned just short of Nova Lisboa.48 
According to the Unita intelligence reports, the MPLA was advancing eastwards along 
two routes from the coastal cities of Benguela and Lobito. Considering the northern 
Lobito route the more dangerous, due to its better road surface, Major Holtzhausen 
decided to deploy his force along this route. Unita intelligence reported that the 
MPLA was in the vicinity of the village of Norton de Matos, 165 km north-west of 
Nova Lisboa. Leaving Nova Lisboa on 4 October 1975, the entire force (that now 
consisted of 21 South Africans)49 moved the 127 km to an Assembly Area (AA) at the 
small village of  Vila Massano de Amorim. Here, Major Holtzhausen was joined by the 
local Unita commander, Major Lumumba, and his infantry company. These additions 
raised the total available Unita forces to 2 infantry companies and one commando, 
supported by Unita mortars and 106 mm recoilless rifles.50 The men welcomed the 
addition of these extra forces as another Panhard, this time the Panhard 60 of Sergeant 
K.D. Strauss,51 had become mechanically unrepairable and would have to be left 
behind at  Vila Massano de Amorim.
Leaving Vila Massano de Amorim at 05:00 the following Sunday morning, the force 
shortened the distance 33 km west into a Forward Assembly Area (FAA), only 5 km 
east of Norton de Matos and just a kilometre away from the bridge over the Balombo 
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TS between the SADF and Unita elements, Major Holtzhausen ordered the force forward 
to contact. The leading Panhard 90 of Lieutenant van Rensburg quickly reached the 
bridge over the Balombo River where it halted. The original battle plan had called 
for the bridge and its immediate surroundings to be secured by Unita forces, but 
Lieutenant van Rensburg could see that this had not occurred, and he was thus 
sceptical of crossing the bridge. The vegetation at the bridge was also very dense, 
limiting observation, while the preceding day’s rain had made the entire area extremely 
soft and muddy and thus not mechanised negotiable (accessible for any vehicles).52 
While the South Africans tried to track down the missing Unita infantry, a civilian 
light aircraft overflew the convoy. The crew in the leading Unita Land Rover armed 
with a 12.7 mm anti-aircraft machinegun immediately opened fire on the suspected 
enemy reconnaissance plane. Two signal flares were then spotted by the South Africans 
on their eastern flank and almost immediately after that the entire convoy began 
taking fire from rocket, artillery, mortar and small arms. The ambushers drew first 
blood, when the command jeep of Major Holtzhausen took a direct hit from a large 
calibre anti-tank weapon. The strike that hit the command vehicle’s right rear, flung 
the Major, his signaller, Staff Sergeant Corrie Maré, Sergeant K.D. Strauss and Trooper 
A.C. Botha, acting as the command vehicles driver, onto the ground. Only Sergeant 
Strauss, who had taken shrapnel to his face, was injured. The Angolans, along with their 
Cuban advisors, had chosen their ambush site well, with dense vegetation and steep 
terrain channelling the SADF-Unita alliance onto the road (designated killing zone). 
While the Unita infantry abandoned their comrades in their mad rush to the rear, 
Major Holtzhausen ordered his South Africans into battle. Lieutenant van Rensburg, 
in the sole remaining Panhard 90, quickly got his vehicle into a firing position, from 
where his gunner, Corporal F.J.S. Scheepers,53 began to rapidly engage the enemy 
positions. Simultaneously, the Entac armed Jeep of Staff Sergeants Sid Brown and Jeff 
Pattison fired one missile at a mortar position they had observed and a second missile 
at the ambushers’ left flank. A second Entac Jeep crewed by Warrant Officers Class 2 
Kalahari Jacobs and Piet van der B. Lambrechts hit the enemies’ heavily congested 
right flank with two missile strikes.54 
Major Holtzhausen realised that to remain on the road within the enemies designated 
killing zone was foolish, and therefore he ordered his force to withdraw 2 km back up 
the road.  The Entac Jeep of Staff Sergeants Brown and Pattison covered the withdrawal, 
by firing two more missiles, one at each flank of the enemies’ position. Unfortunately, 
Lieutenant van Rensburg in his Panhard did not monitor the withdrawal order, so 
he and Corporal Scheepers continued to fire 90 mm High Explosive (HE) rounds 
at the enemy. Realising that they had left Van Rensburg behind; the Major and 
Sergeant Strauss proceeded forward on foot to go and retrieve them, only to see the 
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In the interim, fighting had also broken out at the rear of the column. Major 
Holtzhausen had previously positioned the Jeep of Corporal Bes Bezuidenhout, 
armed with a 12.7 mm Browning machinegun, at the rear of his column, with the 
task of keeping the South Africans escape route clear. While in this position, Corporal 
Bezuidenhout, his gunner, Trooper Hugh Hulett and driver, Trooper Eddie Young, 
along with three passengers, Lance Corporal Manus Myburgh, Trooper Barend 
Liebenberg, and Trooper Wilhelm Swart, suddenly found themselves under attack 
by an enemy force of approximately 150 men.56 The enemy infantry, led by Cuban 
instructors, had outflanked the South African elements in front and were now 
determined to cut-off the entire force. Quickly operating the 12.7 mm machinegun 
and ably supported by his fellow armoured comrades, Corporal Bezuidenhout lay 
down a wall of fire that the attacking infantry failed to penetrate. With the attackers 
pinned down, Major Holtzhausen, also ordered these men back to safety.57
After pulling back a safe distance from the fighting, Major Holtzhausen quickly held an 
impromptu group meeting. Lieutenant van Rensburg reported that he had destroyed 
one enemy armoured car (most likely a BRDM)58 and sent another rearward belching 
smoke, while the Entac crews reported one mortar destroyed along with multiple 
enemy casualties inflicted. Major Holtzhausen, worried about the loss of his command 
vehicle abandoned at the bridge, sent a team forward, in the hope of recovering it. The 
scouts soon reported back that the entire area was now full of enemy soldiers, who 
were busy recovering the command vehicle (and both the Unita Land Cruisers, both 
of which had been abandoned by their crews, immediately after the firing started), 
back towards their own lines.59
Realising that all the vehicles were lost, Major Holtzhausen, leaving behind a Unita 
covering force tasked with keeping observation on the bridge over the Balombo River, 
withdrew his force back to Nova Lisboa.60 The 12 SAAC members, transferred back 
to Silva Porto (Cuito), resumed their training of the Unita designated armoured crews. 
Two weeks later, the 12 were picked up and flown to Rundu. Here they learnt that 
the SADF had entered Angola and needed them at the front. On 22 October 1975, 
the men withdrew four brand new Eland 90 mm armoured cars at the depot in 
Grootfontein. By month’s end, exactly 30 days after leaving Bloemfontein, the 12 men 
and their four Elands, joined up with Major Toon Slabbert and his Delta Squadron, 
2 SAI, at Sá da Bandeira, 408 km south-east of their last post at Nova Lisboa.61
COMBAT GROUP FOXBAT 1: CENTRAL ANGOLA
The engagement at Norton de Matos, while relatively small, was a catalyst for future 
SAAC operations, as it demonstrated that the MPLA was indeed effectively utilising 
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TS Lieutenant Colonel  A.P. R. Carstens, was ordered to prepare another Eland Armoured 
Car Squadron for operational duties in SWA. By combining the remaining personnel 
from Bravo Squadron, who had volunteered for extra service63 and who had just 
returned from the border with Captain Beyleveldt, with Charlie Squadron, 2 SSB, a 
new squadron was quickly formed under the command of Captain George Schoeman, 
2 SSB. On 9 October 1975, the squadron left Bloemfontein, arriving in Ondangwa, 
2 400 km away, four days later. Over the period 17-22 October, all 82 men plus their 
22 armoured cars were airlifted by night at tree-top level to Silva Porto (Cuito) in 
Central Angola. Once there, they joined up with various other SADF groupings in 
what was to become known as Combat Group Foxbat  1, under the command of 
Lieutenant Colonel Eddie Webb.64
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TASK FORCE ZULU: SOUTHERN AND WESTERN ANGOLA
While Major Holtzhausen and his men were enduring their baptism of fire, the SADF 
was forming a new combat formation on the border. Task Force Zulu, under the 
command of Colonel J.S. van Heerden,65 originally consisted of two Combat Groups. 
The first, Combat Group Alpha, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Delville Linford, 
consisted of two companies of ex-Angolan Bushmen soldiers, who had formed the 
famous Fletcha units in the Portuguese army. The second Combat Group, Combat 
Group Bravo, was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Jan Breytenbach and 
consisted of four companies of FNLA soldiers, whom he had been training in M’pupa. 
This task force crossed over into Angola at Katuitui on 14 October 1975 and quickly 
advanced and occupied Caiundo and Serpa Pinto (Menongue). By 16 October, the 
task force was spending the night at Cuchi. On 17 October, the task force passed 
through Cassinga, and a last-light assault saw them spend the night in Cuvelai. 
Two days later, the task force attacked and conquered the MPLA-controlled town 
of Pereira d’Eca, thereby removing a significant portion of MPLA forces in both the 
Cuando Cubango and Cunene provinces of Angola.66
While Task Force Zulu was busy executing its mission, Brigadier Dawie Schoeman, 
the commander of 1 Military Area, ordered Lieutenant Colonel D.S. du Toit, Officer 
Commanding 2  SAI, to attack and occupy Fort Roçadas (Xangongo) with his 
Battalion Group. Leaving an infantry company and two troops of armoured cars67 
behind at Calueque, Lieutenant Colonel du Toit successfully attacked and occupied 
Fort Roçadas on 20 October 1975. The attack was spearheaded by the remaining 
twelve68 Eland Armoured Cars, who by firing both 90 mm and 60 mm ordinance into 
the old fort located just south of the town, quickly eliminated all Fapla resistance. 
Task Force Zulu, joined up with 2  SAI at Fort Roçadas later on that same day.69 
The next morning, Brigadier Schoeman informed Lieutenant Colonel du Toit that 
2 SAI Infantry was to remain in their current locations, while Task Force Zulu, now 
reinforced with Major Slabbert’s Delta Squadron, as Combat Team Charlie, would 
continue their advance northwards into Angola. Considering that his command had 
left behind two troops of Elands at Calueque,70 higher command informed Major 
Slabbert that he would be reinforced with two new troops of armoured cars,71 directly 
sent as quickly as possible from South Africa.72 
Over the next 27 days (up until 19 November 1975), Task Force Zulu was to blitzkrieg 
its way across southern Angola, with the Eland armoured cars leading the advance and 
often proving to be the decisive factor in many of the impending battles. Advancing 
northwards, a string of settlements soon fell to the Task Force, with Sá da Bandeira, 
the capital city of the Angolan province of Huíla, falling after some ineffective fighting 
on 24 October 1975. Next, the Task Force struck due west towards the Atlantic coast, 
with the prized coastal port of Moçâmedes (Namibe) falling to Colonel van Heerden’s 
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TS TASK FORCE ZULU: BATTLE AT CATENGUE, 2 NOVEMBER 1975
After the fall of Moçâmedes, Colonel van Heerden sent Combat Group Alpha 
back to Sá da Bandeira to protect the city from a possible attack from the north. 
On 29 October, an Eland Troop under the command of Lieutenant Nel van Rensburg 
of Norton de Matos fame, who had returned to SWA and been re‑equipped in four 
new SADF armoured cars, reinforced Combat Group Alpha.74 Leaving one of the 
FNLA companies of Combat Group Bravo behind in Namibe as a holding force, Task 
Force Zulu again struck out north from Sá da Bandeira with Combat Group Alpha 
in the vanguard. After overcoming relatively light resistance at Cacula, Quilengues, 
Chongoroi and the Coporolo River, they encountered main Fapla‑Cuban defensive 
positions at Catengue, where 51 Cuban instructors from the CIR Benguela deployed 
with the MPLA. 
Under Cuban leadership, the MPLA had deployed into defensive positions consisting 
of an Infantry Battalion of approximately 1 000 men, dug in along a ridge supported 
by RPG 7s, two 82 mm and two 75 mm guns deployed next to the road. Behind 
the ridge, the Cuban instructors manned the 82 mm mortars and approximately four 
122 mm single barrel rocket launchers.75 This strong resistance was unexpected, and 
the first two SADF attacks were unsuccessful. Changing tactics, Colonel van Heerden 
sent Combat Group Alpha supported by armoured cars to attack the position, while 
he sent Combat Group Bravo also with armoured car support on a 51 km wide out‑
flanking manoeuvre via San Christovao and Changongo.76 
After launching a third assault, led by Captain J.P. Dippenaar with Bravo Company 
and Captain Gert Grobler’s Charlie Company, supported by the Vickers machineguns 
of the Support Company of Captain James Hill, the MPLA infantry abandoned their 
positions and began to flee northwards towards the port city of Benguela. Meanwhile, 
Combat Group Alpha had rejoined the main road towards Benguela, where they set 
up an ambush site, using their Eland Armoured Cars. No sooner was it in place, when 
a convoy of vehicles approaching from Benguela entered the killing zone. The first 
vehicle destroyed by a 90 mm shell turned out to be a cargo vehicle loaded with 
artillery ammunition. In total, seven vehicles were engaged and destroyed, including 
the vehicle transporting a Cuban artillery detachment that was heading for Catengue 
to provide improved artillery support to the battle there.77 
OPERATION CARLOTA
With very little time left before the 11 November 1975 deadline, FNLA leader 
Holden Álvaro Roberto (12 January 1923 to 2 August 2007) decided the time had 
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by elements of the Zairian Defence Force (ZDF) and the SADF, he struck out for 
Luanda from the east. To counter this imminent threat to their Centre of Gravity, the 
Cubans only had available the forces deployed in the original training CIRs. With 
no other option, the Cubans quickly shut down the CIR at Salazar, only three days 
after it became operational and redeployed its instructors along with their recruits to 
Luanda. On 23 October 1975, forty instructors from the CIR at Salazar took part 
in an unsuccessful assault on an FNLA/ZDF force dug in at Morro do Cal. Five 
days later, the second group of instructors were in action to the east of Quifangondo 
(Kifangondo).
The battles at Catengue and Quifangondo and the subsequent loss of life to the Cuban 
forces deployed in those areas galvanised Havana. The MPLA had continually been 
harassing the Cubans for more and more aid and on 4 November 1975, their prayers 
were answered, when Castro decided to deploy an unprecedented Cuban force into 
Angola. That same day the first plane with 100 heavy weapon specialists left Cuba for 
Luanda via Brazzaville, arriving in Angola on 7 November 1975.  Two days later, the 
first two Cuban planes landed in Luanda carrying the first company (158 men) of 
a 652-strong battalion of elite Special Forces of the Ministry of the Interior, tasked 
with the important mission of protecting Luanda at all costs.78 Eighty-eight of the 
158 Special Forces were immediately taken to Grafanil, the MMCA military camp 
on the outskirts of Luanda. There they were issued with weapons, equipment and 
clothing before being rushed forward to the front. By 08:00 the next morning, the 
company deployed in position behind the defenders of Quifangondo.79 
Additionally, they also sent the 100 heavy weapon specialists who had landed on 
8 November 1975 to the front at Quifangondo, where they would join up with an 
850-man Fapla battalion, a Katanga infantry company of 200 men and one  Soviet 
advisor named Yuri, who was already locked in battle with the FNLA/ZDF.80 The 
Cuban defenders at Quifangondo also had access to some heavy weapons (artillery 
cannons, mortars and most importantly a battery of 6 BM-21 (Katyusha) multiple 
rocket launchers, that had just arrived from Cuba by ship on 7 November 1975. By 
the beginning of March 1976, the Cuban military strength within Angola would reach 
an impressive 36 000 men strong force.81
The Cubans also commandeered all available ships in their merchant marine to 
sealift further reinforcements and all the war materials required to Angola, with 
the first three ships (the Vietnam Heroico, Imías and Océano Pacífico) sailing from 
Havana on 11  November 1975 and docking in Luanda between 27  November 
and 1 December 1975, bringing in 1 253 Cuban soldiers, primarily members of an 
artillery regiment.82 On 6 December, Fapla would also receive an important shipment 
of Soviet weapons. The Russian Airforce had transported ten BM-21 multiple rocket 
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TS TASK FORCE ZULU: WESTERN ANGOLA
After the unexpected heavy fighting around Catengue, Colonel van Heerden ordered 
Combat Group Bravo to clear the route of all enemy forces from Catengue eastwards 
towards Nova Lisboa, to prevent Fapla-Cuban forces from operating in his rear.  With 
Alpha and Charlie Companies leading the way, along with armoured car support, 
this task was completed by 5 November 1975. Simultaneously, Combat Group Alpha 
resumed its advance towards the Port of Benguela. After successfully capturing the 
airport located south-east of the city, Combat Group Alpha became pinned down by 
accurate 122 mm rocket and 82 mm mortar fire, delivered from within the town. The 
arrival late that afternoon of Combat Group Bravo allowed Colonel van Heerden to 
launch an assault into the town the next day, that finally resulted in the port falling to 
the South Africans.84
Suspecting that the enemy might abandon the Port of Lobito, located 33 km north 
up the coastline on the right bank of the Catumbela River, Combat Group Alpha 
quickly advanced the next day, 7 November 1975, and by 20:00 that evening, the 
port was successfully captured.85 With Lobito in their hands, Task Force Zulu’s next 
target, the port city of Novo Redondo, lay 181 km further north up the coastline. 
With Combat Group Alpha again in the vanguard, Task Force Zulu headed north on 
10 November 1975.  After overcoming light resistance at the Cuula River, 60 km north 
of Lobito, the South Africans encountered the enemy’s main defensive positions that 
had been established by the Cuban instructors from the CIR of Benguela,86 situated 
along the high ground overlooking the bridge over the Quicombo River, only 19 km 
south of Novo Redondo. When the leading armoured car crossed the bridge, it was 
engaged and struck by an RPG 7, that disabled the vehicle and wounded two of its 
crew. The enemy now opened up with artillery, mortars and rockets on the stranded 
combat group. Luckily for the South Africans, it was already late in the day, and when 
night fell, they were able to reorganise themselves under cover of darkness. The next 
morning, making use of a newly arrived 88 mm artillery battery, the Combat Group 
successfully managed to force their way over the Quicombo River and continued 
their advance north. With the Elands leading the way, Novo Redondo was captured 
intact on 11 November 1975, the same day the Portuguese would have handed over 
power, according to the Alvor Agreement.87 
On 14 October 1975, Colonel van Heerden sent Combat Group Bravo north again, 
their target the important port city of Porto Amboim, 66 km further north, up along 
the Atlantic coastline. The combat group made good time, until it came upon the 
bridge over the Queve River, only 15 km south of Porto Amboim. Unknown to the 
South Africans, the second and third companies of the battalion of Special Forces, had 
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sent south to the Queve River, where they linked up with the surviving instructors of 
the CIR Benguela. Their orders, “hold the line, whatever the cost”.88
When the South African leading elements reached the bridge they wanted to 
reconnoitre, they discovered it demolished, and heavy and accurate artillery, mortar 
and rocket fire hit them. No amount of threatening could convince their FNLA 
soldiers to cross the river on foot, and so the combat group was forced to pull back to 
Novo Redondo.89 
A second attempt by a combat team from Combat Group Bravo, utilising the route 
to Gabela was also unsuccessful as its bridge over the Queve River had also been 
destroyed. The Cuban commander of the Central Front, Major Raúl Diaz Argüelles,90 
had deployed a few men in key locations, such as the four bridges between Porto 
Amboim and Quibala, while half his force (the Special Forces and the instructors from 
the CIR Benguela) shadowed the South Africans eastward advance. Major Argüelles 
was trying to defend a 160 km long front with a few hundred Cubans and about 
400 Fapla soldiers.91
Stopped in its tracks and still considering what its next move should be, the task force 
headquarters received new orders. Leaving behind Combat Group Alpha along with 
two Eland Troops92 as a holding force along the coast, Task Force Zulu headquarters 
along with Combat Group Alpha and the remaining three troops of Major Toon 
Slabbert’s Eland Squadron were ordered inland towards Cela, where they would 
be needed.93 
COMBAT GROUP FOXBAT 1: CENTRAL ANGOLA
After arriving by air at Silva Porto (Cuito) over the period 17 to 22 October 1975, 
Captain George Schoeman, 2 SSB, got his 22 Eland Armoured Cars ready for 
operational use. Unknown to Combat Group Foxbat 1, the MPLA headquarters 
had decided on 22 October to launch a renewed assault to capture Novo Lisboa. By 
25 October, this MPLA advance supported by three armoured cars and two tanks 
had recaptured Norton de Matos (Balombo), while a second force, supported by nine 
armoured cars had advanced up to 14 km north of Santa Comba (Waku Kungo). In 
response to these reports, Lieutenant Colonel Webb decided to redeploy his combat 
group from Silva Porto (Cuito) to Alta Hama, located 71 km north of Novo Lisboa. 
By nightfall of 25 October, the combat group was at the bridge over the Queve River, 
5 km east of Alto Hama. The next morning, Lieutenant Colonel Webb sent three 
Eland armoured car troops supported by Unita infantry out on the road westwards 
towards Norton de Matos. At Luimbale, only 30 km west of Alto Hama, this force ran 
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TS quickly engaged the two leading MPLA Armoured Cars,94 destroying both and killing 
all six of their Cuban crews. The rest of the MPLA force hastily withdrew back down 
to the coast.95 
To safeguard Nova Lisboa, Lieutenant Colonel Webb realised he would have to patrol 
and dominate at least three routes into the city; from the east the two routes from 
Benguela and Lobito and the north, the main road that links Luanda with Nova 
Lisboa via Quibala and Santa Comba. From 28 to 31 October 1975, various combat 
teams were sent out on these routes, with clashes occurring on the bridge over the 
Queve River, 91 km north of Alto Hama, again at Norton de Matos on the Lobito 
route, both on the 29th; and at Cuma (Ukuma) on the Benguela route, 89 km west of 
Nova Lisboa, on the 31st.96
With Task Force Zulu flying up the coastline, the command decided that Combat 
Group Foxbat should advance eastwards towards Lobito, thus cutting off the inland 
escape route of all enemy forces escaping from Task Force Zulu’s attack. By the evening 
of 5 November, the Eland Armoured Car Squadron of Captain Schoeman deployed in 
ambush positions at the road junction 32 km east of Lobito. Early the next morning, 
the first vehicle convoy fleeing Lobito entered the ambush area and the Elands engaged 
them. By day’s end, 18 enemy vehicles were either destroyed or captured, with another 
15  on the next day, Friday, 7 November 1975. However, tragedy struck the Eland 
Squadron early that Friday morning, when Captain Schoeman accidentally stood on a 
Pom Z-2M anti-personnel mine that severed his left leg just below the knee. Despite 
being CASEVAC-ed almost immediately by air to 1 Military Hospital in Pretoria, the 
captain passed away from his wounds two days later. Command of the squadron now 
fell to his second in command, Lieutenant Chris du Raan.97 
On 8 November 1975, another combat team from Combat Group Foxbat 1, this one 
under the command of Captain Johan Holm, who had stayed behind as a holding force 
at Luimbale, deployed northwards towards Santa Comba. Once command determined 
that Santa Comba was secured, Lieutenant Colonel Webb made this village his new 
headquarters position. Over the next ten days various combat teams from Foxbat 1, 
attempted to reconnoitre all the possible routes northwards from Santa Comba to 
Quibala, that was designated the combat group’s next objective. However, Fapla and 
Cuban soldiers had destroyed the bridges over the various routes and contested all 
possible crossings.98 
ESTABLISHMENT OF 101 TASK FORCE
By the beginning of November 1975, despite the spectacular successes achieved by 
both Task Force Zulu and Combat Group Foxbat 1, the South Africans realised that 
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decision was thus required; continue advancing or halt in place. On 10 November 1975, 
South African Prime Minister Balthazar Johannes Vorster (13  December  1915 to 
10 September 1983), gave in to frantic requests by Unita to keep on advancing and 
thus keeping the pressure on the MPLA-Cuban alliance.  The SADF was now re-tasked 
with capturing as much territory as possible before the upcoming emergency meeting 
of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), scheduled to take place in Addis Ababa 
on 13 January 1976.99
As a new phase of the operation had commenced, command decided that a new 
command structure was also required. Consequently, 101 Task Force established at 
Rundu, with Major General André van Deventer in command. The SADF divided 
the entire northern SWA and Angola into three military areas, each with their 
headquarters. Military Area  1 consisted of the Ovambo-Kavango-Caprivi areas of 
SWA, while Military Area 2 covered southern Angola with its headquarters at Cela, 
with Military Area 3 covering northern Angola, with its Head Quarters at Ambriz; the 
dividing line being the 90-degree southern latitude line. Brigadier D.F.N. Schoeman 
was appointed the commander of Military Area 2, with Colonel P.J. Schalkwyk 
(normally the OC of 81 Armour Brigade) appointed as his Chief of Staff. The 
headquarters at Cela became operational on 22 November 1975.100
In support of the expanded role now facing the SADF, the Chief of the SA Army, 
General Magnus Malan (30 January 1930 to 18 July 2011) ordered the SAAC to 
mobilise the regimental headquarters of 1  SSB along with three more complete 
Eland Squadrons. However, the challenge was the entire National Service intake of 
January 1975 of the SAAC already deployed in Angola. Either as part of D Squadron, 
2 SAI or as members of Alpha and Bravo Squadrons, 1 SSB. All that remained was the 
recruits of the July 1975 intake, who were less than five months into their year-long 
training programme. Nonetheless, the crews were needed north as the January 1975 
intakes year of service was rapidly coming to an end. With no other choice but to 
comply, Lieutenant Colonel A.P.R. Carstens, the OC 1 SSB, mobilised his regimental 
headquarters while simultaneously forming his July 1975 intake into two new Alpha 
and Bravo squadrons under the commands of Captains Theo Beyleveldt and Fred 
Rindel.101 While the OC 2 SSB, Lieutenant Colonel G.D.M. Coetzee, did a similar 
exercise by forming his July intake into a new squadron under the command of 
Major Fido Smit.102
COMBAT GROUP FOXBAT 1: BATTLE OF THE EBO RIVER
On 15 November 1975, Lieutenant Colonel Webb was replaced as OC of Combat 
Group Foxbat 1 by Lieutenant Colonel George Kruys. The next morning a second 
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TS Fourie, arrived at Cela, along with a desperately needed 88 mm artillery battery. The 
SADF activated the squadron in Bloemfontein on 5 November 1975, to relieve the 
Eland squadron now under the nominal command of Major W.C.A. Rigaardt,103 sent 
as a replacement for the killed Captain Schoeman. This squadron would need a day or 
two to acclimatise before it could replace the original Foxbat 1 squadron. However, 
Lieutenant Colonel Kruys was not in the mood to wait for them. Consequently, with 
the plan already in place, he ordered his forces forward.104
Unbeknown to Lieutenant Colonel Kruys, the Cuban Central Front Commander, 
Major Argüelles, had anticipated this very movement. After stopping the South 
African advance over the Queve River, Major Argüelles had relocated part of his 
force to Catofe, the Fapla-Cuban positions in front of Quibala. After reconnoitring 
the most likely route the South Africans could take from their headquarters at Cela, 
Argüelles ordered his subordinate commander, René Hernández Gattorno, to prepare 
an ambush position along a small wooden bridge that crossed the narrow but deep 
Mabassa River. Gattorno deployed his force of 70 Cubans, who were manning BM-21 
multiple rocket launchers and RPG teams, along the riverbank. He placed the Fapla 
infantry in a defensive trench system to contest any crossings of the bridge.105 
The SADF plan called for Combat Group Foxbat  1 to continue advancing from 
Quissobi north over the village of Ebo towards Condé. The vanguard under the 
command of Captain Holm would consist of the Eland Squadron of Lieutenant du 
Raan, while the Elands of Captain Fourie would form the reserve. Captain Holm and 
the vanguard moved out from Quissobi early on the morning of 23  November  1975. 
About 21 km along the gravel road, the leading Elands entered the village of Ebo 
without encountering any resistance. With Ebo secured, Captain Holm ordered 
the Elands forward again. About 5 km north of Ebo, the road dips down to cross 
the Mabassa River, that flows westwards off two high granite grounds, Dongo and 
Luanda, situated east of the road. A SAAF light aerial reconnaissance aircraft, flown 
by Lieutenant K.A. Williamson observed the Angolan and Cuban entrenchments and 
weapon emplacements, located on the high grounds. In a desperate attempt to indicate 
the enemies’ exact position to the leading Eland Troop under the command of Second 
Lieutenant J.W. Swanepoel, Lieutenant Williamson flew directly over their positions 
several times. Second Lieutenant Swanepoel, while aware of the enemies’ general 
location, could not pinpoint their exact location. Observing, a two-lane dirt track 
leading east off the main road, the Lieutenant redeployed his four armoured cars onto 
it as he hoped that it would provide better observation northwards. With Lieutenant 
Williamson providing fire corrections from above, the Troop then fired thirty 90 mm 
rounds in the indicated general direction. Besides, the Cubans and Angolans held their 
nerve and did not give away their position by returning fire.106 
When Lieutenant Williamson reported observing cargo vehicles parked along the 
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of Second Lieutenant Johan du Toit moved forward.107 As the leading armoured car 
approached the bridge over the Mabassa River, the Cubans and Fapla soldiers deployed 
along the river’s northern bank, finally opened fire. An anti-tank shell fired from a 
Russian 76 mm cannon immediately hit the leading Eland of Second Lieutenant du 
Toit’s Troop and killed the driver, Trooper Neil Lombaard. This Eland left the road and 
ended up in the river. Soon the three other cars of the Troop were also hit by enemy 
fire and disabled. Second Lieutenant Swanepoel immediately rushed his Troop forward 
to assist. As immobilised vehicles blocked the road, the troop approached the river 
cross country directly north from their previous firing positions. They soon became 
bogged down in the soft mud, where their stationary vehicles became easy targets for 
the Cubans manning the artillery. While abandoning his immobilised Eland, Lance 
Corporal Gerhard Volgraaff was also hit and killed.108 A third Eland troop under the 
command of Second Lieutenant A.J. Kriel also moved forward to assist their comrades. 
By this time, seven Elands had been hit and immobilised. For the rest of the day, the 
battle raged, with the South Africans fighting to rescue the Eland crews either stuck 
in their vehicles or in whatever cover they had sought out for themselves outside 
their vehicles.109 
Captain Fourie, the commander of the reserve Eland Squadron, was ordered to form 
two combat teams and deploy them on the Hengo and Tunga roads to protect the 
withdrawal of the vanguard. Captain Fourie then went forward with the Eland Troop 
under the command of Second Lieutenant Jan Alberts. Together they successfully 
recovered the Eland of Corporal G. Botha along with another one from the original 
troop deployed on the road. While busy with this task, headquarters informed Captain 
Fourie that he was placed in command of the vanguard’s withdrawal, because another 
mishap had struck the combat group. While Second Lieutenant A.J. Kriel and Corporal 
J.J. Taljaard were busy offloading mortars from a cargo vehicle for their Eland  60s, 
Captain Holm stopped alongside them in the Eland that he had commandeered from 
Lieutenant L. van Niekerk, who was now following in the civilian Honda 4x4 that 
Captain Holm had been utilising as his command vehicle. As the four discussed the 
mission, a 122 mm rocket struck their very position, immediately killing Captain 
Holm and Corporal Taljaard, while simultaneously wounding the two Lieutenants.110 
By nightfall, with all the SADF forces withdrawn, concern remained about the 
missing Eland crews, especially the crews of the two leading Elands destroyed closest 
to the bridge. The next day, various search teams were dispatched to find the missing 
SADF soldiers. The teams soon dispatched good news as all were eventually found and 
reunited with their comrades.111 
The Cubans had suffered one dead and five wounded.  The Fapla infantry deployed in 
their trenches suffered no casualties at all and had been mere observers of the battle 
as the SADF never crossed the river. The Cuban ambush commander, Gattorno, 
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TS wounded.112 Officially, the SADF only had five members killed, three of whom were 
members of the SAAC. The Unita casualties are not known, but Breytenbach writes 
about “large numbers” of infantry lost during the battle.113 This loss, along with the 
destruction or capture of seven Eland Armoured Cars, was a bitter pill for the SADF 
to swallow.
REORGANISATION ON THE CENTRAL FRONT
Colonel van Heerden and Task Force Zulu, minus Combat Group Alpha who would 
remain behind on the coastal strip, had left Novo Redondo on 22 November 1975, 
arriving at Cela on the Central Front the following day, just as the battle at Ebo was 
unfolding. The original plan had Combat Group Bravo along with reinforcements 
from South Africa, deploying to Malanje, where Unita was still locked in the bitter 
struggle for control of the area. The SADF hoped that this force could quickly 
overcome the MPLA resistance in Malanje, where after they, in collaboration with 
Combat Team Foxbat 1, could assault Quibala from both the south and the east. The 
arrival of Combat Group Bravo precisely as the battle at Ebo was unfolding changed 
this plan as elements of Combat Group Bravo were immediately sent forward to assist 
their comrades in Combat Group Foxbat 1.114 
With Combat Group Alpha still deployed on the coast and Combat Group Bravo 
been utilised on the Central Front at Ebo, it was decided to replace the personnel at 
the headquarters of  Task Force Zulu. Some like Colonel van Heerden was sent back 
home to South Africa, while others like Lieutenant Colonel S.W.J. Kotzé, the Task 
Force’s second-in-command, were given new assignments within the various combat 
groups now operating within Angola.115 
COMBAT GROUP ALPHA: WESTERN ANGOLA
Lieutenant Colonel Linford and Combat Group Alpha had also been busy since 
the departure of  Task Force Zulu. Not just content to deploy his force south of 
the Queve River, the Lieutenant Colonel decided to see if he could probe for an 
alternative route over the river. On 24 November 1975, a patrol under the command 
of Major C.P.  Upton was sent to reconnoitre the Gabela Road up to the bridge 
over the Queve River. Leading the patrol would be three armoured cars under 
the command of Lieutenant Alex Nicolaou. Upon reaching the bridge, the patrol 
discovered a span of 13 m destroyed. When two Elands were called forward to assist the 
bridge reconnaissance team, the Cuban and Fapla forces, deployed on the northern 
bank, opened fire. One of the Elands suffered a mechanical breakdown right in the 
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commander, Trooper N.G. Obbes then climbed out of the vehicle, where he was shot 
and killed. The vehicles gunner, Trooper S.P. Janse van Rensburg continued to engage 
the enemy with 60 mm mortar fire. When the enemy fire died down, Trooper Janse 
van Rensburg and the driver, Trooper Wessels withdrew from the vehicle and were 
picked up by the vehicle of  Corporal H.J.B. le Roux. Trooper Janse van Rensburg was 
awarded the Honoris Crux (silver) for his actions that day. When the enemy fire began 
to slack later in the day, Lieutenant Nicolaou in the third Eland went forward and 
recovered the remains of Trooper Obbes. After last light, he went forward again, this 
time to remove all the salvageable equipment still located on the now destroyed Eland. 
For his actions on that day, the SADF awarded Lieutenant Nicolaou the Honoris 
Crux (Silver).116 
COMBAT GROUP X-RAY: EASTERN ANGOLA
The 18 Eland 90s and 4 Eland 60s and the crews of the armoured car squadron under 
the command of Captain Fred Rindel were airlifted to Silva Porto (Cuito) during the 
night from 24 to 28 November 1975.117 Upon their arrival, they were allocated to the 
newly formed Combat Group X-Ray under the command of Lieutenant Colonel 
S.W.J. Kotzé, only informed of his new appointment as the leading elements of the 
squadron, were touching down at the airfield. X-Ray consisted of the squadron, along 
with an infantry company from 2 SAI under the command of Major Chris Prinsloo, 
an 88 mm artillery battery from 4 Field Regiment under the command of Major 
M.J. Brown and a Field Engineer Troop from 2 Field Engineer Regiment under the 
command of Lieutenant L.S. Terblanche.118 
Reports that Unita had suffered a string of defeats in the east meant that the SADF 
would send X-Ray from Silva Porto (Cuito) with their objective being the capture 
of the town of Luso (Luena), the administrative capital of Moxico Province, located 
399 km east of Silva Porto (Cuito). Once completed, the combat group was expected 
to continue advancing eastwards with its ultimate objective the conquest of the town 
of  Texeira de Sousa (Luau), located 313 km further east on the border with Zaire.119 
On 29 November 1975, the entire combat group and their vehicles were loaded onto 
two ancient stream trains and transported the 220 km further east to the hamlet of 
Munhango. At Munhango, word was received that the village of Cagumbe, 91 km 
up the track had already fallen to the MPLA and that this forces’ leading elements 
were now in the vicinity of Cangonga, only 33 km away.120 With two troops of the 
90s leading the advance and two covering the rear, the Eland 60 tasked to protect 
the echelon, the combat group set off for Cangonga.121 Around 16:00, the leading 
Eland crews observed an enemy armoured car driving up a steep incline that the 
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TS engage it, the enemy infantry, mortars and artillery deployed on the high ground, 
retaliated with fire. Nightfall halted all operations for the day with Lieutenant Colonel 
Kotzé pulling the combat group into a laager, 10 km back, for the evening. The next 
morning, 1 December 1975, a quick investigation of the area indicated that the enemy 
too had withdrawn during the night to new positions.122 
The 57 km road from Cangonga to Cangumbe was nothing more than a two-lane path 
through thick bushveld. When the leading Elands approached Cangumbe, located on a 
plateau, machinegun and RPG fire hit them from the heights. But, the defenders soon 
made haste to escape when the Elands began answering their fire with 90 mm rounds. 
While the combat group spent the next day in Cangumbe, replenishing and resting, 
Lieutenant Colonel Kotzé was informed that he was to be replaced immediately by 
Lieutenant Colonel Hans Möller, as his services were required elsewhere. After the 
arrival of  Lieutenant Colonel Möller on 4 December, the advance could continue the 
final 89 km to objective one, the district capital of Luso.123
During the night of 7/8 December, the 88 mm guns of Major Brown were pre-
positioned within range of Luso, in anticipation for the coming assault. Lieutenant 
Colonel Möller’s battle plan comprised two parts. Firstly, a combat team was to attack 
directly east into the town using the main road as its axis of attack. Once this combat 
team had fixed the enemy’s attention on itself, a second combat team would attack 
and capture the airport north of the town, before striking further into the town from 
the north. After waiting for an entire day for their Unita guides to arrive, the combat 
team under the command of Captain Rindel sent off for their flanking attack on the 
airport. The Unita guide, Major Vittoria, however, got completely lost in the dark and 
the combat team never made it to the airport. The second combat team attacking 
directly east ran into stiff resistance and were beaten back by the defenders. The next 
morning, 10 December 1975, Lieutenant Colonel Möller launched a second assault, 
with both combat teams attacking directly east, with one combat team north of the 
road (Captain Rindel) and one south of the road (Captain M. Kinghorn).124 
The Eland armoured cars under Captain Rindel soon penetrated the town’s defences 
forcing a gap between the town and the airport. When the leading armoured cars of 
Lieutenant Frik van Zyl’s troop exploded onto the airport’s tarmac from the south, the 
crews were relieved to see that they had caught the airport’s heavily armed defenders 
napping, as all the defences were orientated northwards, (the original direction of 
attack). With the Troop of Lieutenant Sakkie van Zyl following close behind and the 
Eland 60 Troop of Lieutenant Alexander Bischoff, transporting Captain J.H. Laubscher, 
an 88 mm battery frontline observer, bringing up the rear, the Elands spread out into an 
extended firing line.125 Suddenly a metal ‘monster’ appeared out of the bush. “Contact 
tank right”, was yelled over the air. Quickly HE rounds were replaced with 90 mm 
HEAT, and the various cars began to engage. With no less than six cars pumping 
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the monster was, in fact, a huge tractor, encased in an armoured plate and armed with 
a 106 mm recoilless gun and two machineguns. The fall of the ‘monster’ signalled the 
end of resistance within Luso itself.126 
With Luso now firmly under his control, Lieutenant Colonel Möller directed his 
attention at securing the surrounding area. Over the next ten days, various combat 
teams were sent out on all the routes radiating out from Luso to drive the MPLA 
forces out of the Moxico Province. On 20 December 1975, Lieutenant Colonel 
Möller and the infantry company from 2 SAI were replaced by Lieutenant Colonel 
A.J.M. Joubert and a new company from 5 SAI. By 22 December, this hand over was 
complete, and the next day the combat group left Luso heading towards Teixeira de 
Sousa. On 24 December, the combat group occupied Cassai Gare, situated on the 
southern bank of the Kasai River. Christmas day was spent repairing the numerous 
small wooden bridges that had all been destroyed by the retreating MPLA forces. 
When the combat group reached the small hamlet of Lumeje, on the border of the 
Parque Nacional da Cameia, Lieutenant Colonel Joubert detached a combat team 
to reconnoitre and if necessary, destroy the bridge over the Kasai River, 11 km to 
their north. Upon reaching the bridge, that was still intact, the armoured car of Staff 
Sergeant Robert Fletcher crossed over to protect the sappers (combat engineers) 
tasked to destroy it. Just past the bridge, the Eland detonated a landmine that destroyed 
the vehicle, but thankfully the crew escaped serious harm. This event was the general 
signal for the concealed Fapla infantry to begin their attack, that soon pinned down 
the two sapper officers, Lieutenants C.H. de Wet and J. van der Merwe, who was busy 
on the bridge. Seeing the two officers in trouble, Corporal K.B. Piccione, an Eland 
crew commander, grabbed his R1 assault rifle and proceeded the 250 m on foot to 
the bridge, where with 11 shots he successfully killed nine Fapla soldiers manning a 
machinegun position. Lieutenant de Wet, his demolition charges now set, returned 
to safety under the covering fire of the Corporal. Both Lieutenant de Wet and 
Corporal Piccione were awarded the Honoris Crux (Silver) for their actions that day. 
On 27 December 1975, the headquarters at Cela ordered Combat Group X-Ray to 
return to Luso and then back to Silva Porto (Cuito). On their arrival at Silva Porto 
(Cuito), the Combat Group’s name was altered (to confuse the enemy) to Combat 
Group Boxer and deployed on a new mission north of Silva Porto (Cuito).127
COMBAT GROUP ORANGE: CENTRAL ANGOLA
The armoured car squadron under the command of Captain Theo Beyleveldt was 
airlifted into Silva Porto (Cuito) during the night from 26 to 28 November 1975. 
They, together with the regimental headquarters of 1 SSB would now form part of 
a new combat group, codenamed Orange. Lieutenant Colonel Dolf Carstens and 
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TS 5 December 1975.  The Combat Group consisted of: a Vickers machinegun element 
(2  SAI); an 140 mm artillery battery (14 Field Regiment under the command 
of Captain P.R.B. du Plessis); a light 20 mm anti-aircraft troop (10  Anti-Aircraft 
Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Billy Malherbe) and a field engineer troop 
(14  Field Engineer Regiment under command of Lieutenant D. Crafford). After 
spending three days at Silva Porto (Cuito), mainly because the armoured car troopers 
still needed time to complete their training programme, the combat group headed 
northwards, covering 180 km that first day to the village of Calucinga.128 
The following day, the combat group, acting on Unita reports that the MPLA was 
about to attack the town of Mussende, advanced the 105 km to the town. However, on 
their arrival there, all they found was a Zairian Infantry Company, neatly dressed and 
well disciplined. The following morning, 10 December 1975, the advance continued 
north. When the vanguard was 33 km north of Mussende the leading Eland Troop, 
under the command of Lieutenant J. Britz was engaged with small arms, 82 mm 
mortar and 122 mm rocket fire. The armoured cars began to engage those positions 
visible to them while the infantry deployed off-road on their flanks. Somehow in the 
ensuing melee, the infantry of the Zairian Company moved in front of the guns of 
the armoured cars, which resulted in the killing of three by the South Africans. In a 
fit of rage, their commander threatened to shoot Lieutenant Colonel Carstens. After 
a lengthy discussion, the Zairian company subsequently decided to turn back to Silva 
Porto (Cuito), the following day.129 
The battle against the MPLA-Cuban forces in the meanwhile continued, with the 
88 mm artillery guns firing airbursts over suspected positions. It was only after lunch 
that the enemy fire began to slack and then cease. A recon of the position late that 
afternoon showed an extensive trench system, with the South Africans liberating from 
their previous owners, three different variants of 75 mm recoilless guns, seven 82 mm 
mortars and various other abandoned small arms. The most important find, however, 
was positive proof in the form of empty packing suitcases of the first deployment by 
the MPLA-Cubans of the Soviet-designed 9M14 Malyutka (NATO – AT-3 Sagger) 
wire-guided anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) system. From then on, the Eland crews 
would have an extra reason to be concerned on the battlefield.130 
Early the next morning, the Elands were on the road again, their destination being the 
Ponte Salazar (Salazar Bridge) over the Cuanza River. Completing the trip of 48 km 
by 11:00, the armoured cars carefully entered into the Cuanza Valley and approached 
the bridge. Despite being under mortar and rocket fire from the moment that they 
entered the valley, a troop of cars succeeded in reaching the kilometre-long bridge, 
only to discover an entire span demolished. With this news, the combat group was 
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The combat group was now ordered to redeploy from Mussende due west, over the 
village of Cariango towards Quibala. Brigadier Schoeman hoped to dislodge the 
Fapla-Cuban forces deployed across Task Force Zulu’s front, by threatening Quibala 
from the east. By the evening of 14 December 1975, the combat group had completed 
the 76 km trek to Cariango. Early the next morning, barely 10 km from their previous 
night’s laager position, the combat group ran into a brick wall, namely the Pombuige 
River and its destroyed bridge. A single round mountain, Ulende, dominated the 
opposite bank from which the Angolan and Cubans had excellent observation over the 
bridge and its approaches. An Eland troop under the command of Second Lieutenant 
T. Pike was sent down to the river, but the accurate indirect fire soon forced them 
back from the river.132 
In response, Lieutenant Colonel Carstens then attempted to establish a bridgehead on 
the opposite bank, by sending two infantry companies, one SADF from 2 SAI and one 
Unita, over the river while his engineers frantically repaired the bridge.  A concentrated 
wall of fire and the total lack of watercraft on the part of the Unita company scuttled 
this plan. In response to this attempt, the Cubans deployed three T34 tanks on the 
bridge, with which they then began shelling the South African positions in front.  The 
Elands quickly responded by firing 90 mm HEAT rounds at the tanks. When one was 
hit and disabled, the remaining two withdrew to safety.133 
By Christmas Day, the South Africans had been pinned down behind the river for 
more than two weeks, with every indication that the Fapla-Cuban position was being 
strengthened almost daily, with the arrival of fresh troops. On Boxing Day, while the 
South Africans and their Unita allies tried to think of another plan, small groups of 
Fapla infantry, many of them led by Cubans, crossed over the river and infiltrated 
the South-African-Unita lines. The first indication of trouble was when one isolated 
artillery observation post after another reported being under attack. With no other 
force available, Lieutenant Colonel Carstens launched his Elands in a desperate 
counterattack. Anticipating just such a move, the Cubans had set up an ambush site 
between the South African front lines and Cariango. As the leading Eland entered 
the pre-determined killing zone, an RPG smashed into its turret seriously wounding 
its commander, Corporal A.P. Haasbroek. The following Elands counter-attacked, 
and soon the attackers found themselves under furious attack from all directions by 
rampaging Eland Armoured Cars.134 Not only were RPGs a worry, but the Angolan 
Air Force even made a brief appearance, with a MiG ‘strafing’ (shooting at) the South 
African positions as well. By nightfall, the situation had stabilised, but it had been 
a close call, with the South Africans suffering one killed and five wounded. After 
consultation with Brigadier Schoeman, the combat group was withdrawn back to 
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TS COMBAT GROUP BEAVER: WESTERN ANGOLA
After being placed in command of 101 Task Force in mid-November, Major General 
André van Deventer felt that the tactical situation was of such a fluid nature, that the 
establishment of a central reserve would be a wise decision. He decided to locate this 
reserve at the coastal city of Lobito, 35 km north of the Port of Benguela, due to its 
central location, from where it could assist any of the South African combat groups 
operating further north.136
On 5 December 1975, command of this reserve force, renamed Combat Group 
Beaver, was bestowed upon Lieutenant Colonel Yvor de Bruyn. The forces allocated to 
Combat Group Beaver began to arrive from South Africa at Grootfontein in Namibia 
on 6 December 1975. Two days later, the command of Lieutenant Colonel de Bruyn 
consisted of a mixed infantry company. Two platoons (7 SAI Battalion); one platoon 
(2 SAI Battalion); an 81 mm Mortar Fire Group (6 SAI Battalion); a Field Artillery 
Battery (4 Field Artillery Regiment) and Troop Eland Armoured Car Squadron 
(2 Special Service Battalion, under the command of Major Fido Smit) made up the 
company. Additionally, a Signal element (South African Corps of Signals); a medical 
element, under the command of Lieutenant (Doctor) S.H. Walsh; a Light Workshop 
Troop; an engineer section; and finally an Echelon with 11 three-ton cargo vehicles, 
under the control of the Quarter Master (4 Field Artillery Regiment) supported 
De Bruyn’s force.137 
By midday on 8 December 1975, enough rations, equipment, ammunition and fuel 
had been loaded by the Echelon to enable the combat group to be self-sufficient for 
ten days. By sunset on 8 December 1975, Lieutenant Colonel de Bruyn led his convoy 
of 120 vehicles on the 1 184 km trek northwards towards Lobito, that they reached 48 
hours later on the evening of 10 December 1975. The following morning the combat 
group established themselves at the local golf course as it offered excellent defensive 
positions while providing an unobstructed breath-taking view over the entire port 
and the surrounding area.138
Besides acting as the reserve for 101 Task Force, Combat Group Beaver was also 
required to execute a set of military missions. They had to maintain a South African 
military presence in Lobito, to patrol and dominate the roads leading down towards 
Silva Porto (Bie), Benguela and Sá da Bandeira and finally to train and thereby enable 
local FNLA and Unita forces to effectively defend the port and its adjacent airfield 
from enemy assault.139
A few days after arriving, Major Smit was ordered to take a combat team northward 
to link up and liaise with Lieutenant Colonel Linford and Combat Group Alpha, 
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command consisted of an infantry platoon, an armoured car troop and an artillery 
observation element. While en route, the leading Elands informed Major Smit that 
they observed two stationary Russian cargo vehicles deployed next to the road. They 
believed that the vehicles were transporting landmines. Consequently, Major Smit 
ordered the Elands to destroy both the vehicles, that a few rounds of 90 mm HE soon 
accomplished. Not long after that, a lonely vehicle came tearing up the road. Within 
was an extremely angry Lieutenant Colonel Linford, who informed the bashful major 
that they had just destroyed two of their cargo vehicles. Nevertheless, they had now 
established contact between the two South African combat forces.140
Besides patrols, the combat group also provided the defence of the port. On both of 
the occasions during December when the cargo ship Chuabo arrived in port with 
much needed logistical supplies, two infantry platoons and an armoured car troop 
deployed to protect from both enemy actions and local looters.141 
During January 1976, after it had been decided to withdraw South African forces 
from Angola, Major Smit was once again ordered to take a combat team down to 
protect the airfield at Sá da Bandeira. Leaving on 4 January 1976 with a force that 
consisted of an armoured car troop, an infantry platoon and an 81 mm mortar section, 
Major Smit was almost at his destination when the leading elements reported seeing 
signs that a battle was raging on their immediate front. After a quick reconnaissance 
mission, the platoon discovered that it was an FNLA-Unita clash upfront. Ordering 
all hatches closed, Major Smit led his force straight down the road and right through 
the centre of the battle, fortunately without suffering any mishaps. Major Smit and his 
force would remain at the airfield at Sá da Bandeira until the rest of Combat Group 
Beaver, who was by then also withdrawing to South Africa, joined him.142
TASK FORCE ZULU: THE BATTLE FOR BRIDGE 14
The departure of Colonel  van Heerden resulted in the need for a new commander 
for Task Force Zulu, who was now in command of two combat groups deployed along 
the Central Front. Colonel P.J. Schalkwyk appointed Colonel C.J. Swart as the new 
commander, an appointment ratified by Brigadier Schoeman upon his return from 
his meeting with Major General van Deventer in Rundu. On 29 November 1975, 
Colonel Swart received his orders; capture the villages of Ebo and Condé and if this 
was not possible, pin down all enemy forces along the Central Front as far as possible.143 
Not only did Task Force Zulu receive a new commander, but so did Combat 
Group Bravo. Lieutenant Colonel J.D. Breytenbach had commanded this ragtag 
force of FNLA recruits since the establishment of Combat Group Bravo. In early 
December, he was withdrawn and placed in command of a section of Special Forces 
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TS The newly-promoted Lieutenant Colonel Frank Bestbier took Lieutenant Colonel 
Breytenbach’s place as commander of Combat Group Bravo.144
Not only were commanders being shifted around, but the entire force reorganised. 
The challenge was that all the January 1975 National Servicemen’s yearlong service 
was coming to an end, with most of the ‘veterans’ that has started SAVANNAH 
sent back to ‘clear out’ of the military and were replaced with fresh troops from the 
Republic – mostly from the July 1975 National Service intake. The forces deployed 
along the Central Front now consisted out of Task Force Zulu headquarters, with a 
support element and an armoured car squadron under the command of Major A.C. 
Slabbert in reserve, all located at Cela. Combat Group Bravo under the command of 
Lieutenant Colonel Bestbier with an armoured car troop, a machinegun platoon, four 
81 mm mortars and an FNLA infantry company. Combat Group Foxbat 2 under the 
command of Lieutenant Colonel G. Kruys consisted of an FNLA infantry company 
a SADF infantry company tasked with protecting two troops of field artillery, an 
engineer troop, five 81 mm mortars, two 4.2 inch (107 mm) mortars and seven troops 
of armoured cars.145 In total, this force amounted to only 724 South African soldiers.146
By early December 1975, thanks to the effective interrogation of prisoners, radio 
communication interception, effective deployment of listening and observation posts 
and aggressive patrolling, Colonel Swart had a reasonably accurate picture of the 
enemy deployments along the Central Front. For example, the South Africans were 
now aware that the enemies’ headquarters were located at Catofe, increased in size to 
that of a battalion.147 The dilemma facing the South Africans, however, was how to 
conquer this identified enemy. The road north from the South African headquarters 
at Cela towards Condé splits at a Y-junction, with one route going via Tunga and Ebo, 
while a second more direct route goes via Hengo, Balaia and Panga. The challenge 
was that the Cubans and Angolans had effectively destroyed all the bridges along both 
these routes, thereby pinning the South Africans down south at Cela.148
On 4 December 1975, observation posts deployed at the destroyed bridge over 
the Nhia River (12 km north of the village of Ebo and 23 km south of the enemy 
headquarters at Catofe) reported that they spotted enemy soldiers inspecting the 
bridge. Colonel Swart estimated that the Angolan-Cuban alliance was preparing to 
repair the bridge over the Nhia as a prerequisite for an attack southward towards 
his headquarters. Consequently, he decided to take control of the bridge first, before 
launching his attack northwards. Colonel Swart decided that while Combat Group 
Bravo would be responsible for the securing of both of their flanks, Combat Group 
Foxbat  2 would conquer the damaged bridge over the Nhia River, labelled by the 
South Africans as Bridge 14.149 
By the evening of Friday, 5 December 1975, Colonel Swart was ready to present his 
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Colonel George Kruys’ Combat Group Foxbat 2, to attack and conquer the territory 
between the village of Ebo and the bridge over the Nhia River. Combat Group 
Foxbat  2 consisted of an infantry company (2  SAI and the Eland Armoured Car 
Squadron, under the command of Captain Fourie); two Unita Infantry Companies; 
and 22 Portuguese Freedom Fighters, formed into a loose group under the command 
of a Captain Ferreira. Phase 2 of the battle plan called for the repair of the bridge 
over the Nhia in preparation for Phase 3, an assault over the bridge resulting in the 
conquest of the area north of the river up to the village of Cassamba (Almeida), 5 km 
further north. 
Early on the morning of Monday 8 December 1975, the South African and their 
Angolan allies, successfully passed through the village of Ebo and deployed southeast 
of the bridge over the Nhia River. The infantry then moved forward, while the rest of 
the force remained hidden behind the high ground. By 17:00, the infantry was in place, 
that allowed the SADF mortars, artillery and armoured cars to shorten the distance 
towards the river itself. By sunset, they achieved Phase 1 of Colonel Swart’s plan. The 
following morning (9 December 1975), with the infantry securing the bridge site, 
Second Lieutenant T.S. Fountain and his engineers began constructing a bridge over 
the fast-flowing Nhia River. Following the orders that he had received, to prevent the 
enemy from approaching the Nhia via the mountainous terrain to its north, Captain 
Fourie had deployed three armoured car troops on tactically important terrain south 
of the river, leaving him with only two troops. Troop 22 ‘Papa Troop’ under Second 
Lieutenant Ben Grib and Troop 23 ‘November Troop’ under the command of Second 
Lieutenant Lou van Vuuren,150 to protect the bridge construction site. The enemy only 
realised what was happening at the bridge at 19:00 the evening of  9  December 1975) 
and began to fire on the engineers with small arms, grenades and RPGs. The engineers, 
nonetheless, remained on location, working throughout the night and by sunrise the 
next morning the bridge was almost completed. For his efforts while under fire, the 
SADF awarded Second Lieutenant Fountain the Honoris Crux decoration.151
The following day, 10 December 1975, the Angolan and Cubans engaged all the South 
African positions with their accurate mortar and rocket fire. A second infantry assault 
aimed at the bridge killed Sapper A.R. Willemse. When the vehicle transporting him 
back, stopped under tree cover at the medical post at Foxbat headquarters, it was hit by 
indirect enemy fire, that immediately killed Sapper U.K. von Schmettau and wounded 
three others. Around lunchtime, Lieutenant Colonel Kruys dispatched a fighting 
patrol from Charlie Company, 2 SAI152 to reconnoitre a road that ran parallel with the 
river towards Quipuco. The patrol began its mission by crossing at the semi-completed 
bridge. While removing various mines deployed on the road, the enemy ambushed the 
patrol. Private T. Lotze was killed immediately, while Private D.H.D. Marais suffered 
a serious stomach wound. The patrol then launched a counterattack, that succeeded 
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TS their wounded comrade in a local cattle enclosure, where they were forced to spend 
the night. A relief force was unable to reach them that night due to continued 
fighting around the bridge site. The relief team only reached them the following day. 
Unfortunately, Private Marais passed away due to his injuries.153
At last light, around 18:15, the enemy infantry attacked the bridge site for a third 
time. Artillery, mortar, RPGs and small arms fire supported the attack. The attacking 
force penetrated the South African positions in such a manner that they now had 
direct sight on the bridge construction site, while a secondary grouping succeeded in 
occupying a sandbank in the river, south-east of the bridge itself. Darkness halted all 
further operations.154 
After a long night, Colonel Swart had only one thought the next morning, 
11 December  1975, and that was to secure the area around Bridge 14 to give the 
sappers time and space to complete the bridge’s construction. While the sappers 
worked around the clock, the enemy only made their appearance at 11:30, with 
sporadic rocket and mortar fire onto the South African positions, that drove the sappers 
back into their trenches. By that afternoon, the sappers reported that the bridge was 
now strong enough to support the weight of the Eland Armoured Cars. Captain 
Fourie immediately ordered Papa Troop under the command of Second Lieutenant 
Grib over the bridge, with orders to eliminate all enemy resistance within the range 
of their 90 mm guns. While the armoured cars advanced slowly northwards from the 
bridge, a rescue force was sent to bring back the infantry patrol still sheltering at the 
cattle enclosure. By 17:30, this rescue mission was complete and headquarters recalled 
the Eland Troop as it was under heavy anti-tank fire from mobile RPG teams.155 
Lieutenant Colonel Kruys believed that the enemies’ determination to continue 
resisting was beginning to falter, and wanted to take control of Bridge 14 with one 
final push. Consequently, his final plan called for an Eland Troop to cross the bridge 
at first light the next morning, supported by a Unita Infantry Company. They were 
then to advance up the road in a herringbone formation, overcoming all enemy 
resistance, up to Bridge 15, a small bridge 4 km further down the road that crosses a 
dry tributary of the Nhia. Simultaneously, a second Unita Company would advance 
and occupy the area around the cattle enclosure, while a third Unita Company would 
advance and occupy a laager area near the village of Cassamba (Almeida), 5 km north 
up the road from Bridge 14. The last part of the plan called for the remaining Eland 
Troop along with infantry support to advance further up the road and capture 
Cassamba (Almeida).156
At 04:00 the next morning, 12 December 1975, with the entire area covered in mist, the 
three157 Eland Armoured Cars of Second Lieutenant Grib and Papa Troop waited for the 
light to strengthen enough for them to cross over the newly constructed Bridge  14. 
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Charlie Car, followed by the Alpha Car (Troop Sergeant) and lastly the Zero Car 
(Troop Commander), advanced over the bridge and linked up with the Unita infantry 
already deployed on the far bank.158
The  Troop had only advanced a little way and were approaching the first bend in the 
road when the expected deluge of enemy fire engulfed them. Enemy B10,159 RPG 
and AT-3 Sagger anti-tank missiles fired from prepared positions right of the road 
about another 400 m to their front came flying in. It appeared that the enemy had 
employed a classical L-shaped ambush position with the RPG and Saggers on the long 
leg to the vehicles right flank, with the heavier B10 anti-tank guns deployed directly 
ahead of the Troop where the river swung away from the road. To remain on the road 
would have been suicidal but to leave the road and go cross-country through the mud 
was also taking a huge risk. Not seeing another option, the Troop Sergeant, Corporal 
Stephan Fourie ordered his driver, Trooper Eion Gibson, to manoeuvre the 6-ton 
armoured car off the road. When it became clear that the terrain was holding up the 
weight of the armoured car, Corporal Fourie contacted Lieutenant Grib and informed 
him.  The Lieutenant, after some convincing by his Troop Sergeant, deployed his three 
cars right off the road 100 m apart from each other. This unexpected manoeuvre by 
the Elands not only got them out of the designated killing zone of the Cuban ambush, 
but now placed them in a tactically advantageous position to the right of the Cuban 
positions at an oblique angle to these positions (located as they were next to the road 
and now orientated away from the Troop). From these positions, the Troop began to 
engage the Cubans at will.160
With the three armoured cars pumping 90 mm rounds into the Cuban positions, an 
unexpected incident was to occur that would materially affect the entire outcome of 
the battle. After firing his first 90 mm shell at a house located directly ahead of their 
position, Corporal Fourie accidentally got one of the gloves used for removing the 
hot 90 mm empty cartridge shells jammed in the gun’s breach, effectively preventing 
any further loading of the gun. Try as they may, neither Corporal Fourie nor his 
gunner, Trooper Martin Ziegler, was able to pull the glove loose from the breach. 
The only option left was to drive up and push the barrel back against a solid object, 
thus opening the breach. After first attempting the manoeuvre against a post, that the 
armoured car pushed over, Corporal Fourie decided to advance and try again, this 
time against the very house they had just engaged with their main gun. The house, 
located at the top of a rise, had dense bushes behind it. The crew drove there as fast 
as possible, leaving them quite some distance ahead of the remaining two cars of the 
Troop. The crew succeeded in pushing the barrel back and retrieving the glove, by 
using the far studier wall, reloading the gun once again. The crew now manoeuvred 
their car around the house and into a firing position upon the high ground. From 
this new position, the crew had an open arc of fire across the entire road, including 
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TS the bushes to their left and shot a 90 mm HE round at it, causing a huge explosion. 
It appeared to have been an ammunition truck for the 76 mm anti-tank guns, deployed 
in firing positions just below it.161 
Lieutenant Grib, informed of his Troop Sergeants new location, immediately ordered 
the remaining two armoured cars forward and onto firing positions upon the ridge. 
The Cubans, realising that the South Africans had outflanked them, frantically tried 
to turn their B10s weapons around while simultaneously redeploying their Saggers 
within a trench network located behind their positions. In response, Corporal Fourie 
poured a belt of two hundred 7,62 mm rounds in bursts from his co-axially mounted 
Browning machinegun into them, neutralising the rocket and missile positions. Next, 
the crew turned their attention to the four olive green 76 mm guns with their crews of 
six scurrying all around them. The Cuban gunners had no idea the Eland was deployed 
a scant 100 m to their left above them on the ridge. The lone Eland made short work 
of them, and when the remaining two Elands arrived the entire Troop deployed along 
the crest of the rise, with their attention now focused towards targets up on the next 
rise. From their new firing positions, the Troop had observation upon the enemies’ 
next line of defences; infantry deployed in trenches. With the armoured cars raining 
90 mm HE rounds down onto their positions; the Angolan infantry abandoned their 
trenches and withdrew backwards over the high ground – the three armoured cars’ 
machineguns enforcing a high butcher’s bill on the exposed infantry.162 
The three cars continued to attack, although headquarters was by now frantically 
screaming at them on the radio to stop advancing and to take up positions. From 
the second rise, the Troop had observation over the enemy’s third line of defences. 
A quick scan of the area revealed the location of the Cuban’s 120 mm mortar positions. 
However, South African artillery counter bombardment had already shot the Cuban 
weapons and their crews to bits. All that remained of the mortars were their massive 
yellow-green baseplates, shot into the ground. As for their Cuban and Angolan crews, 
only bits of body parts hanging over everything with the fresh smell of guts and blood 
permeating the air remained.163
As the crews had been fighting within the cramped confines of their armoured cars 
since before sunrise, Lieutenant Grib permitted for the crews to climb out of their 
vehicles quickly, to stretch their legs. Corporal Fourie, who wanted to examine the 
Cuban positions, left his men and wandered along a small stream surrounded by bushes 
just north of the mortar positions. Suddenly he heard all the armoured cars start up 
their engines. Almost immediately after this a group of approximately 12 Cubans 
broke from cover about 30 m away from him and began running north. Outnumbered 
and only armed with his P38 sidearm the corporal let them go. The moment they 
were past him, he ran back to the Troop who had already formed on the tar road 
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The  Troop continued advancing northwards making use of various cuttings through 
the high ground located to their north. Some small ways, further along, Corporal 
Fourie was amused to find a set of GAZ tyre tracks coming straight off the side of the 
road’s cutting easily 2 to 3 m high onto the tarmac with its tyre marked where it hit 
the tar. A Cuban driver is his haste must have driven straight off the cutting to make a 
clean getaway. The Troop continued advancing without meeting much resistance until 
they reached the general area surrounding Cassamba (Almeida), the South Africans 
final objective for the day. It was at this location that they observed Lieutenant Hans 
Heinze,165 their Squadron Second in Command’s armoured car rapidly advancing up 
the road to where they deployed in their firing positions. The irony of that Eland 
now travelling unmolested along the tar road not being lost on the Troop members. 
Lieutenant Heinze had been dispatched north to track down the lost Troop of the 
Squadron. After receiving a quick feedback report from Lieutenant Grib, he ordered 
the Troop forward to complete their assault on Cassamba (Almeida).166 
Papa Troop thus continued to advance northwards along with the tar round until 
they reached the outskirts of Cassamba (Almeida). Lieutenant Grib stopped the  Troop 
in firing positions in front of an open field located next to the first houses of the 
village. Suddenly heavy anti-tank fire burst from some bushes ahead of them and the 
Troop could not advance without infantry clearing the area first. Spotting a section 
of Unita troops lying prone some distance behind the cars, Corporal Fourie got out 
of his armoured car to get them moving forward. Repeated shouts of “advance” did 
not achieve the required result, so the Corporal removed his A39 radio’s aerial and 
commenced laying into the infantry with the aerial to get them to stand up and move 
forward. Although most had earlier discarded their G3s and picked up captured AK47s 
they still refused to advance and clear Cassamba of the enemy.167
While Corporal Fourie was busy struggling with the Unita infantry, the rest of the 
Troop continued to slug it out with the defenders of the village. Soon the crews 
began to report that their ammunition status was approaching critical levels, with the 
majority of the cars only having extremely limited amounts of  7,62 mm ammunition 
remaining for their Brownings, while the remaining 90 mm rounds now consisted 
of the anti-tank HEAT rounds, their general purpose HE (High Explosive) rounds 
already used. As a consequence of their low ammunition status, Papa Troop were 
ordered back to their echelon area to rearm as quickly as possible, their position being 
taken over by the four Elands of Second Lieutenant Lou van Vuuren’s November 
Troop, who had crossed over the bridge shortly after Papa Troop.168 
As Papa Troop started making its way back towards their own lines, an Observation 
Post (OP) radioed to headquarters that they saw three tanks169 advancing towards the 
South African positions. Lieutenant Colonel Kruys immediately ordered all the Eland 
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TS command decided that the crews of Lieutenant Grib and Corporal Fourie would 
share the third armoured cars HEAT rounds between them while returning to base to 
rearm. Along with their remaining HEAT rounds, the two-vehicle commanders were 
confident that they could hold their own against any approaching Cuban armour. 
Lieutenant Grib proceeded to position both the cars in a classical hull-down firing 
position, from where both would be able to engage any armour as it became visible in 
the cutting ahead of them.170 
The report of the tanks approaching not only caused some concern within Papa Troop 
but November Troop as well. Following behind Papa Troop over the river, the four 
Elands of Lieutenant van Vuuren had stuck in the road. They soon found themselves 
under a storm of mortar fire. The enemy mortar positions, located within a loop of 
the Nhia River on a stone embankment, had not been located by prior South African 
reconnaissance forces. A few well-aimed 90 mm rounds, quickly caused the Cuban 
mortar soldiers to abandon their weapons for the safety of their trenches. By rapidly 
advancing, Lieutenant van Vuuren was thus able to capture all six mortars on position. 
Three days later, a wounded Cuban mortarman, Alberto Morales Bella, would also 
be captured on the road to Cassamba – he had hidden in the thick bush near the 
mortar positions before wandering out onto the road. Behind the mortar position, laid 
the enemies main defensive positions, occupied by at least a battalion strong infantry 
force. Between the fire from Lieutenant Grib’s troop on the ridge and Lieutenant van 
Vuuren’s fire from the road, the SADF soon drove the enemy from these positions.171
When the call went out over the radio of three ‘tanks’ approaching the South African 
lines, Lieutenant van Vuuren also took up firing positions with November Troop 
about a kilometre away from that of Lieutenant Grib, despite his Troop now being 
completely out of 90 mm HE and machinegun ammunition. As the troop moved 
into the position, a large force of Cuban infantry suddenly appeared out of the dense 
vegetation and rushed to the vehicles, firing as they came. Lieutenant van Vuuren 
immediately ordered his crews to close all hatches of the armoured cars as the Cubans 
clambered aboard. The Lieutenant, previously hit in his right hand, drew his service 
sidearm with his left hand and systematically began firing at the Cuban infantry 
through a half-open hatch. In this way, he succeeded in killing some and driving off 
the rest. Second Lieutenant van Vuuren was awarded the Honoris Crux decoration for 
this action.172 
Ultimately, the Elands were not needed as a concentrated artillery barrage succeeded 
in turning the attacking armour back towards their own front. With November Troop 
also reporting their ammunition status as critical, Bravo Squadron’s commander 
Captain Fourie ordered his designated reserve troop, Sierra Troop under the command 
of Second Lieutenant André Freyer to the front to take over the position recently 
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Once it became clear that the tank threat was over, Lieutenant Grib and Corporal 
Fourie returned to their own lines to rearm. Waiting for them at the Echelon Area, 
4 km south of the bridge, was not only the rearmed Charlie Car but also the fourth 
vehicle of the Troop, the Bravo Car, whose crew had been monitoring the squadron 
radio network back at the headquarters at Cela and heard that the battle had started. 
Quickly obtaining their allocated replacement Crew Commander, the crew had 
returned as quickly as they could to the front. With the entire Troop rearmed, all four 
cars returned into the heart of the fight. After proceeding north along the tar road, 
the Troop crossed a small stream then again managed to manoeuvre off the road. The 
fighting had died down considerably by this stage, allowing Papa Troop to continue 
with their advance. After successfully repairing a small mechanical failure on the Alpha 
Car of Corporal Fourie, the Troop continued to advance up the road. Passing through 
Cassamba (Almeida), the Troop continued north, even though their original orders 
named Cassamba (Almeida) the final South African objective of the mission.174 
Soon the first buildings of Catofe, 23 km from the Nhia River Bridge and 18 km 
north of Cassamba appeared in front of the Troops vehicles. As they approached the 
first group of buildings on the outskirts of Catofe, the Troop saw soldiers deployed 
directly in the road, busy working on something that they could not identify. The 
Elands opened machinegun fire on the soldiers in the road, killing some and sending 
the survivors running for cover. When the armoured cars reached this location, the 
crews were surprised and relieved to find dozens of halved assembled AT-3 Sagger 
anti-tank missiles standing on their green suitcases in the road all pointing directly 
down the route the Elands has just ridden. More missiles were found heaped upon 
the steps of the building located next to the road, while inside the largest building, 
the crews found a fully functional headquarters with many detailed maps on the walls 
and rows of big radios all crackling away in Spanish. The enemy did not know that the 
headquarters had fallen yet and was desperately trying to reach them on the radios. 
The building was also full of the Cubans’ kit bags, upon which the mostly bare-footed 
and equipment-scarce Unita infantry fell upon with a frenzy. Leaving Unita to its 
spoils of war, the crews mounted their vehicles again in preparation of continuing 
their thrust northwards along the road towards Quibala, another 16 km further north. 
The Troop had just departed Catofe when Lieutenant Heinze ordered them all over 
the troops’ radio network back into defensive positions on the edge of Cassamba 
(Almeida). The armoured cars rapid advance was out-stripping the rest of the support 
weapons allocated to the attack, and thus Colonel Swart had ordered them to halt 
until the rest of the slow-moving Combat Group could catch up.175
The challenge facing Lieutenant Colonel Kruys was that it had begun to rain steadily 
after lunch, that quickly turned the area around Bridge  14 into a sticky muddy mess. 
He was afraid of getting his command split into two halves, with the artillery unable 
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TS guns, and the armoured cars unable to cross southwards back over the bridge to safety, 
due to their inability to travel through extensive muddy terrain. Fortunately for the 
South Africans, the conquest of Cassamba (Almeida) had already been achieved at 
11:45 following a Unita infantry company assault on the town – thus ensuring that 
they met the entire set of objectives for the day, allowed Lieutenant Colonel Kruys to 
call a halt to offensive operations for the day.176 
That evening, however, Captain Fourie sent out Sierra Troop under the command of 
Second Lieutenant Freyer to set up an ambush on the Cassamba-Sanga Road just north 
of Quipuco. Just on sunset, a Land Rover with a Browning machinegun mounted on 
it, approached from the east. The vehicle stopped at the leading vehicle, and a Cuban 
climbed out, obviously thinking that he was amongst friends. Upon realising his 
mistake, he drew the pin of a hand grenade and threw it at the vehicle’s crew, injuring 
two. He and three other Cubans, still in the vehicle, were then obliterated by a 90 mm 
round, fired at point-blank range into the Land Rover.177
Over the next couple of days, while the engineers continued to work, day and night, 
to strengthen the bridge, the infantry and armour combed the battlefield for stragglers 
and enemy equipment. Eventually, the South Africans were to capture sixteen 120 mm 
mortars, six 75 mm anti-tank guns, a 14.5 mm anti-aircraft machinegun, two 7-ton 
and three 2-ton Russian cargo vehicles, thirteen AT-3 Saggar anti-tank missiles (with 
control boxes), four 15-ton cargo vehicles loaded with the mortar and small-arms 
ammunition and a 122 mm multiple rocket launcher.178
WITHDRAWAL
The successful crossing of Bridge 14 was to be the final offensive action by South 
African forces. Earlier the previous day, the South African Security Council had decided 
to withdraw all its forces from Angola, due to the negative international pressure the 
world asserted upon South Africa. These orders only reached Colonel Swart on the 
morning of 12 December 1975. Consequently, he ordered Lieutenant Colonel Kruys 
to take a defensive position and await orders to begin withdrawing his forces. The 
following day, a high-level delegation arrived at Colonel Swarts headquarters at Cela. 
The group consisted of Minister of  Defence P.W. Botha, Minister of Economic Affairs 
J.C. Heunis, Lieutenant General Magnus Malan, Chief of the South African Army, 
Major General C.L. Viljoen, Director of General Operations, and Major General 
A. van Deventer, Commander of 101 Task Force. They came to see for themselves 
how the campaign was progressing, while simultaneously informing Dr Savimbi of the 
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By 25 January 1976, the withdrawal was practically completed, with all five Eland 
Armoured Car Squadrons back across the border.180 Soldiers from South Africa’s 
Active Citizen Force protected this withdrawal. They included three Eland Armoured 
Car Squadrons181 and one Centurion-Semel Tank squadron,182 mobilised and deployed 
as part of four combat groups in Southern Angola to protect the Calueque-Ruacana 
Water Scheme. The last SADF units would, however, only leave Angola almost two 
months later, on 27 March 1976.183 
CONCLUSION 
Military terminology defines the required ‘end state’ as that specified situation at the 
successful completion of the final phase of a military operation. For the endeavour to 
be successful, it is the collective goal that all the various military missions within any 
given campaign must accomplish. If the end state is not identified or poorly articulated, 
then a situation may arise where a military force wins every battle but loses the war.
Linked to this concept is the military levels of war; tactical, operational and strategic. 
Each one can have its ‘end state’, but collectively they must all contribute to the 
achievement of a national end state. For it is pointless, winning every engagement and 
battle on the tactical level but failing dismally on the strategic level. I believe such a 
situation befell the SADF in Angola in 1975/76.
Throughout Operation SAVANNAH, the SADF routinely bested their opponents on 
the battlefields of Angola. However, on the strategic level, the situation was reversed. 
South Africa’s decision to enter into Angola was not well thought out or even planned. 
The SADF was in no manner prepared to execute extensive mobile warfare operations 
hundreds of kilometres from its bases. That so much was achieved was only due to the 
bravery and dedication of the ordinary soldier and not thanks to the Generals and 
their political masters in Pretoria.
By launching an extensive campaign so late in the year, the Generals unnecessarily 
placed huge pressure on field commanders whose troops (by law) had to finish their 
military service by year’s end. No professional army sends home their most experienced 
soldiers mid-battle and replaces them with half-trained recruits. It is madness.
Furthermore, by not having a well-defined end state (the capture of Luanda, yes or 
no), the SADF wasted valuable time and resources on other tasks, ultimately giving 
the MPLA-Cuban alliance just enough time to deploy their forces and stop the SADF 
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TS While the strategic planning and decision-making of the SADF was poor, the SADF 
on the tactical level proved to be excellent. A large part of the successes achieved on 
the battlefields was due to the robust and daring utilisation of its armoured car units. 
In the conclusion of his book on Operation SAVANNAH, Unisa historian Professor 
F.J. du Toit Spies notes that:
Both Colonel Swart and his opponent Commandant Arnaldo T. Ochoa Sánchez 
commanded infantry, not properly trained, equipped or motivated. Both sides, 
due to the lack of infrastructure within Angola, were forced to move their 
motorised forces along the countries poor gravel roads. Fapla, however, had a 
firepower dominance. The Fapla support weapons far out-ranged their South 
African counterparts by such a measure that they could be deployed well outside 
their effective counter-bombardment ranges. Additionally, the firing tempo of 
the 122 mm multiple rocket launchers overshadowed the South African weapons. 
Finally, the enemy also had more artillery weapons than the South Africans – 
with a Fapla mortar and gun battery having 12 launchers versus only eight in an 
equivalent South African battery.
However, the one vital area where the South Africans enjoyed an advantage was 
in the armour department. While South Africans received reports of the Cubans 
deploying six armoured cars, armed with machine-guns and a few T34/85 tanks 
on the central front, the South Africans had four squadrons of Eland Armoured 
Cars (Combat Groups Charlie, Foxbat 2, Orange and Boxer) with a fifth in 
reserve at Lobito (Combat Group Beaver), armed with mortars, cannons and 
machine-guns. These armoured cars provided the South African forces with 
mobility that Fapla, with Angola’s chronic shortage of vehicles, never could have 
matched. The armoured cars were the keys to success in many of the attacks, no 
more so than during the battle for Bridge 14. Here, Commandant Ocha was 
forced to maintain an aggressive defensive posture until numerical superiority 
allowed him the opportunity to go over to the offensive, an opportunity that was 
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TS 145 Shortly after the battle of the Ebo, the armoured cars available on the front were reduced 
when Bravo Squadron, 1 SSB was sent back to Bloemfontein, while Alpha Squadron, 
1 SSB, under Captain Anton Fourie, remained to continue its duties.
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180 D Squadron, 2 SAI under Major A.C. Slabbert; A Squadron, 1 SSB, under Captain Anton 
Fourie; A1 Squadron, 1 SSB under Captain F. Rindel, B1 Squadron, 1 SSB under Captain 
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INTRODUCTION
The conflict in Southern Africa between the existing order and revolutionary 
organisations commenced in 1960 when the banned African National Congress 
(ANC) and the Pan African Congress (PAC) began an armed struggle against the 
South African government. In Namibia (South West Africa [SWA]), the South West 
Africa People’s Organisation (Swapo), as opposed to South African rule, launched 
their first military operations in 1966. Namibia became independent in 1990, but 
the conflict in South Africa lasted until 1994 when the ANC came to power. The 
war also involved other countries in the subcontinent such as Angola, Zimbabwe and 
Mozambique, that also influenced the eventual political outcome of events.
The role of the South African Defence Force (SADF) in the Namibian war, 1966‑1989, 
must be understood within the framework of the so‑called Forward Defence Strategy 
that aimed at buying time to find political solutions to conflicts in the region against 
the background of the Cold War. The core problem this chapter deals with is to 
determine what role the war in Namibia played in this national security strategy of 
the South African government and how it influenced the outcome of the events in 
the subcontinent by 1994. Scholtz1 believes that the sacrifices made by South Africans 
were worthwhile as they eventually forced the Marxist orientated Swapo to accept 
the result of democratic elections, the drafting of a constitution that guaranteed a 
democratic dispensation and thus paved the way for the establishment of democratic 
dispensations in Angola and South Africa.
The question is how vital the continuation of the war in Namibia was, considering 
the revolutionary struggle in South Africa and the rest of the subcontinent? Did this 
war not weaken, rather than strengthen the position of the South African government 
internally and in the region? It is dangerous for a government that faces the possibility 
of revolutionary violence on its soil to be involved in a foreign military adventure that 
weakens its hold on the home country and its population. A classic example of this was 
tsarist Russia that got involved in the Russo‑Japanese War (1904‑1905) and the First 
World War (1914‑1918). The impact of these wars on the government to effectively 
govern a vast empire led to the eventual revolutions of 1917, that led not only to the 
end of the tsarist rule but also the overthrow of a democratically elected government 
in November of the same year and the establishment of a Marxist dictatorship.2
Giliomee3 quotes Toynbee, who states that the decline of civilisations was due to 
human shortcomings such as self‑satisfaction and the inability to recognise the burning 
discontent of the oppressed in society.  The Forward Defence Strategy was the result of 
human decisions up to 1978 and, we must judge it against its inability to prevent the 
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TS THE ORIGINS OF THE FORWARD DEFENCE STRATEGY
Traditionally South African defence policy since 1910 focused on waging war away 
from home and preventing violent armed conflict from destabilising the country. The 
invasion of German South West Africa (SWA) in 1914 can be seen in that light as 
well as the point of view of the Smuts government in 1939 that East Africa was the 
Union’s first line of defence.4
Indeed, one of the factors that enabled the South African government to defeat the 
first insurgency5 campaign of 1960‑1965 was the presence of a buffer of friendly 
states whose armed forces and police intercepted the infiltrators before they reached 
South Africa proper, making it difficult to wage guerrilla warfare inside the country. 
The Portuguese were already fighting a counterinsurgency war against indigenous 
groups inside Angola and Mozambique; Rhodesia was under the white rule; and 
South African rule in Namibia under the League of Nations Mandate retarded the 
ability of the military wings of the ANC, PAC and Swapo to make much headway in 
weakening the position of the government.6
In Namibia, the Swapo military cadres, PLAN (People’s Liberation Army of Namibia), 
had difficulties in launching an insurgency in the north of the country. Most 
infiltrations were stopped by the Portuguese forces in Angola and even the infiltration 
from Zambia into the Caprivi Strip up to 1962 did not produce significant results. 
It seemed that the then South African Police (SAP) and from April 1974 the SADF 
would handle the insurgency with relative ease without drastically escalating the cost 
of the war.7
REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE 
The nature of the threat facing the South African government was revolutionary 
warfare, the most prevalent form of insurgency against colonial and minority 
governments during the Cold War era. 
This struggle would manifest in different spheres of life. The political dimension would 
entail establishing an alternative government inside the country, or initially in exile, 
challenging state authority and demonstrating to the population that the insurgents’ 
ideas would determine the future. The military dimension would consist of guerrilla 
warfare that aimed to tie down the armed forces of the government, and if it were 
not possible to defeat these forces, military actions such as ambushes and sabotage 
would serve as armed propaganda to support other dimensions of the conflict. 
Revolutionary action could also develop into conventional warfare. Linked closely 
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cultural supremacy, between the current value systems of society and a new order. The 
psychological dimension is linked closely to the ‘battle for the hearts and minds’ of 
the population. The primary focus of the insurgents was to convince the people that 
their alternative system would provide them with a better future, and eventually, the 
ruling elite that the status quo could not be maintained. The international dimension 
of the struggle would consist of two parts – support of neighbouring states for the 
guerrillas, providing them with training facilities protected by the armed forces of that 
state and infiltration routes into the target state. International support in the form of 
military training and equipment and economic sanctions against the target state was 
also decisive in the eventual convincing of the target government to end the war, even 
to the detriment of its political ideals.8
As long as South Africa could participate in the international economic system, the 
revolutionaries would be faced by a population experiencing rising living standards, 
thus undermining the very fabric of the revolutionary climate needed to mobilise 
the masses. Therefore, the international community had to be mobilised to introduce 
sanctions, especially Western countries like the United States of America (USA) and 
the United Kingdom (UK) that had close economic ties with South Africa. Military 
support in the form of weapons and training would be forthcoming from Marxist and 
the Afro‑Asiatic bloc of states.9 It is important to understand that military operations, 
even when inflicting heavy losses on the insurgents, can weaken the government in 
terms of other dimensions of the conflict. It can lead to an increase in economic 
sanctions and diplomatically isolate the ruling elite even further.
THE COLLAPSE OF THE BUFFER ZONE
The coup d’état in Portugal in 1974 set in motion a series of events that by 1980 would 
leave South Africa surrounded by a group of hostile states that provided different levels 
of support to the ANC, PAC and Swapo.
The Portuguese withdrawal from Angola in 1975, enabled PLAN to activate the 
insurgency across the whole length of the border between the two countries. The 
inability of the SADF to utilise the invasion of Angola in 1975 by putting its ally, 
Unita in power, implied that Swapo now had a sympathetic government in Luanda, 
the Marxist orientated MPLA enabling it to escalate the insurgency. It also had the 
advantage that the Ovambo people, the main base of support for Swapo, lived on both 
sides of the international border, enabling Swapo to re‑activate Ovamboland, their 
main base of support where 46 per cent of the population lived.
The physiography of the border region consists of four main areas – the Northern 
Namib in the extreme west; the Kaoko Highlands directly east of the Namib; the 
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TS in the east. Along the northern border, the landscape range from sandy Namib dunes 
in the west; to hills and mountains in the Kaoko Highlands; to plains that stretch from 
the Etosha Basin to the eastern edge of the Caprivi Strip. Climatically, the first two 
areas are classified as desert, with the Etosha Basin and north‑east Sandveld classified 
as hot steppe. Rainfall along the northern border is high compared to the rest of the 
country. The annual rainfall increases progressively from west to east, with the rainfall 
in the Caprivi Strip the highest of between 600 mm and 700 mm per annum. The 
vegetation of the Etosha basin, where most of the infiltration would take place, is 
characterised by grasses and widely spaced trees, increasing in density in the woodland 
areas. Furthermore, the terrain and weather favoured the insurgents, especially during 
the rainy season when the bush made detection of movement difficult.10
These factors soon forced the SADF to launch punitive invasions into Angola to 
offset the advantages that PLAN enjoyed. By 1977, the insurgency had escalated, and 
the only way to regain the military initiative was to deny PLAN bases in Angola.11 
De Vries12 describes the area in which most of the fighting took place in Angola as 
characterised by dense entangled African bush and large areas for manoeuvre. This 
sand‑surfaced vastness would swallow up large conventional formations as well as 
guerrilla armies. It also differed from the area south of the border in that several rivers 
would influence the conduct of military operations. It favoured the SADF in that 
it could use the terrain effectively to fight with smaller mobile forces against larger 
conventional operations. The reality was that it also took a heavy toll on time and 
equipment, taking into account the vastness of the area.
Logistically supporting such operations was an even more daunting task. Military 
operations against PLAN bases soon led to conventional battles with the armed forces 
of Angola and Cuba and, by 1987, an administrative forward point had to be established 
at Mavinga. To establish a forward point meant a supply line by bush track, due to 
the lack of developed roads – 356 km from Rundu and another 120‑150 km to reach 
the frontline troops. But that is only part of the story. Keegan and Wheatcroft argue 
that it was an unpopular campaign at the farthest extremity of South African control, 
taking into account that the principal means of supply was along the corridor from 
Upington to Windhoek and from there to Grootfontein, the main supply base in the 
operational area.13 In essence, the battlespace in this war implied that it would be a 
long, drawn‑out war along long lines of communication and quick strategic results 
would not attainable. One should also take into account the fact that it would be 
logistically difficult for the SADF to support large tank formations in the event of 
conventional warfare.
South Africa’s military leaders at the time believed that if Swapo gained control of 
Namibia, it would threaten the north‑western part of the Cape Province and the 
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wing of the ANC, MK (Umkhonto we Sizwe) to infiltrate South Africa. The fear was 
that apart from insurgency semi‑conventional forces under the guidance of the Soviet 
Union, East Germany and Cuba would pose a direct threat against the western border 
of South Africa.14
It is imperative to analyse this alternative. Keegan and Wheatcroft state that if South 
Africa could settle in Namibia, it would improve security by shortening the frontier 
considerably.15 The terrain in the south of Namibia up to the Orange River consists 
of two parts: along the coast the Namib Desert, and to the east a plateau of sub‑desert 
steppe and arid shrub‑grass veld.16 One can also describe the area south of the river 
as semi‑desert with mountain ranges stretching from Vioolsdrif on the Orange River 
southwards via Springbok to Bitterfontein. The area is also thinly populated.17 The 
contrast between this area and the operational area in the north is striking.  Apart from 
operating on much shorter lines of communication, the area can be easier defended 
using mobile land forces and airpower.
The Namibian infrastructure was also less able to sustain large conventional forces 
due to the lower capacity of Luderitz and Walvis Bay. Compared to what De Vries 
describes as the evenly spaced harbours of Luanda, Lobito and Namibe with a large 
carrying capacity, from where the Soviets and Cubans helped the MPLA government 
in Angola to build well‑developed forward airfields at places such as Lubango, 
Cahama, Menogue and Cuito Cuanavale.18  To duplicate this in the south of Namibia 
to support conventional forces would take time, and the distribution and density 
of the population along the Orange River did not favour insurgency operations. 
Furthermore, between Namibia and Botswana lies the Kalahari Desert and the road 
and rail systems in the latter were mainly in the eastern part of the country. Thus, a 
major highway would have had to be built from Windhoek to Gaborone to supply 
conventional forces or insurgents, presenting a target for the SADF operating from 
Upington.19  This terrain and shorter lines of communication would also have favoured 
a defence posture relying more on airpower and armour that could produce more 
decisive strategic results. 
The claim that MK would find it easier to infiltrate via Botswana should also be 
investigated.  The area in dispute would be the common border between the Bantustan 
of Bophuthatswana and Botswana and the Bushveld Savanna of the Northwest 
Transvaal from Zeerust all along the Limpopo River to an area west of Musina 
(formerly Messina). It stands to reason that the pressure from Frontline States on 
Botswana to allow MK to use its territory as a sanctuary for MK would have increased. 
At this stage, the armed forces of Bophuthatswana were still loyal, but in general terms, 
one can assume that the population in this region would be more susceptible to ANC 
political overtures than in the sparsely populated north‑western part of the Cape 
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TS too close to one another, interspaced with grass. Bushveld is a South African term 
indicating a higher rainfall than with dry Savanna.20 Thus, the terrain would make it 
impossible to prevent infiltration, but it is less difficult than the north of Namibia and 
southern Angola.
THE CONFLICT WITH MOZAMBIQUE
When the Portuguese left Mozambique, they handed over power to the Marxist‑
orientated Frelimo (Frente para Liberação de Moçambique – Mozambique Liberation 
Front). Initially, the SADF hoped that the close economic ties with South Africa 
would prevent the Samora Machel government from supporting the insurgency in 
South Africa. Nonetheless, early in 1975, President Machel declared that the people 
of South Africa had the right to fight against apartheid and that his country would 
support this.21
Of the buffer states lost to South Africa from 1975 to 1980, this development was the 
most detrimental from the South African government’s point of view. With its long 
coastline of 2 500 km and good harbours such as Beira and Maputo, foreign maritime 
powers such as the Soviet Union and Cuba could upset the balance of power in terms 
of conventional forces in the region. They could do it in a short time by supplying 
the Mozambique armed forces with key equipment and military advisors, as had 
happened in Angola. The southern part of the country, with the Maputo harbour, 
was also geographically the closest area from where the Frontline States could deploy 
conventional forces to threaten the industrial heartland of South Africa, the Pretoria‑
Witwatersrand‑Vereeniging (PWV) complex. It is also relatively close to the Durban‑
Pinetown industrial area.22
Furthermore, Mozambique’s location posed a threat to escalate the insurgency in 
Rhodesia, as indeed happened between 1975 and 1979, and the re‑activation of the 
internal front in South Africa. In the border region, the bushveld‑type vegetation 
would retard the detection of groups infiltrating South Africa and the straddling of 
the international boundaries by different ethnic groups would enable insurgents to 
easily mix with the local population before the government forces could detect them. 
It could develop into a rural insurgency, and the proximity of the PWV and Durban‑
Pinetown industrial areas held the potential of activating urban insurrection.23 Thus, 
an ideal situation existed for the large‑scale re‑activation of the internal insurgency 
front in South Africa.
Military intelligence reports also indicated that during the period 1975 to July 1977, the 
Soviet Union and its allies delivered military equipment to the value of R400 million 
to Mozambique. More and more Soviet, East German and Cuban instructors and 




ibia: Effective strategic buffer zone or draining foreign m
ilitary adventure?   
   Jam
es Jacobs
FADM (Forces Armadas de Mozambique) and the maintenance of their equipment. 
Also taken into account, was the demonstrated ability of the Soviet Union to re‑supply 
their clients with an air bridge during the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and the Marxist 
government in Ethiopia during 1978. Having Yemen and Ethiopia as client states 
provided the Soviets with the opportunity to use such an air bridge to alter the force 
levels in Mozambique in a short time, to the disadvantage of South Africa.24
The most immediate threat to the South African government, though, was the 
re‑activation of the insurgency in South Africa. In 1975, the ANC established a 
political office in Maputo to serve as a reception centre for people that fled South 
Africa. At the same time, MK cadres moved from Tanzania, and the SADF suspected 
that they used facilities of the armed forces of Mozambique on route to South Africa.25 
In November 1976, the first MK cadres infiltrated South Africa from Mozambique via 
Swaziland, and during the following two years, the feared re‑activation and drastic 
escalation of the insurgency in South Africa followed. As a result of the Soweto riots, 
thousands of young blacks left the country and joined the ranks of MK and Apla 
(Azanian People’s Liberation Army, formerly known as Poqo, the military wing of the 
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)), thus creating an even more favourable climate for the 
escalation of the conflict.26
The first indications of the training of MK recruits in Mozambique raised the concern 
of repeated escalating insurgency in South Africa that would surpass the situation in 
Rhodesia where the government forces were struggling to prevent a military collapse.27 
From 1975 to 1976, a small group of Apla guerrillas cooperated with members of 
the Mgomezulu people, a community straddling the South African‑Swazi border. The 
SAP crushed this cooperation, but the PAC succeeded in re‑establishing underground 
structures in Johannesburg and East London.28
SOWETO AND NEGATIVE INTERNATIONAL EVENTS 
While the struggle against the buffer states escalated, international events also worked 
in favour of the revolutionary movements in Southern Africa. In 1973, the oil crisis 
in the Middle East weakened the South African economy that led to dissatisfaction 
amongst the black population, who experienced the consequent negative impact of 
these events most, while also realising that the war in the South African neighbouring 
states was escalating. In 1974, the gold price increased, and the South African economy 
recuperated, but during the next year, a drastic decline caused the economic growth 
rate to decrease from 8.3 per cent to 1.3 per cent within a year, and in 1977, the 
growth rate was nil.29 Two years later, drastic increases in the oil price again stimulated 
inflation.30 The sudden decrease in economic growth caused a phenomenon 
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TS It emphasised the difference in income between the population groups, and with the 
escalation of the conflicts in SWA and Rhodesia, the revolutionary climate in South 
Africa reached its zenith.31
In contrast to the situation in 1960 to 1965, the black population in the cities was 
ready for insurrection. The government’s stance that only the homelands should serve 
to channel the political and economic aspirations of the black population had failed. 
In spite of draconian measures to prevent it, urbanisation continued apace, but because 
blacks, regarded as temporary residents, were not allowed to own property, that had 
countless negative socio‑economic implications. Furthermore, the withdrawal of the 
Portuguese from Africa and the success of the Civil Rights Movement in the USA 
created political expectations. In June 1976, when black pupils in Soweto started 
protesting against inequality in the educational system and the compulsory use of 
Afrikaans as the medium of tuition, the police opened fire and killed several. Unrest 
spread throughout the country, and thousands of youths left South Africa to swell the 
ranks of MK and Apla.32 
Since 1965, the government had had ten years to find a political and socio‑economic 
solution that could satisfy the reasonable expectations of the black population in 
South Africa. However, the unimaginative manner in which the government executed 
its counter political strategy and regional events aggravated the situation, rather than 
subdued it. It called for a drastic revision of the government’s national security strategy.
THE REFORMULATION OF DEFENCE POLICY
In government circles, the need for a more aggressive defence posture was already 
prevalent by the end of 1976. The White Paper on Defence of 1977 identified the 
enemy of South Africa as International Communism under the leadership of the 
Soviet Union that wanted to, from a South African government point of view, 
instigate the so‑called liberation movements like the ANC and PAC to wage war 
against the country and all its inhabitants. The government identified the aim as the 
overthrow of the current state dispensation and the establishment of a Marxist peoples’ 
republic along the lines of countries such as East Germany and Cuba. It would also 
coincide with the ideals of Pan Africanism that wanted black people to control all the 
countries on the continent south of the Sahara. The government identified the grand 
strategy of the ‘enemy’ as a ‘Total Onslaught’ through which the insurgents would try 
to undermine all the power bases of the state to overthrow state authority within the 
framework of revolutionary warfare. According to the government, the only viable 
course of action to counter this was a so‑called ‘Total Strategy’ that also had to protect 
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Political reform was to be one of the cornerstones of the new approach to address the 
grievances of the population, linked to draconian internal security measures like states 
of emergencies to curb internal unrest. The attitude was that this would all be negated 
if the military dimension of the insurgency spiralled out of control, as in Rhodesia, 
destroying the legitimacy of the government and forcing the population to choose 
the side of the perceived winners, the revolutionary movements. Under P.W. Botha’s 
leadership, the State Security Council was reactivated in 1978 as the main organ that 
had to formulate the government’s grand strategy and coordinate the actions of the 
different state departments to prevent the duplication of government expenditure and 
win the hearts and minds of the people.33
THE FORWARD DEFENCE STRATEGY
P.W.  Botha’s foreign policy was to promote international cooperation between 
the countries in Southern Africa within the framework of a constellation of states. 
Through this, he hoped to gain international recognition for the independent black 
homelands, such as the Transkei, and economic integration of the region to offset 
the hostile attitude of the Frontline States towards South Africa. It would have to be 
backed up by a defence strategy that had to prevent further escalations of conflict.34
Until 1978, the regional strategy of the SADF was based on deterrence of conventional 
aggression through expanding South Africa’s arms industry and creating a credible 
conventional force. It had to be supplemented by the curbing of insurrection through a 
counterinsurgency strategy within South Africa and SWA. The SADF supplied limited 
aid in terms of personnel and equipment to the Rhodesian armed forces and Unita 
in Angola. Though, in the light of the changed security situation in Southern Africa, 
it was deemed that this had to be supplemented by a more aggressive intervention in 
neighbouring states that posed a threat to South Africa. It was to augment the close‑
defence strategy, as the previous approach was redefined.
Southern Africa was divided into three geostrategic areas: 
  Northern Angola, Zaïre, Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi and northern Mozambique – 
The SADF had to be able to collect information in the so‑called area of interest 
and if necessary to conduct punitive operations.
  SWA (Namibia), Southern Angola, Rhodesia, Southern Mozambique, Botswana, 
Swaziland and Lesotho –  The combat/tactical area was the most important region 
in which the strategy would manifest. The SADF had to be able to influence 
the governments through diplomatic, economic and military means to adopt a 
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TS   South Africa and the black homelands constituted the vital survival area – From 
within this region, the SADF had to be able to conduct conventional and 
counterinsurgency operations in the combat area and punitive expeditions into 
the area of interest.35
South Africa had to keep the Frontline States off balance by dominating the 
subcontinent up to the Congo River basin. Support to insurgent groups inside 
the Frontline States implied that attacks against the rail and road networks in these 
countries forced them to export and import through South African harbours. It had to 
be used to ensure the establishment of governments in Rhodesia and SWA that would 
not support insurgency against South Africa and to put pressure on Mozambique to 
also toe the line. These military actions would also be supplemented by external attacks 
by the SADF against insurgents in neighbouring countries and against conventional 
forces if military confrontation proved to be inevitable.36 Thus, the strategic military 
concept was to destroy enemies before they could destabilise South Africa and the 
black homelands.
CONFLICT WITH MOZAMBIQUE, 1978‑1984
In 1978, the strategic situation in Rhodesia created the impression that this strategy 
could be successfully implemented. An internal settlement between the Ian Smith 
government and certain black leaders led to elections and the establishment of a 
government of national unity under Abel Muzorewa. There was hope that most of the 
insurgents would support the government and that, what was then called Zimbabwe‑
Rhodesia, would be recognised by Western countries.
Within the framework of the new strategy, South African military aid to Zimbabwe‑
Rhodesia increased drastically. The Rhodesians attacked guerrilla bases in Zambia and 
Mozambique, leading to a large loss of life amongst the insurgents.37 Another facet of 
this approach was the establishment of an insurgent movement in Mozambique by the 
Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) with help from the Rhodesian 
Army. By 1979, the Renamo (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana – Mozambican 
National Resistance) cadres were conducting a guerrilla war in the central provinces 
of the country against the Mozambique armed forces, FADM (Forcas Armadas de 
Mozambique).38
The new strategy of the Zimbabwe‑Rhodesian armed forces could not stem the tide 
of the insurgency inside the country and Western recognition did not materialise. 
British intervention in 1979 led to the Lancaster House agreement, elections in 1980 
and the establishment of the Republic of Zimbabwe under the leadership of Robert 
Mugabe.39 Another of the buffer states lost, and the Zimbabwean border added to the 
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Furthermore, access via Zimbabwe could also lead to the activation of Botswana as 
a base area for the insurgents. Previously, the location of Rhodesia and the Caprivi 
Strip in SWA made this difficult. Even worse, intelligence indicated that these events 
contributed substantially to an increase of support for the ANC amongst the black 
urban population in South Africa.40
To aggravate matters the Soviet build‑up of conventional forces in the Frontline States 
increased unabated, with the probable aim of deterring the SADF from conducting 
military operations against their armed forces and the insurgents. Soviet involvement 
in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique also created the impression that 
they were prepared to support Marxist client states to the hilt to expand their influence 
in the Third World.41
In spite of this, certain international trends favoured the South African government. 
In 1979, Margaret Thatcher became the Prime Minister of Britain and the next year, 
Ronald Reagan was elected President of the USA. Both were well known for their 
anti‑Marxist points of view and preparedness to combat the spread of global Soviet 
influence actively. It would eventually entail American military support to insurgents 
in self‑declared Marxist states. The South African government believed that with 
internal political reform and its external military actions, they would receive tacit 
support from the West.42
The first component of the military strategy against Mozambique constituted 
operations by special and air forces against houses in Maputo used by MK as training 
and transfer facilities from where their cadres could infiltrate South Africa.43
During 1981, SADF Special Forces also conducted raids in Lesotho. In December of 
the next year, a SADF raid in Maseru killed 42 people, more than 20 MK members.44 
Close cooperation with the Swaziland Defence Force also led to the eventual 
expulsion of MK cadres from that country.45
The support to external insurgent movements in the Frontline States produced the 
most spectacular military results. After the establishment of Zimbabwe, the SADF 
moved Renamo to Phalaborwa, close to the South African border with Mozambique, 
started training their cadres and helped them to infiltrate Mozambique. Most of the 
time, the insurgents were accompanied by SADF Special Forces to help with planning 
and guidance. From 1980 to 1983, the civil war in Mozambique escalated to the 
point that Renamo conducted operations in all but one of the country’s provinces 
and exploded bombs in Maputo and Beira. The FADM could only move in large 
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TS THE INTERNAL FRONT, 1978‑1984
The leadership of the ANC took note of the change in government strategy. From 
1976 to 1979, several sabotage acts were carried out in South Africa but were pinpricks 
compared to the military resources the government could mobilise. According to 
Barrell,47 the ANC focus, still too much on the military dimension of the struggle, was 
rectified only after a visit to Vietnam in 1979. The lessons the ANC leaders learnt on 
this visit were that the most important aspects were the establishment of underground 
structures and the mobilisation of the masses. Their focus would also shift to the cities 
where the discontent amongst the black population was rapidly rising.
Henceforth, military actions would only serve to enhance this process and contribute to 
the raising of the insurgents’ morale. They realised that the South African government 
would never tolerate the establishment of large military facilities in countries such 
as Mozambique, Swaziland, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Botswana. Barrell48 claims that 
after 1979, MK military attacks such as the explosions at Sasol in 1980 and Koeberg 
in 1982, as well as the Church Street car bomb in Pretoria in 1983, highlighted the 
ability of MK to conduct sabotage inside the country. The overwhelming reaction of 
the black population, as measured against the attendance of funerals of MK members 
killed by government forces and the support to protest actions reflected the effect of 
the ANC’s new strategy. In August 1983, the United Democratic Front (UDF) was 
established inside South Africa to act as a front organisation for the ANC to facilitate 
the mobilisation of the masses against all the power bases of the state.49
In spite of this, the leadership of the ANC realised that the establishment of liberated 
areas inside South Africa was still a far way off. In 1982, they decided to deploy an MK 
brigade inside Angola to fight against Unita, probably to gain military experience in 
preparation for the future when possibly waging a full‑scale guerrilla war in support 
of the revolutionary struggle.50
With the providence of hindsight, it is clear that at this stage, the strategic choices of the 
South African government should have been re‑appreciated. Apart from a drastically 
needed new political strategy as far as the urban black population was concerned, 
the military strategy could not prevent the use of Botswana as an infiltration area in 
spite of the continued South African occupation of Namibia. From bases in Zambia, 
infiltration was conducted through Zimbabwe and hence Botswana. In terms of 
the ANC’s new strategy, they did not need large military bases in countries such as 
Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Botswana, only sympathetic governments that would 
not stop the infiltration into South Africa.  The question was, what were the chances 
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NAMIBIA – STRATEGIC TRAP?
An important development on the diplomatic front was the involvement from 1977 of 
the big five Western countries – the USA, Britain, West Germany, France and Canada – 
in a search for an end to the war in Namibia. The first significant development was the 
arrival of their legates on 22 September for further settlement talks in Pretoria. There 
were rumours that President Carter had drawn up a plan with Tanzania’s President 
Julius Nyerere that required the South African forces to withdraw from Namibia and 
be replaced by a PLAN contingent as a run‑up to independence. Another suggestion, 
rejected out of hand, was that a small token force of the SADF stays in Namibia, but 
the PLAN camps on the Angolan side of the border should be left intact, and remain 
under UN supervision. By 26 September, the talks were suspended, and the only 
statement was that the representatives would report back to their governments. In the 
meantime, up to December, the infiltration from Angola escalated.51
On 2 December, the representatives returned to Pretoria after consultations with 
Swapo and the Frontline States. The issue was still the South African troop presence in 
Namibia, and as long as Swapo demanded total withdrawal of the SADF, they would 
achieve nothing. Prime Minister John Vorster offered the reduction of personnel to 
4 000, including 1 500 combat troops, based in two camps under UN supervision. Even 
before it became clear if Tanzania and Angola could persuade Swapo to moderate its 
demands, the South African government reacted. The statement was that due to the 
death of two members of the SADF, there would be a correlation between the tempo 
of withdrawal and the level of violence. From 1966 until the end of 1977, a total of 
88 members of the SADF and SAP had died as well as 363  insurgents, the former 
figure too high for the South African government’s liking.
In the same month, Vorster and his security advisors held a long discussion at his 
holiday home, where P.W. Botha and the SADF propagated stronger measures. The 
core argument was that by fighting a defensive war, with the South African forces 
waiting for PLAN to infiltrate before they could react, would not stop the insurgency. 
They had to act before crossing the border. Steenkamp52 states: “It was a landmark 
decision, a watershed that would have as great an effect on the Border War as the 
withdrawal from Angola in 1976, which had presented Swapo with its safe border.”
Another important development was the UN enforcement of an arms embargo 
against South Africa by the end of 1977. They would feel the implication of this 
severely towards the end of the conflict, especially concerning equipment such as 
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TS In February 1978, negotiations between R.F. Botha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and 
Sam Nujoma, leader of Swapo, under the guidance of the five Western countries were 
continued in Windhoek and New York. Nujoma demanded the incorporation of 
Walvis Bay into a future independent Namibia and the deployment of 1 500 members 
of the SADF near Karasburg in the south. The Western countries and South Africa 
wanted them at Grootfontein and Oshivelo in the north. On 28  February in a 
television interview, Nujoma denied that his organisation was guilty of any atrocities, 
murders or intimidation. He claimed that the landmines that killed civilians had 
been laid by the SADF and that the SADF had the habit of firing indiscriminately at 
civilians and then reported the casualties as being PLAN members. He promised that 
once in power, his organisation would ‘do away’ with Namibians that served in the 
SADF, as well as puppets serving in anti‑Swapo political parties. He concluded that 
the question of black majority rule was out, that they were not fighting for this, but to 
seize power in Namibia. It destroyed any hope of a peaceful settlement. 
International peace talks continued and, on 25 April, South Africa formally accepted 
the Western countries’ proposals for a settlement. It would include a ceasefire and 
a reduction of SADF troops, the holding of an election and the formation of a 
constituent assembly. But Swapo rejected the proposals, and the UN General Assembly 
started a 10‑day special session scheduled to attack South African intransigence and 
inflexibility and to call for unconditional withdrawal. On 28 April, a group of 100 PLAN 
members infiltrated from Angola.  Attempted attacks on Ovambo tribal leaders and the 
planting of landmines took place. On 3 May, Nujoma delivered a speech at the UN 
special session where he stated that Swapo would intensify the struggle. On 4 May, 
the SADF launched Operation REINDEER that dealt PLAN a severe blow from a 
military point of view.54 Scholtz55 asks the question if the South African government 
had forfeited an opportunity for a peaceful solution to the problem. 
On the other hand, the attitude of the Swapo leadership created the impression that 
an election under UN supervision would not be free and fair and would lead to 
retributions and bloodshed and the establishment of a Marxist dictatorship such as in 
Angola. REINDEER was a successful test to the new approach of the SADF of using 
external military operations to make it difficult for PLAN to infiltrate Namibia. It also 
set the pattern for military operations until the end of the war.
The SADF kept a watchful eye on the Namibian election process. Swapo refused to 
participate, and as expected, the UN rejected the results in which the Democratic 
Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) won and took over most of the governmental functions.56
Early in 1979, there was optimism as the negotiations were resumed. The PLAN 
attack on the Nkongo base, 15 km from the border, however, led the South African 
government to send a protest note to the UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim 
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would arrive before the end of the month to set the independence process in motion. 
Waldheim could give no such assurances and blamed South Africa for the delay in the 
peace process. Besides, Nujoma’s talks with UN representative Martti Ahtisaari led to 
the announcement that in the event of a settlement, they would not restrict PLAN 
to their bases and SADF troop strength had to be reduced, irrespective of whether a 
visible peace should come about. The South African answer to this to withdraw no 
soldiers until PLAN stopped its acts of violence. Consequently, both sides escalated 
their military actions.
In October 1979, the Western contact group proposed that the SADF be allowed to 
retain five bases within 50 km from the Angolan border, that from there to the border 
a demilitarised zone (DMZ) be established, patrolled by UN forces. They wanted to 
retain the bases for the first three months of the independence process, excluding 
PLAN forces from the DMZ. Swapo was lukewarm to the proposals, but the South 
African government accepted them, subject to certain conditions. On the military 
front, the SADF was achieving substantial success. By the end of the year, according 
to SADF sources, 915 PLAN members were killed compared to 50 on the South 
African side. The number of incidents had increased from 500 in 1978 to more than 
900 in 1979.57 Thus, the pattern of both sides escalating the conflict to improve their 
positions continued.
During 1980, the situation would become even more complicated. The proposed 
UN Task Force Commander (Untag) General Prem Chand visited Luanda, while the 
Unita leader, Jonas Savimbi, wrote a letter to P.W. Botha, demanding that they include 
him in the peace talks. By this time, South African aid to Unita, together with external 
military operations, further escalated the conflict. On 1 May 1980, the South African 
government extended home rule to Namibia and in August the South West African 
Territory Force (SWATF) was established involving all the population groups in the 
country, but in the same month, the first clashes between the SADF and the Angolan 
Armed Forces (Fapla) occurred.
In June 1980, negotiations resumed. The South African government proposed a 
reduction in SADF bases from 40 to 20 south of the DMZ, but PLAN had to be 
disarmed seven days after the elections and relinquish claims to bases in Namibia. 
Furthermore, Waldheim had to stop declaring that Swapo was the legitimate 
representative of the people of the country. It seemed as if Waldheim agreed and 
Angola and Zambia proclaimed that they would guarantee the acceptance of election 
results by Swapo. Also, if South Africa agreed to the concept of the DMZ, the UN 
would not insist on PLAN having bases in Namibia after the ceasefire.
Against the background of these events, the SADF was conducting external operations 
as far north as Chitando and Evale in southern Angola (Operation SCEPTIC). Two 












   











TS against South Africa because of Operation SCEPTIC. The military results caused a 
decline in incidents in Namibia, but another chance to end the war was forfeited. 
Furthermore, the effects were temporary. As soon as the SADF withdrew from Angola, 
PLAN re‑occupied the area and rebuilt their bases. 
Consequently, in 1981 the SADF would again have to launch operations into Angola.58 
Thus, a new strategic pattern emerged. To keep PLAN infiltration at acceptable levels 
of external operations into Angola and support for Unita was vital, but this led to 
armed combat with the Angolan armed forces and more international condemnation.
In January 1981, it seemed as if the negotiating process had come to a grinding halt. 
In  Genève, Switzerland, the delegates engaged in a shouting match and achieved 
nothing. On 30  January, the SADF attacked MK bases in Maputo, leading to 
international condemnation. In August, the SADF launched its largest external raid 
of the war against PLAN, Operation PROTEA, followed by Operation DAISY in 
November. The battles involving clashes between the SADF and Fapla had at the 
same time drastically increased as the latter proceeded to protect PLAN. At the same 
time, Unita also stepped up its operations against Fapla in a drastic escalation of the 
war. The other consequence of PROTEA was that the SADF started maintaining a 
semi‑permanent presence in the Cunene province of Angola. In the UN Security 
Council, the USA vetoed a resolution condemning the South African actions. The 
stance of the Reagan administration on the war favoured South Africa, but PLAN was 
not defeated.59
The first development on the diplomatic front was in June 1981 when R.F. Botha 
announced that the withdrawal of the Cuban forces from Angola had to happen 
first, before the implementation of Resolution 435, the UN plan for a settlement. 
The interests of South Africa and the Reagan administration were now closer than 
ever. During talks in New York in July, Angola categorically stated that the Cubans 
would only withdraw after Namibia became independent and all SADF forces had 
withdrawn from the territory. In exchange, the Cubans undertook to stay north of 
the 14th parallel (240 km north of the border), and PLAN would be confined to bases 
no closer than 350 km from the Angolan border. On 29 July, R.F. Botha asked for a 
ceasefire date, 15 August, and agreed that the Cubans did not have to leave before the 
implementation of Resolution 435. Swapo did not agree and stated that South Africa 
had brought back the precondition that the UN monitor PLAN bases in Angola and 
Zambia. However, the Frontline States persuaded Swapo to accept this, but then the 
South African government demanded that they disarm and that the UN provide a 
specific timetable for the Cuban withdrawal from Angola. On 30 August, the Angolan 
Minister of Foreign Affairs rejected the linkage between the Cuban and South African 
withdrawals. In a letter to the Frontline States, President Reagan made it plain that he 
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Another proposed ceasefire date, 15 September 1981, came and went. It was clear 
that the opposing parties were not yet prepared to compromise enough to settle. The 
SADF stayed in southern Angola, Fapla improved their anti‑aircraft defences and 
PLAN continued infiltrating Namibia. From December 1981 to August 1982, the 
SADF conducted three operations in Angola, Operations MAKRO and MEEBOS I 
and  II. Consequently, Swapo called the efforts of the Western countries to mediate 
peace a diplomatic charade.
In August 1982, media reports indicated that the Frontline States recognised the 
importance of the Cuban withdrawal for the USA. Also reported was the USA’s 
possible recognition of the Angolan government and aid provision, if South Africa 
would stop its attacks on Angola and its support of Unita and that the USA would 
hold South Africa to this promise. Also stated was that if South Africa did not accept 
this, it was not serious about ending the conflict.
On 8 December 1982, negotiations resumed between South Africa and Angola at the 
Cape Verde Islands, but nothing was achieved except a joint declaration to continue 
with talks. During the same month, the SADF launched attacks in Lesotho against 
MK facilities. During a General Assembly debate, the Western contact group was 
condemned for its cooperation with South Africa and specifically the US delegates for 
their government’s stance that there should be a link between the Cuban withdrawal 
and the implementation of Resolution 435.60
During January 1983, the South African government reiterated its statement on the 
linkage between the withdrawal of the Cuban forces and the implementation of 
Resolution  435 and in February further talks produced nothing, due to this issue. 
At the same time, PLAN launched a massive infiltration into Namibia, so much so 
that members of the South African parliament questioned whether the SADF was 
winning the war. On the other end of the equation, Unita now controlled 25 per 
cent of Angola, and its military strength was more or less 35 000 men. They were also 
receiving help from other African countries, apart from South Africa, such as Zaire 
and Zambia. The area occupied by Unita in Southeast Angola implied that PLAN 
could not activate the full length of the border and the insurgency was confined to 
Ovamboland, making the task of the SADF much easier. On the other hand, Soviet 
and Cuban aid to Angola also drastically increased.
In November 1983, the new Secretary General of the UN Perez de Cuellar visited 
South Africa, Namibia and Angola, where he had discussions with Angolan leaders 
and Nujoma. The Frontline States met on 13 November and condemned the USA 
and South Africa about the link between the Cuban withdrawal from Angola and the 
implementation of Resolution 435. At the same time, the Soviet government issued 
South African delegates at the UN a stern warning that they would not tolerate the 
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TS achieve a withdrawal of Cuban troops before the implementation of Resolution 435. 
In the background, South African attacks against air defence installations in Angola 
escalated. In December, new proposals were tabled, drawn up by R.F. Botha and 
Chester Crocker, Assistant Foreign Secretary in the Reagan administration. According 
to these, the SADF would disengage all troops from Angola by 31 January 1984, and 
Angola had to restrain their armed forces and ensure that Swapo and the Cubans did 
not exploit this. Nonetheless, both the SADF and PLAN escalated military operations.
In January 1984, during the attack on Cuvelai, elements of the SADF encountered 
T54/55 tanks in a mobile role. In the intense battles that ensued, the SADF prevailed. 
While mopping up operations continued, Swapo handed a letter to the Secretary 
General of the UN, asking for renewed negotiations. Despite this, the UN General 
Assembly passed a resolution calling for punitive sanctions against South Africa. In the 
Security Council, it was vetoed by the USA with the UK and France objecting to 
some of the wording in the document.
When the SADF withdrew on 15 January 1984, it was clear that the SADF has severely 
disrupted PLAN operations and destroyed a large number of Fapla tanks. It proved 
that even being outnumbered, the SADF could beat a conventional force through 
better tactics and battle handling. But the aggressive reaction of the Fapla and Cuban 
forces indicated that the days of relatively easy external operations were over and, for 
the first time, Russian personnel also participated in the fighting. Another reality was 
that South Africa’s semi‑permanent presence in southern Angola had turned into an 
intolerable political burden and the economic costs also escalated.61
THE JOINT MONITORING COMMISSION AND NKOMATI
After lengthy negotiations, South Africa and the Angolan government signed the 
Lusaka Accord. A joint monitoring committee consisting of members of the two 
defence forces had to determine if all SADF elements had withdrawn south of the 
Angolan border and if Fapla and Cuban forces did not occupy this area. Swapo 
exploited the situation to escalate the conflict, and the Fapla and Cuban forces 
reinforced their conventional force capability. Therefore, South Africa withdrew from 
the commission.62
In Mozambique, the Forward Defence Strategy results became even more spectacular. 
Renamo had by March 1984 activated all the provinces in Mozambique, and the 
SADF Chief of Staff Intelligence Division reckoned that Renamo would be able to 
wrest political power from Frelimo by 1985.63
Certain Western media, however, used South Africa’s destabilisation of the subcontinent 
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to the increased isolation of the country from the international community. The 
argument was that South Africa’s regional actions had become an embarrassment 
to the Reagan administration.64 At the same time, South African efforts to promote 
Renamo as a viable alternative to Frelimo in the West met with only limited success.65 
President Machel realised that the Soviet Union would not be able to bail out his 
government in a conflict with South Africa. It also became clear that the USA did not 
want to overthrow the governments of Angola and Mozambique, but was using Unita 
and Renamo respectively to move them away from Marxism towards democratic and 
free‑market dispensations.66 Since 1981, the Mozambique government liaised with the 
USA, that had the clear message that MK could not escalate the war in South Africa 
to full‑scale guerrilla war and, as long as the Frontline States supported insurgency 
against South Africa, they should not expect help from the West.67 The Nkomati 
Accord between South Africa and Mozambique was signed on 16 March 1984. In 
exchange for Mozambique’s undertaking to cease support to MK, South Africa agreed 
to halt its support to Renamo.68
The Nkomati Accord was a temporary setback for the ANC. Simultaneously it became 
known that Swaziland had a secret agreement with the South African government to 
act against MK in its territory. The result was MK cadres, hastily deployed in South 
Africa, and a sudden rise in casualties inflicted by the SADF and the SAP. Despite 
maintaining armed activity for a short time in South Africa after that, the outbreak 
of a new wave of protest in September 1984, they could not supplement it with a 
full‑scale guerrilla campaign, due to the loss of military facilities in Swaziland and 
Mozambique. At the same time, infiltration routes through Zimbabwe and Botswana 
had not been developed. To aggravate matters, dissatisfaction with the circumstances 
in which MK members had to fight in Angola led to a mutiny in some MK camps.69 
In a secret meeting between P.W. Botha and Machel, they agreed that South Africa 
would continue to provide non‑military aid such as agricultural implements, seed and 
medical support to Renamo. It could then be used to facilitate negotiations between 
Renamo and the Frelimo government to create a government of national unity.70
THE FINAL PHASE, 1985‑1989
In spite of the diplomatic setback of the failure of the Joint Monitoring Commission 
to end the wars in Angola and SWA, on face value it appeared that the Forward 
Defence Strategy allowed the South African state to survive. But it was soon proved 
that appearances were misleading.
The nature of the war in Angola and Namibia changed. Although counterinsurgency 
against PLAN continued, the main focus of the SADF became a support to Unita, 
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TS hold on southeast Angola. During 1985 and 1986, Fapla launched military offensives 
against Unita that were beaten off by a limited SADF presence.71 It seemed as if South 
Africa was winning the military side of the conflict in SWA.72 The Unita guerrilla war 
against Fapla still enabled the SADF to limit the insurgency to Ovamboland, and the 
PLAN losses increased dramatically.73
In spite of this, MK infiltrated from Zambia via Zimbabwe, Botswana and Swaziland 
in 1985 and planted landmines in the border region on the South African side.74 
On 14  July, the SADF and SAP attacked MK underground structures in Botswana 
and killed 12 people.75
In January 1986, Major General Justin Lekhanya led a military coup d’état in Lesotho. 
He favoured closer relations with South Africa, and it led to the deportation of ANC 
members and specifically MK operatives. As MK had used Lesotho to infiltrate into 
the Eastern and Western Cape, the Transkei and, to a limited extent, the PWV area, 
this was a serious blow to the ANC.76
Strategic realities proved the above to be only temporary gains. In 1985, Keegan 
and Wheatcroft77 warned that the position of the South African government was 
vulnerable, as the following four years would demonstrate. According to them, the 
war in Angola and SWA had become a drain on the South African economy. They 
saw part of the solution a disengagement from this war, as it would ease international 
pressure and burden South Africa’s enemies with the logistic problem of fighting 
a war with long lines of communication. A glance at the map of Southern Africa 
indicates that after the creation of Zimbabwe in 1980, SWA lost its value as a buffer 
zone. The argument that a Swapo government in Windhoek would allow infiltration 
into the north‑western part of the Cape Province and via Botswana does not take 
into account the fact that infiltration through the latter could from then on anyway 
proceed via Zimbabwe. Also, the semi‑desert nature of the border with Namibia and 
its resultant lack of large population concentrations in that area defeats the argument 
that Namibia, as a strategic buffer, was still vital for national survival. Also, according 
to L’Ange,78 by 1988, it became obvious that Swapo was winning the contest for 
the loyalty of the population, as they had the political support amongst most black 
Namibians, especially the numerically strong Ovambo people in spite of the extensive 
communication operations amongst them by the SADF.
In Mozambique, the problem was the failed efforts to facilitate negotiations between 
Frelimo and Renamo. Also, by signing the Nkomati Accord, the South African 
government had for the first time officially acknowledged its support of Renamo. 
The civil war escalated and, in desperation, Machel used the continued limited aid to 
Renamo to accuse South Africa of breaking the accord. His death in a plane crash on 
19 October 1986 aggravated this. Mozambique, the Soviet Union and the Western 
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the accident and used the accusations of continued support to Renamo to depict South 
Africa as the regional bully.79 It neutralised the temporary diplomatic advantage gained 
by South Africa, and during 1985, MK and Apla had again started using Mozambique 
as an infiltration route.80 The Mozambique government had outmanoeuvred its South 
African counterpart within the diplomatic dimension of the war.
The war in Angola escalated as Fapla, supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba, 
from 1986 to 1988 launched large‑scale offensives against Unita. The South African 
contribution had to increase accordingly. The SADF‑Unita forces achieved spectacular 
success on the Lomba River in 1987, but then got bogged down in a war of attrition 
near Cuito Quanavale. Still, the South African government could not afford the 
impression that it had caved into Marxist pressure due to right‑wing accusations of 
a sell‑out of the white people. The deadlock was eventually broken in 1988 when 
the Soviet Union approach the USA government, indicating that it wanted to end 
its military commitments in Africa and also put pressure on its clients such as the 
ANC to negotiate with their political opponents.81 Ultimately the South African 
withdrawal from Cuito Quanavale, the implementation of UN Resolution 435 and 
the independence of Namibia established the situation recommended by Keegan and 
Wheatcroft, but only in 1989, four years later.82
The South African government did not escape unscathed from this conflict. They, 
and the SADF, never understood the importance of propaganda in war. The events 
at Quito Quanavale were used to create the impression that the SADF was defeated 
and that South African diplomats negotiated from a position of weakness.83 The effect 
of this on the election in Namibia and the subsequent political victory of Swapo are 
aspects that will have to be examined by historians as well as the PLAN invasion of 
Namibia early in 1989 as the UN forces started to deploy. The UN requested South 
Africa to re‑mobilise its forces and countered this military action and the PLAN 
cadres were defeated. It only demonstrated that the SADF could not curb the actions 
of Swapo and the Cubans only withdrew after Namibia became independent in 1990, 
in spite of Western diplomatic efforts and South African military actions from 1977. 
The only difference this time around was the involvement of the USA and the Soviet 
Union, providing some guarantee that the Cuban forces in Angola would not interfere 
with the implementation of Resolution 435 in Namibia.84
In 1985, Keegan and Wheatcroft85 also warned that the government’s internal policies 
were not working and that they should find alternatives quickly. Since 1983, the 
UDF synchronised a coalition of anti‑apartheid organisations that included labour 
movements, educational, youth, civic, women’s, religious and political organisations in 
mass actions against the government. The government’s efforts to placate black political 
and economic aspirations through the homelands, local government participation in 
the urban areas and the Tricameral Parliament again aggravated rather than defused the 
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TS even spread to certain rural regions. MK and Apla membership increased drastically, 
and some authors reckon that the country was on the verge of full‑scale civil war.86
Hough87 thought that by 1988 the ANC had to admit setbacks in their attempts to 
transform unrest into insurrection. The government’s counter‑measures such as states 
of emergency and, in certain cases, addressing the immediate causes of discontent 
stemmed the tide. MK and Apla could not convert any area in South Africa into 
liberated areas, but the government could also only stay in power through emergency 
legislation and brute force. Also, international pressure and sanctions further isolated 
the country. That set the stage for the dramatic events of 1990 that would resolve 
the conflict.
THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION
In Revolutionary Warfare, the cost for the government mostly leads to a collapse of 
will to carry on with the struggle. Not to mention the negative influence of world 
economic events such as drastic rises in the oil price again. The influence of economic 
factors on South Africa, as far as Namibia is concerned entailed two components: 
The foreign perception was that, apart from being a buffer against the infiltration of 
guerrillas, Namibia was important for South Africa because of its mineral wealth.88 
The reality was that the South African economy, to a large extent, supported that of 
its neighbour. The annual contribution of the South African government to keep the 
railways in Namibia running was R70  million. During 1982, South Africa provided 
R60 million for drought relief, and since 1973 Namibia was provided with loans and 
direct financial contributions totalling more than R2 billion.89
The other component was defence expenditure. Official figures on the cost of the 
war in 1985 were R2  million per day on average,90 while only the ammunition 
used during the 1987/88 book year cost R328 million. Other figures are somewhat 
contradictory. Geldenhuys91 states that defence expenditure as a percentage of state 
expenditure declined from 18.4 per cent in 1977‑1978 to 14.4 per cent in 1986‑1987, 
while defence expenditures as part of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) declined 
from 4.8 per cent (1977‑1978) to 4.2 per cent (1986‑1987). According to him, the 
war in Namibia cost R580  million per year but with a defence budget being less 
than 5  per cent of the GDP, compared with other countries, USA (6.5  per cent), 
Britain (5.4  per cent), Israel (14.8  per cent) and Mozambique (10.8  per cent). 
According to Giliomee,92 military expenditure between 1985 and 1986, and 1988 and 
1989, increased with 25 per cent against constant pricing and constituted 17.7 per 
cent of state expenditure. The latter figures were probably indicating the effect of 
the conventional battles in Angola from 1986 to 1988. See these expenditures against 
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Western World. The South African economy was not on its knees, but lack of foreign 
investment would have inhibited the government’s ability to curb unemployment, that 
would have led to an intensification of the revolutionary climate.93 The problem is 
that the money spent on the war in Namibia and Angola could have been used for the 
execution of a counterinsurgency strategy in South Africa. After all, what is the use of 
pumping millions of Rand into the Namibian economy while the people in Soweto 
did not have running water and electricity?
CONCLUSION
The main lesson learnt from the Rhodesian bush war was that if the South African 
government forces lost the military struggle, they would have to negotiate from a 
position of weakness. The Military strategy, therefore, had to win time for the 
government by preventing an escalation of the conflict in South Africa to become a 
full‑scale people’s war. To achieve this was imperative, to prevent the insurgents from 
using neighbouring states and eventually liberated areas in the country from where to 
conduct guerrilla warfare. After all, to win the military dimension of the conflict avails 
to nothing if the political struggle, in the end, is lost.
The time gained between 1960 and 1975 were not exploited, and the loss of 
Angola and Mozambique as buffer states to the revolutionary onslaught contributed 
substantially to the Soweto riots that were an indication of the futility of the 
government’s internal policies.
From 1976 to 1980, the Forward Defence Strategy furnished the government with a 
strategy that could buy time to find answers to the internal problems of the country, 
but the loss of Rhodesia and the escalation of the conflict in Angola and SWA were 
serious blows, that called for an even more aggressive posture. From 1980 to 1989, 
the SADF achieved spectacular military results, but it was not decisive enough, and 
on the diplomatic and economic fronts, the South African government could not 
win the war.
The government again failed to capitalise on the security umbrella to find an answer 
to the most pressing political question, the design of a constitutional system that 
would address the aspirations of the majority of the people in the country. Thus, the 
ruling elite found themselves overtaken by world events such as the end of the Cold 
War in 1989 and the mounting support for the ANC in the West. The inability to find 
a way out of the conflict in SWA and Angola only aggravated the situation. The result 
was that the SADF got dragged further into an unwinnable war of attrition, while 
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TS After 1989, the only positive result of the continued war in Namibia and Angola from 
a South African government point of view, was that MK had to vacate their training 
bases in Angola and move to Tanzania and Uganda, following the final agreement 
between the warring parties.94 It was to the advantage of Unita, but it is debatable 
whether this had much influence on the war inside South Africa. All the fighting and 
diplomacy could not get the Cubans to leave Angola before elections in Namibia, and 
the final PLAN invasion into the country not prevented. The population demography 
ensured a victory for Swapo anyway.
As for the Cold War, the South African involvement in Namibia and Angola did 
contribute towards the eventual demise of the position of the Soviet Union and Cuba 
in Africa. Crocker95described the situation by 1980 as one in which the Soviets had 
developed the means for further expansionism into the region, while South Africa 
had developed the means and rationale for military intervention beyond its borders. 
The Soviet approach to the USA in 1988, indicating a willingness to disengage and 
support negotiated settlements, constitute a victory for the West and supports Scholtz’s 
argument for sustainable peace in the subcontinent.
In the revolutionary war, military dimensions can only achieve limited success. By 
1989, the government was losing the war on all fronts, except for its military power 
in comparison with the Frontline States and the revolutionary movements. The end 
of the Cold War created the circumstances for a new political strategy that would 
not have been possible had the government also lost the military dimension of the 
conflict. But, the strategic focus was wrong. The main focus should have been the 
counterinsurgency campaign in South Africa, implying an imaginative plan to satisfy 
the aspirations of the majority of the country’s population. It is where the South 
African government lost the war.
An earlier withdrawal from Namibia would not have been without risks. However, it 
is difficult to see how that would have enabled MK and Apla to repeat the Rhodesian 
scenario by using military bases in Namibia and Botswana to escalate the conflict 
in South Africa to the level where the insurgents were also winning the military 
dimension of the war. Conventional operations with mobile forces along shorter lines 
of communication would be logistically less taxing. If the Soviets and Cubans got 
involved, they would have faced a bigger logistic burden: the distances from Angola to 
Luderitz and Walvis Bay, and from there to the Orange River and over the breadth of 
Botswana, from west to east to build up forces against South Africa. Operating on such 
long lines of communication could also have led to these Marxist forces overextending 
themselves, making it unnecessary to counter this threat on the Cunene River rather 
than on the western border of South Africa.
The war in southern Angola had the risk that the SADF with its limited ability to 
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battles if the Soviets and Cubans quickly increased the scales of such forces in the 
region. It was quite possible taking into account the earlier arguments of South 
African defence planners about the ability of the Soviet Union to establish an air 
bridge via Ethiopia to Southern Africa. South Africa also ran the risk of the Soviets 
and Cubans using the infrastructure in Mozambique to tip the balance of power even 
further against South Africa and create a protective cordon around MK and Apla bases. 
It would have provided a firm platform for the drastic escalation of the insurgency in 
South Africa.
The geographic factors, in the event of a withdrawal from Namibia, were also far less 
favourable for infiltrating insurgents. MK did not need to win the war primarily with 
military means, like in Rhodesia, and the South African presence in Namibia did not 
prevent the infiltration of small groups via Zimbabwe or Botswana to support the 
internal uprisings in the South African cities after 1984.
The impact of the war in Namibia was perhaps not as dramatic as that of Tsarist 
Russia’s foreign military adventures, but the result was the same – the loss of political 
power and the risks involved if the Soviets and Cubans wanted to escalate the conflict. 
Keegan and Wheatcroft summarised it well in 1986: 
South Africa’s problem is war on too many fronts. There is a draining conflict for 
the protection of Namibia, battles to preserve an economy over‑reliant on the 
gold price, a constant need to police an increasingly unworkable racial policy, 
and a never‑ending struggle to preserve contacts – personal and commercial – 
with an increasingly hostile outside world. Fighting on all fronts, she is winning 
on none: problems which are containable in isolation become insuperable in 
combination. The root cause is the ceaselessly rising tide of internal violence, 
which calls into question the capacity and wisdom of political leadership.96
All the efforts of the South African government from 1966 to 1989 in Namibia and 
Angola could not provide the ideal situation for the political climate in Namibia 
to favour the anti‑Swapo parties in a UN‑supervised election. South Africa never 
overcame the unwillingness of Swapo to keep to agreements, and the population 
demography of Namibia virtually guaranteed them a political victory. Withdrawing 
from the conflict in 1989 did not run fewer risks than, say, in 1978, 1980 or 1984, 
but the effect on all the dimensions of the revolutionary struggle by 1989 had a 
detrimental outcome on the position of the South African government in the region 
and especially in the country itself. Scholtz97 refers to SADF military intelligence 
reports of 1981 that states that the Soviet Union instructed Swapo to draw South 
Africa into a war of attrition in Namibia, in support of an internal uprising in South 
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Mopping up the base at Ongulumbashe after the helicopter assault
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Cassinga, burning after the South African attack
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SADF casualties sustained during the attack on Cassinga
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An SADF Ratel IFV navigating the dense Angolan bush during a cross-border operation
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South African tanks moving out of Mavinga in a line-ahead formation
South African armour was deployed on a number of occasions during the conventional phase 
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South African infantry being extracted from the battlefield by a Puma helicopter
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During the 1960s, the SADF operated as part of a beleaguered white community: 
traditional allies Britain and the USA enforced the United Nations’ arms embargo; 
MK attacks and Poqo murders occurred; the Rivonia trial and its aftermath took 
place; the arrests and trials of African Resistance Movement (ARM) members, 
including station bomber John Harris and leading SACP fugitive Bram Fischer, 
occurred. The press devoted considerable attention to all of this. Mobilising the 
consent of white South Africans regarding conscription occurred alongside the SADF’s 
task to counter perceived armed threats to the state – external and internal – which 
meant that the SADF worked within National Party (NP) post-republic strategy.  This 
involved stressing loyalty and fear commonalities within the largely split white South 
African identity, while still retaining Afrikaner nationalist political control. It presented 
challenges pertaining to both the Afrikaner and white English-speaking (WESSA) 
groupings in their collaboration with the SADF projecting itself as a highly visual and 
important component of the white community.
Neither the SADF commanders nor defence minister Jim Fouché could have 
anticipated the effects of 1960s prosperity on Afrikaners, or how it might influence 
their  and other whites’ attitudes to compulsory military service. Urgent planning 
against assumed threats included widening conscription, but this also meant having to 
cope with drastically increased trainee numbers from 1962. In this, SADF preparation 
lacked in a wide range of infrastructural and instructional personnel issues, concerning 
suitability, numbers and programmes. This resulted in numerous complaints from 
parents and trainees, well reported in a local media that was, in general, markedly 
supportive of the SADF.  Fouché also gave a new political direction to the Permanent 
Force (PF) core that included members buoyant with Afrikaner nationalist confidence, 
while others remained explicitly professional. Nationally, although more strident 
Afrikaner nationalism was slowly waning, it found some important common cause 
with the largely conservative WESSAs regarding defence, despite surprise and outrage 
in both communities regarding aspects of their sons’ management by the SADF. 
FOUCHÉ APPOINTED DEFENCE MINISTER
Numerous SADF changes affirmed the NP’s republic goal during the 1950s, but 
defence remained a rather low government priority. Frans Erasmus’s portfolio as 
defence minister was not particularly prized, and neither were defence issues central to 
NP apartheid legislation.  However, as African nationalism accompanying decolonisation 
ignited alongside the intensifying, globalising Cold War, it brought the SADF more 
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Y threats were perceived: black insurrection, communist subversion, and guerrilla warfare 
possibilities.1 Even a conventional warfare ‘African threat’ was seriously mooted with 
intimations thereof accompanied by Third World, UN and Superpower military 
support.2 After the early 1960 post-Sharpeville State of Emergency and the SADF’s 
Citizen Force (CF) call-up, Verwoerd was concerned about the military’s capacity 
to assist in maintaining order. Significant mobilisation and operational problems had 
occurred,3 while the defence force’s capacity needed appraising and stiffening to 
defend against conventional or guerrilla attacks.4 
Appointed in January 1960, Fouché also worked explicitly within the government’s 
belief of communism being at the root of all dangers facing South Africa, which the 
West, he explained, did not fully understand.5 Undoubtedly favoured by Verwoerd for 
his diplomacy, Fouché set about to repair SADF/government distrust and smoothing 
SADF English/Afrikaans conflicts. Erasmus’s politically motivated meddling had 
impacted negatively on the SADF’s image; across the white community, respect for it 
was at a low ebb. Fouché appealed that the SADF be spared from ridicule: 
… we can depend upon our armed forces. We need not refer to them in a 
sneering manner … I regard it as my duty to build up the fighting strength of 
our armed forces.6
In overseeing a more trusted and effective SADF, Fouché was heavily dependent on the 
SADF General Staff, for within senior Afrikaner nationalist political ranks there was a 
complete dearth of military experience. He was assisted by some remaining competent 
senior officers with significant war experience.  These included Commandant General 
(CG) Pieter Grobbelaar, a committed Afrikaner nationalist, and SA Navy Chief, Rear 
Admiral Hugo Biermann, a more apolitical professional, as was Major General Charles 
Fraser,  Army Chief from 1965 and Joint Combat Forces Chief from 1967.7 During a 
Military Academy passing-out parade in December 1960, Grobbelaar announced that 
South Africa could be isolated and urgently needed to build up its forces against any 
enemy.8 Extended conscription for all white school-leaving males had long been called 
for by the ambitious Major General Rudolf Hiemstra, the Inspector General position 
incumbent in 1960 – effectively the third top-ranking SADF officer. Hiemstra had 
outraged with withering contempt the outgoing CG Stephen Melville by writing 
that “there [in the SADF] was a lack of authoritative policy … so that circumstances 
were now bordering on chaos”.9 
Despite the political, historical, economic, cultural and social divisions between 
Afrikaners and WESSAs, the SADF had been identified as an important environment 
for facilitating a common ‘white nationhood’. Fouché, therefore, followed the 1960s 
republican goal, adopting its mildly convincing part-reconciliatory approach or ruse, akin 
to the 1920s-30s Hertzog ‘two-stream policy’, but retaining explicit Afrikaner control. 
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This contrasted with the Anglo-Afrikaner ‘South Africanism’ of the United Party (UP) 
Second World War government era – a supposedly sincere equal collaboration between 
the two language groups, but more Anglo than Afrikaner its opponents maintained. 
Where Erasmus had been reckless, divisive and incompetent, Fouché had to repair and 
build bridges in the SADF and maintain Afrikaner hegemony. From 1960, the SADF 
publication, Commando, paid attention to reporting successful ‘cooperation’ between 
the two language groups at all three services gymnasiums, including publishing a 
percentage breakdown according to the recruits’ language, education, province and 
religious denominations “to illustrate how the gymnasium trainees are representative 
of the different white population and language groups”, generally aligned 60-40 in 
favour of Afrikaners.10 Addressing a predominantly Afrikaans Bloemfontein crowd 
during the 1960 Union Festival celebrations, Fouché commented on the SADF’s 
post-Sharpeville mobilisation: 
… it was … an extremely hopeful and gladdening sign to see how in all the 
Provinces the various English and Afrikaans … Citizen Force units rallied to the 
cause of national security … a praiseworthy spirit of unity for a common cause 
… of self-preservation. … the armed services set a fine example … and it will be 
a good day for all of us … [that] our entire nation could [emulate].11 
Likewise, at the conclusion of a national school cadet competition, Fouché reflected on 
the respective white language groups’ heritages regarding young white South African 
male historical heroes: 
Let the Dick Kings and Dirkie Uys’s … offer each other a brotherly hand on the 
road to a great future. When you return to your different schools remember that 
you coexisted here as future Afrikaans and English citizens of this country … and 
competed … in a spirit of unity. Make the effort to build upon this.12
Often, the SADF was also present whenever the white “reconciliation” theme was 
performed in public: the 11 July 1964 unveiling of the Spioenkop Burger Memorial 
epitomised the popularised concept of the Afrikaner nationalist Republic projecting 
English and Afrikaner as one. State President C.R. Swart referred to the urgency of a 
common white nationhood: 
We are no longer Boer and Brit – we are South Africans … we honour the 
graves on Spioenkop, but we must direct our eyes towards the future.13
Accompanied by much publicity, Fouché made a bold move in 1962 to  “restore” 
WESSA confidence in the SADF by announcing 130 promotions, “warmly received 
in the Defence Force … many English-speaking officers are involved”.14 Fouché’s 
facilitating the re-inclusion of the alienated Defence Force WESSAs was a consistent 
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Y nation-building was reiterated in 1963 during a speech by Stellenbosch University 
Rector, Professor H.B. Thom, at the annual Military Academy passing-out parade. 
He referred to the combining of   WESSA and Afrikaner military traditions, while 
acknowledging that Afrikaners felt until comparatively recently that the Defence 
Force was not “theirs”.  An aggressor would therefore had to reckon with the “full, 
combined potential of both the English-speaker and Afrikaans-speaker”.15 
Wherever practical, the SADF continued to strongly endorse components of Afrikaner 
traditionalism. Scenes in a 1964 Department of Information film affirmed as much: 
a farmer on a tractor staring appreciably upwards at South African Air Force (SAAF) 
Sabre jets flying low overhead, with the film’s closing scene showing a soldier 
guarding the Voortrekker Monument against a sunset backdrop.  The CG had ordered 
that SADF assistance be given to the filmmakers with the production, fitted into 
regular training programmes.16 Significant SADF involvement occurred at Afrikaner 
commemorative ceremonies such as the provision of troops for the annual Day of the 
Covenant commemoration in December 1965. Commando remarked on the soldiers’ 
movement from their Ladysmith base to the Blood River site:
5 SA Infantry Battalion transported the guard of honour easily within fast-
moving troop carriers … to the historic terrain. This modern unit possesses the 
same inspiration … as the wenkommando of Pretorius, which shall echo if the call 
ever comes again.17 
While Erasmus was in his last ministerial months, the UP war veteran MPs escalated 
their attempts to demonstrate government defence mismanagement. One particularly 
heated debate included accusations of SADF political favouritism, resulting in the 
furious trading of insults and accusations of cowardice and fraud.18 However, once 
Fouché took over during the turbulent African and international circumstances, with 
defence matters perceived as linked to the Cold War ideological struggle, the mostly 
WESSA-supported UP faced a dilemma in opposing the NP on defence without 
wanting to appear unrealistic regarding security.  While insisting it viewed the country’s 
security as a top priority, the UP struggled to convince the electorate majority that 
the NP’s defence management was lacking, discovering rather that its space to be 
critical was reduced. During parliamentary defence debates, the NP was seldom 
particularly uncomfortable, despite the UP highlighting strategic problems regarding 
the country’s increasing isolation, aggrieved conscript and parental concerns, and 
SADF operational problems. 
Although he had assured politically-motivated SADF appointments was a thing of the 
past, Fouché still at times continued with Erasmus’s practice,19 either as a compromise 
for NP unity or because of his own convictions that those positioned on merit had 
to be counterbalanced by others “deployed” according to NP preference.20 Hiemstra’s 
grooming for CG is undoubtedly the best example. 
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RUDOLF HIEMSTRA: AFRIKANER NATIONALIST SOLDIER/POLITICIAN
An SAAF pilot in the late 1930s, Hiemstra had self-suspended his career by declining 
on political grounds to take the African Oath whereby Union Defence Force (UDF) 
members consented to war service anywhere on the continent. Hiemstra supported 
the NP position that South Africa should remain neutral in any war between Germany 
and Britain. He resigned after pressure from hostile fellow officers. 
Following the 1948 NP election victory, Hiemstra returned to the military and, initially 
bolstered with Erasmus’s political patronage, renewed his career accompanied with a 
zeal to ‘Afrikanerise’ the UDF.21 In 1949, he was invited to join the Broederbond.22 
Hiemstra was an almost unique civil servant at the NP government’s disposal. 
While hardly the only Afrikaner nationalist senior SADF member, he was the most 
brash in political rhetoric and action, audaciously playing out a public “soldier/
nationalist politician” role, clearly with NP endorsement. This, and his lack of war 
service, meant that Hiemstra’s career was fraught with controversy, drawing regular 
adverse comment from the English-language press, parliamentary opposition and 
amongst some PF personnel.23 
In August 1958, Hiemstra strengthened direct Afrikaner nationalist political involve-
ment within the SADF by initiating the creation of the Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniging 
Volk en Verdediging (AKVV), accepting the position as its first chairman.24 Established 
to ostensibly promote Afrikaans as a military language and to strengthen the 
relationship between Afrikaners and the military,25 the AKVV ensured that Afrikaner 
nationalist commemorations were endorsed with a military presence. The AKVV’s 
existence is some measure of the extent to which the SADF became compliant to NP 
political designs. Cultural and commemorative activities perceived as “too English” 
received much less or no SADF patronage.26 The AKVV’s SADF profile remained 
high throughout the early to mid-1960s, positioning itself to the right of the growing 
verligte or verkrampte NP struggle. By mid-1965, just before Hiemstra assumed his party-
intended CG position, the AKVV ensured that the most strident right-wing variation 
of Afrikaner nationalism enjoyed institutional security and influence. In  mid-1965, 
during an address to the civilian ATKV, the AKVV demonstrated how threatened it 
perceived Afrikanerdom to be. The speech, published in Commando, was paranoid and 
manic, an attitude that must have found traction amongst many personnel working 
with conscripts:
The struggle around us is fierce. There are those who seek our demise with 
violence and economic pressure … they scream for our blood. There is even a 
more subtle attack against us … even within Afrikaner ranks, who want to break 
down our volk on the cultural front and deliver us to those who seek our demise. 
In our literature, in our churches, and at every cultural level … They gnaw at 












   












Y POWER! Its POWER and CULTURE are born out of its love for those things 
that are its own – Its GOD, its LAND, its LANGUAGE, its TRADITIONS, and 
its MORAL VALUES. … The Afrikaner culture was always the salvation of the 
white national element in South Africa …27 [capitalisation in the original]
Commando covered Verwoerd’s death by referring to the slain Premier as being the 
‘Father of the Republic’ and ‘A Giant Amongst our Heroes’.28 Commando subscribers 
were encouraged to purchase copies of a recently published study of  Verwoerd’s life. 
At  the October 1966 funeral of former Ossewabrandwag leader, Hans van Rensberg, 
the SADF provided a guard of honour and pall-bearers.29 
In December 1960, Hiemstra progressed to Deputy CG, alongside sustained personal 
acrimony with newly-appointed CG  Grobbelaar dating back from the 1940s.30 
Hiemstra continued to advocate conscription for all white males from their 18th year, 
resulting in bitter clashes with Erasmus and Hiemstra’s two CG predecessors.31 When 
Fouché passed the CG baton to Hiemstra in October 1965, it was a reward for his 
wartime NP loyalty and assiduously promoting Afrikaner nationalism within the 
SADF – “serendipitously” endorsed by the increased white public interest in defence. 
Hiemstra, who had never even been SAAF Chief, would have battled to secure CG, 
had merit been the sole criteria.32 
The achievement in 1968 of full white conscription was Hiemstra’s most important 
career achievement, and while pursuing it, he never received any resistance from 
Fouché and enjoyed full support from the post-1967 defence minister, P.W. Botha. 
Until his retirement in March 1972, Hiemstra indulged himself with public political 
rhetoric.33 However, by the end of the 1960s, some of the more extreme SADF 
political posturing had diminished, with Commando providing much less space for 
AKVV activities. The organisation lost impetus after Hiemstra, following his CG 
appointment, resigned the organisation’s chairmanship – a severance which Hiemstra 
described as one of his regrets.34 
AFRIKANERS AND THE SADF 
By the early 1960s, Afrikaner perceptions of the formal military had changed 
considerably, yet some negativity still lingered. Thousands living, remembered the 
traumatic Second World War intra-Afrikaner disputes. In contrast to WESSA war 
veterans, Afrikaner ex-servicemen were never honoured within any Afrikaner cultural 
or  institutional forums.35 However, the government had already long given notice 
of military preparation being one of its highest priorities. Die Burger stressed that the 
“southward advance” of decolonisation meant that the white community needed to 
accept that defence planning involved increased public spending and participation: 
“[W]e have little time to put our political, economic and military houses in order.”36
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Within the post-war SADF PF,  Afrikaners dominated the army, increasingly so within 
the SAAF, although not in the navy,37 while Afrikaner and WESSA war veterans were 
still fairly common at senior and middle rank levels. During the previous decade, it 
was not unknown for still-serving war veterans to be viewed with contempt by other 
Afrikaner soldiers whose service dated from before and after 1945. This was in response 
to marked suspicions held during the war years within the UDF and UP government 
towards suspected or known Afrikaner nationalist armed forces members. Even 
post-1948 Afrikaner recruits could be mocked in the street as “khaki’s”.38 In 1962, 
Afrikaner nationalist historian Scholtz wrote: 
… the [negative] relationship that a considerable section of the Afrikaans-speakers 
have maintained towards the Defence Force … [caused] many Afrikaners to 
stand apart regarding (the SADF).39 
A critical component of Fouché’s task was the “mobilization of white consent” 
amongst Afrikaners and WESSAs, to facilitate or persuade them to accept the SADF 
becoming a periodic and potentially very intrusive part of their lives. During the 1950s, 
thousands of Afrikaner males had participated in the reinvigorated skietkommando’s 
and newly established Afrikaans CF units. Skietkommando’s offered a community 
experience compatible with volk heritage, memories and traditions, rather than any 
direct Afrikaner consent to formal militarisation. However, the skietkommando’s also 
enacted a culturally comprehensible military socialisation, assisting in forging a later 
conscription acceptance. 
Another key factor in garnering full Afrikaner conscription consent was the position 
of  Afrikaans churches. During 1960, the Hervormde Kerk leaders had corresponded 
directly with Verwoerd to influence Hiemstra’s appointment to CG,40 but the 
position went instead to Grobbelaar with his wartime combat experience. During 
December 1960, the Dutch Reformed Church and other Afrikaans denominations 
had come under severe pressure from Verwoerd.  Alongside most Afrikaner intellectuals, 
the majority of dominees understood the Republic’s defence to be a “God-given 
national calling”.41 
Hiemstra was determined to inculcate an authentic Afrikaner military image: 
burgerkommando members comprised a heritage befitting a citizen who should also 
be ‘naturally’ affirmative to formal army service.42 He had noted changes placing 
Afrikaners twixt country and town; fitting neither the nineteenth-century rural 
Boer image nor a street-wise urban proletariat. Hiemstra used this to further endorse 
extended conscription, referring to young men with little practice in skietkuns being 
no longer “children of the veld”. However, they were also not “children of the street” 
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Y Hiemstra reminded his audiences how their forefathers had willingly served to ensure 
the current generation’s existence. Because of the “Afrikaner warrior’s” militia mindset 
from Free Burger to armed and mounted Boer, he was “the most outstanding citizen-
soldier of his time”.44 However, the armed and mounted Boer image, long part of 
community collective memory and schools teaching, was not necessarily integrated 
into the priorities of growing numbers of Afrikaner suburban families enjoying the 
economic boom, consumerism pleasures and ambitions for their children. Since 1948, 
Afrikaner socio-economic diversity had changed markedly, but was still behind the 
WESSA community in terms of education levels, university graduates and incomes.45 
In December 1962, Hiemstra drew attention to comparative white prosperity during 
a speech for graduating officers, advising them to respect and seek advice from those 
older officers and non-commissioned officers who had been less privileged.46 
Increased numbers of Afrikaner males were entering university and Hiemstra was 
a regular guest at Afrikaner Studente Bond (ASB) events, his well-received speeches 
inevitably following a hard AKVV-type political line. The Pretoria University ASB 
clearly perceived his opinions as bolstering their own.47 Emphasis was placed on 
“Afrikaner survival” facing threats from “Liberalism, Communism, Jingoism and 
Roman Catholicism”, but also on the need to build prosperity amidst a world of 
revolution and dramatic change.48 Students were strongly cautioned to resist influences 
undermining Christian-National principles.49 When invited on Republic Day in 
1964 to the same university, he reiterated the above, finding a resonance amongst the 
Tukkies student leaders,50 but no doubt at other Afrikaner tertiary institutions, too. 
While Hiemstra’s popularity shows that a strong core of Afrikaner youth readily 
accepted a senior nationalist SADF officer’s explanations of ‘threats’, NP political 
support at Pretoria University did not necessarily translate into a mass student 
military enthusiasm. When appointed CG, Hiemstra received an obsequious letter 
of congratulations from the Regiment Pretoria University’s Commanding Officer, 
Commandant J. A. Vorster: 
For seventeen years this regiment has looked forward … when the SADF would 
be led by a full-blooded South African son. … [the] regiment that has stood 
firmly by these (Afrikaner) ideals … now requires security regarding its future.51 
In 1964, out 10 000 students and 800 lecturers, the unit had just 315 members of 
whom only about thirty percent were actually lecturers, students, or even past students. 
Some Afrikaners clearly also viewed Hiemstra’s CG ascendancy as opportunistic, 
still anticipating political favours supposedly done away with under Fouché. Lt Gen 
W.P. Louw, appointed army chief in 1968 with Broederbond membership from 1962, 
also enjoyed a meteoric career rise like Hiemstra and was perceived by some colleagues 
as “Hiemstra’s man”.52 But Vorster also demonstrated that there was no overwhelming 
interest from students in a university military unit, a trend likely to have been replicated 
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at other Afrikaans universities. There was scant interest by young educated Afrikaners 
for an SADF career – it provided little motivation to shift away from plans to secure 
high paying occupations. Even Commando permitted correspondents to point out the 
SADF failure to effectively market itself: a young officer severely criticised a planned 
military tattoo based around an unimaginative theme of  “Physical Education through 
the Ages”.53
The navy, in particular, struggled with technical manpower shortages, but recruitment 
was also low in the army, and this was severely criticised in parliament. The UP 
attributed it to low salaries and poor management: a provision existed for 20 000 
officers, yet Fouché acknowledged the air force and navy were short by 1 755 and 
1 537  officers respectively, while the army lacked 2 492 officers, 25  percent of the 
approved SADF strength.54 It is not difficult to see that the state’s push for full 
conscription was also motivated by an acute manpower need, just as Hiemstra had 
always claimed. By the mid-1960s, the SADF’s efficiency in all aspects was also not all 
what it seemed, including the SAAF – the military’s best public show-piece.55
THE SADF AND WESSAs 
While Fouché appealed for white unity, his party’s 1961 severance of the British 
connection helped undermine any WESSA identity developing, comparable to that of 
their historical kin in Australia or New Zealand. Constant nationalist baiting of all that 
was British had also edged WESSAs to relinquish, forget or ignore their colonial past 
as one defining component of identity.  Yet, notwithstanding the Erasmus years and 
Afrikaner nationalist state dominance, the 1960s WESSAs were not generally hostile 
to the SADF, with most accepting government explanations regarding the State of 
Emergency call-up and SADF external threat perceptions and mobilisation. These, 
along with Fouché’s reforms, were largely supported or reinforced by the English-
language press.56 
‘Republican unity’ was partly a white racial compromise for national defence.  WESSAs 
were never seriously drawn into the Afrikaner volk structures – neither grouping 
demonstrating any particular interest in it – nor was the civil service ethos adjusted 
to make WESSAs feel the state sector was culturally more accepting of them.57 
However, NP appeals to defend “white civilisation” were more readily heard by 
WESSAs than concerns for “white nationhood”. Political activists to the left of the 
essentially conservative WESSAs were not complimentary. Alan Paton caustically 
referred to English South Africans as “half-willing, half-wry prisoners, moved by self-
interest and the desire for security rather than by that quaint relic known as British 
fair play”.  ARM activist Rudolf  Vigne believed the white English community had 
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Y Africans to the Afrikaner-controlled state as never particularly strong, or at least it was 
weaker than Afrikaner loyalty.59 Did figures like Hiemstra assume or intended that 
compulsory military service would in time help “Afrikanerise”  WESSAs, which the 
Broederbond intimated should be a broader cultural objective?60 Even Anton Rupert, 
a leading Afrikaner businessman whose opinion the government took seriously, 
asserted exclusive Afrikaner leadership, sweepingly maintaining that “English settler 
culture” had not developed any bond of national identity and that it was an Afrikaner 
responsibility to set the pace and course of “nationhood” by the “activation of the 
younger and significantly divergent elements of the population”.61 This would have to 
include the new generations of WESSAs and Afrikaans males conscripted to the SADF. 
By 1960, the NP was also hoping to draw more of the ‘English’ vote as whites observed 
the Congo/Algeria racial violence and resultant panic-stricken white exodus, in turn 
influencing a growing WESSA perception that Britain was betraying both them and 
white Rhodesians: “whiteness” had become more important to WESSAs than their 
“Britishness” and they now increasingly “sought to preserve their position as part of a 
privileged white minority by accepting an implicitly racist consensus with Afrikaner 
nationalism”.62 Seen another way, most WESSAs felt enough (white) South African 
patriotism to be explicitly counted on regarding defence. 
The 1963 Rhodesian Federation collapse prompted the Afrikaans press to appeal 
that the prosperous middle-class WESSAs shift their voting support behind the NP, 
as their identity and class kinsmen, the white Rhodesians, were doing regarding 
Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front.63 In fact, more WESSAs adopted a ‘local Rhodesian 
UDI-type mindset’ and at least tacitly supported the Afrikaner-led republic. Certainly, 
this was some shift away from the WESSA 1939-45 intense hostility towards the NP. 
Numerous regimental histories written during the 1960s record the enthusiasm and 
pride with which ‘English’ CF regiments performed their post-war dutiess. 
WESSAs seeking a military career also had the option of joining the Rhodesian Armed 
Forces. In August 1960, with the SA government’s blessing, visiting Southern Rhodesian 
army representatives recruited men in Durban, Cape Town and Johannesburg for new 
regular all-white army units formed in the wake of the Congo events.64 Good pay 
was an incentive,65 but WESSA considerations joining the Rhodesian Light Infantry 
(RLI) also included the Afrikaner dominance in the SA Army, with the larger number 
of recruits drawn from Natal.66  The RLI troops during the early to mid-1960s mostly 
comprised South Africans. Rhodesian military intelligence had surmised that they 
would resist a post-UDI British invasion.67 
Young WESSA and Afrikaner males encountered one another regularly in school 
sports, compulsory military service and innumerable other contexts.  The communities 
had historically lived cheek by jowl, with many interacting at the deepest social levels 
around urban and rural areas. But undoubtedly this occurred less so than the opposite, 
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where the two groupings lived separate lives and could (and did) harbour jaundiced 
views of the other. Politically disempowered, WESSAs might arguably have been more 
resentful than most Afrikaners regarding military service. But WESSA commitment 
to defence obligations also manifested strongly through an interest in local military 
affairs, stimulated by SADF-sympathetic defence press correspondents, writers of 
military histories and contemporary commentaries, together with connections to the 
culturally familiar CF ‘traditional’ regiments and ex-servicemen organisations such 
as the Moths, Sappers Association and SA Legion.68 World War veterans often held 
prominent positions in business and politics, Harry Oppenheimer69 and De Villiers 
Graaff 70 being two obvious examples. 
WESSA boys’ schools had cadet detachments often a century or more old, besides 
educational cultures retaining the lingering legacy of preparing young men to 
serve the British Empire, a component ensuring them to be ideal training grounds 
for imbuing respect regarding military conformity.71 Community memory long 
anticipated military service and it held a place as time honourably spent with respected 
sacrifices within family histories and community and cultural entities, where a long-
standing community cultural construct also existed whereby military service was 
accepted as a masculine rite of passage.72 A strong social culture of war remembrance 
existed regarding the world wars, with constant reminders thereof through memorials 
scattered amongst schools, churches, universities and city or town public places. 
Unlike Afrikaans universities, ‘English’ universities allowed an academic depth and 
freedom equating their Western counterparts, but WESSA schools and communities 
were much more conservative than reflected in UCT/Wits SRCs or Arts and Social 
Science faculty staff and students.73 A growing minority of  WESSAs had supported 
the NP during the republican referendum and the 1966 general election74 and, as 
with their political choices, WESSAs were also hardly homogenous. Conscription 
meant drawing WESSAs from different sections – public and private schools, class 
distinctions, rural and city, church denominations and religions, including Jews and 
Jehovah’s Witnesses.75 
Just as the NP government after 1948 was determined to ensure preferential opportunities 
for Afrikaners in state employment, creating work environments sometimes perceived 
by WESSAs as culturally uncongenial, by 1960, numerous WESSAs viewed the regular 
military likewise.  Although there were still WESSAs seeking careers in the navy and air 
force, comparatively few entered the army, which received the bulk of the compulsory 
trainees. But “traditional’ regiments received their share of men, ensuring a new lease 
of  life for WESSA military involvement. 
Some SADF military intelligence reports expressed concern that balloted non-
Afrikaners could include subversive elements. In April 1963, a confidential report 
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Y become active in the spreading of subversive propaganda.76 Urban white Afrikaners 
were “part-quarantined” through separate educational, cultural and commercial 
organisations,77 but if conscription presented challenges from potential sedition, it also 
provided an opportunity for stressing government political imperatives to WESSAs. 
From 1968, the reinforcing of communism’s role in military, civil, moral and social 
threats became even more apparent during Botha’s defence ministership. Judging 
from press letters, journalistic comment and the opinions of parliamentary opposition 
members, it is clear that WESSAs were also committed to understanding the Cold 
War as being explicitly Soviet driven, with South Africa the chief target of communist 
designs in Africa.
With Afrikaner social structures being culturally more autarkic and authoritarian, 
there was less of the conflict-filled generation attitudinal gap existent then across the 
Western world and already marginally discernible amongst young WESSAs. Afrikaner 
national servicemen, most particularly in the army, entered a military environment 
better tailored for them through a largely Afrikaner officer/non-commissioned 
officer corps. However, it is unlikely that many WESSA national servicemen felt the 
desperation of acclaimed writer J.M.  Coetzee to the prospect of military service 
during 1960.78 
As WESSAs felt the early-1960s white anxieties of  African internal revolution and racial 
violence, it tended to also mute any loud objections that may have been felt against 
the government increasing its conscription demands in 1962 and 1968. The forced 
republican change of military titles and insignia did not dull enthusiasm within CF 
‘English’ units.79  The Cape Town Highlanders, for example, were pleased to hear that 
Fouché had no intention of interfering with their British originated traditions80 and 
received their new colours from Hiemstra81 whom its members would have openly 
despised two decades earlier. Lt Gen Gleeson, who attested in 1953, remarked that 
during the 1960s, republican changes upset some, but on the whole the “main officer 
group … got on with the job”.82 Within the republic context, WESSA military 
traditions continued virtually unchanged. 
After initial “republic hesitations”, the English-language press displayed a different tone 
on defence to that of the 1950s, for example, the Cape Times reported enthusiastically 
on the local 1962 trainees’ experiences: 
There are boys from Bishops Court and boys from Woodstock; English-speaking 
youths from the cities and Afrikaans-speaking from the platteland, working and 
living together in the rugged, healthy atmosphere of the army camp.83 
With the mooting of further extended compulsory service for all school-leaving 
white males of age, the media projected the WESSA community as supportive: 
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High-school youths of call-up age … interviewed by the Cape Times yesterday 
endorsed the general agreement among industrialists, businessmen, school 
principals and defence experts that the proposed ‘100-per-cent call-up’ was 
preferable to the present ballot system for the CF.84 
English-language newspapers reflecting their white readers views and even wary 
of differing from the government on defence issues, took a generally conservative 
and supportive view.85 At the end of 1965, the Cape Times published two lengthy 
articles by the military historian, Neil Orpen, an influential 1960s military analyst 
read in government and SADF circles. Orpen showed identification and empathy 
with the Boer struggle against British Imperialism, comparing it with white South 
Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories facing current African and world 
hostility.86 Orpen’s views reinforced the government’s ‘backs to the wall’ philosophy, 
demonstrating that whites were aware of the military’s growing prominence.87 In 1967, 
inspired by the history of Boer guerrilla forces during 1900-1902, Orpen published 
a book titled Total Defence,88 collated articles he had written concerning his envisaged 
role of the SADF commandos in the event of a foreign invasion. 
AFRIKAANS/WESSA RELATIONS: SOME OBSERVATIONS
To illustrate whites drawing closer through conscription, the SADF published 
selected letters in Commando affirming its successes. Emphasis was placed on ‘English’ 
servicemen successfully integrating and developing a better understanding of the 
Afrikaans community,89 without ever any hint suggesting the reverse. Confirmation 
of military service ‘benefits’ purportedly even came from within components of the 
‘English’ academic environment. It was reported to the CG that, at UCT’s medical 
school, a professor had stated that students having undergone military service 
turned out better doctors and citizens, while a proposal by the University’s ‘Medical 
Association’ to approach the government for medical students’ military exemption 
had been defeated.90 In the same year (1963), the Pretoria University rector, Professor 
Rautenbach, expressed serious misgivings about military training occurring between 
school and university, an issue sensitive enough for Fouché to challenge him 
immediately, resulting in the University administrator quickly retreating.91 Clearly, 
political pressure had ‘corrected’ Rautenbach, however, non-political dissension with 
military service was a reality Fouché and his officials had to come to terms with. 
Fouché’s SADF “nation-building” had not received unanimous Afrikaner approval; 
antipathy remained in certain contexts and circumstances. By early 1962, white 
urbanisation and the white nation-building theme contributed to the establishment of 
25 English-language commando units,92 prompting a badge amendment.  The single 
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Y OC, Commandant Frans Cronje, complained angrily via his MP about this 
‘undermining’ of Afrikaner Commando identity to appease the ‘English’. According to 
Cronje, the reason why defence authorities had changed the badge was to ensure that 
“ we [Afrikaners] dare not offend our ‘English friends’ … Commandos remind them 
of the English war and how the Boer Commandos mowed them down”.93 Insisting 
that, during a 1964 conference, the attending Commando Officers had in unison 
supported restoration of the original badge, Cronje also reminded SADF officialdom 
that he was a Boer War general’s grandson, and slated WESSAs supposed reluctance 
to accept symbolic changes accommodating the republic: “Somewhere within the 
SADF,  there was violent opposition that was putting this ‘thing’ aside … We Afrikaners 
have to throw away all our traditions to win the goodwill of the English-speakers.”94 
On a similar theme, the wife of an Afrikaner SADF member received a stinging 
response when she suggested that it would be preferable if two separate Defence 
Force wives organisations existed for English and Afrikaans members, with a possible 
future single organisation uniting both under the common embracement of Afrikaner 
culture.95 The above examples are unlikely to have been exceptions. Clearly not all 
intra-white tensions had been smoothed over by Fouché’s appeals, and conscripts from 
both language groups entered an organisation still rife with such attitudes. 
In contrast, former trainee correspondents (except one)96 recalled relations between 
English and Afrikaans troops as good, with all remembering their understanding the 
country’s threats as “communist-inspired”. The religious denomination divergence of 
servicemen had obvious implications for any project attempting to mould a common 
“white-nation”. Although the permanent force chaplaincy was dominated by the 
DRC97 in terms of worship facilities, time and diet, the SADF dutifully covered all 
denominations and the Jewish faith.98 Some groupings such as Anglicans were already 
strongly critical of government racial policies, but only towards the late 1970s were 
there louder objections from them and other ‘English churches’ towards the political 
controversies surrounding National Service.99
Inevitably, tension regarding “white cooperation" also existed within the NP.  Albert 
Hertzog’s insulting of  WESSAs constituted one of the reasons given by John Vorster 
for Hertzog’s 1969 expulsion from the party.100 The SADF persisted with their 
promotion of a ‘white nationhood’ through the repeated emphasis on ‘English’ and 
Afrikaner conscripts working successfully together as one ‘nation’. by the end of the 
1960s, some of the ultra-nationalistic promotion of Afrikaner symbolism within the 
SADF had become slightly more toned down. 
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SADF PERCEPTIONS OF THE WHITE COMMUNITY: EARLY 1960s 
Military Intelligence (DMI) attempted to assess the white population’s capacity to 
respond effectively to military threats, both conventional and guerrilla. Some appraisals 
(1963) reported that it was not entirely certain if whites could face potential sustained 
enemy subversion:  “There are indications that the volk’s will to succeed and willingness 
to accept necessary suffering is not as strong as is generally presumed.” There were 
risks of frustrations predominating, ultimately creating an outlook (amongst whites) 
“that at some or other stage they (the ‘revolutionary forces’) will get what they 
want.  This aspect should be further investigated.”101 Because all attempts to combat 
subversion were essentially defensive, it implied that this could result in frustration 
and a defeatist attitude.102 There was speculation about a conservative component of the 
volk not viewing possible assistance from neighbouring states (Portuguese or Rhodesia) 
as necessary, with potentially negative consequences.103 The suggestion was that some 
Afrikaners were complacent and lacked insight regarding local military threats. 
How such deductions were determined was not explained, but one fear was that 
volkseenheid and nationalism were waning. As Afrikaners increasingly consolidated 
around their urban identity, new ‘dangers’ ‘lurked’ – phenomena perceived as 
disseminated readily from within the city environment: “Atheism; Internationalism; 
Liberalism; Materialism”.104 The NP understood these issues as directly connected with 
the ‘communism’ supposedly behind military threats. With many Afrikaner conscripts 
coming into the SADF from the same cities as their WESSA counterparts, the military 
showed growing concerns about a decadent misguided youth. Commando reported on 
a parade containing members from the final balloted draft during 1967: 
The public enjoy military parades … not only [to] stimulate national pride … 
but also [to] counter the despondency that has grown over the beatniks, hippies 
and other human oddities that prowl our city streets and haunt coffee bars.105
‘Materialism’ had also not escaped the concerns of military chiefs – already in May 
1961, the SA Navy Chief-of-Staff, Rear Admiral Hugo Biermann, referred to his 
perceptions of young whites’ priorities:
… concentrated training in the armed forces could only be of benefit … Modern 
youth in South Africa has too many bioscopes, too many Elvis Presleys and too 
much money …106 
Reflecting during a 1959 Day of the Covenant speech upon the marked distance 
between the increasingly ‘indulged’ 1960s volk and his generation, Hiemstra lashed 
out at parents who assumed military service was the panacea for difficult sons in an 
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Y people of today are the responsibility of their parents and it is misguided to think 
that the Defence Force … can correct what these parents have  spoilt.”107 Hiemstra 
was referring to a persistent popular assumption within the military, political and 
public domains that ‘army life’ straightened out anti-social behaviour. Early  1962, 
a reporter, interviewing an instructor staff sergeant, wrote the following about 
Oudtshoorn trainees:
I [the reporter] was assured that ‘ducktails’ and ‘milkbar cowboys’ presented no 
problems in camp. They arrive here … but … soon have the nonsense knocked 
out of them – usually by the trainees themselves, … For them, it is a period of 
abstinence and rigid discipline. What mother and the coloured servant did for 
them before, they now have to do themselves.108 
‘Milk bars’ were popular 1960s white urban youth ‘hang-out’ locations and it prompted 
the perception that military experience might rehabilitate young men who displayed 
bad behaviour. In June 1964,  J.F. Schoonbee, the NP MP for Pretoria District, claimed 
that idle youths and gangs should be conscripted into the army, where “scum was 
eliminated, and ducktails were turned into decent people”.109 Justice Minister Vorster 
mooted the 1930s Special Service Battalion concept of a youth battalion rehabilitating 
young white male offenders, emphasising the need for military discipline being 
enforced upon young white men between the ages of 18 and 30, further expressing 
concern that, compared to just 47 white woman prisoners nationally, there were 
about 60 000 white male prisoners, who should “sweat out their penalties on the 
parade ground”.110 Schoonbee went so far as to state his concerns in a non-racial 
commonality: 
Whether black, brown or White, youths should not be allowed to run wild and 
grow ripe for communism. Even if they were given nothing more than to clean 
the guns they should be kept off the street.111
While military conscription constituted one component whereby the state exerted 
some control over forging a degree of white political and cultural uniformity,112 but 
this compulsion to serve also created resentment and enthusiasm from within both 
white WESSAs and Afrikaners. A uniform reaction from either cannot be generalised, 
although the dominant joint response was certainly conformity with the law. 
BALLOT CONSCRIPTION EXEMPTION GRIEVANCES 
Amongst many prospective trainees and their parents, there was no end of efforts to 
legally evade or postpone call-ups, usually without success. Both language groupings 
exhibited confidence in their parliamentary representatives’ capacity to influence.113 
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However, only the exemption board possessed the necessary legal power, insisting 
that even a ministerial recommendation required support by “relevant facts”.114 
University candidates had to complete military obligations first, causing consternation 
amongst parents anxious that their sons’ post-matric study should not be interrupted. 
Future teachers received special exemption if willing to undergo a school cadet 
officer’s course.115 
The SADF responded to the numerous exemption applications with lecturing 
letters explaining the impracticality of making exceptions; how critical the country’s 
defence was; and that the military dealt with scores of such applications. Rejecting a 
university study application followed a standardised process. J.F. du Plessis’s example 
typically demonstrates the resentment felt by some families: his mother rationalised 
that military service might malign her son’s study habits and expressed indignation 
at just receiving a ‘rolled-off ’ refusal letter. When her representations failed, she wrote 
directly to Verwoerd, pleading that ‘JF’ intended qualifying as a chemical engineer. She 
inquired why teachers received exemption and whether their profession was more 
important than “science”.116 Her detailed and personalised response from the Defence 
Secretary contained the predictable content – thousands of identical applications were 
received and any policy exceptions would set a “dangerous precedent” – followed by 
a lesson on patriotism.117 
Ballot administrative dogmatism was mixed with clumsiness, for example, three future 
chartered accountants complained that, although never balloted at school, they had 
all received later call-ups making it difficult for them to complete their professional 
internships.118 An anonymous complainant in a similar position detailed spending his 
period of service living in a tent, unable to study properly by candle-light, enduring 
poor food, unhygienic toilets, uncurbed stealing, inadequate leave and abusive officers.119 
Medical exemptions could also be managed in a tardy, insensitive style: UP MP  Van 
der Byl reported a case of a recruit who had been declared medically unfit and whose 
elder brother by tragic coincidence had been shot while doing training. No official 
inquest had been held nor any form of compensation granted to the family, but the 
younger brother, despite a medical certificate posted three months earlier, had still 
been informed to report for duty. Van der Byl wrote that this was “typical of the 
slackness … in replying to correspondence ”. Although the said soldier eventually 
received the exemption, he was kept waiting for three months, leaving him and his 
family “in anxiety”.120 Yet, in selective situations, the SADF could also be pragmatic; 
farmers might be disadvantaged if a needed son was called up: After being denied 
leave, M.J. de Kock deserted after six months to assist his ill father on their farm.  This 
matter was considered important enough for the CG to be kept informed, and 
documentation consulted suggested SADF sensitivity and fairness, but also caution 
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COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE SADF
With the readjusted 1962 ballot resulting in greater trainee numbers, MPs received 
very substantial grievance representation appeals regarding poor treatment, inadequate 
facilities and boredom; already Tempe had achieved particular notoriety with 
complaints of inadequate water.122 The press also reported on scores of incidents 
concerning alleged assaults and the general brutal treatment of conscripts.  A significant 
letter, directed privately to the defence minister, came from J.A. Fourie, principal 
of Afrikaanse Hoër Seunskool (AHS), based upon communications with numerous 
ex-students. Fourie affirmed support for military service, but challenged Fouché on 
concerns regularly expressed by numerous complainants: 
Almost without exception, the boys explain … that they waste a great deal of 
time; … that they are often involved … in paltry things like washing dishes 
for several weeks; … I get the impression that there is not a proper plan for 
instruction over the entire period of training … 
A second issue … are complaints about the non-commissioned officers who 
have to give instruction, and where it is done in such a manner that (it causes) 
undermining of respect and authority … the above allegations are so regularly 
forthcoming that truth could well be hidden therein, and I feel our Defence 
Force … is developing a reputation that is unworthy, and it cannot.123 
In 1965, AHS drew its boys from amongst families that included senior politicians, 
professionals and civil servants, like then Justice Minister John  Vorster.124 Conceivably, 
Fourie was also describing frustrations demonstrating the increasing class divisions 
amongst white Afrikaners. Such allegations threatened to mar the public’s view of  both 
SADF and military training, subverting the country’s largely citizen-based defence.
UP parliamentarians wrote regularly on behalf of their constituents, repeatedly stressing 
they would not assist anyone perceived as attempting to evade military service. UP MP 
Gay reported in parliament that parents were “ringing up Defence headquarters 
… say[-ing] they are not prepared to let their sons go … under conditions such as 
those exposed in the Press”.125 Headmaster Clarke of Rondebosch Boys’ High 
School, through De Villiers Graaff, confirmed Fourie’s deductions that later stages 
of training were marked by poorly utilised time.  Conclusively, it seemed the SADF 
was not sufficiently organised to properly occupy the trainees or even accommodate 
them properly: 
The general slackness in the latter part of the training period has been raised 
from many quarters and all we can get from the Minister [off the record] is that 
while he has not yet adequate facilities for intensive training during the whole 
period of service, he feels compelled to hold trainees for the full period so as to 
have a large force underarms for security reasons. This, of course, is not public 
property and we cannot get him to say it publicly at the moment.126 
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Fouché had stated in 1960 that training existed principally to deal with internal 
security, but this was amended by later defence appraisals outlining potential external 
threats.127 Maintaining large trained troop numbers with resultant problems was 
directly connected to SADF threat appraisals. The increased call-ups and service 
duration implemented from 1962 had been intended to ensure the constant 
availability of trained troops within ‘Full-Time Force’ units.128 The SADF was 
severely criticised for poor management: UP MP Vause Raw accusing Fouché of 
over-conscripting, despite PF personnel being unable to cope with unsatisfactory 
training in consequence – three months “square-bashing, three months training” with 
the last three months “ wasted because of excessive … numbers. 16 000  men were 
drawn out [of] the economy but without proper utilization; companies commanded 
by lieutenants, during the winter over 1964 men in Bloemfontein were not issued 
with their winter clothing”.129 Another complaint pattern concerned the trainees’ 
enthusiasm stunted by poor management and abusive instructors.130 An anonymous 
parent wrote undated complaints about her son’s experiences in the navy, including 
lack of control in Lourenço Marques; trainees visited a brothel and were ordered to 
receive ‘VD injections’. This complaining mother inquired why the “boys” were not 
properly supervised:  “[T]hey are not yet permanent force – nor are they adult.”131 
Other complaints were lack of responsibility by officers and non-commissioned 
officers while on watch duty and cruelty towards the ship’s dog.132 
These views are in stark contrast to what Lt Gen Dutton, who commanded a Bloem-
fontein training unit during the mid-1960s, expressed concerning its programmes. The 
distance between the commander and his men can be considerable in terms of training 
experiences, but the many archived complaints from the public may have been less 
apparent in Dutton’s camp: 
From the point of view of  discipline, I was at all times most satisfied with our 
standard. I had a large staff of officers, WOs and NCOs, all of whom were well 
trained, experienced and reliable.133
In 1965, Fouché formally addressed public complaints regarding the SADF and trainees 
through the Groenewoud Committee.134 Additionally, MPs were requested to submit 
their complaints to a Commission of  Inquiry.  Two years later, the committee resolved to 
support Hiemstra’s call for military national service being extended to all white male 
school leavers.
COMPLAINTS REGARDING ASSAULTS
Parent complaints of brutality and cruelty inflicted upon their sons by instructors 
were the most serious fielded by an SADF increasingly alerted to protect its 
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Y on behalf of Josef Davids, a 19-year-old rejected for PF service on the grounds of 
civilian court convictions. The SADF pointedly informed Davids that they did not 
want impressionable young conscripts mixed alongside PF members with dubious 
reputations.135 A correspondent, balloted for service in Walvis Bay during 1962, 
remarked on his disillusionment with non-commissioned officers boasting about 
their dagga smoking to trainees.136 A father wrote a particularly strong letter about 
his son’s experiences at the Air Force Gymnasium where he had been injured during 
training, describing recruits having their faces pushed into their own vomit and 
cartilage damage caused to several men due to brutal drilling.137 Such bad conduct, 
suggesting ill-suited personalities given instruction duties, is corroborated by many 
other accounts. In a 1961 “Memorial Album” for the Air Force Gymnasium, some 
of the photos provide glimpses of the institutional culture, one illustrating a recruit 
having to drink a ‘doctored’ cold drink during ‘Boeresport’.138 The NP MP for 
Wolmaransstad confirmed that his colleagues received numerous trainee complaints 
and demanded that bad language be eradicated in the SADF and that soldiers should 
not fear their superiors.139 
Equally serious grievances came from the father of a 1964 ballotee describing an abuse 
level which was unlikely to have been an exception.The complainant, who held a “very 
senior position in a well-known scholastic institution”,140 related a series of events 
witnessed or endured by his son during training at Diepkloof. Allegations included 
physical assault on a trainee by a PF corporal, the victim also being compelled to 
run along cattle kraal walls with full pack throughout the morning. At the end of the 
exercise, this man was further punished by being “placed under close arrest” and forced 
to run with sandbags after refusing to get into a hole the corporal had threatened to 
bury him in. Later, when the troops drove through a “coloured reserve,” a corporal 
ordered them to “arrest” a “coloured bystander” and several children from nearby 
houses. Some soldiers participated, while others refused. Eventually, at their camp all 
of the captives were released, although they were “shot at with blank ammunition” as 
they ran away. During a night attack exercise later, instructors allegedly assaulted one 
recruit and threw stones at others. The trainee’s company did not receive breakfast on 
three occasions during the exercise as punitive measures for allegedly not cooperating. 
The report concluded by stating that nothing came out of the above man’s arrest.141 
It is notable that many trainees and parents showed faith in the parliamentary 
constituency system’s role of representing citizens grievances, expressing outrage that 
the SADF could be a place where violence against conscripts seemed to be prevalent 
and increasing. Also intimated in these complaints was a willingness to support 
military service, but with expectations of appropriate instruction. However, it is also 
notable that the majority of   Van der Byl’s complainants insisted to remain anonymous. 
During the same year (1964), Fouché received correspondence signed by Grobbelaar 
concerning similar complaints about instructors. A board, appointed to investigate, 
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found six incidents where ballotees’ complaints were verified and accepted evidence, 
supporting four incidents concerning swearing and bad language alongside eight 
incidents of assault. One instructor was found guilty of blasphemy, while disciplinary 
steps were being taken against an officer, a warrant officer and six non-commissioned 
officers. Grobbelaar reported to the Minister that because of previous complaints he 
had appointed a senior officer board to investigate certain aspects of training, and 
particularly the issue of time being allegedly wasted.142 
One of the clear problems during the 1960s was that, although the SADF also utilised 
CF instructors, much of this work was under junior PF members’ control. There was 
not only a shortage of PF instructors, but a dearth of quality, particularly amongst 
non-commissioned officers. Later, army chief Magnus Malan remarked during the 
early 1970s that “if he could not have an army of good permanent force sergeants, 
then it would be better to have an army of good national service corporals”.143 The 
inference was of problems that dated back to the 1960s. 
Yet, despite complaints, the SADF continued to become pervasive within white South 
Africans lives. By mid-1966, new Minister of Defence P.W. Botha was capitalising 
on that. Addressing the Rapportryers Club in Porterville, Botha made specific 
references to employers needing to support their workers’ SADF obligations. More 
specifically, Botha emphasised that the white youth should view military service as 
a patriotic duty that promoted the “physical and spiritual well-being” of the nation. 
The view of compulsory military service had shifted since 1960; it now possessed a 
louder nationalistic purpose as opposed to army duty for internal defences. Within 
six years, Botha was making grandiose statements such as: “South Africa has a 
right to expect enthusiasm for her Defence Force from every patriotic citizen”,144 
a considerable change from 1960 when Die Burger cautioned that the government 
should carefully approach the issue of extending national service. By the late 1960s, 
the SADF senior officer mindsets were shifting towards understanding revolutionary 
and counterinsurgency warfare, following Major General Fraser’s important study on 
that, closely read and approved of by Botha.145 
THE 1960s SADF IN PUBLIC:  
ENTERTAINMENT, PRIDE, PROPAGANDA AND REASSURANCE 
Military prowess was projected as an important manifestation of republican nationhood 
by a supportive media that reported on military displays, showcasing the SADF 
as a force to be reckoned with. Future trainees and parents imbibed the patriotic 
atmosphere associated with these shows, accompanied by numerous other whites 
in very large numbers, motivated by a mixture of national pride and entertainment 
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Y A very significant example occurred two months after the March 1960 unrest at 
the main training area outside Bloemfontein. A 70 000 white crowd witnessed the 
firepower of tanks, field artillery, aircraft, and an infantry battalion, followed by a 
braaivleis and display of  “searchlight aerobatics”.146 This SADF spectacular reassured 
white insecurities during a nationally unsettled period. The event’s importance was 
emphasised by the presence of   Verwoerd accompanied by his cabinet, making his first 
public appearance after an assassination attempt.147 The frequency of  SADF exhibitions 
and live ammunition demonstrations definitely increased after 1960,148 public viewing 
of new arms arrivals, particularly ships, were guaranteed to draw big crowds and 
usually received front page publicity. When the last of the navy’s new frigates docked 
in Cape Town on 26 September 1964, people lined Signal Hill and surrounding 
heights to observe it met by four other warships and several aircraft formations. 
Die Vaderland spoke of  “the biggest demonstration of South Africa’s maritime strike 
power yet seen.”149
SADF chiefs clearly comprehended the usefulness of military spectacles and exploited 
the SADF’s capacity to stage them, bolstering further public interest, patriotism and 
the incipient ‘popularisation’ for the SADF, while arms acquisitions were open to 
inspection by white tax-payers. Various civic organisations regularly called upon the 
SADF to perform on supposedly notable occasions. Many requests had to be rejected, 
like one from the Harrismith Municipality in June 1964, asking for a display of jet 
fighters to mark the occasion of the opening of a new tar road to the Rand.150 When 
Hiemstra addressed the exclusive Durban ‘Wings’ Club, the accompanying show, 
including a huge SAAF aerial display, were watched by 180 000 people.151
With the SADF often the dominant presence at large commemorative and national 
occasions, businesses also saw profit in associating themselves with the growing SADF 
public presence. The South African Mutual Life Assurance Company produced a 
well-carried full-page advertisement, portraying three of the SAAF’s new Buccaneers 
jets.152 A June 1967 BP advertisement presented a display feature titled ‘BP Salutes our 
Fleet’,153 and popular magazines increasingly ran lengthy, informative and admiring 
articles on the SADF.154 
THE SADF’s ROLE IN THE 1966 REPUBLIC DAY FESTIVITIES 
The most spectacular SADF public display occurred in Pretoria during the fifth 
republic anniversary celebrations in May 1966. Hiemstra wanted a parade that would 
compare to the Bastille Day equivalent, and in posterity wrote that it had signalled to 
“black nations of Africa who had thought … they could take us over … not after that 
day”.155 Thousands watched a march-past of nearly 20 000 troops, columns of several 
armoured vehicles, trucks and artillery, while dozens of aircraft thundered across 
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the  sky.156 It was an impressive military display intended to confirm to whites the 
Republic’s success and security.  The celebrations finale centred round the Voortrekker 
Monument, recalling its triumphant opening in 1949: 
Before sunrise, already thousands of people were huddled around camp fires 
… the air was thick with smoke and the aroma of coffee. Flags fluttered in the 
breeze, a carnival atmosphere prevailed, and the military organisers worked hard 
to control the arriving crowds.157
The military proceedings easily dominated other programme items and an admiring 
national press responded accordingly: “On parade for peace” wrote the Cape Times 
editorial with a bold front-page headline: “S.A. Shows World her Might”. The press 
intimated that Verwoerd’s intention was peace, shared by “all South Africans”,158 
while the parade was also a white celebration of militarised nationalist fervour.159 
Verwoerd’s speech was focused on white unity and resolve in the face of outside, 
particularly African, hostility.160 The Star spoke of the spectacle grandeur, headlining 
it as “South Africa Shows Might in Vast Parade”.161 The Cape Times reported on 
hundreds crowding to board the new navy frigates at the city docks,162 giving the 
SADF further prominence in a ‘Festival Supplement’ that commented favourably 
on the organisation’s marked growth since 1960/1961.163 The 1966 Republic Day 
parade was an effective public relations exercise as compulsory full white male military 
conscription loomed.
Callistair deduced that by 1967 national service was one under sufferance by some, 
citing comments by the retiring Chief of the Army, General Jacobs, complaining of 
substantial trainees entering the military “in a spirit of resistance”.164 This point is valid 
in that, for many, the military was for varied reasons perceived as a much resented 
intrusion into their personal lives. But there was also no significant wide public 
resistance – SADF ‘popularisation’ had in fact triumphed. By 1966, the Cape Times 
referred optimistically to changing public attitudes: 
Another important change … has come into the attitude of the ordinary man 
in the street towards the armed forces. Previously he was inclined to look down 
upon them. This was all changed and now he takes a real interest.165 
Afrikaner nationalists from the 1960s started likening their historical struggle to that 
of Jewish Zionist aspirations to protect Israeli independence.166 After the Six-Day 
War in 1967, it was discussed how small, determined states with a “dedicated citizen 
army” and “economic and technical strength” could survive against “overwhelming 
odds”. Articles on the Israeli armed forces became more prominent in Commando. 
Like the IDF’s assimilation of Jews from different traditions and diaspora regions, the 
SADF arguably performed a similar role with Afrikaans and WESSA trainees and, by 
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Y This compared to the “sneers” Fouché referred to in 1960, while the SADF remained 
“captured” by the NP, ensuring national service obligations were blended with a loud 
patriotism definition, strictly within this political party’s terms and objectives. Whether 
whites during the 1960s would have fought en mass against an invader to maintain 
political control is not clear.167 However, this was likely, considering the conformism 
of the time and the interest, besides involvement in the military, by large sections 
of the community. The mobilisation of South African white consent for the SADF 
during the 1960s was prompted by deliberate policy decisions and there is also no 
doubt that whites in general were receptive rather than obstructive.
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INTRODUCTION
The Kavango Department of Education, at the behest of the government of South 
West Africa (SWA), ordered the creation of a local youth movement during 1975. 
The primary aim of the Kavango Jeugbeweging (youth movement) was to prevent 
the spread of communist propaganda, foster a sense of Kavango nationalism, and 
limit the political influence of the South West Africa People’s Organisation (Swapo) 
amongst the local Kavango youth. The Institute for African Studies (IAS) at the then 
Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education (PU for CHE) played a 
crucial role in the formative years of the movement, by providing key sociocultural 
knowledge on the ‘human terrain’ of the Kavango people to the government of SWA. 
The creation of this movement coincided with the start of the conventional military 
involvement of the South African Defence Force (SADF) in the Angolan Civil War 
during 1975, as well as with the escalation of the Swapo insurgency in northern SWA. 
The South African Government hence developed a total national strategy to combat 
these threats in the military, social, political, economic and educational spheres. The 
Kavango Jeugbeweging formed an integral part of this strategy in the Kavangoland. 
There has been an exponential increase in revolutionary wars and insurgencies in 
Africa since the end of the Second World War. These insurgencies, often referred to 
as the wars of decolonisation, were mainly waged by African liberation movements 
intent on securing their independence from European colonial powers. As such, some 
European counterinsurgency campaigns were waged across Africa before the former 
colonies gained their independence.1 An insurgency is defined as:
… an organised, violent and politically motivated activity conducted by non‑state 
actors and sustained over a protracted period that typically utilises several 
methods, such as subversion, guerrilla warfare and terrorism, in an attempt to 
achieve change within a state.2 
Insurgencies may have many aims, the most common being to gain control of territory, 
pursue the resolution of a grievance or to seek the overthrow of the existing political 
authority. The origins of insurgencies may be ideological, religious, ethnic, sectarian, 
class‑based, or more generally, a combination of all these factors. Counterinsurgency, 
on the other hand, is defined as:
… [the] military, law enforcement, political, economic, psychological and civic 
actions taken to defeat an insurgency, while addressing the root causes.3 
In counterinsurgency operations, the front lines are often blurred; there is no 
distinguishable enemy and often no clear end. It is a war waged amongst the people. 
The success of counterinsurgency operations is also often difficult to measure, and the 
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Y According to historian Leopold Scholtz, South Africa fought three distinct wars 
during apartheid. The first war was fought against the African National Congress 
(ANC) insurgency within South Africa, with limited cross‑border operations by South 
African security force personnel into Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Swaziland 
and Lesotho to thwart the movement and its armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). 
The second was the counterinsurgency war fought against Swapo in SWA and 
Southern Angola. The SADF directed the mainstay of the South African security force 
operations in this war against the armed wing of Swapo, the People’s Liberation Army 
of Namibia (PLAN). The third was a conventional war waged by the SADF against 
the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and its armed forces, the 
People’s Armed Forces of Liberation of Angola (Fapla). The SADF became involved 
in this war in 1975 when it intervened in the Angolan Civil War.5 The focus of this 
chapter is however on the counterinsurgency war fought against Swapo in northern 
SWA and southern Angola by the South African security forces.
Abel Esterhuyse argues that the very nomenclature surrounding the South African 
military involvement in SWA and Angola remains extremely problematic. According 
to him, the labels ‘Border War’ or ‘Bush War’ are often used interchangeably, although 
there is a clear distinction between the two wars. Esterhuyse further states that the 
South African counterinsurgency war against Swapo was unconventional, and 
primarily fought inside SWA with some pre‑emptive and follow‑up operations into 
Angola and Zambia. This war is more commonly referred to as the Border War. The 
initial South African military involvement in support of the National Union for the 
Total Independence of Angola (Unita) in the Angolan Civil War, in contrast, was 
largely conventional in orientation and had an explicit strategic defensive purpose. It 
was also primarily directed against Fapla and their Cuban military allies within Angola. 
This war is more commonly referred to as the Bush War. He argues that the majority 
of the available literature on the South African involvement in both of these wars are 
also problematic, in that they romanticise South Africa’s role in both wars, and often 
seek ideological justification for the country’s involvement in them. He concludes 
that these works also clearly disregard the complex nature of both wars, by actively 
ignoring the participation of the Angolans, Namibians, Cubans and the Soviets in the 
conflict.6 Two of the most recent South African works that appeared on these wars are 
South Africa’s ‘Border War’: Contested Narratives and Conflicting Memories 7 written by Gary 
Baines, and A Far-Away War: Angola, 1975-1989 8 edited by Ian Liebenberg amongst 
others. These two publications are refreshingly liberal in outlook, and despite some 
flaws provide a counterpoint to the mainly conservative, and at times hagiographic, 
‘drum and trumpet’ or campaign histories on the South African military involvement 
in SWA and Angola.
Despite those mentioned above, the South African counterinsurgency war in northern 
SWA has received some scholarly attention over the past thirty years. Some of the 
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more notable works include those authored by Francis Toase,9 John Turner,10 Anita 
Gossmann,11 Abel Esterhuyse and Evert Jordaan,12 Kersti Larsdotter,13 Richard Dale,14 
and Leopold Scholtz.15 The majority of these scholarly works are, however, primarily 
focused on the South African security force operations against PLAN insurgents, and 
have measured the conduct of the war against well‑established counterinsurgency 
theories. As such, one often overlooks the social, political, economic and administrative 
elements of counterinsurgency warfare. Lieneke de Visser, on the other hand, challenged 
the more conservative approaches to the study of the counterinsurgency operations in 
northern SWA.16 In an article, she argued that:
… the overall direction of a counterinsurgency war belongs with the civilian 
power, and the armed forces are but one of many instruments at its disposal.17 
In doing so, she demonstrated that there was a complete lack of unity of purpose and 
effort in the counterinsurgency war in northern SWA, and that this had a detrimental 
effect on the South African, and in particular SADF, efforts at winning the hearts and 
minds (Wham) of the local population in the operational area.
Military forces have historically used and abused both anthropology and ethnography 
for their gain during times of war.18 The most recent example is the Human Terrain 
System Programme of the United States (US) Armed Forces, which was established by 
the US Army Training Doctrine and Command between July 2005 and August 2006 
amidst substantial controversy.19 In the South African context, Lindy Heinecken and 
Donna Winslow, as recently as 2010, have debated the value of ‘Human Terrain’, ipso 
facto cultural intelligence, and the possible lessons it might hold for the South African 
National Defence Force in modern counterinsurgency operations.20 The Namibian‑
born anthropologist Rob Gordon was one of the first individuals to alert academia 
on the extensive cooperation between the SADF, security police and some Afrikaner 
academics during the counterinsurgency war in SWA.21 This element of the South 
African counterinsurgency campaign in SWA, including the involvement of PU for 
CHE in the establishment of the Kavango Jeugbeweging, has received no real scholarly 
attention. Two postgraduate studies from the University of the Western Cape have 
discussed elements that are in part related to the Kavango Jeugbeweging during the 
period in question, although both Herberth Karapo and Michael Akuupa have failed 
to address the reasons behind the establishment of the movement. They have also failed 
to take the South African counterinsurgency strategy in northern SWA into account. 
Both authors clearly do not understand the military environment, nor the complex 
and multi‑dimensional nature of counterinsurgency warfare, especially during the 
Swapo insurgency in SWA. These studies do, nonetheless, provide unique insights into 
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Y This chapter has three specific aims. First, to investigate the reasons behind the 
establishment of the Kavango Jeugbeweging in 1975, by providing a brief historical 
background to the South African counterinsurgency campaign in northern SWA. 
Second, to explain the nature, extent and the development of this youth movement 
between 1975 and 1987, with a specific focus on the role that the IAS at the PU 
for CHE played in the formative years of the movement. Lastly, the chapter will 
evaluate the effectiveness of this youth movement, as a counterinsurgency tool, within 
the framework of the broader South African counterinsurgency strategy deployed 
in northern SWA during the Border War. To elucidate the background, nature and 
development of the Kavango Jeugbeweging, the author draws from a myriad of primary 
archival sources, from both governmental and private institutions, as well as private 
and official correspondence, along with a host of secondary sources. In doing so, the 
chapter uncovers an aspect of the South African counterinsurgency campaign in SWA 
that has received little or no scholarly attention to date.
BACKGROUND TO SOUTH AFRICA’S BORDER WAR
The SA Government became involved in a major counterinsurgency campaign in 
SWA from 1966. During that year, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly 
revoked the South African mandate over SWA, granted in 1920. By June 1968, the UN 
General Assembly renamed the territory Namibia and called for its independence. The 
International Court of Justice, furthermore, declared the South African presence in 
Namibia illegal during July 1971.23 During the same time, the nationalist movements 
within the territory started to threaten the South African presence increasingly. The 
largest military and political threat to South Africa Government in SWA was Swapo. 
Soon after its establishment in April 1960, Swapo decided to use force in its quest to 
gain the independence of Namibia. The first batch of PLAN insurgents infiltrated 
SWA during 1965 and established bases in Ovamboland. Ovamboland consequently 
formed the nerve centre of the Swapo insurgency, as the Ovambo people formed 
the party’s major support base.24 During August 1966, South African security forces 
attacked the Swapo camp at Ongulumbashe and killed some PLAN insurgents. 
Swapo regarded the attack on Ongulumbashe as the opening of the ‘final phase’ of 
its liberation struggle. The attack on Ongulumbashe forced Swapo to relocate its 
in‑country bases within SWA to the relative safety of Zambia. The Swapo bases in 
Zambia, geographically removed from their primary target area of Ovamboland, 
naturally hampered the insurgency.  The PLAN insurgents were therefore forced to 
infiltrate SWA via two distinct routes that stretched over vast distances.25 The first 
route was via south‑eastern Angola, under Portuguese control. Since 1961, operations 
against an insurgency backed by various nationalist movements kept the Portuguese 
military involved in counterinsurgency. The SADF supported the Portuguese 
counterinsurgency operations in Angola from 1968 under the auspices of Operation 
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BOMBAY.  The major Angolan nationalist movements involved in this insurgency 
were the MPLA, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and Unita. 
The second route was via north‑eastern SWA and the Caprivi Strip where the SADF 
had a few military bases.26
PLAN insurgency intensified between 1966 and 1974. In the military sphere, small 
groups of insurgents infiltrated SWA through southern Angolan and the Caprivi Strip 
with the explicit aim of conducting sabotage and harassing the SA security forces 
and the local civilian population. In the political sphere, Swapo sought to politicise 
the SWA people in an attempt to gain popular support, while concurrently working 
to establish a viable political structure within the territory. The South African Police 
(SAP) was initially the main protagonists in the counterinsurgency campaign in SWA, 
with the SADF merely acting in a supporting role. The SAP attempted to prevent 
the infiltration of Swapo insurgents by blocking their infiltration routes from Zambia 
and Angola into SWA through a series of regular patrols and combined operations. 
The SADF launched these operations from M’pacha in the Caprivi, Ondangwa in 
Ovamboland and Rundu in Kavangoland. The Security Police furthermore monitored 
internal political activities of Swapo and detained suspected Swapo adherents within 
SWA.27 These measures met with some success, as Swapo was unable to gain a political 
foothold in SWA, while the actions of its military wing PLAN were negligent. 
The South African Government subsequently pressed ahead with the findings of 
the Odendaal Commission and incorporated SWA into the Republic as a de facto 
fifth province. By May 1973, the two largest homelands in SWA, Ovamboland and 
Kavangoland, also gained a level of independence as self‑governing territories within 
the territory.28
By 1974, the general security situation in southern Africa drastically changed 
following the overthrow of the Portuguese Government during a coup d’état in 
April of that year. Angola, along with Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea, gained 
its independence from Portugal in November 1975 after the signing of the Alvor 
Agreement, whereafter the country spiralled into a civil war. The diminished cordon 
sanitaire created a situation conducive to the Swapo insurgency. Swapo was hence 
able to establish bases in the southern part of Angola, and could, in theory, infiltrate 
SWA along its entire 1 600 km long northern border. The main PLAN infiltration 
route was via the 280 km long border between Ovamboland and Angola, which was 
geographically featureless and largely porous due to the overwhelming Ovambo 
support for Swapo.29 By 1974, Swapo intensified its armed struggle, with operations 
extending to the Caprivi Strip, Ovamboland, Kavangoland and the white areas in the 
so‑called murder triangle around Grootfontein‑Tsumeb‑Otavi. Coincidentally Swapo 
had also declared 1974 as ‘the year of the kill’.30 Despite the initial counterinsurgency 
successes of the SAP, the deterioration of the security situation along the northern 
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Y responsibility for all counterinsurgency operations along the northern border of the 
territory. It forced the SADF to adopt a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy 
from 1974, that brought with it fundamental changes to the South African policy 
within SWA. This new strategy focused on the military, political, social and economic 
dimensions of counterinsurgency warfare as a counter to the intensification of PLAN 
insurgency. The so‑called ‘Total Strategy’ was a multi‑component strategy based on the 
experiences of other countries in counterrevolutionary warfare and low‑intensity 
conflict. The SADF largely based their strategy on the writings of the French General, 
André Beaufre, and an American Army Colonel, John McCuen. Militarily, the SADF 
was forced to check the influence of Swapo within SWA for the political, social and 
economic initiatives of the SA Government to be implemented. By June 1974, the 
South African military strength within SWA was gauged at 15 000 men. By early 1976, 
this number had escalated to 45 000 men as Pretoria continued to devote a significant 
portion of its military resources to the defence of SWA.31
The SA Government sought to deliver a crushing blow to both Swapo and the MPLA 
by intervening in the Angolan Civil War during 1975. In conjunction with Unita, the 
SADF was able to destroy several Swapo bases in southern Angola as part of Operation 
SAVANNAH. These locations were revealed to the SADF by Unita who had shared 
some of these bases with Swapo before the start of the Angolan Civil War. The SA 
Government, politically isolated and logistically overstretched, was forced to end 
Operation SAVANNAH and withdraw its troops from Angola between January and 
March 1976. Swapo, as a result, soon re‑established itself in southern Angola with the 
backing of the MPLA government.32 The South Africans were thus forced to reconsider 
their counterinsurgency approach towards PLAN insurgency and developed a new 
approach, based on four key elements. Firstly, the South Africans wished to exploit any 
political divisions within Swapo to their benefit and cause a political rift within the 
organisation. Secondly, desertions were encouraged from amongst the PLAN cadres 
through a dedicated propaganda campaign. Thirdly, the SADF aimed to destroy the 
in‑country organisational efforts of Swapo. Fourthly, the SADF established a civic‑
action programme amongst the local inhabitants in the northern border areas of SWA. 
Pretoria sought to use the SADF as a development agency of sorts in its civic‑action 
programme, and the military became increasingly involved in rendering agricultural, 
educational and medical assistance as part of the counterinsurgency campaign.33 It is 
against this backdrop that the SADF first conceptualised and established the Kavango 
Jeugbeweging.
THE ORIGIN AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE KAVANGO JEUGBEWEGING
During July 1975, Elrick Pretorius, in his capacity as the Youth and Culture Organiser 
of the Kavango Department of Education, was tasked to establish an indigenous 
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youth movement amongst the Kavango people to prevent the spread of communist 
propaganda, to foster Kavango nationalism, and limit the influence of Swapo amongst 
the local Kavango youth.34 At the end of that month, Pretorius contacted the IAS at the 
PU for CHE to seek assistance with the conceptual implementation of the Kavango 
Jeugbeweging. He supplied a detailed confidential report on the problems facing the 
establishment of a youth movement in Kavangoland. The report in part states that a 
mere 400  teachers taught approximately 13 000  school children in Kavangoland in 
only 150 schools. There were hardly any extramural activities on hand, and very few 
teachers were qualified to oversee leisure time and sports activities. A then recent 
survey had established that approximately 600 children no longer attended school and 
that some children had joined the various terrorist organisations across the Cubango 
River in Angola. Evidence even suggested that some children were receiving training 
with these groups in Zambia. During 1974, Swapo had held a meeting at Calai in 
Angola during which they organised a loose‑knit political organisation amongst the 
secondary school learners of the Kavangoland. Some of the learners also attended an 
interdenominational Christian rally at Döbra near Windhoek, where Swapo openly 
preached its propaganda. The report concluded that it was evident that the Kavango 
youth had become politicised by Swapo, and that drastic measures had to be taken to 
stem this influence.35
Towards the end of August 1975, Prof Hennie Coetzee, the Director of the IAS and a 
trained anthropologist, replied to Pretorius confirming the IAS’s willingness to render 
assistance with his request. For a start, the IAS pledged to provide Pretorius with some 
useful literature on communism and its ‘intrusion’ in Africa. Coetzee further suggested 
that the Malawi Young Pioneers, as well as its sister movements in Zambia and 
Ghana, should act as the theoretical blueprints for the establishment of the Kavango 
Jeugbeweging.36 These movements, Coetzee argues, were prime examples of youth 
movements that were established to nullify the spread and influence of communism 
amongst the young people of Africa. A chapter written by A.W. Wood carries this 
argument. He states that these movements were part of large‑scale governmental 
youth training programmes or national youth services, that had: 
… a somewhat military flavour, an emphasis on physical development and 
various forms of morale boosting, in some cases frankly described as political 
education.37 
It is of interest to note that these organisations were established under the auspices of 
the Israeli government during their constructive engagement with Africa, starting in 
the 1960s. The young pioneers’ movements in African were modelled on the Israeli 
Gadna programme. The Gadna programme was established with the sole purpose of 
preparing young people for military service with the Israeli Defence Force, while 
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Y and was established soon after the founding of the state of Israel the year before. The 
Gadna programme to this day focuses on discipline, as well as military and physical 
training, and falls under the command of the renowned Nahal Infantry Brigade.38
Both Pretorius and Coetzee realised that before establishing a youth movement in 
practice, a detailed study of the culture, history and languages of the Kavango people 
was a necessary prerequisite.39 By the end of August, Coetzee sent Pretorius copies of 
some radio talks that he had presented for the Tswana service of the South African 
Broadcasting Corporation on communism, and that he believed could be generalised 
for use and distribution amongst the Kavango youth.40 During October, Coetzee 
also posted Pretorius a copy of a publication on the Malawi Young Pioneers, as well 
as more information on Swapo and a pamphlet titled The Christian Mission in the 
Communist World.41 By the end of the month, Pretorius once more wrote to Coetzee, 
emphasising the urgency of the training of youth leaders, and requested his professional 
help in the drafting of a basic training programme for the Kavango Jeugbeweging. The 
changing security situation within Kavangoland brought about by the relocation of 
Swapo bases to southern Angola between 1974‑1975, as well as the start of Operation 
SAVANNAH was a concern to Pretorius. It enticed him to secure the cooperation of 
the SADF, who promised the services of some of its professional personnel alongside 
Coetzee and his colleagues.42 
By the end of November, Coetzee once more wrote to Pretorius and gave his views 
on the confidential report sent to him in July on the establishment of the Kavango 
youth movement. He suggested that he and his colleagues needed to visit Kavangoland 
in‑person to examine the existing situation first‑hand and to meet Pretorius to discuss 
the proposed structure of the Kavango Jeugbeweging. He further suggested that it would 
be particularly useful to meet at Rundu. He also provided Pretorius with an initial 
analysis based on the confidential report of the Kavango Jeugbeweging. He addressed 
factors such as the need for a youth movement in Kavangoland, as well as the risk 
associated with the establishment thereof. Coetzee’s greatest fear was that the youth 
movement might become a weapon of the very elements that it was trying to subvert 
– Swapo. In principle, Coetzee suggested that sport and leisure time activities would 
form the initial backbone of the organisation and that the key to success would be the 
direct and continued involvement of the Kavango Government.43
During February 1976, Coetzee and Dr Hendrik van der Wateren, a fellow 
anthropologist, were invited by the Kavango Department of Education to visit the 
region for a fact‑finding mission. The urgent need for their visit was once more 
emphasised by Pretorius, as he desired to start the training of Kavango youth leaders as 
soon as possible.44 The visit to Kavangoland occurred from 24 to 29 March 1976 and 
coincided with the end of Operation SAVANNAH.45 During their visit, Coetzee and 
Van der Wateren called at various Christian missions and schools, but failed to attend 
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the inaugural Hompa Leevi youth leaders camp at Mbunza. They spent the majority of 
their time in talks with the military staff at the headquarters of 1 Military Area (1MA) 
at Rundu, as well as the command element of the Kavango Battalion (202 Battalion).46 
The headquarters of 101 Task Force, which oversaw Operation SAVANNAH, was 
located at Grootfontein, approximately 240 km south of the border with Angola. 
There were two operational areas under the command of 101  Task Force: 1MA 
with its headquarters at Rundu in Kavangoland, and 2 Military Area (2MA) with its 
headquarters at Oshakati. The SADF operations in Kavangoland and Western Caprivi 
was run by 1MA, while 2MA conducted all military operations in Ovamboland and 
the Kaokoveld. The Eastern Caprivi fell under 13 SubArea, which was a sub34division 
of 1MA but operated as a separate command.47 
On 10 May, Coetzee wrote to thank Pretorius for their visit. He attached a detailed 
report on the Kavango Jeugbeweging and their findings. They also circulated their report 
to the Kavango Secretary of Education, who was also coincidentally Pretorius’ father 
in law, and the Commissioner General of South West Africa.48 The report revealed 
several interesting elements. The name and motto of the movement translated into 
diligence from the Kwangali dialect of the Kavango and had great significance as it 
related to the goals of the Kavango Jeugbeweging. The Kavango Jeugbeweging was to 
establish a national consciousness amongst the Kavango youth to shift the political, 
cultural and economic awareness of this group from that of traditional clan‑based 
loyalties to one of a national character. ‘Kavango unity’, they argue, would prevent 
Swapo from using the Kavango Jeugbeweging to its advantage and fostering anti‑white 
feelings amongst the Kavango population. Both Coetzee and Van der Wateren stressed 
the importance of writing up the history of the entire Kavango and its people, to 
promote the national character and instil a sense of national pride. The Kavango 
Jeugbeweging as an organisation, they stated, was a first of its kind within the South 
African sphere of influence and was thus not allowed to fail. They further argued that 
Pretorius would have to nominate and train a Kavango understudy to take over the 
leadership of the organisation, as this would emphasise the fact that the movement 
was for the benefit of the Kavango people. The success of the youth movement, 
they argued, would be dependent on the operation thereof. At first, the focus would 
be on the training of leaders for the movement; whereafter the focus would shift 
to sport and leisure time utilisation as a means of combatting idleness and boredom 
amongst the Kavango youth. After that, the movement’s focus would gradually change 
to issues such as family relations, good citizenship, political education, discipline, and 
establishing a purified Christian Kavango culture.49 The end goal of the Kavango 
Jeugbeweging was the establishment of an effective training programme that would 
ensure that the Kavango youth became goal‑orientated, staunch nationalists and good 
Christian citizens. The state could then recruit future Kavango police officers, soldiers, 
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Y At the request of Defence Headquarters, Coetzee once more travelled to Kavangoland 
during June 1976 to address approximately 500  teachers on the importance of 
Kavango nationalism.51 In July, Pretorius wrote to Coetzee and requested his 
professional assistance in the drafting of a manual, titled Burgerleiding, for use in the 
training of the regional leaders of the Kavango Jeugbeweging. Pretorius also suggested 
to Coetzee that he wished to contact academics at other South African universities to 
help with the writing of the manual.52 One can deduce that this did not sit well with 
Coetzee, as communication between him and Pretorius immediately broke down. 
Henceforth, only Van der Wateren corresponded with Pretorius. By the beginning 
of August, Van der  Wateren suggested that several Potchefstroom academics would 
contribute chapters to this manual. These chapters focused on a variety of topics such 
as international political relations, the independence struggle in Africa, communism, 
terrorism, South Africa’s relations with the Kavango, patriotism, nationalism and 
culture.53 Pretorius agreed to the suggested outline of the manual,54 and Van der 
Wateren promised to deliver the manual by March 1977.55 The promised chapters 
of the manual were only provided to Pretorius in April 1977, whereafter Van der 
Wateren intimated that he and Coetzee wished to visit Kavangoland once more in 
June 1977. This trip never materialised.56 By October 1977, the final correspondence 
between the IAS and Pretorius occurred, because Pretorius had failed to acknowledge 
receipt of the Burgerleiding manual. It signalled the end of the constructive engagement 
between the PU for CHE and the Kavango Department of Education.57 
Be that as it may, there is some evidence that suggests that the Kavango Jeugbeweging 
continued to operate in an unabated form until about 1987, when the movement 
ended abruptly. By 1978, the main camp of the Kavango Jeugbeweging at Shambyu, 
more commonly known as Ekongoro, was upgraded to a fully‑fledged cultural 
centre, managed by Pretorius. The cultural centre comprised a museum, botanical 
garden, dormitories, kitchen, dining hall and administrative office block. The centre 
operated according to ten laws, to which anyone who wanted to be part of the 
Ekongoro activities had to conform.58 By the mid‑1980s, the Kavango Jeugbeweging 
concerned itself primarily with the organising of a sangfees (a song festival) amongst 
the local Kavango youth. The various district leaders of the movement had to oversee 
teacher training and workshops on the activities of the sangfees and help to compose 
a sangbundel (songbook). The finale of the sangfees occurred at Ekongoro, where the 
various student groups performed selected songs from the sangbundel. These songs 
included the Kavango anthem, Christian hymns and other local folk songs. The soldiers 
from 202 Battalion became increasingly involved in the sangfees from the mid1980s, 
despite widespread disapproval from the local community. Akuupa, an anthropologist, 
argues that though the sangfees was organised to preserve the culture and tradition 
of the Kavango people, it increasingly became a politicised space where the SADF 
actively discredited Swapo and spread South African propaganda. He also argues that 
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the continued presence of soldiers at the sangfees was an indirect measure from the 
SADF to emphasise their authority within the Kavango. The Kavango Jeugbeweging 
and the sangfees continued until Pretorius was recalled to South Africa somewhere 
between 1985 and 1986. It seems as if Pretorius’ disagreement with senior military 
officials and education administrators, who felt that he had to promote the Kavango 
Jeugbeweging during the sangfees for various political and military means, hastened his 
departure. Pretorius vehemently opposed this strategy. After it became apparent that 
several teachers were unwilling to cooperate with Pretorius, the SADF removed him 
from his position. A certain Jan Bradley replaced Pretorius in 1987 and became the last 
Youth and Culture organiser of the Kavango Department of Education. During his 
tenure, the sangfees became increasingly dominated by the soldiers of 202 Battalion, 
amidst mounting pressure from the local community to halt the pseudo‑cultural 
activities at the Ekongoro camp.59
THE KAVANGO JEUGBEWEGING AS A LENS TO THE  
BROADER COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN
The Kavango Jeugbeweging provides an interesting lens through which to analyse the 
South African attempts at Wham amongst the local SWA population, the growing 
‘namibianisation’ of the counterinsurgency war, and the unprincipled use of academics 
by the SADF during the Border War. In doing so, the section also discusses the broad 
course of the South African counterinsurgency campaign in SWA.
De Visser argues that the SADF sought to gain the cooperation of the local SWA 
population in several ways. It included the provision of socio‑economic help, instilling 
respectful attitudes towards the population amongst the South African soldiers, and 
through a sustained propaganda campaign aimed at undermining local support for 
Swapo and at the same time instilling a positive attitude towards the SA government. 
The purpose of the SADF Wham campaign was: 
… to obtain intelligence and deny the insurgents food, shelter and intelligence 
… [and] … to cultivate a positive attitude towards the authorities … to make 
the population less susceptible to enemy propaganda and more receptive to 
psychological action by the SA authorities.60
Esterhuyse argues that the SADF Wham campaign was more successful in Kavangoland 
and the Caprivi as opposed to Ovamboland, mainly due to Swapo having more 
support in the latter.61 The Kavango Jeugbeweging was a pseudo‑cultural organisation 
established with the explicit aim of Wham of the local Kavango population, and to 
develop a positive attitude towards the South African regime. Herbert Karapo argues 












   












Y with anti‑Swapo ideologies and that its organisation was not really as cultural as it 
sounded, but rather used as a strategy to achieve the political‑military agenda of the 
SADF and to foster an overarching Kavango nationalism.62 
Akuupa also states that the Kavango Jeugbeweging was not a one‑of‑a‑kind organisation 
but that similar pseudo youth movements functioned in Hereroland and Ovamboland 
during the Border War. These youth movements were used to counter the radical 
politicisation that Swapo advocated.63 According to Akuupa, the Kavango Jeugbeweging 
did not, however, have a universal appeal across Kavangoland. In the uKwangali 
District, near modern‑day Nkurenkuru, the general perception of the inhabitants 
towards the SADF and the youth movement was negative. It was, in part, due to 
the unprecedented number of PLAN combatants who operated in the district and 
who were able to actively counter the anti‑Swapo propaganda and mobilise popular 
support for the insurgency. The youth camp, supposed to be established at Katara 
in this district, also never materialised due to the ongoing threats posed by the 
presence of PLAN cadres.64 One finds this hard to believe, as there is overwhelming 
evidence suggesting that Swapo, and PLAN for that matter, hardly had a foothold in 
Kavangoland after 1978. A closer investigation of the evolution of the South African 
counterinsurgency campaign confirms this.
Between April 1975 and March 1977, fighting in Ovamboland, Kavangoland and East 
Caprivi lead to the killing of a total of 231  insurgents, 33  security force personnel 
and 53 local inhabitants. According to South African intelligence reports, there were 
roughly 300 Swapo insurgents active in Ovamboland by October 1977, with a further 
2 000 and 1 400 insurgents located across the border in Angola and Zambia respectively. 
Reports showed that roughly 100 ‘contacts’ between the security forces and insurgents 
per month. By 1978, Swapo had a significant number of forward operating bases 
located in Angola within striking distance of northern areas of SWA. The security 
that Angola offered Swapo was all but relative and extremely short‑lived. The Angolan 
Civil War continued unabated after the culmination of Operation SAVANNAH in 
March 1976. It had particularly severe consequences for Swapo. From 1976, there was 
a vast number of MPLA/Cuban forces deployed to southern Angola to counter Unita 
rebels and to prevent further SADF incursions. South Africa, in turn, provided Unita 
with direct military assistance, which made it an enemy of Swapo.65
The South African defence analyst, Helmoed‑Römer Heitman, argues that the 
immediate result of the relocation of Swapo bases to southern Angola was the planning 
of a very large PLAN incursion into SWA during 1978 to disrupt the elections 
scheduled for that December. The SADF realised that a pre‑emptive strike against 
the Swapo bases in southern Angola was necessary to stop the impending incursion 
of PLAN insurgents. The SADF subsequently launched Operation REINDEER, 
which was both the first South African major cross‑border operation against Swapo 
as well as the first operation directed against Swapo bases deep inside Angola.66 
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Overall, Operation REINDEER was quite successful, despite a few setbacks. During 
the operation, 859 experienced PLAN cadres were killed, 202 captured and at least 
340 wounded, with valuable intelligence gained from the seizure of high‑level Swapo 
documents at Cassinga. The SADF lost six soldiers who were killed and effectively 
halted the planned large‑scale PLAN infiltration of SWA.67
The SADF planned two further pre‑emptive cross‑border operations in 1979 after it 
became known that Swapo had recovered from the previous year’s attacks, and that 
PLAN was preparing for a new large‑scale infiltration of Ovamboland. Swapo was 
also in the process of opening up the Caprivi as an active front. The SADF launched 
Operation REKSTOK against Swapo targets in southern Angola and Operation 
SAFRAAN against Swapo targets in the south‑west of Zambia. These two operations 
met with some success, although the SADF mainly encountered evacuated Swapo 
camps and only inflicted some casualties. The planned Swapo infiltration of the 
Caprivi never materialised, and as a result, the movement was forced to step down 
operations in northern SWA. An important outcome of Operation SAFRAAN was 
that Zambia hence denied Swapo to launch incursions from their territory.  The year 
1980 thus marked a turning point in the Border War, after which Swapo attacks in 
Ovamboland drastically declined. The SADF soon realised that pre‑emptive cross‑
border attacks against Swapo bases were not the answer. The new strategy adopted by 
the SADF called for the launch of spoiling attacks with the explicit aim of disrupting 
Swapo efforts to prepare and support infiltrations, and to disrupt their infrastructure 
in southern Angola.68 As part of the SADF strategy of disruption, they conducted 
several cross‑border operations from 1980. These operations prevented Swapo from 
rebuilding its forward staging areas near the SWA border and forced the movement to 
relocate its bases deep into Angola. The most notable operations include SCEPTIC, 
PROTEA, DAISY, SUPER, MEEBOS and ASKARI. The external South African 
operations persuaded the MPLA to protect the Swapo bases in the south of Angola. It 
did not perturb the SADF, and they decided to engage any Fapla forces who attempted 
to interfere with their cross‑border operations against Swapo. The South Africans 
also felt obliged to establish dominance in the area to the north of the Angola‑
Ovamboland border. The direct result of this South African strategy was a sudden, 
sharp, sustained decline in Swapo activity in Ovamboland.69 It ultimately led to the 
signings of the Lusaka Agreement in 1984, which called for the withdrawal of the 
SADF from southern Angola and for MPLA to prevent Swapo from establishing bases 
in the area. The Lusaka Agreement, however, totally failed, as the MPLA government 
did not enforce the agreement and Swapo was allowed to re‑establish its bases in 
southern Angola.70 
After the failure of the Lusaka Agreement, the SADF decided to step up its support 
for Unita. Through this, they hoped to achieve two aims. Firstly, Unita dominance 
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Y cross‑border infiltrations. It would dramatically reduce the length of the border 
that would require full protection. Secondly, a Unita insurgency would force the 
MPLA government to reconsider its support and protection of Swapo. It would 
allow the SADF to attack Swapo bases with relative ease. These operations included 
the 1987/1988 campaign of Operations MODULER, HOOPER, PACKER and 
DISPLACE. The Unita dominance of southern Angola successfully prevented the 
Swapo infiltration of the Caprivi and most of Kavangoland. The majority of Fapla 
and Cuban forces in the south of Angola was tied up in operations against Unita, 
which led to little or no forces to protect and support Swapo.  The MPLA government 
further required Swapo to provide troops to help fight the Unita insurgency. By the 
mid‑1980s, nearly one‑third of the total strength of Swapo was allocated to security 
and counterinsurgency tasks in south‑eastern Angola, leaving preciously few forces for 
raids into Ovamboland.71 
The intention of Swapo to have waged a classic insurgency failed dismally. The 
movement failed to move beyond acts of agitation, propaganda and terrorism, and never 
had the capability of conducting a conventional war against the SADF by itself. The 
Swapo campaign in northern SWA failed because of no real support in the Caprivi, 
especially after the success of Operation SAFRAAN in 1978. In Kavangoland, Swapo 
found it increasingly difficult to win popular support amongst the local population, 
particularly after the SADF started to conduct ‘external operations’ into Angola to 
stem the insurgency through pre‑emptive measures. The South African pro‑active 
support of Unita after the breakdown of the Lusaka Agreement of 1984, successfully 
denied Swapo from establishing a permanent presence in southern Angola. The 
SADF further maintain that there were only 30 PLAN fighters in Ovamboland, 23 in 
Kaokoland and practically none in Kavangoland by the end of 1984. Heitman argues 
that the inability of Swapo to gather support in Kavangoland and Caprivi was largely 
thanks to a dislike and distrust of the organisation by the local population, rather than 
the result of the South African counterinsurgency strategy in northern SWA.72 
The Kavango Jeugbeweging was in its essence nothing more than a pseudo‑cultural 
organisation, established with the sole purpose of countering Swapo propaganda, 
kerbing the exodus of Kavango youth from joining Swapo in exile, and supplying the 
South African security forces with strategic human capital for it counterinsurgency 
operations in northern SWA. De Visser, however, states that by 1989, the underlying 
assumption that civic and psychological action could affect a change in attitude in 
the ideological mindset of the population was proved to be largely unsuccessful in 
Ovamboland. According to Visser, this region was never under complete South African 
control, and Swapo was able to capture 92 per cent of the total votes cast during the 
1989 election. In contrast, the results in Kavangoland and Caprivi regions that were 
firmly under South African control, seemed better. Swapo only managed to capture 
52 per cent and 45 per cent of the votes in Kavangoland and the Caprivi respectively. 
183
The Kavango Jeugbew
eging and the South African counterinsurgency cam
paign in N
am
ibia   
   Evert Kleynhans
The Kavango Jeugbeweging may have played an insignificant role in achieving these 
results in Kavangoland.73 
The establishment of the Kavango Jeugbeweging furthermore ties in with a crucial, but 
often overlooked, part of the South African military campaign in SWA – the policy 
of the ‘namibianisation’ of the counterinsurgency war. Pretoria, in general, sought 
to transfer the military burden, and indeed ownership, of the counterinsurgency 
operations in SWA to the local inhabitants of the territory. Initially, only white South 
West Africans were considered for combat roles, while non‑white soldiers were 
confined to support roles. This policy, however, drastically changed after 1974, and 
they adopted a new racially inclusive military system in SWA. The SADF subsequently 
launched a recruitment campaign amongst all inhabitants of SWA that invariably led 
to the raising of military units on an exclusively ethnic basis. As such, they formed 
army battalions from the San in 1974, and the Ovambo, Kavango and Caprivi peoples 
during 1975.74 By 1977, the SADF centralised the command and control of all 
military activity in Windhoek and established the South West Africa Territorial Force 
(SWATF) in August 1980. The SADF subdivided the entire SWA into seven sectors 
who each fell under the command of SWATF headquarters in Windhoek. Of the 
seven sectors, the SADF was responsible for the defence of Sector 10 (Kaokoland and 
Ovamboland), Sector  20 (Kavangoland, Boesmanland [Bushman’s land] and Western 
Caprivi) and Sector 70 (Eastern Caprivi).75 
Richard Dale maintains that Pretoria localised the counterinsurgency campaign in 
SWA from 1974 to 1980 through the creation of ‘apartheid‑like’ military structures 
in Ovamboland, Kavangoland and the Caprivi. The local battalions, created in each 
homeland under the guise of SWATF, held two main attraction for the South African 
defence planners.76 First, the burden of the casualties in the Border War shifted from 
South African soldiers to that of locally recruited SWATF soldiers. Second, to comply 
with the UN Security Council Resolution 435 adopted on 29 September 1978, which 
called for the withdrawal of South African troops from SWA, the SWATF could fill 
the void left by the SADF and continue the counterinsurgency operations against 
Swapo.77 From 1982, local forces such as 202  Battalion in Kavangoland accounted 
for nearly 60 per cent of all operational forces in SWA.78 It is, in turn, evident that 
the Kavango Jeugbeweging served as a recruitment pool for the SADF from 1976, 
and that the various youth camps were aimed to empower the young people with 
semi‑military skills while developing an interest in the South African security forces. 
According to Karapo, the majority of the Kavango youth who joined the SADF or 
Koevoet, the renowned SAP counterinsurgency unit, were graduates from the five 
youth camps79 established at Mbunza, Shambyu, Ukwangali, Gciriku and Mbukushu.80 
The Kavango Jeugbeweging thus provided the SADF, and by extension the SWATF, 
with the necessary local human capital with which to wage the counterinsurgency 
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MAP 6.1 The military sectors in South West Africa/Namibia during the Border War
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The Kavango Jeugbeweging lastly provides a rare, though limited, insight into the 
various, and at times perverse, roles that some South African academics rendered to 
the SADF during the counterinsurgency operations in SWA. The establishment of 
the Kavango Jeugbeweging during 1975 happened to coincide with the creation of 
a dedicated ethnology section in the SADF. The SADF sought the specific skills of 
anthropologists and ethnologists in order:
… to provide ethnological knowledge not only for strategical and tactical 
operations but also to ‘improve race relations’ both within the SADF and between 
the SADF and the black population that bore the brunt of military operations.82 
These academics were thus mainly concerned with Wham, as perverse as some of their 
plans and programmes were, as part of the broader South African counterinsurgency 
strategy in SWA. Gordon argues that this section formed part of the larger civic‑
action programme of the SADF, organised around the assumption that victory in 
the counterinsurgency war was 20  per cent military, and 80  per cent political and 
civil. Consequently, the SADF became the single largest employer of anthropologists 
and ethnologists during apartheid, with the majority of graduates drawn from 
Afrikaans‑language universities and their Anthropology departments that offered 
a uniquely South African ‘social anthropology’.83 Coetzee and the IAS also had 
various dealings with the SADF between 1975 and 1977, and Coetzee was, on 
more than one occasion, summoned to Pretoria and Rundu to deliver lectures to 
military personnel and teachers on communism, nationalism and various non‑military 
aspects of counterinsurgency.  The SADF use of academics stretched far beyond 
mere ethnologists and anthropologists and included geographers, political scientists, 
psychologists, pedologists, historians and horticulturalists to name but a few.84 The 
fact that the ethnology section of the SADF comprised of 16 Permanent Force staff 
members by March 1977, may in some way explain the breakdown in communication 
between Coetzee and Pretorius during that year. One might venture that the specific 
brand of anthropology that Coetzee preached did not sit well with Pretorius and 
that the SADF at that stage offered an in‑house ethnological service with dedicated 
personnel deployed to SWA that negated the services of Coetzee and the IAS.85
CONCLUSION
The Kavango Jeugbeweging was established in 1975 with the explicit aim to prevent 
the spread of communist propaganda, to foster a sense of Kavango nationalism, and 
to limit the political influence of Swapo amongst the local Kavango youth. The 
youth movement furthermore provided the SADF with strategic human capital 
in the counterinsurgency war, by acting as a recruitment pool for amongst others 
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Y the larger counterinsurgency war in SWA may be negligible, but when limited to 
the Kavango it makes for an interesting lens through which to analyse the Wham 
campaign, as well as the eventual ‘namibianisation’ of the South African Border War. 
One must somewhat disagree with Gordon, for in the end it was military feet on the 
ground, and not so much the civic‑action programmes of the SADF, that bestowed 
some measure of success in the South African counterinsurgency war in SWA from 
1975 to 1989. The Kavango Jeugbeweging does, after all, offer a mere glimpse into the 
role that academics played during the counterinsurgency war in SWA. The full extent 
of the role and functioning of the ethnology section of the SADF, especially regarding 
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INTRODUCTION
As far as military matters during the 1980s were concerned, South Africa’s Border 
War has dominated. Not surprisingly the historiography has reflected this and grown 
exponentially from initial forays describing campaigns and battles to analyses of the 
different frameworks explaining the reasons for the war, the nature of civil-military 
relations, the war in international affairs, the experiences of ordinary soldiers and the 
ways popular memory expresses the afterlife of the war. What happened away from the 
war zone, also came into focus for example in work dealing with gender, the activities 
of civic organisations and analyses of the anti-conscription campaign.1 This chapter 
also addresses an additional dimension – how oppositional parliamentary politics 
played out under duress and how the role players mediated divergent points of views. 
PARAMETERS
The stark realities of militarisation in South Africa during the 1980s could not but 
infuse the nature of political discourse. As the official parliamentary opposition for 
most of the period, the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) was not in a position to 
define the terms of the debate as the agenda was being set by the National Party 
(NP) under P.W. Botha. Botha, a long-standing Member of Parliament and Cabinet 
Minister served as Defence Minister from 1967, was chosen as Prime Minister in 
1978 and became President in 1983 under a new constitutional dispensation. He and 
his handpicked Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, assiduously promoted 
defence force interests. 
At the heart of the ideology of militarisation was the notion of a ‘Total Strategy’ to 
counter what was perceived to be a ‘Total Onslaught’ emanating from South Africa’s 
enemies. These enemies were first and foremost communists – the Soviet Union and 
its satellite state, Cuba – that used Angola as a base and a springboard for incursions 
into the South African controlled South West Africa (SWA), currently Namibia. 
South Africa, it was argued, stood largely alone in this struggle as the liberal West was 
perceived to be too pusillanimous to assist. Conveniently underplayed in this outlook 
was that apartheid in itself was a major destabilising factor that attracted negative 
worldwide attention.2 
The idea of a Total Onslaught seeped into the very fabric of white society and 
inevitably resonated in party political terms. The PFP, as the opposition to the 
left of the NP, was concerned with its pervasive effect. Colin Eglin, a senior PFP 
parliamentarian, believed in 1983 that: 
Every attack on South Africa, every criticism of its policy or actions, every move 












   












Y Onslaught. Foreign governments, international organisations, church bodies, 
trade unions and political activists who criticise or act against South Africa are 
seen to be part of the Total Onslaught whether as initiators, agents, allies or 
simply as dupes in the Total Onslaught strategy.3 
The PFP tried to mediate the Total Onslaught approach by seeking to separate 
‘legitimate security considerations’ from ‘wholesale panic that bordered on paranoia’. 
It was not convinced that in terms of realpolitik the Soviet Union had grand designs 
of per se imposing communist rule on Southern Africa, but considered the Soviets to 
be opportunistic in trying to take advantage of targets that may present themselves 
to increase their spheres of influence.4 Such a more nuanced understanding, while 
it might have had a certain appeal in rarefied political circles, was difficult to convey 
effectively in the rough and tumble of everyday politics. Especially at a time when 
Cubans amassed on the northern frontier of SWA, bombs exploded in public spaces in 
South Africa and the country seethed with black unrest that called for the government 
to decree several states of emergencies. Neither were matters helped by the African 
National Congress (ANC) in exile making blood-curdling pronouncements that in 
order to advance their cause, it is necessary to develop a ‘hatred of the enemy’ and 
claiming, reaching back into history, that one of the reasons ‘our forefathers fought so 
heroically against the enemy was that they hated them’.5 It was within these prickly 
political parameters that the PFP had to operate. 
PARLIAMENTARY SKIRMISHES 
Given the pre-eminent place accorded defence matters in white society, the PFP was 
careful not to convey an image in parliament and also further afield that it was intent 
on the outright rejection of the role of the military. On the contrary, Harry Schwarz, 
a noted PFP member and one who was particularly hawkish on defence issues, made 
it clear that the South African Defence Force (SADF) had a legitimate task and that it 
should be supported:
If you are a South African, if you believe in peace and if you seek protection 
against violence and terror from our Defence and Police forces, you must be 
prepared to assist in that defence.6 
Similarly, Philip Myburgh, PFP spokesperson for defence matters in 1983 argued that 
as far as the military is concerned; “… the greatest possible measure of agreement 
should be reached, and that the security and defence of South Africa are one of our 
prime considerations.”7
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Apart from the personal convictions of these speakers, this point of departure was also 
meant to portray the PFP to the public as a party that was not ‘soft’ on security as 
the NP members often averred.8 It was a point that the PFP needed to repeat often. 
In May 1987 before the general election, Brian Goodall, then PFP spokesperson for 
defence, made it clear that it was ‘nonsense’ for the government to pronounce that 
the PFP refused to acknowledge the threat against South Africa. Even if the PFP was 
in government, he continued: “… there would still be a threat. We would, however, 
deal with it much more effectively than this government has.”9 Such a message was 
essential for the PFP to try and establish its credentials with the voting public as well 
as to create manoeuvring room in parliament. Otherwise, it could far too easily be 
side-lined based on perceived ‘disloyalty’. 
Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, PFP leader from 1979, started soon after the beginning of 
his parliamentary career in 1974 to exploit the available space to extract information 
on military matters. His concern had a personal angle to it as his half-brother, Shamus 
Taylor, was one of the conscripts involved in the ill-fated incursion into Angola in 
August 1975. Slabbert was one of an official parliamentary delegation to the border 
in January 1976, when they received the news of the Angolan invasion. He was not 
only perturbed about the possible fate of Shamus but aghast at what he considered 
the foolhardiness of invading Angola in what turned out to be a futile attempt to 
influence local politics. This attack meant that the principle of non-interference in 
the affairs of other countries South Africa advocated for so long, was violated. As 
information of the incursion was classified, Slabbert was not allowed to raise the issue 
in parliament, but he nevertheless tried to circumvent the restrictions by posing a 
hypothetical scenario of where conscripts should be allowed to be deployed.10 
As the ideology of ‘Total Onslaught’ gained greater traction, the dividing lines between 
the state and the party became more porous. Slabbert was concerned that what started 
as a ‘Total Strategy’ was in the process of becoming a ‘Totalitarian Strategy’.11 The 
incident that sparked off this remark was a report that was leaked to the Sunday Times 
newspaper in March 1980, revealing a plan by the SADF to try and manipulate the 
news media to counteract the opposition’s criticism of P.W. Botha. In parliament, 
Botha viewed the matter of minor concern and was loathe to admit that the SADF 
has transgressed the fine line between state and party by trying to shield him from 
PFP criticism.12 Slabbert stated that the Defence Force should be very careful not 
get involved in partisan party politics and that if the idea took root that the “Defence 
Force is simply the NP in uniform; he feared this country would split from top to 
bottom”.13 In a lengthy critique of the leaked document, Slabbert consistently argued 
for a clear and rigorously observed division between party and state.
It is a moot point whether Slabbert believed that there was in the first place, such 
a substantial difference between the party and the state. There was some criticism 
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Y two entities.14 The political reality though might well have been that in line with 
PFP general strategy it was publicly necessary to bring to the fore such a divide, as 
it provided a way of drawing the NP into the debate and keeping the government 
accountable. Jannie Geldenhuys, Chief of the Defence Force in 1985, later stated that 
Slabbert’s opinion did indeed carry some weight in certain government circles.15
Debates on defence matters could derail easily. In response to Slabbert’s comments 
on the revelations of the SADF’s involvement in party politics, the irascible Botha 
described Slabbert’s speech as a ‘tirade’ and likened him to a ‘young rhinoceros bull’. 
Slabbert’s response was measured: he regretted that a senior member of the house with 
years of service should speak to a junior member in such a manner and he hoped that 
he would not ever have to stoop to the level at which Botha had addressed him.16 
Relations between Botha and Slabbert remained strained. A senior NP member later 
allowed it to slip that the root cause of the animosity was: “Slabbert is too clever; 
PW hates him.”17 
It could, furthermore, not be taken for granted that when the leader of the opposition 
addressed the House on military matters that suitable attention would be paid. In 1985, 
while speaking on the complexities of conscription, Slabbert found himself rudely 
interrupted by two NP members who for some unknown reason started to argue 
amongst themselves – the one calling the other ‘dikkop’ (blockhead) – and they first 
had to be reprimanded by the speaker before Slabbert could continue.18
For most of the time, Slabbert preferred to shy away from name-calling or ridiculing 
his opponents. There were exceptions, though. Malan’s stonewalling tactics or what 
Slabbert regarded as the Minister of Defence’s hypersensitivity to criticism of the 
SADF, could occasionally become exasperating. He compared Malan to a turkey that 
he had encountered on the farm of his youth. When teased, the turkey would start 
cackling, and after a while, the turkey had become so conditioned that as soon as 
he sees someone approaching, he would start cackling without even being provoked. 
It, Slabbert said, was the ‘cackling politics’ of the Minister of Defence.19
Despite such exchanges, not all was lost in parliament. Through diligent committee 
work, the PFP at times did succeed in changing or watering down more extreme NP 
defence proposals. Thus a 1983 Bill on Conscription was changed in several respects, 
after PFP interventions, amongst others, that religious objectors should be given the 
option to buy themselves out of further military service after they had completed 
their first stint. The PFP argued that this would privilege the rich and that nobody 
should be exempted from service just because they could afford it.20
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FRICTIONS AND FACTIONS
While the PFP sought as far as possible to maintain a united front in parliament, 
defence issues in the turbulent 1980s spilt-over into the deliberations of the party. 
These mainly revolved around the question of compulsory military conscription 
and conscientious objection and since late-1984 the deployment of troops in 
black townships.
The terms of who qualified for military exemption on religious grounds were 
narrowly defined and did not leave much latitude for those who objected to the draft 
based on the assumption that the conflict was an ‘unjust war’. Moreover, the penalties 
for those who refused to do military service were severe and could include a jail 
sentence of up to six years. As the country became more militarised, the government 
extended the periods of military service accordingly. Compulsory military service for 
all white males first introduced in 1967 with a stretch of nine months, then extended 
to twelve months in 1972 and subsequently in 1977 to two years of compulsory duty. 
In tandem with these obligations, the lengths of time one had to spend doing camps 
after the initial spell also increased: in 1972, it was 19-day camps for five years; in 1977, 
this rose to 30-day camps for eight years; from 1983, each member was required to 
serve a further 720 days spread over 14 years.
It was not the end yet: afterwards, the conscript, transferred to the Active Citizen 
Reserve Force, he was expected to serve twelve days annually for another five years. 
He could also be called up to the age of 55 before finally placed on the national 
reserve for a further ten-year period.21 The stringent call-up regulations could, in 
theory at least meant that all white males were for most of their adult life, beholden 
to the Defence Force. The scope and extent of these demands catapulted the issue of 
conscription right into the centre of the political arena. Conscription was no longer a 
minor issue of young men being called up for a limited period; in the 1980s, it started 
to assume the form of mass mobilisation.
The deployment of white troops under state emergency regulations in black townships 
where unrest occurred was an equal quantum leap for the Defence Force. Although 
there is evidence that some black people preferred the troops to the police in the 
townships – the latter regarded as more vindictive and ill-disciplined22 – overall the 
impression now gained currency that South Africa was descending into civil war. The 
border was no longer north of the country but has moved south into the towns and 
cities of the country itself. Once the Defence Force had moved into the townships to 
help quell anti-apartheid protests, it compromised its claims, debatable as they might 
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Y It was against this background that Slabbert opened the PFP Federal Congress in 
Durban in 1985. He stated frankly:
Defence issues have always been controversial within the PFP, and rightly so, 
because they involve matters of life and death. I prefer a controversial, heated but 
honest debate to the kind of pseudo-patriotic posturing which so often typifies 
political comment on these matters. It has been stated I --- am too uncritical or 
even ‘jingoistic’ in speaking on behalf of the PFP on defence matters. I disagree 
with such sentiments.23
In general terms, without always being mutually exclusive, there were three groupings 
on defence issues within the PFP. In the middle, there was some consensus on the 
need for political reform instead of increased defence spending as the preferred 
manner to ensure stability. Besides, there was a fair measure of agreement that a larger 
professional Defence Force consisting of career soldiers as opposed to a preponderance 
of conscripts was desirable. To the left, a grouping with anti-militarist tendencies with 
distinct undertones of disapproval of military culture in general and associated actions 
held sway. On the right, there was a more sympathetic stance towards the need for 
conscription and a greater willingness to accept the government’s assurances of why 
the Defence Force should play a central role in South African affairs, with the proviso 
that this should not become an end in itself and meaningful political reform should 
accompany it.
The position of shadow Minister of Defence in the PFP had the reputation that it 
was one of the more controversial major portfolios in the party and it was here that 
underlying tensions surfaced.24 Defence spokespersons frequently vacated the hot 
seat as they followed each other in rapid succession: Harry Schwarz, Roger Hulley, 
Myburgh, Slabbert himself, Brian Goodall, Peter Gastrow and, before the end of the 
decade, Nic Olivier.
Those parliamentarians to the left of the party included people like Helen Suzman, 
Graham McIntosh and Alex Boraine. (One of Boraine’s sons was on the run from the 
Military Police for failing to report for camp duty.)25 More to the right was Harry 
Schwarz, Myburgh, Alf Widman, Dave Dalling and Reuben Sive. It is probably no 
coincidence that three of these had some actual military experience that might as 
well have influenced their outlook. Schwarz, whose family came out to South Africa 
as Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany in 1934, felt deeply loyal to South Africa as 
the country providing them with opportunities at a time of need.26 He served in the 
South African Air Force in the Second World War. Myburgh volunteered for army 
service in 1958, and some of his immediate family also served during the Second 
World War. Sive carried the title of Major for service in the Union Defence Force. 
Internecine clashes could at times be unedifying. McIntosh in particular, who at one time 
refused to report for military duty, was at loggerheads with Schwarz. Schwarz regarded 
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it as the duty of every South African to obey the law and that included McIntosh.  The 
latter retorted:
I don’t take his [Schwarz’s] comments very seriously. Mr Schwarz has a political 
erection every time anybody mentions the Defence Force, and with that, his 
rationality disappears completely.27
McIntosh was somewhat of a stormy petrel when it came to defence issues. Slabbert 
also berated him for implying that there was no or little difference between the 
SADF and terrorists. “Hyperbole, exaggeration and emotional utterances,” Slabbert 
cautioned, “are detrimental to a satisfactory and constructive debate on defence 
matters and cause alarm.”28 
The issue of conscription specifically caused considerable debate within PFP circles. 
While not all that urgent during the 1970s, the question assumed greater political 
proportions with the dramatic increase in the length of military service during the 
early 1980s and the more prominent role of the Defence Force. Heated arguments 
for and against conscription became a hallmark of PFP congresses and had the effect 
of clouding the practicalities of what was possible at the time. It caused Myburgh 
to resign as defence spokesperson. He considered the idea put forward by the left-
wing of the PFP that conscription should be abolished immediately as impractical 
and irresponsible. It could not be done without having a suitable alternative in place 
and without that the Defence Force would be seriously weakened, precisely at a time 
when it needed as a shield behind which political reforms could take place under 
peaceful circumstances.29
Slabbert had to step in as defence spokesperson, buffeted from all sides. At one point, 
he even threatened to resign as party leader should the caucus fail to resolve the 
controversy.30 Gradually tempers did become less frayed, but whether that was because 
of Slabbert’s threat or perhaps just enough time to reflect more calmly on the issue, is 
hard to say. Eventually, Slabbert was able to pass a resolution, described as a ‘personal 
triumph’ for him, to the effect that:
… as the expansion of the fulltime non-racial professional Defence Force and 
volunteer reserve arm progresses, so also progress can be made with the phasing 
out of conscription as part of the military organisation until it is no longer 
necessary.31 
With this formulation, Slabbert tried not only to appease the warring factions of his 
party, but it was also an attempt to provide a firm directive on the issue of conscription. 
He furthermore made it clear that the party was in “no way going to oppose military 
service actively, nor in any way undermine the role of the Defence Force”.  At the same 
time, he was alert to the fact that, while it seemed that conscription was a burning 
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Y It was particularly the case with the deployment of conscripts in black townships. The 
military argued that their role in the townships was not to arrest ringleaders but to 
protect innocent people who preferred to stay out of politics. It was only in extreme 
cases of conflict that they were supposed to intervene.33 It was, however, a very thin 
line. Slabbert could not but observe: 
I do not think it helps to say the Defence Force will only be involved in a supportive 
capacity. The temptation to go further and intervene is inescapably great.34 
While the prescriptions on the military in the township might have been difficult to 
observe and easy to transgress, the situation also had worrisome policy implications 
for the PFP as it militated against the view that the SADF should be an impartial 
guardian. The Defence Force itself had now in effect become a key player and could be 
perceived as promoting the status quo. As a result, Slabbert noted, it will be “impossible 
to present it [the Defence Force] as a neutral shield behind which orderly reform can 
take place”.35 With this development, the credibility of a much peddled PFP argument 
came under severe strain.
To add to Slabbert’s woes, the SADF kept on conducting cross-border raids into 
Mozambique, Botswana and Lesotho. He experienced a sense of déjà vu, similar to 
how he was deceived by the military at the time of the incursion into Angola in 
the mid-1970s. Under the cloak of confidentially, he as leader of the opposition was 
bypassed and left in the dark while the usual parliamentary protocol was to inform the 
leader of such developments. He could barely conceal his resentment: 
If the … Minister of Defence and his department do not trust me or my Party, 
let them say so clearly and not inform me confidentially about anything. I will 
learn to live with that, but I prefer that to being lied to.36 
It is not surprising that Slabbert had started to lose faith in the military. It became clear 
to Myburgh who, to establish a better working relationship, had arranged for informal 
meetings between Slabbert and senior military personnel. Slabbert only attended two 
of these meetings and then decided to decline further invitations.37 
Steadily then during the 1980s as military matters started to loom large, the PFP had 
to position themselves on two fronts. The party had to counter the government’s view 
of a Total Onslaught without appearing as ‘soft’ on security by the voting public. 
Moreover, it had to contend with divergent points of departures on military matters 
within its ranks. It fell to Slabbert to steer this ship through treacherous seas with 
a squabbling crew. And as if this was not enough of a challenge, there gathered on 
the horizon new clouds in the shape of another organisation with its sights set on 
military matters. 
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THE PFP AND THE END CONSCRIPTION CAMPAIGN (ECC) 
The ECC, founded in 1983, stated its aims as follows: to pressurise the government 
to terminate conscription; to stimulate awareness of the extent of South Africa’s 
militarisation; to oppose the presence of the SADF in SWA; to campaign for alternative 
forms of National Service; and to work for peace and justice in South Africa. Of 
these, the main thrust was to object to compulsory military service. In doing so, it 
sailed legally close to the wind as it was punishable by law to encourage men to 
refuse service. It, therefore, claimed that it merely provided conscripts with ‘accurate’ 
information about SADF activities, allowing them to make up their minds.38 
Such a fine distinction was, nonetheless, not always observed in practice. Not 
surprisingly, the organisation was on a collision course with the government. Over and 
above attacks in the press, it also had to deal with some underhand ‘dirty tricks’ and 
harassment aimed at discrediting the campaign.39 The government banned the ECC in 
1988; inasmuch because the state thought that the ECC improperly influenced young 
men and thereby transgressed the law, as it was aware that certain members worked 
underground for the banned ANC. At the time, the ECC for understandable reasons 
sought to deny ANC linkages, but that these connections indeed existed emerged 
after 1994.40 
There is a tendency in the historiography of oppositional forces in the 1980s to 
give some prominence to the ECC as a significant player in the politics of the day.41 
Without wishing to deny its uniqueness, one also has to bear in mind that over time, 
its influence can easily be exaggerated. Just because, as it subsequently turned out, 
in the post-1994 era the ECC happened to be on the ‘right’ side of history, does 
not necessarily mean that it was all that important in the 1980s. As a matter of fact, 
at its peak, it had no more than between 1 580 active members in nine regions. Its 
restricted organisational reach, in major cities only, failed to make significant inroads 
into Afrikaans campuses – at Stellenbosch University it only had a 2.1  per cent 
following. In the English-speaking community its support base was mainly drawn 
from the middle-class liberal intelligentsia, church organisations and civic bodies like 
the Black Sash, which had a hand in establishing it in the first place. Although many 
people made much of its supposed success in influencing men not to enrol, it is hard 
to prove that the ECC was, except in highly publicised cases, actually instrumental in 
refusals. Men also stayed away for reasons other than the political objections the ECC 
advanced. Overall, despite some minor fluctuations, reporting figures stayed relatively 
constant.42 What the ECC lacked in actual influence, they made up for in a highly 
visible and creative counter-culture drive, including mocking cartoons and posters of 
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Y It also raised the ire of General Malan who did not take kindly to the lampooning 
of the SADF. He moreover claimed that funding for the ECC came from abroad 
and that the organisation was less concerned about conscripts than they were about 
undermining the SADF that, according to him, served as a bulwark against revolution.44 
Besides, he sought clarity about the attitude of the PFP towards the ECC. To his mind, 
the party was too circumspect. “Why does the PFP not clearly state that they reject an 
organisation like the ECC?” he asked. “Is this another one of the PFP albatrosses?”45
While the ECC might not have quite been an albatross for the PFP, it did put the party 
on the spot and presented it with an explicit challenge from the extra-parliamentary 
white left. Some ECC members considered the PFP’s view that conscription can only 
be phased out once a viable alternative was in place, as a vote for the continuation 
of apartheid.46 Along similar lines, Max Ozinsky, later to become prominent in the 
ANC in the Western Cape, recalled that he and other like-minded youths in the 1980s 
regarded the PFP stance as hypocritical as the party was quick to criticise but not 
prepared to make any real sacrifices to end apartheid. He had joined the ECC and 
later Umkhonto we Sizwe, the armed wing of the ANC. It stood in contrast to what 
he considered the “‘fake liberals of the PFP’ in the 1980s who had become completely 
irrelevant to a generation of white youth who were expected to sacrifice their lives [in 
the SADF] so that their parents could continue enjoying the benefits of apartheid.”47 
Although not cast in the same strident tone, the PFP youth wing at the time also 
edged closer to ECC rhetoric. It started questioning the validity of the claim that 
conscription can only be phased out gradually as well as the idea that the Defence 
Force was a shield behind which politicians could bring about the necessary reforms.48
The PFP sought to inject what they considered to be a measure of realism into 
the debate. Myburgh recalled that the ECC was more intent on publicity and less 
concerned about finding working alternatives. The military authorities he claimed, 
although they had to act against the ECC, was not given to unseemly and running 
public squabbles with a section of the country’s youth. As a result, in certain cases, it 
was possible to come to a compromise solution with young men who had serious 
qualms about armed service insofar that they were allowed to serve in non-combatant 
capacities. The ECC, on the other hand, did not buy into this as such men, despite their 
non-combatant status, were still seen to be part of the ‘apartheid war machinery’.49 
Slabbert, notwithstanding his increasing disillusionment with the military, had as he said 
in 1985, “not yet lost all my idealism”.50 He did his best to hold the official PFP line 
and at the same time also expressed his misgivings about the ECC. In public debates, 
he berated them for targeting the Defence Force without providing an alternative. 
All such a strategy did, he argued, was to provide ECC supporters with “… a kind of 
moral superiority that allowed them to call other people bad names”.51 Although he 
could, on certain points, agree with the organisation, especially as far as the presence of 
troops in the township was concerned, overall he considered its position too glib, even 
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“dangerously romantic, extraordinarily naïve and counterproductive”.52 He explained 
that the ECC vilified the Defence Force more than understanding the complexities of 
the matter. He found it: 
… totally illogical to use the issue of conscription in order to in fact attack the 
SADF, and the role it plays in South Africa. The Defence Force can do away with 
conscription tomorrow completely (which no doubt would help a great many 
morally anguished and privileged White South Africans), but would in no way 
affect the negative and counter-productive role that the Defence Force can play 
if not called to account or controlled in society.53 
He said that it was easy for the ECC to polish ‘platitudes in front of a supportive mass 
rally’, but another matter to try and engage the top echelons of the SADF with realistic 
alternatives.54 Slabbert’s reservations about the ECC also echoed on the Stellenbosch 
University campus where similar concerns about the organisation were raised. The 
demeanour of and the arguments advanced by ECC spokespeople also piqued some 
Afrikaners who considered the tone to be “enveloped in a haze of intellectual and 
moral superiority”.55 
The arguments of the ECC and the PFP despite their divergent points of departure 
were, however, in a way locked into a binary position. Both considered the issue of 
conscription as of paramount importance and the touchstone of defence politics. What 
was at stake here, though, were different political views of conscription, but the origin 
of their conflict had its roots in a single source, namely the policy as decreed by the 
government. It meant that both bent the knee before the imperatives of high politics. 
In doing so, they ignored a whole swathe of interested parties. While the pro and 
anti-conscription political arguments, including positions in between, were well 
represented, those that belonged to neither of these camps and were outside the 
media and political spotlight hardly featured. These were the troops who were 
politically apathetic or whose political views were not considered worth canvassing 
or considering. In all likelihood, they formed the bulk of conscripts and were the 
silent majority. 
Although there was some fusion between civic patriotism and the willingness to do 
military service, this did not necessarily translate into boundless enthusiasm on the 
part of conscripts. Even P.W. Botha himself thought that only between 20 and 30 per 
cent of National Servicemen were highly motivated.56 The majority merely sought 
to survive military service unharmed; they were more animated about the prospects 
of the conclusion of their duty than the service itself.57 In a way then for both the 
PFP and the ECC, partly at least because they fixated on the implications of policy, 
actual conscripts stayed under the radar. These conscripts have moreover, also stayed 
outside the ken of general historiography, that tends to deal with the more dramatic 
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The very nature of the PFP’s position as official parliamentary opposition determined 
the extent to which it could influence military matters during the turbulent 1980s. 
As it lacked substantial power, its reach was accordingly limited. Its strategy was to 
steer a middle course on issues such as conscription, one of the vexed issues of the day. 
The party was caught in the crossfire: the government, on the one hand, was quick to 
describe the opposition as unpatriotic and anti-South African, and on the other hand 
was the ECC with strident if not very carefully considered calls for an immediate end 
to conscription. The position was not only invidious but also impacted on the internal 
dynamics of the party.
In all of this, Slabbert as leader of the opposition had to try and straddle different 
positions. He had to make a real effort to keep a government who was intent on 
usurping more power accountable, he had to cauterise wounds inflicted by the 
internecine strife in his party, and then he had to deal with a rumbustious ECC.  At the 
same time, keeping the greater picture in mind and considering the long-term effects 
of the government’s Total Onslaught ideology.
It is common practice in war and society studies to investigate how societies react 
to war and to focus on the general tensions that emerge amongst different layers of 
society.58 As this primarily calls for a social history approach with a focus on ordinary 
people, the impact on more formalised parliamentary developments runs the risk of 
being side-lined. On the other hand, those writing more explicitly on politics and 
war tend to focus generally on ruling parties. This chapter has hopefully demonstrated 
that if we wish to move to a more rounded understanding of the impact of war, 
there are benefits to be gained by also setting our sights on oppositional parties, often 
dealing with their unique problems. In addition, while work on high politics during 
this period has its advantages, one should also be aware of the silences or blind spots 
that such an approach may contain. 
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INTRODUCTION
Elizabeth Albrecht led the establishment of the Mozambique Soldiers’ Fund in 1968. 
The presence of the Portuguese military forces in South Africa’s neighbouring states 
motivated Albrecht. While providing humanitarian support for the Portuguese, 
the organisation quickly became aware of the presence of South African troops. 
Within months of creation, the Mozambique Soldiers’ Fund changed its name to the 
Southern Cross Fund (SCF) (Afrikaans: Suiderkruisfonds) and extended its services to 
providing aid, supplies and comforts to the South African Defence Force (SADF). 
The organisation mostly consisted of white members of the civil society, and in 
cooperation with the SADF, the SCF strived to serve the basic needs of the soldiers 
involved in the conflict in Mozambique and Angola and of troops later deployed in 
the violent townships in South Africa. The duration of the support from the SCF 
equalled the length of the deployment of South African soldiers, therefore suggesting 
to the SADF’s possible dependence on civilian mobilisation. Through its support of 
the troops, the organisation also strived to serve as a morale builder. This secondary 
role surpassed the immediate environment of the military base and penetrated the 
civilian sphere. Through a thorough analysis of the image of the SCF in the media, as 
well as veterans’ recollections of the support rendered by the organisation, this chapter 
endeavours to determine the impact of the SCF on both military and civilian spheres. 
It is especially the personal viewpoints of the veterans that can give insight to the level 
of significance of the organisation. This insight allows us to ascertain whether the SCF 
could have softened the impact of military service on civil society, created unity and 
served to build morale. 
The South African Army, until its crossover to the South African National Defence 
Force (SANDF), had relied on conscription to meet its manpower requirements. The 
conscription system had expanded by the late 1960s as the threat on South Africa’s 
border increased.1 The South West African People’s Organisation (Swapo) wanted 
independence for South West Africa (SWA), then under South African administration 
and the independence of Angola caused a civil war between different factions for 
control over the former Portuguese colony. With the support of Russia and Cuba, 
the takeover of Angola by a socialist guerrilla faction, the Popular Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola (MPLA), further threatened South Africa’s position in Southern 
Africa. By 1974, South Africa launched its first cross-border operation, Operation 
SAVANNAH, into Angola. It was the first operation of the Border War.2 A country’s 
civil society harbours the need to provide domestic facilities to soldiers on the 
battlefront during times of war. War serves as the motivation for society to organise to 
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Y During the First World War, the Governor Generals Fund provided for South 
African soldiers and their dependents. In  1919, a Whippet tank toured from Cape 
Town through Mossel Bay to Uitenhage with four young ladies astride the war’s 
newest weapon, armed with bags tied to sticks to collect money for the war effort. 
For £1, a lucky passenger could buy a ride.3 By the Second World War, the National 
War Fund had replaced the Governor Generals Fund to support soldiers and their 
families. The Fund sent glory bags to soldiers during the war with articles like scarves, 
gloves, balaclavas, socks, razors, ropes, handkerchiefs, writing pads, envelopes, pencils, 
cigarettes, sewing kits and, in 1940, even a letter from Mrs Smuts.4 In both wars, the 
Union Defence Force Institute supported the South African Army – a mobile canteen 
with refreshments and other items at low prices.5 The Southern Cross Fund was built 
on this tradition. With the country’s participation in the Border War, the public again 
needed to provide for its army. 
HISTORIOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND 
Arthur Marwick presents the mobilisation of civil society to support the state and its 
national army in times of war as integral to the success of war: 
The success of the war would not depend on the strength and the organisation of 
the army alone; it would depend directly upon the efficient organisation of the 
public forces, on the organisation of the community.6
The definition of ‘mobilisation’ can be the organisation and participation of the public 
in the production and preparation of the requirements for war.7 Various historians 
have researched this form of mobilisation as a process of the consequences of war 
within society. The threat to a country cannot be measured objectively and does not 
necessarily lead to conflict but can still lead to a defensive attitude and influence the 
mobilisation of society. With the encouragement to mobilise and the extended role of 
the army in society, the public develops a political mindset. It then creates the context 
for mobilisation. 
Marwick further categorises mobilisation into two areas: unguided and guided 
mobilisation. Guided mobilisation refers to the purposeful attempts by the government 
and national army to gain the support of society. Unguided mobilisation, in turn, 
is the independent reaction, with or without state support, by society to create an 
interaction with the government or army.8
Patrick Regan concludes that this process becomes self-sustainable within the political 
paradigm that encourages the mobilisation of society.9 Because the preparation for 
war forms part of the mobilisation process, the status of society changes to that of 
a militarised society. The definition of ‘militarisation’ is the extension of military 
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influence on the civilian sphere.10 Due to this influence of the defence force on society, 
society becomes more than just participators in war; they come to represent the war:
A society in which the institutions and the men who hold military, economic 
and political power have become so dependent on one another; in which their 
goals and interests are so complementary, and in which the traditional boundaries 
between military and civilian spheres have broken down to such an extent, that 
the very conception of civilian versus military control has no meaning.11
At the forefront of the organisation of the public during the Border War was the 
Southern Cross Fund.
RESEARCH
Research on the SCF proved problematic. According to Colonel Pieter van der 
Walt, last national president of the SCF, all documentation relating to the SCF was 
handed over to an unknown Director of Fundraising in 1995. The documentation, 
minutes and agendas of meetings, financial states, has not been preserved in any of the 
national archives, and, after many inquiries, unfortunately, seems lost. Possible reasons 
may include negligence, damage or even deliberate destruction.12 Documentation at 
the SANDF Documentation Centre contains references to the Southern Cross Fund. 
Throughout the decades, the media advertised the activities of the SCF. 
Oral sources served of great value during research. The author interviewed Van der Walt 
(second and last president of the SCF); Lieutenant General Raymond Holtzhausen 
(National President of the South African Army Fund for eight years); Ds Jan Venter 
(served on the Council of the Southern Cross Fund as Provincial Head of the Orange 
Free State branch); and Dr Carl Albrecht (son of Elizabeth Albrecht, who established 
the SCF). Albrecht also kindly provided access to his mother’s diaries and privately-
owned recorded interviews. The author also interviewed veterans via social media. 
THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE SOUTHERN CROSS FUND
According to an article in Rapport, 1974, the defence of the country was 20 per cent 
military and 80 per cent social.13 The apparent ‘Total Onslaught’ was, therefore, not 
just aimed at the battlefront, but also at the home front.  According to Holtzhausen:
To get an even better understanding of the environment in which the Southern 
Cross Fund functioned; one must also consider the National Conscription 
system. Without conscription there would be no justification for the Fund’s 
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Y Of the 600 000 white men who received military training, 320 000 served on the 
South West African border. South Africa also had a strong military presence in SWA 
with strategically placed military bases in Ruacana, Rundu, Ondangwa, Katima Mulilo, 
Oshakati, Oshivelo and the Caprivi Strip. Annually, 40 000 South African troops 
manned the border and 60 000 served within SWA in a support capacity. This military 
presence stretched from 1975 to 1989.15 Despite this presence, they also required social 
participation in the war effort. 
Anna Wolf honours the role of society during wartime: “The home is at all times the 
nation’s first line of defence”.16 Organisations like the Southern Cross Fund took a 
prominent role in the society’s support of the state and army.  Admiral Ronnie Edwards 
supported this notion, stating: 
The Republic is involved in a full-scale war that is fought on various fronts. The 
front least talked about is the home front that has to bear the consequences of the 
total onslaught. In fact it is the home front that protects the army.17 
In Organising Societies for War, Regan asks: “Does violent foreign policy feed the process 
that leads to a society organised around the goals and missions of the military?”18  The 
mobilisation of the home front during war depends entirely on the political context in 
which the state functions.  A country’s foreign policy reflects the international context 
and serves as the basis for the defence policy.  A country cannot construct the defence 
policy without considering the international context and the state’s position within 
that context.  In turn, the defence policy serves as the context for the mobilisation 
of the home front as it influences the political disposition of the public.19  The 
mobilisation of the South African home front and therefore the Southern Cross Fund 
should be viewed against the backdrop of South Africa’s international political context.
During the 1950s, South Africa’s political context was characterised by strong support 
for the West during the Cold War, as seen in conflicts like the Korean War, and a 
positive relationship with Western countries with a strong presence in Africa. However, 
by the late 1950s, the international context started to change as countries like Great 
Britain and France began to grant independence to their African colonies.20 By the 
1960s, South Africa also began to withdraw from the international community as the 
condemnation of the country’s apartheid system increased.21 Although, it would be 
Portugal’s changing political context that would have the most profound influence on 
South Africa’s mobilisation process.
Due to South Africa’s withdrawal from the international community, South Africa’s 
defence policy became a reaction to domestic upheaval and threats on the country’s 
border and focused on the country’s protection. The legitimacy of these threats is 
subjective and is therefore not relevant.  The defence policy and consequential civilian 
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militarisation and mobilisation are reactions on this perceived threat. Defence policy 
is a dynamic and powerful instrument that can adapt to a changing international 
context. South Africa’s defence policy empowered the Defence Force to change its 
role according to the changing international context, and with Portugal’s withdrawal 
from Angola, the SADF could play a role outside of South Africa’s borders, mobilising 
the public to support this role.22
For the South African government, the fight against the perceived threat was not to be 
limited to the military forces. Despite Swapo’s activities in SWA, it was the communist 
presence in Angola that served as the greatest threat to South Africa. South Africa’s 
involvement in the Korean War solidified its support for the West, but the country’s 
withdrawal from the international community meant that the communist threat in 
Southern Africa became South Africa’s responsibility to face alone.23 An article in Die 
Burger, November 1975, points to the implication of this threat and states that the 
“great danger of Communism”, with its associated “chaos and disorder”, “has reached 
South Africa’s borders”. “It must be stopped, not just for South Africa’s sake, but for 
the Free World.”24 
Within the context of the Cold War, Neil Orpen argues that the change in Angola 
would lead to the inevitable involvement of communist countries in the form of a 
proxy war as well as the involvement of pro-Western countries like South Africa.25 
Under the guise of the ‘total onslaught’, the National Party government successfully 
sold this threat to the South African public – a public already conscious of the 
country’s foreign and defence policy:
Because we face an onslaught so total in extent, our defence should naturally 
also be total in its nature. In other words, it is not a matter which should be left 
to the State alone but one in which every right-thinking citizen, irrespective of 
language, faith or culture, is joined, or in which he should be joined, even though 
it merely be in the precepts of his daily life.26
Therefore, the SCF within this context joined the ‘total defence’ of South Africa 
against the ‘total onslaught’.
Even though the SCF was representative of the society at this time, it should be clear 
that it was not representative of society as a whole. The End Conscription Campaign 
(ECC) and others strived to put pressure on the government and army to end 
conscription, to make society aware of the army’s role in everyday life and to extend 
resistance against militarisation.27 Despite objection to conscription, the SCF still 
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THE FORMATION OF THE SOUTHERN CROSS FUND
During a conversation about communist infiltration in Southern Africa in January 1968, 
journalist Ken Anderson asked Elizabeth Albrecht: “What are you going to do for the 
Portuguese?”28 Albrecht was the only child of Ds W. de Vos of the Dutch Reformed 
Church in Ladysmith. After completing school, she gained a Degree in Journalism 
from King’s College in London. During the Second World War, she returned to South 
Africa and began working at the Cape Times. During this time, she became a member 
of the Maria van Riebeeck Club where she gained valuable skills in fundraising and 
organisation. With her interest in the Portuguese heightened by the conversation 
with Anderson, Albrecht spoke to experts in the field of political science and the 
Communist threat. Following her research, she travelled to Angola and Mozambique 
to investigate the needs of the Portuguese army. A need for equipment and medical 
help in hospitals surfaced, leading Albrecht to call a meeting on 24 January 1968.29
In attendance at this meeting was Elizabeth’s husband and prominent businessman, 
Rudolph Albrecht, Ken Anderson, Dr Vaz Pereira, the Portuguese Consul General, 
a few of Albrecht’s friends and members of the South African Portuguese Society. 
A  committee was formed consisting of Elizabeth Albrecht, President; Isabel Venter, 
Vice-President; Johan Fourie, Secretary; a Mr Liebenberg, Treasurer; and Lynn 
Moolman, first member.30 The organisation, christened the Mozambican Soldier’s 
Fund, approached Telma Valente, President of the Movimento Nacional Feminico, 
a Portuguese women’s charity organisation based in Lourenço Marques, to 
work together.31
With the help of General Kualza d’Arriaga of the Portuguese Army, they determined 
the needs of the Portuguese Army to heed immediate assistance in the form of hospital 
beds, equipment, ambulances, medicine and first-aid equipment.32 To determine the 
needs of the soldiers, members visited military bases in Mozambique and Angola. 
Because of the popularity of the Mozambican Soldier’s Fund, the Portuguese shared 
information with them and gave them access to various bases on the battlefront. 
During these visits to military bases, the involvement of South African troops in the 
conflicts in Angola and Mozambique became evident. During a visit to a base in 
Cazambo, Angola, a Mrs Pam Hansen was warned by a South African lieutenant about 
the sensitivity of the information she possessed. According to his report about the 
visit, it was clear to him that members of the SCF possessed information about the 
movement of troops and the involvement of South African forces.33
Despite the warning, a written proposal was sent to Prime Minister John Vorster 
to suggest an extension of the SCF’s activities to include South African troops and 
setting new goals for the SCF.34 They changed the name of the organisation to the 
Southern Cross Fund and registered as a welfare organisation. Its new purpose and 
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activities included funds for South African forces on and across the border from 1968, 
humanitarian help to the Portuguese army until 1974 and humanitarian aid to the 
Rhodesian forces until 1979, which included and was limited to ambulances and 
medicine.35 Albrecht summarised the goals of the SCF as follows:
[The Southern Cross Fund is] the channel between the people and the forces, 
who receive in this way not only recreational equipment, but also the assurance 
of the gratitude and moral support of the people at home.36
To ensure this channel remained uninterrupted, the government solidified the SCF as 
the only certified fundraising organisation that could raise funds for and in the name 
of the SADF through the Fundraising Act, 107 of 1978.37 This law served to prevent 
a negative influence on the fundraising attempts by the SCF of fundraising projects 
by other organisations. It consequently allowed the SCF greater success on a national 
level and served to appease the public; their money went to a legitimate organisation 
and used for the welfare of the soldiers.38 With the extension of the SCF’s activities, its 
committee and membership also grew. In the Cape Province alone, there were a total 
of 127 branches and 71 branches in the former province of Transvaal. Over the years 
of its existence, the SCF had more than 260 branches in South Africa.39
COOPERATION WITH THE ARMY FUND
To ensure a successful contribution of the Southern Cross Fund to the war effort and 
the welfare of soldiers, fruitful collaboration with the Defence Force was required. 
Both organisations gave their full cooperation in this endeavour.40 In 1969, the 
Brandwagfonds was established to handle all donations from the public to the army 
after a call by P.W. Botha, then Minister of Defence, that “ the public should not forget 
our men on the border”.41 In that year, the Brandwagfonds made its first donation: 
R3 000. By 1  July  1976, the Brandwagfonds had changed its name to the South 
African Army Fund (hereinafter Army Fund) with the approval to also raise funds 
independently. By 1978, documentation of the Army Fund attested to a shortage of 
funds available for the welfare of South African soldiers as the activities of the army 
on and across the border increased. Cooperation with the Southern Cross Fund thus 
became invaluable.42 The motivation to work together and the protection of the law 
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MATERIAL DONATIONS BY THE SOUTHERN CROSS FUND
Necessarily, the SCF had to maintain a positive relationship with the SADF to ensure 
the continued success of the SCF. In an interview with Beeld, Elizabeth Albrecht 
emphasised the role of the SCF:
We have to accept that the state can’t serve all the needs of its soldiers who 
are fighting far from home. This is the case all across the world. While we are 
constantly trying to improve the situation, it is the people of South Africa who, 
through the Southern Cross Fund, donate facilities like swimming pools, films, 
books, sporting equipment, etc., to improve life on the border, especially around 
Christmas.44
Communication between the two organisations was imperative. The Army Fund 
would inform the Southern Cross Fund about the requirements of the soldiers, and 
the SCF would, in turn, update the public about the desires of the army to raise 
the necessary funds. The list of needs would include the requested items and amount 
to guide the fundraising efforts of the organisation. Funds raised would then be 
transferred to the army.45
Even though cooperation between the SCF and the Army Fund was constructive, it 
soon became apparent that the soldiers were not aware of the work of the organisation 
because the army bought the facilities. A misconception existed amongst conscripts 
that the goods they received came from the military and that the SCF was not 
delivering on their promises. This misperception was brought home with them. To 
prevent this affecting the contributions by the public, they addressed the issue in the 
media and added the Southern Cross Fund-emblem to their products.46
Donations by the SCF to the Portuguese and Rhodesian forces lasted until 1974. 
These donations totalled R353 000 and R250 000, respectively. Donations to the 
SADF and South African Police (SAP) lasted until the dismantlement of the SCF. The 
organisation’s total annual income averaged R1 000 000 of which 70  per cent was 
spent on the army and the rest was paid to the Police.  Administrative costs averaged 
4,97 per cent and never exceeded 8 per cent.47
Christmas gift packs and Going-Away gift packs
The primary goal of the SCF was to donate facilities and gift packs to those soldiers 
fighting on and across the border. The Fund emphasised that they made donations 
to all members serving South Africa, not just white members of the Defence 
Force and Police. It was the handing out of gift packs by members of the SCF to 
soldiers that lead to their lasting nickname:  The “Dankie-tannies” (translated to the 
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‘Thank-you-Aunties’), as every soldier thanked the mostly female volunteers. The 
soldiers consequently dubbed the gift packs “Dankie-tannie-pakkies” (‘Thank-you-
Auntie packs’).48 According to Elizabeth Albrecht, the gratitude went both ways, 
describing the reason for the Christmas gift packs as such:  “To thank the young men 
who are willing to sacrifice their Christmas on the border for our safety.”49
The primary receivers of the Christmas gift packs were the soldiers who were stationed 
very far from home, therefore containing luxuries that would make Christmas 
more pleasant. They included the following items in the parcels sent at Christmas: 
a memento of their service, a Christmas card, key holder, diary, bubble-gum, cigarettes, 
snacks including biltong, nuts, dried fruit, raisins, condensed milk and even a T-shirt.50
The Going-Away gift packs were released soon after the positive response to the packs 
sent at Christmas. Where the Christmas gift packs included luxuries, the Going-Away 
gift packs included necessities every soldier might require during his service.  To assure 
the concerned parents of conscripts that the SCF would donate specific necessities 
to their sons, the organisation advertised the contents of the packs in the media. An 
article in Rapport, ‘Hoe lyk die pakkie grens toe’, described the contents of the packs: 
writing pad with envelopes, postcards and a pen, a knife, can opener, nail clipper, 
lip balm, a shaving bag with mirror and razors, shoelaces and a sewing kit.51 The army, 
the SCF and inputs from conscripts determined the contents. The contents were 
handed over in an artificial leather pouch with the Southern Cross emblem on the 
front. The emblem also featured on some of the included items such as the T-shirt, 
pen and writing pad. They also sold the knife, the most popular item, to the public 
at fundraising events. The knife and poach, both durable items, were kept by most 
conscripts after their service period had passed.52
According to Van der Walt, the most important item in the gift pack was the letter, 
in Afrikaans, from the National President to the conscripts. The purpose of the letter 
was to remind the soldier that the donation came from home, but, above all, that these 
services were delivered by the SCF.  The letter from 1977 read as follows:
Liewe vriend,
Hierdie pakkie wat aan u gestuur word met die goeie wense van die Suiderkruisfonds en 
al u volksgenote, is ’n blyk van ons belangstelling en dankbaarheid. Onthou ons staan 
bankvas agter u! Die Suiderkruisfonds, ’n geregistreerde fondsinsamelinsorganisasie, werk 
nou al nege jaar vir die welsyn van Suid-Afrika se veiligheidsmagte, en al die fondse wat 
ons insamel – nou reeds meer as R2 miljoen – word oorbetaal aan die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Weermag en Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie. Dit word bestee aan geriewe soos sport- en 
musiek-items, projektors, yskasmasjiene, ekstra Kersrantsoene ensovoorts, asook hulp aan 
afhanklikes en bystand aan verminktes.
Met hierdie pakkie word u egter op tasbare wyse deur ons gegroet. 
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Y From 1972 to 1984, the amount spent on the contents of the gift packs rose from 
R12 000 a year to R200 000. By 1987, the SCF was spending R280 000 on the 
gift packs.54 
Facilities at military bases
By 1969, reports collected from various military bases attested to the following 
conditions experienced by soldiers: minimal or no recreational facilities were available 
for use and morale and discipline was at a significant low. Conscripts were described as 
dirty, unshaven and aimlessly wandering around during free-time, bars were open later 
than permitted, and chaplains were complaining about immoral activities on base.55 
The lack of recreational facilities consequently had to be addressed, not only to keep 
conscripts busy but to pacify the public who had been complaining that conscripts 
were not utilising their time in the army productively.56
The Fund identified the following facilities for acquisition: concert halls or a bioscope 
with a film projector, a lounge area or restaurant with piano, a reading room, darts 
room or billiard room with billiard tables and a table tennis room with tennis tables.57 
The sporting facilities needed to include a tennis court with equipment, snooker 
tables, dart boards and sets, soccer or rugby balls, swimming pools, trampolines and 
chess sets. Military bases were also in need of everyday facilities to simplify life for 
the conscripts and provide entertainment. These facilities included automatic washing 
machines, air conditioners, televisions, video machines, films, books, newspapers, 
Bibles, musical instruments and cassette players and tapes for diving boats and attack 
vehicles. Cooking and kitchen facilities required by the army included a mobile field 
kitchen, stoves, freezers, refrigerators, warm water tank, cold water machines and ice 
machines.58 The Fund aimed to provide these facilities to as many bases as possible.59
Monetary donations by the Southern Cross Fund
As mentioned previously, the SCF made its first donation to the Army Fund in 1969 
with a sum of R3 000. By 1971, the amount donated had grown to R10 000 and 
R15 000 the following year. In 1973, the amount doubled to R30 000.60 1978 was 
a fruitful year for the SCF with a donation of 11 field kitchens worth R13 000 each 
for the SAP and facilities for the base at Ondangwa worth R17 340.61 By 1980, the 
total monetary donation by the organisation over its 12  years of existence was an 
unprecedented R6 million. In 1982, the SCF donated R500 000, of which they spent 
R350 000 on facilities.62 Administrative problems, unfortunately, did occur. Martin 
Foster, the Tactical Reaction Group officer at Oshivelo, recalls an incident where he 
discovered that donations by the SCF never reached the troops but were taken by, 
what he called the ‘Socks and Jam’, administrative clerks.63
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Visits to military bases by the Southern Cross Fund
Visits to military bases by members of the SCF occurred with the handing out of 
parcels or by invitation of the army. The reason for the SCF’s visits to the military 
bases was twofold: firstly, to determine the needs of the soldiers first hand and to 
show the support of the public, and, secondly, to give feedback to the public about 
the living situation of soldiers.64 Members also made scheduled visits to No 1 
(Voortrekkerhoogte) and No 2 (Wynberg) Military Hospitals. They were involved 
with projects to donate the following facilities, equipment and luxuries to conscripts, 
hospitalised here: a hydro-therapeutic swimming pool; a rehabilitation centre; 
donations for psychological or therapeutic help; overnight sleeping facilities for 
families;65 and Hospital gift packs that included reading material and music, treats, 
PJs and underwear, soap, razors, towels, toothbrushes, toothpaste and shampoo. The 
members of the SCF looked after the patients until their family members arrived.66
Assistance to SADF dependents
The Fund not only served to provide support to the armed forces but also their 
relatives. The Fund aimed to assist the dependents of soldiers in need financially. They 
donated money to those families identified for assistance to be used for rent, water 
and electricity bills, petrol, insurance, food, clothes and school fees.67 By 1980, the SCF 
was supporting 246 families; by 1984, the organisation spent an average of R260 000 
annually on this assistance. Dependents were encouraged to contact the SCF for 
assistance when it was needed. It was especially done to prevent the concern over 
their families to affect the service of the conscripts.68 
The Ride Safe project
The Ride Safe project was an initiative by the SCF that relied on the charity of the 
public to give a lift to conscripts on leave. They used slogans such as ‘Help Johnny 
comes marching home’ and ‘Give our country a lift’ to promote the campaign.69  Between 
1976 and 1977, 232  conscripts were involved in accidents relating to privately-
owned vehicles, thus inspiring this project.70 The Fund sponsored the telephone bills 
and provided shelter at pickup points. By 1983, the SCF had built 43 shelters in the 
Transvaal, 5  in Pretoria, 15  on the Witwatersrand, 48  in the Cape Province, 17  in 
Natal, 17 in the Orange Free State and 9 in SWA.71
Assistance in black townships
By the mid-1980s, the activities of the armed forces had been extended to service 
inside the country. With the deployment of soldiers in the townships in 1984, the 
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Y provide funds for support inside South Africa. In 1987, the SCF spent R142 000 on 
ablution facilities for soldiers’ use in places of protest. They equipped temporary bases, 
set up in strategic areas throughout townships, with luxuries including televisions, 
pool tables, playing cards, darts and dartboards, and domino sets.72 This changing role 
of the SCF would eventually contribute to its end.
THE SOUTHERN CROSS FUND AS A WOMEN’S ORGANISATION
One can label the SCF as both a women’s organisation and a civic organisation. The 
connection between the SCF and the image of a women’s organisation is apparent 
from its nickname, “Dankie-tannies”. This image is also supported by various academic 
works that refer to the SCF as a women’s organisation: S.M.  Fourie in ‘Die impak 
van Militêre Aktiwiteite op die Vaaldriehoekse samelewing’ calls the organisation a “vroue-
organisasie”.73 Jacklyn Cock’s Colonels and Cadres also discussed the SCF under the 
chapter, ‘Women’s organisations’,74 and in Masculinities, Militarization and the ECC, 
Daniel Conway generalises it as a ‘women’s group’.75 This image is most likely the 
result of twenty years under the leadership of Elizabeth Albrecht, who also served 
as the face of the organisation. Paratus, the mouthpiece of the SADF, that regularly 
reported on the SCF’s activities, wrote the following about Albrecht:
Being a true woman, she has over the past ten years worked herself up to a level 
of absolute stability and has shown unshakable solidarity. She maintains these 
principles according to strict discipline and demands respect from all who get 
into contact with her. In the best tradition of femininity the Southern Cross 
Fund bears the prestigious past with dignified pride and a modesty characteristic 
of the remarkable woman she is.76
Brigadier Lets Kok remarked that the woman formed the home front and was 
responsible for the emotional preparedness of society for war: 
The South African woman does not have to be in uniform to serve the army. 
The  woman’s attitude towards her husband or son’s conscription affects the 
quality of their service to their country.77
Lorraine Boyard de Volo argued that one of the reasons why women play such an 
important role during wartime, besides their influence as mothers, is that they can 
be presented as apolitical.78 Colonel van der Walt credits the role of the mother and 
or wife as the success behind the SCF. He claims the Army focused on their role for 
two reasons: To turn possible resistance into active participation and, secondly, to keep 
them ‘busy’ with fundraising events during their husband’s absence. In that way, the 
SCF served as a ‘lightning conductor’ – defusing a possible threat to the war effort.79
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However, not everyone supported or appreciated this role. In Rocky Williams’ poem, 
‘Cuito Cuanavale: For Gary 1987’, he opposes the Border War and suggests that women 
did not always understand the sacrifice made by conscripts until they were affected by 
it themselves: 
And his mother and Pat Carr 
were at one with the love 
that crucifies itself between the armour 
of the Southern Cross 
although she would halt in her giving 
when the stories exploded in her chiffon living room.80
Focus nonetheless fell on the contribution of this women’s organisation to the war 
effort. During the existence of the SCF, Albrecht was awarded for her service by 
numerous organisations. In 1976, she became the first woman to receive the South 
African Toastmasters International Communications and Leadership Prize. In  1978, 
she again became the first women to be awarded the Order of the Star of South Africa 
in the Officer’s class, and a year later she became the first women to receive the rank of 
Honorary Colonel in the SAP. In 1983, Albrecht won the Paul Harris Prize from the 
Rotary Club. Recognition for her service was not just limited to South Africa. The 
Movimento Nacional Feminico, the Portuguese women’s organisation who worked 
alongside the SCF during the early years, honoured Albrecht with a golden necklace 
for her service to the Portuguese armed forces in Angola and Mozambique.81
As a women’s organisation, the SCF therefore represented the participation and 
mobilisation of women in the course of the Border War and filled the expected 
traditional role of women on the home front. De Volo argues that the traditional 
role of women creates the misperception that the state initiates and maintains the 
mobilisation of women due to the contribution of mobilised women to the war 
effort. De Volo concludes that women mobilise out of their initiative.82 Organisations, 
like the SCF, challenge the passive support of women and transform it into active 
support. The women had to be active in support of their country’s safety. Even though 
women were limited to the home front, it was an active home front that formed part 
of the war effort and was not just limited to the support of the traditional role of men 
during wartime.83
THE SOUTHERN CROSS FUND AS A CIVIL ORGANISATION
Initially, the reaction from the public in support of the SCF was lukewarm due to 
the limited operations by the army. With the increase of military activity, the public’s 
support grew.84 By 1981, a poll showed that 83 per cent of the public was familiar 
with the work of the SCF.85 They raised funds on both the national and local level. 
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Y Fundraising events organised by the SCF included, for instance, a Debutant Ball, music 
concerts, Bonanza competitions with a Ford Granada as the 1st prize, blikskud, and 
various sporting events. Branches throughout all the provinces of South Africa also 
organised their fundraising projects. The income from fundraising events, divided 
into the different provinces, is as follows: the Transvaal, 58  per cent; the Cape 
Province, 25  per cent; the Orange Free State, 10  per cent; Natal, 5 per cent; and 
SWA, 2 per  cent.86 Projects for fundraising ranged from ‘Klimtolle vir Suid-Afrika’87 
to exhibitions at the Forces’ Festival, the selling of the Southern Cross Fund diary 
and two cooking books, Trakteer die Troepe and Resepte van Heinde en Ver. Mementoes 
included in the “Dankie-tannie-pakkies” and also sold to the public at Forces’ Festivals 
were, for example, knives, pens, flags, ties, scarves and writing pads.88
Various South African companies donated large amounts to the SCF’s cause. These 
companies included Sanlam, the Department of Correctional Services,89 the Magnis 
Company,90 the Italian Veteran Prisoner of War Bond,91 the Episcopal Church in Texas 
who donated $260,92 Krygkor and Anglo American.93 The annual ball held at the 
Castle in Cape Town was the most popular event, attended by many politicians and 
prominent businessmen.94
To maintain the support offered to the fighting forces, the SCF had to call on the 
public on a regular basis. The role of the public was emphasised time and again in the 
media to gain their cooperation and funding:
The Southern Cross Fund is an important organisation in the South African life. 
It is born from the people and reaches out one hand to the fighters on the border 
and the other to the people back home.95
The Fund was advertised as a dynamic organisation and recognised channel for public 
support.96 They annually advertised the gift packs, handed out at Christmas and to 
departing conscripts. “Basics can’t be all that bad, not with the useful packages handed 
out by the Southern Cross Fund.”97 Southern Cross Fund products sold to the public, 
in turn, contained feedback from soldiers attesting to the SCF’s contribution to their 
welfare and recreational time spent on military bases: “It means so much to us that 
there are people back home who think of us. It helps to drive the loneliness away and 
turns a normal day into a good day.”98 Again the SCF served its purpose as a channel 
between the public and the conscripts. 
Despite the success, there were cases of failure and opposition. By 1988, the profile 
of the SCF, membership numbers and funds raised decreased, and projects were 
postponed and even cancelled. A weaker economy and a decrease in military activity 
could accredit for this.99 From 1990 to 1992, the income and donations of the SCF 
decreased with as much as 35 per cent.100 The organisation also endured several blows 
to its image. In 1980, the model Liz Shai withdrew from a Fund project due to the 
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SCF’s support of the armed forces outside of military bases: “I will have no option but 
to bow out. Black people are sensitive when it comes to defence, and I do not want 
them to see me as willing to help in this regard.”101 In one isolated event, black nurses 
were forced to donate to the SCF. Their employer subtracted the donation from their 
salary, and they were not informed about the intentions of the donation.102 Four years 
later, one member of the SCF, Di Bishop, made negative comments about the attitude 
of conscripts after a visit to military bases, claiming conscripts were uninformed about 
the political situation in SWA.103 Opposition to the organisation reached a climax 
in 1985, when the SCF’s headquarters became the target for a bomb attack by the 
ANC. The bomb did not cause much damage, and no one was hurt.104
Nevertheless, the SCF became the largest donator of funds to the armed forces and 
a representative of the participation of society to the war effort. The foreword of the 
SCF’s cookbook, Trakteer die Troepe, emphasises this: “Throughout the country more 
than 260 Southern Cross branches have been working with dedication for our men on 
the borders, thus underlining their involvement in the struggle against terrorism.”105
THE MEANING OF THE SOUTHERN CROSS FUND:  
MORALE BUILDER AND CREATOR OF UNITY 
Regarding the definition of a militarised society, organisations like the Southern Cross 
Fund become integral to the militarisation of civil society.  The goal of the SCF was 
therefore extended from its primary goal, to serve the needs of the armed forces, 
to an expected secondary goal: by eliciting support for the army, the organisation 
indirectly carried over the values and ideals of the army to the public, thus supporting 
the militarisation process:106
We believe in you, we love you, you are our men, our sweethearts, our sons; 
we expect much of you. You must meet the challenge of this time with faith in 
yourselves, in your leaders, in God. The bravery and loyalty of our South African 
soldiers have been proven on a hundred battlefields. They have never failed us, we 
expect you, their sons, to keep faith.107
This idealisation of the role and duty of the conscript in the media represents the 
military values upheld by the public. 
Regan argues that, while war influences a country on a political, economic and social 
level, it is the social aspect of a war that can derail the war effort, specifically referring 
to the presence of conscription in society. If a society does not accept this system, 
support for the state and army will decrease.108 As the biggest donator of funds to the 
welfare of conscripts, the public held the SCF responsible for their well-being and had 
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Y addressed to the establisher of the SCF, Elizabeth Albrecht, attests to the passionate 
involvement of white South African women at the time and their concern for 
the conscripts: 
The war is no longer that faraway war to the north of South West Africa, it’s here. 
For example, a mother says to you, ‘You give parcels for the man in Ondangwa, 
my son is in Soweto and he is in as much danger as they are, if not more. And 
what are you going to do about it?’109
The concerns of the mothers were exasperated by military censorship: “What I 
remember best is the crying of parents. I don’t think they were crying because their 
sons were going away, but rather because they did not know where they were going.”110
Reports from the SCF after visits to conscripts often answered these concerns. These 
reports were regularly published in the media to reassure the public: 
The boys are tanned, healthy and glad that their parents don’t have to worry about 
them. The conscripts are full of life and motivated in their task. Recreational 
facilities are adequate and include everything from swimming pools to dartboards 
and tennis courts. Some of the bases even have electricity in every tent. The 
soldiers are definitely not bored and free time is organised. The Southern Cross 
Fund is happy with how the money is spent.111
A similar report on the conditions at military bases aimed directly aimed at the 
mothers of conscripts: “Mothers can be assured that their sons are well looked after 
and the Southern Cross organisation has done a lot for our boys.”112 Some reports 
encouraged the support of the public by referring to the ‘total onslaught’ faced by the 
country, therefore directly merging the values of the army with those of society: 
We have no right to expect our men in uniform to endure suffering and hardship 
if we at home do not manifest a strong belief that our cherished values and 
traditions are worth defending.113
The feedback from a civil organisation that represented society brought home the 
condition of the conscript’s military service and served to comfort the public.  This 
was done mainly through the media. As this quote from The Citizen shows: 
Just as they are united in combating infiltration and attacks, so we, on the home 
front, must also unite since union still ensures and guarantees strength. The 
Southern Cross had succeeded laudably in impressing on people the concept of 
a continuous consolidated front from up-country to the border, from the home 
front to the battle front.114
Therefore, the emotional involvement of the public was turned into communal 
support. The Fund thus served to ensure the high morale of society, not just concerning 
victories or defeats, but also the deaths and absence of their loved ones. 
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Historians such as Jonathan Fennell and James Alexander Ulio argue that, even though 
the army can provide for its soldier’s basic needs, clothing, food and shelter, it is not 
enough to ensure the high morale of its troops. We must give equal attention to the 
soldier’s environment. Albrecht believed that the country’s most important weapon is 
the morale of society and its soldiers.115 Politicians regularly emphasised the role of the 
SCF in the building of morale. Magnus Malan, former Minister of Defence, supported 
this role of the SCF:
By providing funds to members of the South African Army for their welfare 
and facilities, the Southern Cross Fund is contributing to the high morale of 
the defending forces – that unmissable quality without which we cannot win 
the war.116
Through its activities, the Southern Cross Fund aimed to reach the following goals: 
firstly, to prove to the South African conscript that the civilians cared about and would 
actively work to contribute to their welfare and, secondly, to improve the morale of 
the conscripts through recreational equipment.117 An article in Die Oosterlig supported 
this sentiment:
A soldier’s preparedness doesn’t just depend on his weapon and what the army 
provides for him – a soldier must also be spiritually combat-ready; that is where 
his strength lies. It means a lot for a soldier’s morale when he receives a Southern 
Cross gift pack in the loneliness of the border area.118
Magnus Malan took this opinion further and implied that the conscripts could not 
fulfil their task without the help of the SCF: “The tangible presence of the home front 
and the people back home in the form of articles provided by the Southern Cross Fund, 
serves as a much-needed morale boost without which the army cannot operate.”119
The contribution to the morale of soldiers by the SCF was held by the organisation 
to be very successful. Albrecht regularly remarked that the SCF received many letters 
of gratitude from conscripts and published selected letters in Southern Cross Fund 
products such as the cookbook, Trakteer die Troepe: “As a soldier, I was made aware 
of the unity built by our people back home. It kept our morale high.”120 This was 
also evident from the interviews with veterans, adding that “[t]he Dankie-tannies had 
hearts of gold”; “I think it especially meant a lot for the troops who were still very 
young to know a mother figure cared about them”; and “The bubble gum definitely 
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THE SOUTHERN CROSS FUND DISSOLVES
With the evacuation of troops from Angola and South West Africa in 1988, the services 
of the SCF seemed to no longer be needed. Troops were still being deployed in 
townships, therefore, changing the role of the SCF in 1990.122 Support continued, but 
the early 1990s was a time of change. After several meetings in 1995, they decided that 
the political situation no longer called for the existence of the SCF.123 At the national 
conference held that year, they decided that the organisation would dissolve.124 The 
organisation still followed normal procedures. The Fund paid all remaining funds 
out to the military bases like Ysterplaat, Saldanha and Pretoria, and a final external 
audit with all documentation were handed over to the Director of Fundraising on 
28 February 1996. Twenty-eight years after the SCF formed, it dissolved.125
CONCLUSION
The Southern Cross Fund was an all-encompassing organisation. Due to a lack of 
sources, it is difficult to determine the precise membership figures, however, available 
statistics do attest to the size of the organisation. At its culmination, the SCF had 
260 nationwide branches, 90 per cent of its funds were allocated to the welfare of 
soldiers, 83 per cent of the population was familiar with the SCF, and the organisation 
averaged a national income of R9 million per year that made it the second biggest 
welfare organisation.126 The grandeur of the SCF ensured that its impact reached the 
majority of the population – military as well as civil. Participation in the activities of 
the SCF served to unite the white society as an active home front. The relationship that 
the SCF built and maintained between the public and the troops was a constructive 
relationship that brought comfort to both parties. 
We should not look at the work of the organisation and its donations as part of the 
debate surrounding the justification of the war. The conflict and legitimacy of the 
‘Total Onslaught’ cannot be measured objectively, and the SCF did not serve to justify 
the war, but it did indirectly contribute to society’s participation in the war. Therefore, 
the SCF should be studied in the context of the mobilisation of society and as a 
product of its time. 
In 2001, South African forces were deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
A volunteer support network, formed by civilian and veterans working together in 
Pretoria to support the deployed soldiers and their families, send gift bags and mail. 
Businesses, community organisations and volunteers donated various luxuries.127 
Forty-three years after the birth of the SCF, the mobilisation process repeated itself in 
the tradition of the support of the troops of South Africa by the public.
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A reminder of the connection between the home front and The Border















































Always an excuse for a braai
The battle for hearts and minds on the home front
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A corporal in the kimbo at the Omega base of 31 Battalion
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INTRODUCTION
In the preface to my book, South Africa’s Border War: Contested Narratives and Conflicting 
Memories,1 I proffered the following statement:
For the sake of full disclosure, it should be noted that I am a former South 
African Defence Force (SADF) conscript and hence a veteran. I make no claim 
to speak on their behalf though. In fact, many of my opinions are at odds with 
those of large segments of this ‘community of remembrance’. Nor did I set out 
to write myself into this (hi)story. But it would be disingenuous or dishonest to 
deny that I have something personal invested in this project.
To reference my prior statement as a point of departure for this chapter might 
well be deemed self-indulgent or solipsistic. But my intention of repeating it here 
is to problematise this articulation of the relationship between my younger self as a 
SADF conscript and my current self as a veteran and historian of the Border War. 
When someone first asked me whether I wrote myself into the (hi)story of the 
War, I demurred. My training as a historian prompted me to take recourse in the 
largely discredited notions of objectivity and impartiality. But I soon realised that, 
while I might not have been fully aware of it at the time, my personal experience 
of the military informed my approach to writing about the Border War. While I 
acknowledged as much in my book, I did not explore my epistemological assumptions 
and how these influenced my historiographical practices. I propose to do so here.
Practising historians seldom articulate their epistemologies, and I am no different, 
partly because the theories of how we acquire and create knowledge seem abstract 
or abstruse to historians trained in the tradition of empiricism. Suffice to say I have 
forsaken the view that we have direct access to reality and come to accept that language 
and genre – in the sense of the codification of discursive practices – mediate the past. 
Hence historical knowledge is not simply derived from observation of the evidence 
and the inference of its meaning. Rather, I have come to accept that the meaning of 
historical narratives are not discovered in the events but reconstructed from subjective 
traces of the past. I subscribe to a ‘soft’ version of constructivism that allows for the 
existence of an independent reality that sets limits to what meaning(s) may be gleaned 
from texts; they cannot simply mean what we want them to mean. History, then, is a 
discourse based upon a set of rules that define how ‘truth’ is arrived at and how it is 
(re)presented and (re)produced.2 My postmodernism – if that’s what it is – has made 
me more self-reflexive about the practice of history. It behoves me to recognise that 
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CE CONFESSIONS AND AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES
The confession is a model of autobiographical writing. It has its origins in Christian 
ritual but subsequently became literary genre exemplified by the writings of the early 
Christian father, St Augustine (397-400 C.E.). Although secularised, the confession 
has retained its form as a series of self-disclosures that amount to the recounting of 
a transformative or conversion expeience. The French philosopher Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau’s ‘foundational autobiography’ The Confessions (1782)4 serves as “serious 
exploration in the limits of truthful self-representation”.5 The confession reveals the 
narrator’s fears and foibles to the reader; it renders the subject vulnerable to being 
criticised, judged, misunderstood, or even not believed. Confessional narratives crafted 
as intensely subjective explorations of the self are mainly concerned with the ethical 
dimensions of growth.6 The conventions of the confession are evident in memoirs and 
other forms of life writing. 
The confession is usually regarded as being an altogether different genre from 
historical writing. Whereas the confession risks exposing the inner self to scrutiny, 
the academic essay is designed to establish distance between the subject matter and 
the self. Thus, when writing about war, the normative social discourse of scholarship 
requires me to disavow the embodied self of a veteran.7 However, I regard this as 
untenable as I have come to share Simon Schama’s viewpoint that “all history tends 
towards autobiographical confession”.8 In what follows, I suggest that my positionality 
as a historian of the Border War was shaped by my experience as a SADF conscript 
that is, in turn, contingent upon my memory as a veteran.
Memory is not merely stored in the brain as a series of snapshots of the past. Instead, 
it is constantly reconstructed to make sense of our experience and knowledge in the 
here and now. We tend to align and fashion our memories according to how we define 
ourselves in relation to others; according to our understanding of self within a group 
or social context. In other words, the intersection of collective and autobiographical 
memory shape our identity. Geoffrey Cubitt notes that autobiographical memory 
refers to “any recollection of past events or circumstances that carry a trace of 
autonoetic (or self-knowing) awareness”.9 If my autobiographical memories reveal 
something significant about my identity and essential truth about the self,10 then they 
are tantamount to confessions even when appearing in the guise of life history.
The confession is thus a mode of life writing that takes the form of testimonials that 
recount personal experiences that provide a version of past events from the perspective 
of someone who directly experienced them. Those that testify assign responsibilities 
to others and assume as much for their conduct – unless the confession is deliberately 
evasive or self-serving to shift blame for reprehensible deeds such as human rights 
violations or atrocities. It might take the form of an ordinary soldier insisting that his 
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conduct was justified as he was following orders, or it might take the form of an officer 
attributing his conduct to conformity to institutional authority. The subordination 
of individuality to the institution and its corollary, the denial of personal agency, is 
seldom absolute. There are always some choices to make, even if circumscribed in the 
case of conscripts. 
At the age of 18, the SADF conscripted me. I went reluctantly, opting to render 
National Service straight out of school rather than defer it until after university. My 
service was wholly undistinguished. I never volunteered for anything and did not rise 
above the rank of rifleman. Following my training, I was deployed in the so-called 
‘operational area’ on the Namibian/Angolan border but did not experience combat. 
Instead, I became a casualty of war as a result of a near-fatal vehicle accident towards 
the end of my stint of  ‘border duty’.11 I spent several months recuperating in military 
hospitals from serious injuries before being discharged. After being declared fit enough 
to resume my military commitments, I was transferred to Donkin Commando in Port 
Elizabeth (where I was teaching). When my Citizen Force Unit was deployed to quell 
‘unrest’ in the local townships, I refused to comply, and the SADF charged me for 
refusing to obey orders. But the officer commanding my unit preferred not to make 
a public spectacle of my case, especially when it turned out that I was one of several 
troops who objected to having to ‘police’ the townships. 
Consequently, I was permitted to perform my duties in the stores in the unit’s 
headquarters. In the official records of the SADF, neither of these episodes is mentioned 
(although the first incident was reported briefly in the press). When I accessed my 
file in the Department of Defence Documentation Centre, I found no trace of either 
of the events. What I did discover was a medical report concerning my injuries and 
treatment following surgery in 1 Military Hospital, as well as a detailed register of the 
hours spent issuing uniforms and equipment to members of Donkin Commando. 
I found this archival ‘silence’ somewhat disconcerting as there seemed to be no official 
confirmation of my acts of recklessness and defiance.
Nonetheless, my recall of these episodic memories suggests that my military experience 
impacted profoundly upon my social consciousness and political awareness. I abhorred 
being treated as a cypher by an institution that sought to break down and then remake 
me in its mould. I developed a deep-seated resentment of the arbitrary authority 
abused by non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and officers who did not earn respect 
but demanded it based on their rank. While I did not directly challenge the opinions 
of instructors for fear of being victimised, I resisted the SADF’s indoctrination in 
other ways. For instance, I had the gumption to submit a piece to the base rag of 
2 South African Infantry Battalion in which I drew an analogy between the futility 
of fighting the desert sand infiltrating Walvis Bay and the South West Africa Peoples’ 
Organization (Swapo). An officer berated me as a ‘communist’ for my troubles. 
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CE legitimacy of the SADF’s occupation of that country. Subsequently, during my years 
at university, I came to regard my service in the SADF with misgivings and the war 
in Angola and Namibia as morally indefensible. I could not identify with those who 
came to regard their time in the SADF with fondness, who evinced a nostalgia that 
I found nauseating. Like Second World War military veteran and scholar, Paul Fussell, 
who adopted the persona of  “the pissed-off infantryman in the guise of a literary and 
cultural commentator”,12 I became a bitter veteran indignant at having had to defend 
an unjust system. In some respects, my Border War project seeks to recuperate my 
sense of self-worth or, at the very least, affirm my humanity.
MY BORDER WAR PROJECT
My reading of several conscript memoirs piqued my scholarly interest in the Border 
War. Their publication punctured the conspicuous silence in the public sphere about 
the subject. I attributed this largely to the need to observe political correctness 
and circumspection in a climate of national reconciliation. SADF veterans who 
had been on the ‘losing side’ of history adopted a wait and see attitude towards the 
new dispensation. As the new ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC) 
consolidated its position as the premier liberation movement and constructed a 
triumphalist ‘Struggle’ narrative. The ANC regarded the Angolan/Namibian War 
as only a sideshow in the anti-apartheid struggle, but Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK)’s 
armed struggle accorded pride of place in the official narrative.13 School curricula 
and history textbooks were revised, memorials erected, commemorative stamps 
issued, and a pantheon of heroes and martyrs was constructed to legitimise the new 
regime. Notwithstanding the ANC’s use of history to validate its rule, the party has 
entrenched a constitution that safeguards freedom of speech and so allows counter-
narratives to circulate in the public sphere. The existence of divisive memory regimes 
allowed SADF apologists to claim control over the SADF’s institutional memory by 
the dissemination of their narratives. Meanwhile, in the private sphere, SADF veterans 
shared their stories with compatriots and family members. An inability to come to 
terms with their trauma, or the burden of guilt and shame, cause reticence on the 
part of former combatants to do so. Thus personal inhibitions and public constraints 
combined to produce a relative silence rather than amnesia.14
In the new millennium, SADF veterans found their voices and the silence well and 
truly shattered. I have suggested elsewhere15 that their renewed self-belief was made 
possible by the belated discovery of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and the 
appropriation of victimhood. It also owed much to the advent of the internet that 
provided an unregulated (cyber)space that enabled veterans to air their views and 
relate their stories. Indeed, the internet has provided them with a ready audience that 
is not particularly demanding as to accurate historical contextualisation nor discerning 
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when it comes to the literary qualities of their output. The Border War has also been 
the subject of a stream of commercially and privately published personal narratives; 
a  documentary film series screened by the Kyknet television channel; a revived 
anti-war theatre production; a musical; popular songs; art; photographic exhibitions; 
media installations; and so on. The market for Border War cultural artefacts and 
memorabilia has been saturated in the last decade or so.
My monograph seeks to understand the ‘afterlife’ of the Border War. I employ a 
framework that focuses on collective memory and cultural production that shapes 
the representation and remembrance of war. The book traces the forms and practices 
of the transmission of such memory by mnemonic communities, particularly SADF 
veterans. It also has a comparative dimension, as it draws on insights gleaned from 
the literature that examines the legacies of wars waged by the German Wehrmacht, 
the US military in Vietnam, French forces in Algeria, and the Israeli army against its 
Arab neighbours. This transnational approach enabled me to make a study of common 
cross-cultural themes in the depiction of  ‘war’ in an array of representations including 
literature (imaginative and non-fictional), photographs, theatre productions and 
memorials. It also allowed me to move beyond the parochialism of South African 
historiography and narrow focus of traditional military history.
I accept the premise that cultural memory shapes social understandings of the war as 
much if not more than published history – including books like my own. It is because 
products of memory are increasingly validated as the veridical representation of the 
war. The meanings of the war produced by veterans through memory work (such as 
writing memoirs), memorialising practices (such as erecting makeshift and permanent 
sites of memory), returning to Angolan battlefields, and so on, has resulted in narratives 
that resonate with the National Service Generation (NSG). As I have already pointed 
out, many of these veterans have taken to the internet to share their experiences with 
others of the NSG where they have created virtual bunkers or discursive laagers.16 In 
the anonymity of cyberspace, some veterans have become cyber warriors, re-fighting 
the war with their keyboards. One of the objectives of my project is to destabilise the 
sometimes racist and recidivist discourse that passes for discussion of the legacy of the 
Border War.
My pluralist credo as a historian recognises the ‘messiness’ of past reality and leaves the 
way open for multiple readings of the past – “none claiming any special privilege, but 
each providing some illumination from its perspective”.17 It does not imply that all 
claims are true, but that they should be judged in terms of the evidence they marshal 
and the coherence of their argument.
With this in mind, my project avoids constructing a (grand) narrative that offers a 
singular political and ideological explanation of the Border War. I fully appreciate 
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CE juxtaposes conflicting narratives rather than endorsing a particular version of the past. 
Some may well see this as a failure of commitment, even the resort of a coward − 
because I do not take a stand. I do not avoid making judgements as I employ common 
language that is far from being value-free so that the very terms I use implies political 
positioning. My criticisms of the conduct of the military hierarchy in refusing to 
admit its poor record of and condonation of human rights abuses have earned me a 
reputation for being ‘anti-SADF’ in certain circles. In this regard, I part company with 
most (military) historians who steer clear of moral judgements and tend to explain 
violence and aggression as an ineradicable aspect of human nature and so regard the 
harm caused by conflicts as unavoidable.
This type of military history (with which I take issue) appears located within a 
technicist paradigm. Its primary concern is with military strategies and tactics, as well 
as with the lessons of history. It avoids having to make moral judgements by invoking 
a commitment to impartiality and objectivity.18 Neither does it have much truck 
with the Keeganesque Face of Battle school or the so-called ‘new military history’ that 
pays more attention to the experience of ordinary soldiers than the decision-making 
of commanders in the field.19 Nor does it have much time for the linguistic and 
cultural turns in war studies. Not only is this chapter indebted to the last-mentioned 
approaches, but also the writings on war and remembrance by scholars such as Jay 
Winter.20 Thus my approach to the legacy of the Border War is informed by an 
eclectic – but not random – an array of paradigms, underpinned by the understanding 
that historians are never free from effect as sensory and somatic stimuli are as many 
filters of knowledge as intellectual ones.21
WRITING WAR EXPERIENCE
Embodied or lived experience is effective, and my recollections of the military were 
often emotionally charged. It became evident when I was moved to tears by the 
stories recounted to me by certain of my informants who confided details that they 
had not previously shared even with loved ones. There is little doubt that I was deeply 
affected by the experience of revisiting my own and others’ repressed memories. Many 
historians might feel uneasy about the capacity of intimacy and emotion to evoke the 
past as they aspire for objectivity and truth. I share this discomfort to some extent as I 
believe that historians are still bound to be responsible for the evidence and people of 
the past. But what we know about war is always mediated by knowledge and feeling. 
Therefore I think that it might be prudent to heed Christine Sylvester’s advice that: 
To access [the myriad] experiences [of war] requires that the researcher takes 
a close look at himself or herself; that s/he engages in self-reflexivity; that s/he 
relates to moods, feelings and attitudes or the affective.22
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Accordingly, war scholars are giving increasing attention to the relationship between 
war and the body, or what Kevin McSorley calls the “corporeal turn”.23 It lends 
credence to Sarah Bulmer and David Jackson’s claim that “the struggle to articulate 
embodied experience is the key problem for research on war”.24
War is visceral and physical. Elaine Scarry has noted that war is “the most radically 
embodying event in which human beings ever collectively participate”.25 Accordingly, 
some scholars admit the impossibility of addressing the topic adequately, of making 
sense of wartime experience. Others place a premium on the first-hand experience 
and hold that veterans have earned the right to write about war by having been 
there.26 But does this necessarily disqualify historians who have not participated in 
war from writing about it with authority? Readers of war stories tend to accept 
at face value the authenticity of the first-hand experience; they routinely regard 
experiential knowledge as more credible than the historian’s expertise. But is this 
warranted? Are there hierarchies of knowledge when it comes to writing about war? 
Why is it assumed that the war memoirist has direct access to past reality, whereas 
the historian has to defend his/her expertise when s/he lacks military experience?27 
I contend that memoirists’ claim to authenticity and veracity does not diminish the 
historian’s authority to write about war. It is not a zero-sum game. Personal narratives 
and histories do not compete with one another. They are discrete genres of literature, 
each of which adds value to our knowledge of war. For the knowledge of war is 
acquired from the body and the mind, from feelings and words.
As literature of lived experience, memoirs are assumed to have been written by 
people who have been through the events that they relate. But given that they are 
based on personal memory and written retrospectively, memoirs depict remembered 
experience. Nonetheless, as participants, memoirists are regarded as having privileged 
knowledge of the events in which they are involved. The historian, typically, holds 
that being experientially distanced or removed from the event better positions him or 
her to “piece together the confused, desperate, and sometimes contradictory accounts 
by participants into a plausible whole”.28 Historians tend to adopt the position of 
omniscient narrators who use the third person, whereas the memoirists appear as the 
protagonist in their stories and use the first person. Memoirs tend to be judged by 
their fidelity to the ‘real’, by their veridicality and veracity, whereas the rules of the 
discipline bound histories or share certain, albeit seldom articulated, epistemological 
assumptions. Although histories and memoirs bear close family resemblances, they are 
distinct discourses about the past to be evaluated on their terms.29 
The war memoir is a well-established genre.30 In his survey of personal narratives 
titled The Soldiers’ Tale, war veteran and scholar Samuel Hynes champions the veterans’ 
voice, but does not do so unreservedly. He reminds us that personal narratives are 
not history31 and that comprehensive knowledge of a historical event – especially 
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CE Eyewitness accounts are necessarily partial, as conflicting accounts of battles often 
demonstrate. John Keegan points out that the ordinary soldier’s battle is a microcosm 
of the war, offering a limited or keyhole perspective on the overall situation.32 It is 
not to argue that his experience is any less valid than his commanding officer, but 
to suggest that the view from the foxhole is different from that of the operations 
room. However, access to past reality is beyond our grasp by the very nature and 
limitations of language as it is an inadequate and arbitrary means of communicating 
the ineffable.33 Indeed, no-one’s account of war; though faithful to the actual 
events can enable the reader to (re)live the experience of war. If we construct lived 
experience culturally and socially as remembered experience (as I believe it to be), 
then the subject is constituted through such experience. The memoirists’ narrative 
provides internal coherence and ascribes meaning to the experience of the individual; 
it does not guarantee the veracity of the text. In respect of the American experience 
of the Vietnam War, Brendan Boyle rather pointedly notes that “if the veteran author 
knows the ‘truth’ about the war, then there would only need be one novel, memoir, 
play film, or history; these representations being interchangeable and all following the 
first, redundant”. He adds that “the biographical, ‘truth-telling’ power of the veteran 
should not be privileged over those who do not claim veteran status”.34
In his discussion of Great War memoirs, Dominic Harman notes that “narratives exist 
as [a] discourse rather than lived experience, [and they] can never bring us to a full 
understanding of war …”.35 As language is unequal to the task of describing warfare, 
there exists a gap between life and literature, or experience and its representation.36 
Memoirs work towards bridging this gap by attempting to transcend the obvious 
limitations of language. As such, they “offer colour commentary on history”37 and so 
add extra dimensions and layers of meaning to the reader’s understanding of war. But 
they also suffer from inherent weakness: namely, a loss of overall perspective due to an 
intense focus on the singular lived experience. Memoirs that examine unremarkable 
events and quotidian experience from the perspective of the individual soldier often 
lose sight of the bigger picture or the overall context that frames and gives meaning to 
the soldier’s conduct during war. 
Veterans are wont to assert that their participation in combat and proximity to the 
enemy accords them special knowledge of war – even though the majority of those 
in uniform do not experience fighting.38 Their premise is that individuals’ sensory 
experiences produce knowledge of war that is the preserve of the soldier. It is, above 
all, the bodily experience that is deemed to be crucial for knowledge of something 
as visceral as war. Accordingly, only those who Yuval Harari calls “flesh witnesses” are 
qualified to speak about war.39 Furthermore, this intimate knowledge cannot be passed 
on by narration; it cannot be acquired second-hand. A soldier might relate what he 
(and occasionally she) experiences, but to know what s/he knows, someone would 
also have had to live through it. In other words, ‘you had to be there’.40 It has become 
the veterans’ mantra invoked as a catchphrase in much war writing. Indeed, ‘being 
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there’ is widely regarded by veterans and their readers as a prerequisite for providing a 
credible account of the Border War.
A collection of writings by SADF veterans compiled by its former chief, General 
Jannie Geldenhuys, first published in Afrikaans as Ons was Daar and translated into 
English as We were there, typify this prerequisite of “being there”.41 The title of 
Geldenhuys’s volume is an assertion of authority based on participation in the conflict, 
of knowledge derived from being on the battlefield. In his preface, Geldenhuys calls 
the contributors to the volume “real-life participants” who “relate the real history 
of the war”.42 They would appear to believe that they alone are qualified to relate 
accounts of combat and other war experiences; that their experience affords them 
special knowledge of the Border War. The implication of this is that only witnesses 
and participants are authorised to speak about war; ‘experts’, including historians, are 
according to this view, mere pretenders to knowledge.43 Thus scholars and armchair 
critics are confronted by the rhetorical question: ‘How can you understand?’ Followed 
by the dismissive retort: ‘You were not there …’44 This amounts to a strategy aimed 
at asserting a hierarchy of knowledge and silencing those who venture to produce 
alternative accounts of the Border War. The ‘retired generals’ are regarded as the 
epitome of the received wisdom of the conflict. It assumes that their authority cannot 
be challenged. But this is not the case.
BORDER WAR STORIES
Some argue that a poor literary tradition in the SADF exacerbated by a censorious 
approach to the dissemination of information curtailed the production of personal 
narratives by veterans.45 While the bulk of the literature on the Border War is in the 
form of campaign and battle histories, unit and regimental histories,46 there has been 
a burgeoning of autobiographies, biographies and prosopographies, memoirs, as well 
as fiction and other imaginative literature of late.47 It seems safe to say that veterans 
produce much of this literature for fellow veterans or military buffs. A few well-written 
personal narratives or memoirs provide something approaching canonical accounts of 
the Border War. On the other hand, some of these memoirs have little historical or 
literary value as they are clichéd and unoriginal. Their significance, if any, lies in the 
fact that they confirm that “the lived experience of war is culturally constructed”.48 
SADF veterans’ memoirs have a limited range of storylines and narrative structures. 
Some are coming-of-age stories suffused with nostalgia for the ‘good old days’ when 
National Service was a rite of passage whereby boys became men. For some memoirists, 
the Border War was a just and necessary war, while others express the conviction that 
they were betrayed by the older generation that sent them to wage an unwinnable 
war.49 Some are stories of life-long male friendships that have resulted from National 
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CE battle. Still, others narrate subversive strategies pursued during National Service to 
make life easier by ‘jippoing’ (avoiding duty) or to test the resolve of the military 
authorities to discipline armed troops and ‘naafi’ (no ambition and fuck-all interest). 
Veterans are inclined to relate stories with considerable candour and unflinching 
honesty.  Whatever their mode of narration – tragic or traumatic, nostalgic, ironic, 
comic – the authors invariably follow the traditional literary-confessional conventions 
of the memoir form.50
The majority of memoirs published by English-speaking conscripts constitute a corpus 
that Christo Doherty has described as a genre of trauma and anti-heroic narratives.51 
He holds that Rick Andrew’s Buried in the Sky (2001)52 established the trend of 
anti-heroic accounts with its portrayal of the boredom and inaction experienced by 
three-month ‘campers’ on the Border. This was followed by Clive Holt’s At Thy Call 
We Did Not Falter (2005),53 Steven Webb’s Ops Medic: A National Serviceman’s Border 
War (2008),54 Frank Nunes’ Altered States (2008),55 Tim Ramsden’s Border-Line Insanity: 
A National Serviceman’s Story (2009),56 Peter Tucker and Marius van Niekerk’s Behind 
the Lines of the Mind: Healing the Mental Scars of War (2009),57 Granger Korff ’s 19 With 
a Bullet: A South African Paratrooper in Angola (2009),58 and Anthony Feinstein’s Battle 
Scarred: Hidden Costs of the Border War (2011).59 Given that these memoirists are mainly 
‘ordinary soldiers’ from the lower ranks, who served as infantry or riflemen, artillery 
gunners, junior officers and medics in the SADF, suggests that they are representative 
of a cross-section of experience. But what has gone previously unnoticed or remarked 
upon is that, whereas in earlier wars the quintessential wounded veteran displayed 
physical injuries, the wounds of the Border War seldom inscribed on veterans bodies.
So, for instance, Korff ’s narrator-protagonist, a gungho paratrooper, is the very 
incarnation of the grensvegter (literally, ‘border fighter’). Although Korff ’s account is 
replete with descriptions of acts of the derringdo with boastful bravado, the admission 
that he was traumatised, tempers it. Haunted by memories of committing or being 
a party to heinous acts, Korff recounts how he suffered a breakdown, diagnosed 
with PTSD at a Veterans’ Centre in Los Angeles. The trope of trauma seems to be 
a common denominator in the abovementioned memoirs. Trauma narratives have 
become almost de rigueur in SADF conscripts’ narratives. Feinstein’s In Conflict was 
revised and re-published as Battle Scarred.60 It relates several episodes that reveal the 
deep emotional and psychological scars incurred by those involved in the fighting in 
Ovamboland. For instance, Feinstein tells of the security policeman who, following 
an ambush in which he failed to overcome his fears, experienced nightmares during 
which he regressed into a state of childhood. And Behind the Lines of the Mind depicts 
Van Niekerk’s attempts to manage his inner turmoil stemming from his attempts to 
confront his culpability for atrocities he committed while deployed as a paratrooper 
in Angola. The titles of Feinstein and Van Niekerk’s texts both bear the word ‘scar’ 
which alludes to their self-diagnosed psychic wounds. Both frame their stories within 
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a PTSD paradigm – the first because he is a psychiatrist and the second because he 
familiarised himself with the discourse after viewing TV documentaries about the 
treatment of US Vietnam veterans.
Like Doherty, I have previously noted the trend that SADF soldier-authors have taken 
to framing their war stories as trauma-cum-healing narratives.61 I would attribute this 
to the de-stigmatisation of PTSD. The psychologist, Lynne Jones, holds that PTSD has 
come to signify the moral, social and political suffering of war. She has observed:
… the growing hold that this one diagnosis, PTSD, had on the professional and 
public imagination. PTSD appeared to be taking hold of the professional and 
public imagination even when it did not apply. Perhaps it was because PTSD 
was a diagnosis without a stigma. The rise of biological psychiatry and its focus 
on mental illnesses as ‘brain diseases’ had failed to remove the taint of moral and 
personal failing associated with the majority of psychiatric disorders. But here 
was a disorder that came packaged with a clear-cut cause that was obviously not 
the patient’s fault, and which set them in the sympathetic and dramatic light of 
victimhood. Here was a diagnosis that could be taken as a badge of suffering.62
In the South African context, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
arguably laid the platform for the de-stigmatisation of PTSD, although this went 
largely unacknowledged by military veterans at the time. In any event, the TRC 
Report encouraged them “to share their pain and reflect on their experiences".63 The 
Report also advocated raising public awareness about the reality and effects of PTSD 
and suggested veterans seek “help to tell and write their stories”.64 The broadcast of 
the television news programme, Carte Blanche’s feature ‘The War Inside’ on M-Net 
in 2001, raised the public profile of PTSD. The feature, produced in response to the 
publicity generated by Andrew’s Buried in the Sky, categorised the author as a PTSD 
sufferer although he did not claim that he displayed the characteristic symptoms of 
the malady in his memoir or during the programme. But the (non-medical) diagnosis 
of PTSD offered former Koevoet operatives who appeared on the programme a 
sympathetic hearing and even a kind of exculpation for their nefarious deeds.65 It is 
little wonder that soldier-authors such as Holt and Van Niekerk have pursued narrative 
therapy in the belief that the writing of their memoirs might prove cathartic and assist 
with their healing processes.
The American historian Jerry Lembcke argues that PTSD is a socially constructed 
category, its meaning only partly derived from its medical context and that it has 
mutated from a diagnostic category to a social trope. He contends that the seductiveness 
of PTSD caused some US veterans to embrace it as an identity and their comrades to 
assign it as a badge of honour.66 Accordingly, they were viewed not only as ‘victims’ 
but as ‘heroes’. This badge was worn by those who were said to have fought hard and 
experienced ‘real’ war. PTSD, no longer regarded as the mark of failed masculinity, 
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CE ultimate display of typically heteronormative masculinity. Whether victims or heroes, 
returning soldiers adopted the symptoms of PTSD and a war-story biography that 
conformed to what they thought family and friends would expect to see and hear.67 
Lembcke’s scepticism concerning PTSD as a medical category in the post-Vietnam 
American context has a degree of resonance in post-apartheid South Africa. Here the 
veteran-as-victim and anti-hero have decentred the narrative of the SADF soldier as 
the grensvegter and hero. Possibly the best example of a Border War story written in 
the anti-heroic vein is Johan Vlok Louw’s ironically titled novel, Eric the Brave,68 not 
a memoir.
CONCLUSION
Like the soldier-authors, my military experience has followed me my entire adult life. 
But, unlike them, I have not seen fit to write a memoir.69 Instead, I have produced a 
monograph, numerous articles and now this essay. None of this work is a substitute 
for fully-fledged autobiographical writing, yet they offer clues to my identity as a 
historian and veteran. Like Jaume Aurell, I am convinced of “the futility of separating 
personal experience from intellectual activity”, of disentangling my personal and 
professional identities. And given that “autobiographical style mirrors historical style 
– and vice versa”, I am equally convinced that “reading academic historical texts 
through the prism of autobiographical narratives extends the possibilities of historical 
interpretation”.70 Thus I have re-read my monograph as a revelation of personal issues, 
imbricated in disciplinary discourse. And I have undertaken this exercise in auto-
historiography that has revealed my identity, not merely represented, but enacted or 
performed in the process of writing.
In this essay, I have sought to come to terms with my embodiment as a veteran, to 
confront the memories that define my experience of National Service and attempt to 
ascertain how these might have influenced my subsequent development as a historian 
of the Border War. To that end, I have divulged personal recollections of my time in 
uniform, acknowledged my personal relationship to the subject of study, and reflected 
upon the linkages between my veteran-historian identities. My attempt to don two 
hats simultaneously, to conjoin my veteran and historian selves, is in recognition of 
the fact that my personal experience is inseparable from my intellectual activity. This 
exercise in auto-historiography or life writing has enabled me to venture outside of 
my comfort zone, to tear down the ramparts of my ivory tower, and deconstruct the 
premises of my profession. I have entered a liminal space or no-mans-land where 
veteran and historian meet. It has been a difficult terrain to negotiate, for “like history, 
life writing is a discourse that generates considerable insight, and sometimes anxiety, 
about its generic and literary status, about the limits between ‘life’ and ’writing’.”71 But 
the risk has been repaid as it has earned me some self-respect and validation.
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What is known today as the ‘Border War’ in South African parlance was, to a large 
extent, a war fought by young foot soldiers extracted from the white minority of 
citizens. The vast majority of these men were conscripts. The exact number is not 
certain but estimated at roughly half a million young white South African men, who 
went through National Service (Nasionale Diensplig) under the apartheid regime, and a 
relatively large number of these young men saw deployment in Namibia and Angola. 
This study deploys a qualitative and auto-ethnographic approach in looking at the 
socialisation of the conscripted or National Servicemen (Nasionale Dienspligtiges). In 
this contribution, it is assumed that qualitative research can enrich contemporary 
South African military historiography. Socialisation is a process from the cradle to 
the grave and occurs in all societies and therefore influences the course of history. 
The state needed people with a specific socio-political attitude to uphold the white 
Christian Nationalist minority regime of apartheid. These correctly socialised men 
were to provide a reservoir of manpower to uphold the repressive system inside 
the country, but also to act as an enabling mechanism for the system to ensure an 
aggressive projection of power outside the borders of the Republic of South Africa 
and its assumed ‘fifth province’, South West Africa (SWA) (today Namibia). Apartheid’s 
survival meant that the government had to have a ready warehouse of willing (young) 
white men available for national defence. Without such a body of registered human 
units, the apartheid politicians and generals would hardly have been able to leave the 
parameters of Pretoria at the time. 
For this reason, a look at the conscript phenomenon is not only advisable but necessary 
to understand the social dynamics of apartheid rule and the war on the ‘border’. 
Through this approach, a wider understanding of the militarisation of state and society 
in (white) South Africa is possible. By having used a qualitative research framework in 
conjunction with auto-ethnographic insights to conduct the research, I can address the 
individual male and his pre-conscription, conscription and post-conscription military 
career socialisation as part of a white nation in arms within a certain historical epoch 
namely the rule of the apartheid regime. The chapter also touches on the extent to 
which this socialisation process contributed to the apartheid state’s military projection 
into Namibia and later Angola (or what some authors refer to as the Angolan War). The 
contemporary socio-political outcomes of such a militarised socialisation process also 
deserve attention.
INTRODUCTION
This contribution to South African literature about the Border War falls squarely in the 
broad realm of qualitative research. Qualitative research can be defined generically as 
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CE fields and subject matter.1 As Denzin and Lincoln argue that the researcher “becomes 
a bricoleur”, a personal tool of research dedicatedly sourcing from many disciplines.2 
I assume here that qualitative research can enrich the writing and understanding of 
history – in this case, the controversial Border/Angolan War with its social-economic 
after-effects still felt in South(ern) African communities.3
Qualitative research encompasses more than the traditional boundaries of disciplines, 
and aims at immersion into a subject without taking a positivistic (or assumed objective) 
distance:4 
Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. 
Qualitative research … means that qualitative researchers study things in what 
is known as their natural settings … it is a set of interpretive material actions 
that make the world visible and interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings 
people bring to them.5
As Carolyn Ellis observed, qualitative research in its broadest terms aims ‘to paint a 
larger, sometimes more intense and human picture’ while sharing and soliciting 
knowledge at the same time.6 In this sense, auto-ethnography can contribute to 
understanding partially historical events, large or small.
In the course of an evolving research process, the representations, field notes, diaries, 
interviews, conversations, personal archives of the research participants, photographs 
and other imagery, related newspaper and other media reports, recordings, memos 
and solicited and unsolicited materials do not only add value. They form an integral 
part of the research process as an exploration of the setting at the time and the 
participants therein.
Given the then (historical) social setting of conscripts within a highly ideologically 
mobilised society under apartheid, a qualitative research approach can unearth a 
dearth of human data that provides a close and intimate understanding of the life 
and world of the National Serviceman under apartheid during the era of the Border 
War. In many ways, it brings the experience of the serviceman up close and personal. 
After a lapse of 40 or 50 years, a qualitative approach can bring ‘alive’ and provide a 
‘feeling for’ what happened at the time. To an extent, qualitative research and, more so, 
auto-ethnography intend to ‘show’, not only ‘tell’ the story7 – in this case, the story/
stories of conscripts under apartheid in a more personal, intimate, grit-touching and 
embodied way. It aims to immerse the researcher, research participants (subjects as 
referred to in more positivist terms) and the audience in a world of real-life experience 
within the setting of the time, be it one of diesel, oil and dust, Savlon and the view 
and smell of a dead body, blood, cordite, or the odour of a stinking waterhole or a 
burning vehicle or kraal.
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WHY USE QUALITATIVE RESEARCH AND AUTO-ETHNOGRAPHY?
The simple answer would be that the time is right. There is a place for more research 
on what transpired during the Border War from new angles. The Border War, or 
Grensoorlog in Afrikaans, is a generic term for the drawn-out counterinsurgency and 
later (semi-)conventional war from 1966 to 1989 between apartheid forces and their 
contestants in northern Namibia; a war that spilt over into Angola. The story of the 
conscript so far has been told mostly in descriptive studies or through individuals that 
opted for fiction or semi-fiction. While some ex-conscripts took to the pen, current 
non-fiction publications on the Border War more often than not tell the story from 
the (old) South African side from the top and not ‘bottom-up’. Others chose to share 
the history of resistance to conscription (mostly in MA studies) or disillusionment 
with a militarised and abusive state, frequently in fictional terms. The life, times and 
experiences of the individual conscript such as myself and the collective of conscripts 
between 1968 and 1990 are relatively under-researched and qualitative research 
together with elements of auto-ethnography opens new angles on the (veteran) 
conscript experience.
Auto-ethnography forms part and parcel of qualitative research and has gained in 
stature over the past two decades, to the extent that despite earlier criticism, it is 
currently seen as a research approach in its own right and utilised in several disciplines 
and subdisciplines.
Auto-ethnography is “an alternative form of writing falling somewhere between 
anthropology and literary studies”.8 It can arguably make for uncomfortable 
reading. Neville-Jan is correct in this. However, he could have also mentioned that 
auto-ethnography has surfaced over the past decade or more in disciplines such as 
psychology, (military) sociology, the sport sciences, health sciences, communication 
sciences, business and management sciences, political science and theology.9 
“Qualitative research is used in many disciplines (and) … it does not belong to one 
discipline”.10 The same applies to the use of this approach in South Africa.11
Arguably, for some this research approach amounts to writing against the grain. It 
tends to come up close and personal in its attempt to share time, experience, context 
and atmosphere – collectively known as the setting – with the reader. Qualitative 
research in its evolution, amongst others, to auto-ethnography, brought to the fore 
notions of story and life, (shared) lived experience, narrative practice, life stories 
and narrative environments and the active involvement of the researcher. In this 
chapter, the story is told from the perspective of the ‘I’ as the author and through 
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CE It is not only about the ‘I’, but also the ‘us’ – the latter not to be construed as a single 
muscular body of men necessarily in unison in thought, belief and action, but all 
with a shared experience. I consciously refrain from a post-modern approach here as 
human life experience is not a dream, and military life is real and not imagined.
METHODOLOGY
In this chapter, I do not intend to go into the nuances and the in-depth developments 
of qualitative research over the past decades.12 The qualitative research approach is 
not new elsewhere. It holds for South Africa in which case some early approaches 
were taken by researchers at the South African Human Sciences Research Council 
(HSRC) during the late 1980s and early 1990s. In South Africa, a single supervisor, 
Prof Willem Schurink, delivered more than 70 PhDs and MAs by 2019; the majority 
of these auto-ethnographies and many of these studies were in business, health, 
management and administrative sciences. Current students of this supervisor come 
from NGO backgrounds, the business environment, and the world of work (labour), 
theology and psychology. In this chapter, military sociology, amongst others defined by 
Paparone13 and numerous others before him,14 is relevant.
The methodology that I used for this study included auto-ethnography (my story) and 
related areas, such as narratives (the story of others, ‘fellow travellers’), stories of the self, 
reflective images, personal archives, confirmed anecdotes (double-checked with other 
sources), oral history, articles of a critical social nature (accredited, non-accredited 
or international, magazine articles and relevant newspaper reports from the era, 
government or party-political media, photos sourced from participants or unsolicited 
photos, cartoons, posters and drawings). The visual element plays an important part in 
sharing the knowledge – or more precisely, in conveying the experience and real-life 
world of the then conscripted. Sadly, the visual cannot be fully represented here due 
to lack of space, whether it was an Instamatic or box camera (or the more expensive 
types such as Nikon), Polaroid, film, video, digital images including YouTube and 
Facebook imagery. The latter two would have assisted in taking us back to the exact 
atmosphere, the dirt, dust and flies in the face. At the time, there was no YouTube or 
Facebook. As for the then conscript, only the boldest of the bold would smuggle in 
a camera as doing so amounted to the transgression of military regulations and per se 
constituted a punishable offence. Some did so, nonetheless. Images of whatever sort 
may have assisted in qualitative research and auto-ethnography, but the fuller picture 
may still elude one. More so, in most journals and even in web-accessible publications, 
the space allocated does not always allow for the plethora of images needed to provide 
a full picture. A lot, as in the past, still depends on the power of mindful retelling of the 
human experience (shall we call the latter oral tradition?).
271
Socialised to serve: An auto‑ethnographical exploration of the m
aking of the (citizen) conscript in South Africa   
   Ian Liebenberg
In preparation for this chapter, I delivered a paper at a symposium on the Border 
War at the Department of History at Stellenbosch University, which initiated this 
event on the 40th anniversary of the Border War that started in earnest in 1966 in 
northern SWA. I engaged the audience with all the above. For this presentation, I had 
prepared files (brownish files, similar to the colour of the then official military files) 
with newspaper clippings from that time, personal photos by conscripts, pre-selected 
military documents of the time sourced in various ways, and examples of Paratus, the 
official military magazine of the time (editions between 1975 and 1983 were selected). 
To add to this, I had selected a few editions of the National Party’s mouthpiece, Pro 
Nat, which at the time was widely distributed (this specific selection of Pro Nat came 
from the 1970s when the Total Onslaught ideology started and grew in influence). 
I had also prepared a slide show that I shared with the audience interactively. About 
half of the audience consisted of ex-conscripts and permanent force members of 
various ages that saw border duty between 1975 and 1988. The rest of the audience 
comprised persons interested, for academic reasons; current service men or women; 
and those with a personal interest, many of them because it involved their parents in 
some or other way at the time. I took along a long-time friend, now a well-known 
journalist, who saw action during one of the larger-scale operations into Angola in 
the early 1980s. In a real sense, he became a fellow traveller over many years. He 
wrote several articles on the war and contributed chapters to books. Moreover, he saw 
deployment in Angola while I saw deployment only in northern Namibia (Sectors 10, 
20 and 70), but we shared similar experiences even though his border stint was two 
years later than mine and at a time that trans-border operations into Angola escalated. 
The research process for this study involved the actual (re-)immersion of the researcher 
as one of the tools of the research but was not limited to the researcher and linked up 
with other participants or fellow travellers. The research framework was not rigid or 
per positivist recipe.
The process enlisted the narrative, the visual and other elements, but rigour was not 
compromised. Qualitative research is not an easy way out to investigate and explore 
human experience and social questions; it is and should remain rigorous and focused. 
I suggest that the building blocks in qualitative research, specifically auto-ethnography 
within the military realm, should abide by the building blocks I identified in 
earlier research.15
SOCIALISATION
In exploring this topic, I simultaneously brought in the concept of socialisation. 
Socialisation is a powerful phenomenon and frequently a political tool deployed by 
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CE to the grave. In highly mobilised societies, the process is set in motion against a specific 
socio-political background or paradigm-in-practice – thus, what we call ideology, the 
latter being a political or religiously inspired action-orientated worldview. Socialisation 
according to the norms, narrative and the (imposed) system of values is intense, and its 
products (the citizens or citizen-soldiers) carry the results thereof with them for a long 
time, even into the grave.
The apartheid state, when it comes to socialisation and the institutions involved as 
socialisation agents, was no different. The incumbents of an ideologically mobilised 
state that believed itself to be beleaguered by a communist onslaught (the ‘Total 
Onslaught’) required a citizenry that could fulfil their role as advocates and defenders 
of a (white) nation in arms. More so, this applied to the security arms of the state, 
namely the police and the military:
Political socialisation can be latent or manifest. In the case of manifest politicisation, 
there is a definite attempt to socialise the individual in a specific direction, an 
attempt for instance made by a state.17 
Political socialisation links to the political culture and beliefs about the prevalent political 
system and: 
… can be understood as the process whereby a person becomes part of a political 
culture and a way in which a society carries the political norms of behaviour and 
political beliefs from one generation to another – it is a lifelong process.18 
Apartheid socialisation amongst white people, together with the role of the apartheid 
state and system, provides a telling example.19
AGENTS OF SOCIALISATION
Volumes have been written on socialisation in disciplines such as sociology and 
to an extent political science.20 In the world of sociology, the term is not new and 
has been in use for a while.21 While the term socialisation as a definition is more 
recent, socialisation is a lived experience and practice as old as (the organised) human 
community itself, stretching from hunter-gatherer communities in defence of territory 
or scarce resources such as water, and later on the military as an organised entity.22 
Let us contemplate for a moment the socialised warrior such as the ancient Egyptian 
and Nubian armies, the Spartan soldier, the kingdom of Shaka Zulu and the well-trained 
impis, the warrior class in ancient China23 and the samurai in Japan.24 Or think about 
the ideologically mobilised soldiers of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union or militarised 
Japan before and during the Second World War, or perhaps the modern-day ‘noble 
warriors’ fighting on behalf of their ruling political elites’ self-declared ‘war on terror’. 
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Patrick Wright, in his excellent work on the evolution of the tank, points out how 
socialisation through digital gaming is preparing future generations for war. The USA 
is a case in point. Advancing to simulators and ‘distributed interactive simulation’ could 
assist an aggressive state in a ‘new wave of warfare’ with, by the way, cyber-consultants 
on standby.25 As the then Chief of Armour School at Fort Knox, Kentucky, put it in 
an interview with Wright: “The kids who have done a lot of video games have exactly 
the right kind of eye-hand coordination … Nintendo has done great things for this 
generation [sic].”26 In this habitus of globalised ‘digitisation’, socialisation will remain 
to play an important role from generation to generation. Indeed, it will do so in the 
form of socialisation where children now socialise their parents, and children socialised 
in a way that benefits war and assisting ‘the Other’ into their graves. Endless movies 
from Hollywood and associates on such soldier and citizen heroism – from Vietnam to 
the elimination of ‘terrorist states’ such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and others and lately 
any conceivable critic of the USA – play a role to socialise people to uphold Western 
capitalism, euphemistically called ‘Western civilisation’. Examples of how media 
discourse assisted power-hungry elite are, for example, Ronald Reagan’s and George 
H.W. Bush and son George W. Bush’s the ‘Axis of Evil’ and ‘you can run, but not hide’ 
and, earlier, a ‘bomb them back to the stone ages’ mentality. (Did Lyndon Johnson or 
Richard Nixon say that?) By the way, the aforementioned mentality mirrors that of 
apartheid, albeit on a much larger and more destructive scale.
In the process of (re-)producing the ideal citizen or warrior, numerous socialisation 
agents come into play.  Amongst these are the family, peers, schools and other educational 
institutions, religious organisations, youth movements, sports bodies, political parties, 
the state system, the media, paramilitary institutions and military institutions. Needless 
to say that the socialisation process is underpinned by abidance to norms, imposed 
social consensus, ‘positive enforcement’ and various levels of sanctions.27
Particularly important are the stages of socialisation across the life of a person, namely 
childhood socialisation, adolescence socialisation, socialisation through young and 
middle adulthood, late adulthood, old age and even the environment of death28 or the 
conclusion of the life cycle.29 Throughout all the above stages, agents of socialisation 
are at play.
MILITARISATION OF STATE AND SOCIETY IN AN APARTHEID SOCIETY
Public utterances by politicians, for example, a Minister of Defence of a country, explain 
a lot about both internal and foreign policy and how the state form public opinion. 
Public perceptions, in turn, stem to a large degree from socialisation, including how 
the state frame things through the usage of language or the world view facilitated. 
Perception confirmed or strengthened through statements calling up images of the 
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CE of action. In 1950, the Minister of Defence of South Africa, F.C.  Erasmus, declared: 
“Every attack by Communists on Africa will immediately be seen as an attack on 
South Africa.”30 Apartheid South Africa started arming itself early on. Naval craft, 
jet-aircraft and modernisation of equipment totalled £40 million by 1955, by rough 
calculation.
The phenomenon of socialisation of the individual through various stages in a 
militarised South African society is relevant here. Authors commented on the evolution 
of South Africa under apartheid from a state kept in power with the support of the 
South African Police (SAP) and the Security Police (1955-1976) and after that a shift 
in focus to primary dependence on the military, the evolution of the security state.31 
Within the international community, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) criticised against apartheid. Coupled 
with the deep-seated fear of communism, further underpinned by the awareness 
of the ‘black danger’ (Afrikaans: Swart Gevaar), the ruling National Party and its 
cultural cohorts such as the Afrikaner Broederbond and the white Afrikaans religious 
community saw itself as beleaguered. (The ‘black danger’ was inherited from the times 
of white Western settlement in South Africa.) The politicians often spoke about ‘the 
winds of change’ in Africa, meaning the liberation of African states from colonial rule 
either by a peaceful transfer of power or by armed struggle, furthered the tendencies 
towards a garrison state. The white nation, dominated by Afrikaners, started arming 
itself against enemies from outside and inside. On 24 May 1972, the State Security 
Council (SSC) was established in South Africa through the Security Intelligence and 
State Security Council Act 64 of 1972. This act triggered the further militarisation of 
South African society. On an annual basis, the military budget increased by leaps and 
bounds. The notion of a Total Onslaught (Afrikaans: Totale Aanslag) from communist 
countries, specifically the Soviet Union became a salient part of the political discourse, 
part of the everyday government jargon and eventually a mantra to be infused into 
the white population.32 The Total Onslaught became a political mantra for the mass 
mobilisation of white society. Such mobilisation included military aspects such as the 
cadet system, conscription and the Citizen Force (CF) (the latter becoming the home 
units of previous waves of annual conscripts).
Interesting to read is what P.W. Botha, leader of the South African government, made of 
the Total Onslaught in his foreword to the 1973 White Paper on Defence:
Like the rest of the Free World, the RSA is a target for international communism 
and its cohorts – leftist activist, exaggerated humanism, permissiveness, materialism 
and related ideologies … the RSA has been singled out as a special target for 
the byproducts of their ideologies, such as black racialism, exaggerated individual 
freedom, onemanonevote, and a host of other slogans employed against us on the 
basis of double standards.33
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At a symposium presented in 1983 by the Institute for the Study of Marxism 
at Stellenbosch University, Prof Mike Hough from the University of Pretoria and 
the then head and Commissioner of the South African Security Police, Lt  Gen 
P.J. Coetzee, expanded ad nauseam on the Total Onslaught and its links to what they 
called ‘terrorism’ and support for national liberation movements.34 Military intelligence 
at the time partly funded the Institute (Afrikaans: Instituut vir die Studie van Marxisme).
Between 1983 and 1988, the already militarised country experienced rising levels 
of militarisation that were visible.35 The military locus of state power under Magnus 
Malan, P.W. Botha (Minister of Defence, later Prime Minister and eventually Executive 
President of the apartheid state), and the so-called (military-dominated) securocrats 
moved to the centre of the decision-making process. The locus of power within the 
state machinery under P.W. Botha and close confidantes such as Malan were shifting 
away from the (white) parliament and the previous guardians of state security, namely 
the SAP and security police. They described this phenomenon as ‘the changing locus 
of decision-making’ in South African politics.36 The changing locus of state power 
should not be equated with praetorianism as Nordlinger37 and others understand it. 
I  prefer to refer to the growing influence of the security-minded with the South 
African military (SADF) in tow as ‘praetorianism of a special type’. The military in 
apartheid South Africa did not take power through a coup d’etat or even a planned 
salient rise to protect the state or the vision of the ideal state. They were invited into 
politics by the then politicians and eventually absorbed into the political status quo 
in South Africa. This changing locus of power and decision-making impacted civil-
military relations that represented a onesided process from above, socialisation of 
the citizenry and, especially, foreign policy and the latter’s effect on defence posture 
and projection.
WHAT TO WRITE AND WHAT NOT TO WRITE
It is not the place to enter the debate or the long traverse of the theoretical-historical 
debates on the place and standing of military autobiographies and truth claims or what 
the exact differences are between autobiography and auto-ethnography. Kleinreesink 
and Soeters addressed these matters eloquently in an earlier article.38 Neither is it the 
place to entertain in detail a discussion on the trials, temptations and tribulations of 
the ‘from an eyewitness to flesh-witness’ notion, albeit relevant. I also do not enter 
the intense debate on projecting the self.39 I had numerous fellow travellers over the 
years and historical materials on the era under discussion, even more so since the 
South African Border War became a heated and not yet exhausted debate, marked 
by sharp personal and ideological differences, some nostalgia and lots of ex post facto 
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CE I had to reflect seriously on what to write and what not to write. Over the years, I had 
amassed hundreds of clippings, photos, military magazines (especially South African), 
posters, propaganda materials, documents and much more. Then classified materials 
have been declassified and the viewpoints of other actors in the war such as the South 
West African People’s Organisation (Swapo) and its armed wing, People’s Liberation 
Army of Namibia (PLAN), the Angolan forces, the Cubans and the Russians (the 
then-Soviets) have been put on paper increasingly. I was fortunate to have access to 
some declassified archival material from the Department of Defence Documentation 
Centre. More publications continue to appear, and daily a broader picture evolves – 
not without contestation though. The author on past military affairs in South Africa 
has a field day, or year or decade(s) when it comes to the Border War.
I still have fellow travellers, some in agreement, others not. Through others’ stories 
published or documented by people I knew or did not know I can weirdly enough 
state that I even have fellow travellers that have passed away already. Fellow travellers 
from the grave? Strange idea? But such is life.
I had to choose how I share the material with the audience, reader and prospective 
student, although I used declassified materials. The reason is that people and individuals 
matter. I do not have contact with all those that were fellow travellers, some as far back 
as 45 years ago, and can in no way hope to reach them to ask for consent. In research 
ethics, the ‘do not harm or hurt’ approach applies for good reasons. Hence, I chose 
not to name any person or disclose anything personal about them if I did not have 
their explicit approval. To that extent, I applied personal censorship. That knowledge 
remains in the stored memory and will stay there.
In criticising past political and military leadership, I do share strong – even bitter – 
opinions openly and attach names to them as I then did. These matters are part of 
current dialogues and (much-heated) debates – as it was then – and, as such, in the 
public domain. And it should remain in this domain in reflecting on the past and 
projecting ideas for a better South African society in the future. History and for that 
matter democratisation of state and society and the reconciliation of the citizenry of 
a previously deeply divided society is, like history, a discussion without end and so are 
insights into the then leadership responsible for the ongoing conflict.
CHILDHOOD AND FAMILY SOCIALISATION:  
FROM THE CRADLE TO THE GRAVE,  
IN STAGES WE SHALL DELIVER YOU 
Imagine two boys aged two-and-a-half and three-years-old with military helmets 
aiming airguns and shooting at an imaginary enemy. Loading the airgun, since it 
was spring operated and the ‘neck has to be broken’ before the next shot, required 
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some skill – as was hitting a target of roughly any size at that age. A foot could assist 
where the young arms were not up to ‘breaking the neck’ of the spring-loaded gun 
or a somewhat older cousin, father or uncle could assist. (There are more ways than 
one to break a neck.) After a few demonstrations, young children could do this and 
reload successfully – or at least some of them if not the majority in Afrikaner society, 
with here and there perhaps a split lip or a slight injury to finger or face. These boys 
imitated what they saw and dreamt about firing larger rifles. At that impressionable 
age, many of their fathers, friends of the family, or older brothers and uncles and a not 
so an insignificant number of mothers and their daughters knew how to use a rifle 
or were at the very least understanding the application of a personal firearm or rifle 
to be used. Men were on ‘border duty’ or just returned from a ‘stint’ at the border 
or an interior training camp (either in the CFs or Commandos) and cemented the 
social fabric (the term now used by ideologues in post-apartheid society is ‘social 
cohesion’). Such social experiences and imagery solidified a social consensus within 
the apartheid ideology.
The scene of the young boys described above is not a dream; it happened in many 
families. Father and uncle taught son; in turn, son and cousin taught cousin or niece 
and nephew. Mothers mostly observed with enthusiasm, apprehension or (dis-)interest. 
In other cases, with deep-seated dedication, some moms taught the young boys 
and girls to shoot or to be ready to shoot. (Females were allowed to become part 
of the Commando system voluntarily. My mother was one of them.) I have to add 
that military socialisation in South Africa’s white community was not confined to 
Afrikaner people or, for that matter, men. In the English-speaking community, with 
some qualifications, the same applied, especially in rural areas.
Socialisation in highly ideologically mobilised and militarised society was not 
necessarily only masculine or patriarchal. It was part of a social paradigm, call it a 
Weltanschaung and the daily practice of being in what Pierre Bourdieu described as 
habitus, namely an environment of being that is created through a social process rather 
than an individual one, is relevant here. “Habitus can be understood as enduring and 
transferable patterns, neither a result of free will, nor (only) by structures that condition 
our perceptions.”40 The then historical habitus amounted to a white (Afrikaans) society 
under perceived siege. Ideology as a social programme influenced society, mobilising 
the people or citizenry towards an imagined ideal world. Values were distilled and 
re-legitimised through an interplay of power, agency and structure – including the 
state system and the power the state holds over its subjects, i.e. young people, the 
worker, clerk, conscript, permanent force member in the military, or citizens and their 
loved ones.
The same applies to imagery and the media in an ideologically mobilised community 
such as the apartheid society. Media and state structures not only interface, but also 
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CE ample attention in newspapers, receiving the freedom of the town, march passes and 
exhibitions at agricultural shows (Afrikaans: landbouskoue). Early childhood socialisation 
was real, not imagined in apartheid society. In the meantime, the Border War escalated, 
and with South Africa illegally occupying Namibia, the war was to spread into 
Angola.41 The escalation of the conflict was a reality. As André du Pisani so pointedly 
argue about the Pax Pretoriana’s military’s role: the SADF under apartheid politicians 
moved beyond the barracks and assumed the role of a frontier army with an aggressive 
posture to be readily enacted far outside the borders of the South African state.42
TEENAGER AND SECONDARY SCHOOL SOCIALISATION  
IN THE APARTHEID HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Imagine walking into the school on a particular day, all 16yearold boys called over 
the ‘intercom’ to the school hall where uniformed men sat with registration papers 
behind desks. On that day, you would be registered for future military service and 
within three months receive an official letter with your force number; the force 
number reflecting the year of registration at high school, i.e. 76 436 252 for a young 
man that was registered in 1976 (in this case), meaning that, if you completed matric 
(Grade 12), the army was waiting for you. Should you have chosen or be forced by 
financial circumstances to leave school earlier, i.e. Standard  8 (now Grade  10), you 
would have joined the army sooner. It was not imagination; it was a real experience 
for those involved. Ideology may be a dream, but ideology in practice becomes real, 
an objectified dream that set ideals in action, action into practice – becoming an 
embodied programme of action. Upholding ideology and spreading the programme, 
bodies are needed whether thinking or forced, being used as (more hyperbolically 
stated) the unknowing useful idiot.
A mentality, such as described, calls for the mobilisation of defence and, when needed, 
offence (authoritarian regimes opt by their acquired constitutional instinct for offence 
inside or outside their borders). For those boys (male learners) that chose to study 
at universities or colleges first, the call-up would again revisit them on completion 
of studies. The legislation was strict, and the only way out was to emigrate or to be 
declared unfit or, in a minority of cases, to be declared ‘key personnel’ in another state 
department. A real (not imagined) option, was to leave the country or to simply face a 
sixyear prison service. 
Growing up in a militarised society was not imagined. It was real, both for the called 
upon and those that suffered the results.43
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THE ROLE OF THE SCHOOL CADET SYSTEM:  
EARLY PREPARATION TO FIGHT IN THE BORDER WAR
The state introduced a system of school cadets at white schools. An estimated 500 cadet 
units came into existence all over South Africa. It implied that all secondary schoolboys 
had to participate in school cadet activities. Uniforms, berets and a designated cadet 
corps badge were issued. Usually, cadet periods took place on Thursdays with the 
majority drilling and a minority selected for shooting teams that would compete at 
inter-school, inter-regional, provincial and national levels. Participation in the cadet 
system, in this case mostly drilling and parade work, was open to girls voluntary.
Cadet weekend camps also took place that widened the activities to map-reading, 
fieldcraft, shooting, drilling and fitness exercises. During winter holidays (June/July), 
two-week-long cadet camps regularly took place. While not enforced, schoolboys 
were motivated to partake in these as such cadet camps provided a useful introduction 
to military life and prepared them for their National Service soon to follow. With the 
use of the system, they installed regimental rules, military discipline and the values of 
patriotism. Cadet training was the continuation of a process whereby the apartheid 
state consolidated a reservoir of bodies for future military use and enacted the 
principle of a nation-in-arms. Photos and other images can best illustrate the above. 
This system furthered childhood socialisation for school-going children in their teens. 
A Christian-Nationalist social consensus, pre-emptively enacted, upheld the state and 
status quo.
YOUTH MOVEMENTS SUCH AS THE VOORTREKKERS  
AND TO A LESSER EXTENT THE BOY SCOUTS
Youth movements in South Africa, usually voluntary, also played a socialisation role. 
In  the case of South Africa, two movements were pertinent. The Boy Scouts (and 
much later, Girl Scouts), mostly English-speaking in orientation, had its origins in 1908 
after it was established as a movement for all countries under British rule and later the 
British Commonwealth. One of Robert Baden-Powell’s first actions after initiating 
and establishing the Scout movement (sometimes referred to as Pathfinders), was to 
write Scouting for Boys. The Scout experience aimed at outdoor activities to contribute 
to character development, health, nurture citizenship, instil a sense of adventure and 
service orientation, getting to know nature and enhance intergroup skills and loyalty 
to the country. The movement grew rapidly in the British Commonwealth to become 
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CE Baden-Powell advocated that the Scout is to be loyal to the Queen (or King), his 
country, his fellow Scouts, parents, employers and those under his leadership. As 
part of the Scouts’ attitude and honour, they advised courtesy, obedience, neatness, 
friendliness and a caring attitude to nature.44 They formed Scout branches in various 
cities and provinces in South Africa, and by 1916, Provincial Councils. By 1930, the 
Imperial Scout Headquarters granted independence to the Scouts in South Africa. 
Initially segregated by race, the Scout Movement in South Africa under international 
pressure became a multi-racial organisation around the late 1970s. Implementation 
was hampered in practice by apartheid laws and separate living areas and to an 
extent, racial attitudes or perceived cultural differences. Baden-Powell implanted the 
idea that a Scout should “prepare himself [sic] to be a good citizen of his country 
and the world”.45 The terms “standing shoulder to shoulder for your country” and 
“[the] sinking of your differences” are voiced, and Baden-Powell suggests that “a 
Scout should think of your country and the good that your work is going to do to 
other people”.46 The Scouts remained separated under apartheid as the ‘independent 
homelands’ Transkei, Ciskei and Bophuthatswana had separate movements. The Scouts 
only announced full inclusivity in 1995. The body then became known as Scouts 
South Africa.
Given the divided history of South Africa, one may assume that amongst white 
Scouts and Scouts of other races, different perceptions existed regarding loyalty to 
one’s country and the meaning of citizenship. Unfortunately, little research has been 
done about this. Arguably, within the white community of Scouts and perhaps some 
of colour, a measure of South African patriotism was developed and made Scouts 
susceptible to the apartheid ideology and the paraideologies of (limited) reform 
and repression (the latter pivoted on the Total Onslaught syndrome). If the Scout 
experience in South Africa had some effect on political socialisation, the studies by 
Gagiano and Booysen47 on student attitudes at South African universities may, to an 
extent, account for more liberal attitudes yet high trust in the military and security 
apparatus of the state amongst white students at English-speaking universities. I will 
address this to some extent later. Until new research proves otherwise, it seems that 
Scout socialisation played some role in maintaining the status quo.
The roots of the Voortrekker Youth Movement (Afrikaans: Voortrekkers) are closely 
identified with the rise of Afrikaner nationalism. The organisation, initiated by 
Dr C.F.  Visser and established in Bloemfontein on 11  December  1920, just seven 
years after the National Party that was to rule South Africa from 1948 to 1991 had 
been established. The growth of the organisation was initially stunted and sporadic, 
but a second initiative followed, and it became a country-wide organisation in 
September 1931 after cultural advocates, Afrikaner church leaders and educationists 
started a drive to broaden the movement.48 The movement, since its establishment, 
catered for boys and girls. The organisation based its ideals and vision on the notion of 
281
Socialised to serve: An auto‑ethnographical exploration of the m
aking of the (citizen) conscript in South Africa   
   Ian Liebenberg
the Afrikaner people as an independent volk, a nation in its own right; a commitment 
to the country; a particular language; and a Christian orientation (as then understood). 
They upheld the values of patriotism, common nationhood and the love of the land 
(fauna and flora included). The movement from the beginning, in the context of 
the rising Afrikaner nationalism, was a whites-only and paramilitary institution and 
importance attached to parades, drills and ceremonies.49
During the consecration of the Voortrekker monument in 1948, large numbers of 
Voortrekkers took part in the proceedings, including torch marches. Ten years earlier 
in 1938, the centenary of the Great Trek (Groot Trek in Afrikaans) was celebrated. 
Centenary treks from all corners of South Africa (ox  wagons, Voortrekker clothes 
for women and men from the past) converged on Pretoria where the cornerstone 
of the Voortrekker monument was to be laid. In the Gedenkboek van die Ossewaens 
op die Pad van Suid-Afrika, 1940,50 there are photos of  Voortrekkers leading a convoy 
of ox wagons in the Worcester-Robertson areas in what is now the Western Cape 
Province. Likewise, other photos demonstrate Voortrekker parades in Koeroeman 
(today Kuruman/Kudumane) in the north-western part of the Cape Province saluting 
the passing wagons en route to Pretoria.51 In Zoutrivier (today Soutrivier) close to Cape 
Town (today ensconced in Cape Town), a large commando of Voortrekkers formed a 
guard of honour for the Cape wagons on their departure to Pretoria.52 Ten years later, 
members of the youth movement (no gender discrimination) were present in large 
numbers at the consecration of the Voortrekker monument (an ode to the Afrikaner 
and its long struggle to gain nationhood as a separate entity) at Voortrekkerhoogte 
(earlier on called Robinson’s Heights, today Thaba Tshwane).
On 31 May 1966, the Republic of South Africa celebrated its first five years of 
independence. South Africa left the British Commonwealth (others may say they 
were unceremoniously kicked out) and after a whites-only referendum declared its 
independence and became a republic (RSA) ruled by a white minority. The family 
magazine, the Ster (the Star),53 included a supplement in August 1966 paying tribute 
to the fifth birthday of the new republic and showing interesting imagery.  Apart from 
military parades, including tanks, armoured cars, self-propelled artillery and flypasts 
by the air force, the supplement mentioned that as 17 000 infantrymen marched past, 
the crowd at the (note!) Voortrekker monument counted more than a 100 000 people. 
The supplement also featured a torch parade by the Voortrekker youth movement 
– in this case, Penkoppe and Drawwertjies, boys and girls up to the age of twelve. On 
11 October 1975, during the inauguration of the Afrikaanse Taalmonument (monument 
for the Afrikaans language) in Paarl, 600  Voortrekkers symbolically carried torches 
from the monument to the Gideon Malherbe House, where one of the fathers of the 
Afrikaans language used to reside in 1875 when the Afrikaans language movement 
started.54 In uniform, the road to a new South Africa was laid; it was a trek of liberation 
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CE battles to be fought in trenches and borders twice removed from Pretoria by 1975. By 
1985, the war moved into South African townships when the military was called in to 
support the AP.
As a movement with a close association with the culture and the politics of 
Afrikanerdom, the Voortrekker youth movement played some role – however difficult 
to quantify – to imprint Afrikaner political values in the participating members and 
served a role as the carrier of collective historical consciousness. By the 1970s, there 
were numerous cases where military instructors from nearby bases, when requested, 
supplied camping equipment or drill instructors and, on occasion, the opportunity for 
Voortrekker boys and girls to get acquainted with the use of a pistol or military rifle.
In preparation for the festival at the inauguration of the Taalmonument, Voortrekker 
Kommando’s participated in carrying torches from cities, towns and rural areas to 
the inauguration in Paarl (roughly 40 kilometres from Cape Town). One can safely 
venture that the Voortrekker movement played an important role in the socialisation 
of Afrikaner youth. It needs saying that not all Afrikaans-speaking young people were 
enthusiastic about the movement and various (derogatory) nicknames from those that 
did not belong to the Voortrekker movement were not uncommon (some of these 
nicknames were not very innovative, yet best not to be mentioned in an academic 
contribution!).
THE ROLE OF YOUTH PREPAREDNESS AND VELD SCHOOLS  
(AFRIKAANS: VELDSKOLE)
Veld schools, as part of the youth preparedness programmes (Afrikaans: jeugweerbaarheid), 
were offered during secondary school holidays. Amongst others, the children listened 
to lectures on South African politics (from the reigning perspective) and the threats 
against South Africa. Basic field skills were taught. Veld schools were more prevalent 
in the then Transvaal Province and to some extent the Orange Free State (Afrikaans: 
Oranje-Vrystaat). South Africa, after the making of the Union of South Africa, became 
a unitary state with four provinces, namely the Cape Province (previously the Cape 
Colony), Natal (also a previous British colony) and the defeated Boer Republics, the 
Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Given the historical background and national 
government seated in Pretoria (Transvaal Province), it could be expected that veldskole 
were dominantly present in Transvaal and the Orange Free State. However, the state 
introduced youth preparedness classes (to be distinguished from the school cadet system 
discussed earlier) in all-white schools during the 1970s. It needs little imagination to 
comprehend the role of such systemic educational exercises on childhood socialisation 
in apartheid South Africa. Arguably Cadets, Voortrekkers and Veldskole played a role 
in what Booysen later described as the “Afrikaner youth’s manipulated political 
consciousness”.55
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THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA
Just like all other agents of socialisation, media in whatever form is a strong agent for 
transferring information and immensely powerful as a tool of political socialisation 
and (re-)affirming political culture. Television came to South Africa in the late 1970s 
and the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) (Afrikaans: Suid-Afrikaanse 
Uitsaaikorporasie – SAUK) was under government control from the start. As far as radio 
broadcasting and television were concerned, the government set the agenda. Therefore, 
the ruling elite56 could decide what could be shared and highlighted or, if need be, 
twisted or spin-doctored to suit the ruling ideology, and what had to be kept away 
from the listener or viewer.57 Add to these, strong media regulations under a variety of 
security laws,58 and the scene was set for a very onesided socialisation process. 
Media socialisation is much older than television. Newspapers, whether national 
or local, and radio programmes played a major part in the socialisation of white 
South Africans of all ages, as in other societies. In a single personal collection, I have 
more than 350 articles, the majority in Afrikaans and about 25 per cent in English, 
and roughly 1 000 photos in printed media covering the era 1965-1988 related to 
(civil-)military affairs. At the time, I did not cover or trace electronic media such as 
radio and television, nor did I trail current Border War veteran websites (the latter a 
demonstration of continuous apartheid military socialisation; such a research enterprise 
will remain for others).
From these photos, images and representations, it is abundantly clear how much 
time and energy, needless to add funding, went into providing suitable reportage and 
imagery to socialise South Africans, including those growing up in the then social 
setting that benefitted the apartheid and militarised status quo. Whether it was family 
magazines, photo storybooks (a well-known genre at the time), ‘girly’ magazines and 
newspapers (daily and weekly) as well as dedicated magazines, i.e. Defence Force 
publications or party-political bulletins, the scene was set to justify and maintain a 
minority state. I did not attempt to quantify the available data from my archives as a 
personal archive is of small comparison to the national Afrikaans and English media 
coverage of the time. I did not utilise any documentaries or recordings of old radio and 
television broadcasts, compare them or quantitatively exploit them. News broadcasts 
and actuality programmes are especially relevant here. This rather imposing challenge 
remains for other researchers. Just unearthing and comparing the then news broadcasts 
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CE YOUNG ADULTHOOD AND BEING A CONSCRIPT
At this stage, it is necessary to mention that the school curricula under apartheid 
selectively reflected Afrikaner Nationalism and its isolationist worldview. It 
contributed to white school children – even students in some cases – being educated 
in a knowledge vacuum where very little was shared with them, for example about the 
history of struggles for independence on the continent. It also happened with regards 
to South Africa’s liberation struggle with the collective description of the political 
contenders as terrorists or communist-inspired useful idiots without supplying a 
broader historical context. And, schools are indeed a strong agent for socialisation as 
most children will spend ten to 12 years at school.59 
When registered at age 16 at your school, you would have received your ‘call-up’ 
papers some months before you had to report to a military unit attached to a specific 
military muster. National Service intakes were in January and June. If you left school in 
Grade 10 (Standard 8), as many did due to financial reasons, the SADF would already 
have called you up when leaving the safer boundaries of your school. As elsewhere in 
the world, the working class happened to be first in the firing line.
One option to postpone military service was to first go for further studies at a 
Technicon or University. However, after your studies, you would have to comply 
with the requirement of becoming a National Serviceman – albeit with the prospect 
of an automatic officer’s rank. Other options ‘out’ were to volunteer for service in 
the SAP or use contacts to manipulate a transfer to the SAP. In certain cases, some 
individuals together with their managers in state institutions, such as the post and 
telecommunication services, organised a declaration of being ‘key personnel’ and, 
because of that, would be exempted from military service. The men who were 
about to enter National Service, or who were busy with it, or who had completed 
it, sometimes regarded those who became key personnel or did their service in the 
SAP as ‘copouts’. It is, however, difficult to say how pervasive such views were as no 
one has researched this. At the time, the state would not have permitted such research 
in any case due to the plethora of security legislation.60 To prevent their children 
from serving in the ‘fighting forces’ such as the infantry, armour and artillery, some 
better-positioned families used their contacts to arrange for callups to the Navy. 
It happened to be close to Cape Town or Durban and anyway not directly involved in 
the Border War.
Related to National Service, a category was later created for universal religious 
conscientious objectors. It was, however, somewhat punitive as the alternative 
service required was four years or a large fine. This matter falls outside the ambit of 
this research.61 
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Conscript training? In the fighting forces, you were trained to kill. This training 
influenced the mind and mentality. It is a given that such training desensitises the 
individual regarding the value of human life, at least in my experience. It was an intense 
socialisation process in a nearly fully institutional world where groupthink, obedience, 
discipline and respect for higher authority, the norm. Uniformly in uniform. A 
serviceman was part of what (military) sociologists describe a total institution and 
the latter leading to confined thinking and socialised through groupthink with high 
potential to absorb authoritarian structures. That in turn, in the long run, has great 
potential to create authoritarian personalities or uncritical conformists.62
Border duty intensified socialisation. During ‘basics’, all conscripts were trained to be 
soldiers, more so those designated to the infantry corps, artillery and the armoured 
corps. The so-called ‘fighting forces’ included those who underwent parachute training 
and became known as the ‘parabats’ and those trained as pathfinders or pioneers, 
infantrymen specifically trained in tracking and reconnaissance.
Border deployment for the fighting forces furthered shared experiences such as 
becoming battle-ready and reinforced and deepened the socialisation of the individual 
and group. For those that saw combat (or ‘contacts’, as they referred to skirmishes with 
guerrilla forces), the process grew in magnitude – especially in cases where comrades 
were wounded or killed or where the person in the engagement saw people killed 
or killed people themselves (the enemy, the ‘terrorists’). Regular call-ups for border 
duty entrenched the military socialisation and solidified a shared warrior experience. 
When simply talking to these men even 40 years later, one discovers how deep the 
socialisation and bonding was, whether people experienced it negatively or positively. 
I recall a case during an evening in a pub in Pretoria circa 2004 when someone 
shouted: “Which of you remember your force numbers?” Immediately, eight of 
12 white males aged 40 plus stepped forward and without hesitation called out their 
force numbers from memory. I made a video of the instance, but it was unfortunately 
lost. I wish I still had this video, because it was a clear demonstration of how deeply 
the military experience was edged into the memories of former conscripts. 
Cross-border operations of semi- and fully conventional operations further cemented 
the experience, as can be seen from numerous veteran websites, some established by 
conscript veterans and other sites that see daily contributions by exservicemen. And 
frequently, the images and attitudes of the past are strongly mirrored in the present.
AFTER NATIONAL SERVICE
Following their initial six months’ training – later expanded to one year and later 
two years (1978 onwards) – National Servicemen were transferred to CF Units, 
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CE next six to eight-odd years, they were due to serve a further one month a year and in 
the following year two or three months. Again, such service included border stints or 
to be called up for major cross-border operations such as Operation RHEINDEER 
(today commemorated in Namibia as Cassinga Day or Heroes Day due to a large 
number of lives lost especially amongst civilians during the airborne attack deep 
inside Angola). 
Leaving the CF still implied being available for a call-up for Commando Service. 
It  applied to both working-class men and students at tertiary establishments. For 
example, in my case, I was transferred from Infantry School in Oudtshoorn (conscript 
and junior officer) to Kimberley Regiment in the Northern Cape, my area of birth. 
Soon after that, I was to be transferred to the University Stellenbosch Military Unit 
(USMU), since I chose to study at Stellenbosch University. In Afrikaans, it was known as 
the Universiteit Stellenbosch Militêre Eenheid (USME), soon ironically dubbed ‘Use-Me’. 
In short, you did not follow the army; the army followed you wherever you went.
Some CF Units, distributed throughout the country, had long histories and set traditions 
as far back as the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902).  Amongst these were Kimberley 
Regiment, the Transvaal Scottish, Cape Town Highlanders, Natal Carabineers and 
others. CF members served in cohesive units and frequently saw further border 
deployments either routine or during semi-conventional operations in Angola, such 
as RHEINDEER, ASKARI, PROTEA, SMOKESHELL, MODULER, HOOPER 
and PACKER. From 1985 onwards, others found themselves deployed in townships 
in South Africa during the tumultuous 1980s under an almost permanent state of 
emergency. Indeed, here we find a socialisation process with a long shelf life, with ‘the 
border’ coming home …
Commandos in South Africa are not to be confused with the meaning of the word 
in the British military sense. Commandos were bound territorial forces organised and 
equipped as units to operate in their immediate and local areas. Their task was to 
assist the SAP and where necessary the military in home defence, restraining unrest, 
road blockades and guard key-points and, when so called, to assist in patrols and farm 
protection. Commandos formed an integral part of the broader defence system even 
if sometimes referred to as oumanne (old men), ‘Dad’s Army’ or skietpiete (roughly 
translated as ‘shooting Johns’). Where commando activities between 1950 and the late 
1960s merely implied attending regular shooting exercises (skietoefeninge) equipped 
with the dated Lee Enfield Mk II rifle, the SADF modernised these units during the 
1970s, instilled more discipline, and created new urban and rural units. The weapons 
issued became modern, such as the semi-automatic R3 rifle, and included light support 
weapons such as light machineguns (LMGs). Commando Officers were motivated 
to attend regular courses to sharpen their skills and enhance their qualifications at 
11 Commando, a unit dedicated to this purpose in Kimberley, Northern Cape.
287
Socialised to serve: An auto‑ethnographical exploration of the m
aking of the (citizen) conscript in South Africa   
   Ian Liebenberg
Commandos, spread over the length and breadth of South Africa, demonstrated 
further proof of a process of military socialisation from cradle to near-grave. As far 
back as 1976, To the Point reported that South Africa’s defence budget rose from 
roughly R333 million (South African Rand) in 1969-1970 to R1 350 million in 1976. 
Reportedly, South Africa had up to 400 000 soldiers ready, including the Commandos, 
if so needed.63 At the time, the number of National Servicemen or conscripts increased 
from a few thousand per year to 20 000; later, call-ups amounted to two per year with 
as many as 40 000 men being called up. For example, in 1978, 43 000 men were called 
up. In 1979, the number was more than 45 000.64 In keeping with the continuous 
training and expansion of forces and arming them, the defence budget rose annually, 
“therefore increasing its share of total government expenditure from 10,5 per cent in 
1970 to 17,6 per cent in 1980”.65 While people of all ages were socialised to accept 
the defence of the Republic and the war up north as normal, rising costs put stress 
on the economy.66 The Armaments Corporation of South Africa (Armscor) and its 
affiliates also employed thousands of staff and contributed to the acceptance of a 
system of arming South Africa against outside threats.67 The arms industry and the 
imagery created around it further contributed to the socialisation of the citizen in 
a militarised South Africa. Armscor, established in 1964 and refined in 1976, grew 
rapidly. An innovative format brought the public and private sector together in the 
endeavour to produce and acquire weaponry. Eventually, more than 400 companies 
were reliant on defence contracts from footwear to sophisticated equipment.68 All over 
South Africa, white families had men either in uniform or working for Armscor, or 
both. The socialisation effect of this speaks for itself.
TO WHAT EXTENT WAS SOCIALISATION SUCCESSFUL?
During 1989, the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa), a pro-democracy 
think tank and activist institute, undertook an extensive survey on Afrikaans and 
English university campuses related to political attitudes of white students. The 
survey covered all white-dominated universities. As Director of the then Research 
Unit of Idasa, I coordinated the project. Two of the principal investigators were from 
the Stellenbosch University and the Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit (RAU) (today, 
the University of Johannesburg). Jannie Gagiano was affiliated to the Department of 
Political Science at the Stellenbosch University and Susan Booysen to the Department 
of Political Studies at RAU.69 The study, the largest of its kind ever undertook in South 
Africa, saw a response rate of 47 per cent (4 321 out of 8 747 questionnaires sent out).
If the then prevalent student attitudes were anything to go by, the socialisation 
process in the military environment of the apartheid state was successful. Years of 
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CE provocatively, that historical prisons confined young South Africans.  Arguably, one can 
assume, as Gagiano did, that the findings of the study rest on the reality of  ‘then’: 
The white segment (of university society) is constituted as a community by 
virtue of the rules of operation of the rules of the political regime that gives them 
differential and superior access to the levers of state in society.70
Some examples will suffice. Support for the security establishment of the minority 
state stood at 62.9 per cent overall. Very sympathetic towards the security establishment, 
Afrikaans students (Likert scale used) stood at 84,6  per cent and English-speaking 
students at 33,5 per cent. However, on closer scrutiny, even with only 62 per cent 
indicating sympathy with the security apparatus of the state, both Afrikaans and 
English students indicated that they harboured a deep dislike for the liberation 
movements. Only 16,3 per cent indicated that they would welcome (3,4 per cent) 
or accept it. Looking at the high levels of institutional trust, it is not surprising that 
with Afrikaans campuses’ repression potential, Afrikaans-speaking students agreed to 
suppression any left-wing activism (even peaceful protest) at 88,2 per cent. English 
students came in much lower at 49,4 per cent. However, the overall figure still stood 
at 72 per cent on white campuses. Likewise, the protest potential (the willingness to 
physically protest, underwrite a campaign or sign a petition against the ruling political 
order) on Afrikaans campuses was extremely low. At Afrikaans universities, 87,9 per 
cent of students saw no need for or had no interest in protests – on the contrary, they 
felt (strong) antagonism towards it. On English campuses, the protest potential was 
somewhat higher, but some 70 per cent of English students saw no need for open 
protest.71 Small percentages on Afrikaans- and English-speaking campuses were indeed 
willing to protest openly, and even far smaller numbers of students felt alienated from 
the state. Considering the above, it seems clear that apartheid socialisation worked 
and that, presumably, the military socialisation process proved more than successful. 
The belief in the Total Onslaught featured strongly at both Afrikaans universities 
(much so) and English universities (lesser  so), Booysen, in her contribution to the 
same report, argues that white students were “paradigmatically constrained due to 
selective exposure to media, debate and access to broader information”.72 She further 
argues: “Political exposure and accompanying socialisation processes are critical in 
establishing what people believe, feel committed to or are prepared to venture upon in 
the political arena.”73 
The research found a close correspondence between parental political attitudes and 
that of the students, including support for institutional parties and a general distrust 
in liberation movements or internal extra-parliamentary bodies.74 Given the access 
to socialisation agents at the time, namely pro-government newspapers, a state-run 
broadcasting corporation and restrictions on alternative media, Booysen argues that 
low levels of potential re-socialisation were prevalent; in short, the paradigmatic prison 
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translated into groupthink with little space for exit or resistance. Some difference 
amongst the more conservative attitudes of Afrikaans students related to their exposure 
to Afrikaans newspapers and the SABC that was unashamedly pro-government, as well 
as supportive of the security apparatus. Add to this the pro-state filtered framework of 
educational institutions such as primary and secondary schools, and one can grasp the 
magnitude of an ideological grip that the ruling state had on its subjects.
English-speaking students were somewhat more critical, although not enough 
to threaten the state. It could hardly be expected. The reading of the slightly more 
liberal English press, amongst others, presumably led to these more liberal attitudes 
of students on English-speaking campuses. The English press in South Africa mostly 
favoured the parliamentary opposition, but not the liberation movements and were 
frequently sceptical of extra-parliamentary organisations. While some journalists and 
perhaps a sub-editor here and there may have harboured sympathy or empathy with 
the liberation movements, it was not possible to articulate this due to restrictions on 
the press, and I suggest the attitudes of the readers and sponsors. Other perspectives 
than those of the institutional media organisations were left to the so-called alternative 
media or alternative newspapers. These had a smaller support and distribution 
structure, fewer readers and were under constant pressure of the state, because they 
were regarded as subversive (interestingly enough, the ‘subversive’ media appeared in 
both English and Afrikaans).75 
Alternative media, mostly distributed in urban areas and at universities, were often 
dependent on smaller budgets. In some cases, these papers were mere newsletters, 
locally printed and distributed. Of these, many did not reach universities, being steadily 
discredited by national news media.
Both Afrikaans- and English-speaking students reported rather low levels of reading 
newspapers left of the parliamentary system. Newspapers representing the black 
viewpoint and ‘alternative’ newspapers saw a readership of between 3  and 10  per 
cent, depending on the campus.76 Booysen’s findings, like Gagiano’s, confirmed that 
there was little love lost for extra-parliamentary political movements and the banned 
liberation movements, with English-speaking students somewhat more sympathetic 
to these movements than the Afrikaans speakers. Quite clearly, the majority of white 
students at Afrikaans- and English-speaking universities supported either the National 
Party or the ‘liberal’ parliamentary opposition and demonstrated majority support or 
at least acceptance of state institutions.
One definite shortcoming of the study was that no surveys were done amongst young 
white working-class men and women as opposed to students, as working-class 
attitudes may have been even more conservative and hard-lined (after all, these men 
and women did not have the privilege of tertiary ‘liberal’ education). As a research 
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CE to students, who can arguably be seen as an elite in themselves. In the middle of the 
1990s and as part of a social identities project under auspices of the Human Sciences 
Research Council (HSRC), I interviewed groups of white secondary school students. 
These focus groups were held in smaller towns and included working-class children. 
In analysing the findings of the study, the attitudes reflected a strong inclination to 
conservatism and anti-communism and distrust in the new majority government after 
the transition to democracy, which is perhaps to be expected with parents socialised 
this way.77
It is clear that, with socialisation on various levels in a highly mobilised society that 
underwent a shift towards the militarisation of state and society, opportunities for 
breaking out of the rather static and rigid political discourse were limited. The status 
quo was either not challenged or only slightly challenged by the large majority, even if 
some people were sceptical about political developments.
Liebenberg and Visser78 identified how limitations on discourse developed over 
the years on one university campus (Stellenbosch University). The authors provide 
numerous examples of unbalanced exposure that furthered selective frameworks and 
worlds of reference and thus contributed to growing tensions on this campus. Limited 
space prevents discussion of these examples here, however informative they may be. 
The findings of the research by Liebenberg and Visser nonetheless provide a useful 
platform for further research on a case-study basis.79
Later conscript veterans were to speak out in books and contributions to the media. 
Some still believed in the Total Onslaught and the ‘righteousness’ of the struggle against 
communism, and that the SADF won the Border War or Angolan war, as did the 
late General Jannie Geldenhuys. Some were openly critical of apartheid militarisation 
early on, others in retrospect.80 Decades after the war, some veterans demonstrate an 
openness to perspectives other than that of the ruling elite of yesteryear. In reviewing 
work on the Angolan War, one South African veteran said: “This must be the toughest 
book I had to review so far!” He then engaged with the material in an open-minded, 
honest way, although the views were conceivably disconcerting and called up strong 
emotions. To do so, I think, means you have ‘steel in the soul’. His relevant conclusion 
is that such views should be read and reflected upon while knowing well that doing 
so will steer a debate or dialogue in a new direction and unleash strong emotions.81
CONCLUSION
History is indeed a discussion without end. The story related here provides but a 
glimpse of a setting of the past that still reverberates in debates and is reflected in 
social attitudes today.82 In this chapter, I only touched on the role of socialisation of 
the media and virtually not at all on the role of religious organisations (Afrikaans and 
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English Christian Churches).83 That is a topic for another day. I did not discuss the 
music of the time, inspirational radio talk programmes or films with a proSADF slant. 
Nor did I touch on the role of the Chaplain Services that were viewed by some as 
positive, while others saw Chaplains being used (sometimes enthusiastically so) as types 
of religious-political commissars to enhance the status quo. As in some other militaries, 
the Chaplain Servicemen within the apartheid SADF were in uniform and all had to 
have security clearance. Some publications, brochures and pamphlets published by the 
Chaplain Services touched on topics that could be regarded as propagandistic, others 
as indoctrination (even if by ‘hidden curricula’). On this aspect, the narrative is far 
from being concluded and much more research is needed.
On the one hand, the socialisation of the South African citizen-soldier from a young 
age was intense, spread over many years, had a lasting influence on political attitudes, and 
impacted social tolerance. In some cases, such attitudes still bedevil social reconciliation 
in South Africa. While a small minority of those socialised by the apartheid state, 
liberated themselves from the historical prison of apartheid and resisted the system, 
the majority remain caught in a past that constrains human interaction in the current 
South Africa.84
On the other hand, in the broader South African society there is a significant lack 
of understanding the lifeworld and experiences of the then white youth, especially 
the conscripts. Those conscripts were then and are now often confused with the 
role of the SAP (including the security police) inside the country and as a SAP 
counterinsurgency unit like Koevoet (in Namibia). There is little understanding 
of the immense socialisation pressures on this generation of white males, and they 
are frequently glibly described as apartheid soldiers, without understanding the 
complex social dynamics of the time. On all sides, a lack of historical knowledge and 
understanding of the socio-political dynamics under an authoritarian and militarised 
state inhibit constructive dialogue on the past with social reconciliation as the main 
objective. In my view, there is much need for an ongoing reconciliatory, non-racial 
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During the Angolan Civil War, South Africa and the West supported parties that 
proclaimed anti‑communist sentiments, notably the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (Unita) and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola 
(FNLA). However, with Soviet support, the Popular Movement for the Liberation 
of Angola (MPLA) emerged as the stronger contender to govern post‑colonial 
Angola, with weak leadership, logistics and supply shortages plaguing both Unita 
and the FNLA. The South African Defence Force (SADF) took over command of a 
leaderless faction of the FNLA and deployed them, as Bravo Group, during Operation 
SAVANNAH, the South African offensive in Angola in 1975‑1976. After withdrawing 
from Angola, Bravo Group was incorporated into the regular SADF structures as 
32 Battalion and deployed against the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), 
but the distinct character of the unit remained intact. 32 Battalion was characterised 
by unusual, non‑racial training and command methods, alien to apartheid South 
Africa. Different Officers Commanding (OCs) imparted different influences on the 
role of the unit, but the innovative character and adaptability of the soldiers meant 
that it continued to be an effective fighting force that was able to provide the SADF 
with many unique skills and opportunities.  After the Border War, 32  Battalion was 
relocated to Pomfret in the north‑western part of  South Africa’s Cape Province (now 
the Northern Cape) and deployed on township duties. This new role, less militaristic, 
was not ideally suited to the unit and problems that arose from it contributed to the 
disbanding of 32 Battalion in 1993.
The clash between the South African Police (SAP) and the South West Africa People’s 
Organisation (Swapo) at Ongulumbashe on 26 August 1966 is generally accepted as the 
start of the Border War. South Africa was still largely unprepared for a higher intensity 
war nine years later. At the start of Operation SAVANNAH in 1975, the majority of 
the infantry component of the South African forces consisted of hastily trained foreign 
troops under South African leadership. These troops were to become the nucleus of 
31  and 32  Battalion of the SADF. The experiences during SAVANNAH made it 
clear to the SADF that its doctrine and equipment would have to be re‑evaluated 
and adapted. This chapter traces the evolution of 32  Battalion from its inception 
during Operation SAVANNAH as irregular infantry using whatever weaponry and 
equipment could be pilfered, acquired, and appropriated, through the days of pseudo‑
operations and guerrilla warfare, to a conventional infantry battalion armed with 
some of South Africa’s latest doctrine and cutting‑edge equipment by the end of the 
war. The post‑war changes necessary for the transition from a combat infantry role 
to a township policing role are also examined. Throughout this period, the SADF 
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CE of Operation SAVANNAH to one of the most modern armies in Africa. Therefore, 
comparisons are drawn between the different roles of 32 Battalion and the perceived 
requirements of the SADF.
Piet Nortje’s comprehensive history of 32  Battalion, The Terrible Ones,1 and, to 
a lesser extent, Jan Breytenbach’s The Tempered Sword2 are used to construct the 
historical narrative. Primary sources from the South African Department of Defence 
Documentation Centre that neither Nortje nor Breytenbach reference are used both 
to confirm the accuracy of their accounts and to enrich and motivate the contentions 
about the evolution of 32 Battalion. The chapter does not attempt to renounce or 
replace existing narratives, or even to be a comprehensive historical narrative itself, 
but rather focuses on and analyses a specific aspect of the fighting history of one of 
South Africa’s most active units during the Border War. In doing so, it addresses one 
of the voids in the extant literature on 32 Battalion. With the notable exception of 
The Terrible Ones, the corpus of 32 Battalion literature comprise almost exclusively 
memoirs, recollections and apologetics.3 Nortje, on the other hand, has written a 
regimental history, of sorts. All these works, however, are either satisfied with providing 
an uncritical historical narrative or using the narrative to justify the actions of the 
author (and the author’s perception of the actions of 32 Battalion) during the war.
OPERATION SAVANNAH
South Africa was already involved in the Civil War in Angola when Luanda declared 
independence in 1975. The MPLA deemed the least desirable of the three nationalist 
organisations competing for power, and the SADF was keen to support either the 
FNLA or Unita. The latter organisations both approached South Africa for assistance 
in their fight against the MPLA and the SADF assisted to a greater or lesser extent. 
Unfortunately for South African strategists, the FNLA proved an unreliable ally and 
an ineffective fighting force, despite the material and advisory assistance from South 
Africa and the USA. The rapid state of deterioration of morale and equipment within 
the FNLA indicated this. A March 1975 newspaper report that states: “FNLA soldiers 
have a neat uniform, modern arms, good pay and allowances, efficient transport 
and their discipline and behaviour are excellent,”4 contrasts markedly with the first 
impressions that the South Africans had of them at M’pupa in August of the same year:
The base was in a filthy state. The approaches were through a several hundred‑
metre‑wide minefield of human excrement […] the stench was all‑pervading 
[…] all of the men showed signs of starvation […] none of them had decent 
footwear.5
It left Unita as the only viable opposition to the MPLA unless support to the FNLA 
was increased dramatically and to a more practical level. Besides, South Africa was not 
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well prepared for a large‑scale conflict in Angola. Conscription was still in its infancy, 
and the Citizen Force pool was not as large as it would be when the SADF planned 
and executed the later large cross‑border operations. To compound the problem,  Army 
Headquarters had, on 19 March 1975, concluded that there was “… geen konvensionele 
militêre aanslag teen die RSA nie [no conventional threat to the RSA]”.6 It meant that 
the SADF focused planning on low intensity, low manpower, counterinsurgency 
(COIN) warfare, rather than conventional operations in a foreign country. South 
Africa required manpower if they were to increase their influence in Angola without a 
great mobilisation effort in the Republic, which was curtailed both by time constraints 
and potential political repercussions. 
Daniel Chipenda played a crucial, though unintentional, part in assisting the SADF 
to fill this manpower void. A former member of the MPLA, Chipenda had fallen 
out with Agostinho Neto, MPLA leader, and joined the FNLA as assistant secretary‑
general in 1975.7 Although some of the MPLA support base – approximately 
2 000 soldiers – followed Chipenda to the FNLA, they did not espouse their new 
organisation wholeheartedly and remained a faction within the FNLA. One of the 
first acts of Chipenda’s faction was to establish a presence in southern Angola under 
Oginga Odinda,8 something the FNLA had been unable to do effectively up to that 
point.9 The FNLA had approached South Africa House in Trafalgar Square for aid in 
the war effort against the MPLA as early as 28 February 1975,10 during the period 
when American aid was still sufficient to keep the movement in the field, but by May, 
Chipenda had apparently come to the conclusion that South African aid had become 
crucial. In an attempt to secure this for his faction, he visited Rundu on 24 May and 
Windhoek on 28 May.11 Perhaps disheartened by Pretoria’s decision to limit FNLA 
support to supplying Holden Roberto with military hardware, rather than his own 
faction, Chipenda left the next meeting with the South Africans to Odinda, who on 
8 July informed the South Africans at Calais of the presence of about 300 Chipenda‑
FNLA troops at M’pupa, about 60 km to the north. Odinda promised that, with South 
African help, these men would take the fight to Swapo inside Angola.12 At a follow‑up 
meeting initiated by Chipenda’s brother‑in‑law, Pilisso, on 11 July, they presented the 
South Africans with a more accurate picture of the situation at M’pupa: there were 
only about 150 men who, between them, only had 15 rifles.13 Besides, Chipenda was 
no longer taking an active part in the leadership of this part of his FNLA faction. 
The SADF quickly realised that this situation could be turned to their advantage, 
identifying the Angolan soldiers as a potential SADF proxy force. 
Major General Constand Viljoen, then Director General of Operations at Army Head 
Quarters, tasked Col Jan Breytenbach to move to Angola and commence a training 
programme. Breytenbach, given 11 Reconnaissance Commando (Recce) operators to 
assist him with the task,14 arrived at Rundu in 1 Military Area (1  MA) in Namibia 
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CE (Officer Commanding 1  MA), Commandant (Lieutenant Colonel) M.  Knoetze 
(South African Military Intelligence) and representatives from the FNLA to establish 
a training programme. In an attempt to keep South African involvement in Angola a 
secret, they told the FNLA delegates that the white SADF personnel that would be 
in charge of the training programme was a mercenary force employed by the South 
African government.15 Although this deception was successful in keeping SADF 
activities secret for a few more months, the epithet ‘mercenary’ would stay with 
32 Battalion for the remainder of its existence. Nonetheless, a detailed training plan 
was drawn up, ostensibly based on FNLA reports of their strength and capabilities at 
M’pupa. Although Breytenbach’s recollections of the training indicate a haphazard, 
makeshift approach,16 the events that he recalls digress only slightly from the training 
plan that he submitted to Brigadier Jannie Geldenhuys, Director Operations at Army 
Headquarters, on 3 September 1975.17
When Breytenbach arrived at the FNLA base at M’pupa on 5 September 1975 on 
a fact‑finding mission, he discovered that even the more realistic image, sketched by 
Pilisso on 11 July, had significantly overstated the reality of the situation at M’pupa. 
Breytenbach is scathing in recollecting his initial impression of the troops18 but applied 
himself and his small core of South African officers and NCOs to the abbreviated 
training that they had planned. After addressing the most immediate concern – 
feeding the starved FNLA troops – Breytenbach organised them into two rifle 
companies of three platoons and a support company with mortar, machinegun and 
anti‑tank platoons. The training focused on physical fitness, section and platoon drills, 
weapons training and offensive drills.19 The actual training differed from the planning 
only in the addition of the anti‑tank platoon, not initially envisaged and added 
by Breytenbach only because the SADF supplied him with 3.5”  rocket launchers 
and an ex‑Portuguese army soldier, by then part of Chipenda’s FNLA, claimed to 
be an anti‑tank expert.20 True to the reputation that he had acquired and was fast 
developing, Breytenbach did not let the opportunity, however improbable, of adding 
additional firepower to his makeshift force slip through his fingers. The agreement 
between the SADF and the FNLA envisaged that the latter would gradually provide 
additional troops for training at M’pupa until the force under Breytenbach’s command 
came up to battalion strength.21 In reality, it rather was the news of the improved 
conditions now prevalent at M’pupa under South African leadership that inspired 
enough ‘recruits’ to turn up to enable Breytenbach to establish a third rifle company.22 
Although this third rifle company lagged behind the other two in training that was 
already cut down to a minimum, they would still, contrary to the initial planning, 
be deployed during Operation SAVANNAH. This lack of training, knowledge 
and discipline had regrettable consequences when Task Force Zulu’s Bravo Group, 
as Breytenbach’s command was now known, ran into a People’s Armed Forces for 
the Liberation of Angola (Fapla) ambush near M’pupa during the initial stages of 
Operation SAVANNAH. In the confusion of battle, Charlie Company established 
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positions on either side of a road, after that the two parts of the company started 
firing on one another. Two soldiers of Charlie Company were wounded, and one of 
them later died of his wounds.23 Because of this incident, Breytenbach kept Charlie 
Company in reserve for the rest of the campaign. In turn, this meant that Charlie 
Company never acquired the combat experience of the first two companies, Alpha 
and Bravo, while under Breytenbach’s command. At the battle of Ebo, when Charlie 
Company detached to Battle Group Foxbat, Charlie Company’s inexperience cost 
them dearly when confronted by a well‑prepared, well‑executed Fapla ambush.24 
Perhaps due to the inexperience of the SADF in using proxy forces, or due to the poor 
track record of the FNLA, the equipment provided to Breytenbach’s men was almost 
exclusively inferior and of Second World War vintage, except the FN/R1 rifles.25 The 
3”  mortars, with an effective range of around 1 000 metres, were hopelessly outclassed 
by the more modern Soviet 82 mm mortars of Fapla that could fire up to 3 000 metres. 
At first glance, the water‑cooled Vickers machineguns seemed prehistoric alongside 
the Fapla RPDs and PKMs. The Sten submachineguns (SMGs) that were used as 
personal weapons by the support platoons might have gained a brutal reputation in 
townships in South Africa, particularly at Sharpeville in 1960, but were of arguable 
use against a well‑equipped opponent. From the outset, the Stens were unpopular 
with the support weapons platoons26 and were eagerly exchanged for Soviet PPSh 
SMGs as soon as they seized these during Operation SAVANNAH.27 Possibly due 
to security concerns, the SADF recalled all the FN/R1 rifles, issued to Bravo Group 
shortly after the start of Operation SAVANNAH, but it was impossible to exchange 
them for AK47s, as proposed by 1  Military Area Headquarters, with Bravo Group 
actively deployed.28 
Despite the challenges facing him and the men under his command, Breytenbach 
succeeded in moulding an effective fighting force from his demoralised FNLA troops. 
Three aspects that would become hallmarks of 32 Battalion in later years stood out in 
the fighting efficiency of Bravo Group. Firstly, the innovative use of whatever equipment 
they had at hand increased the efficiency of obsolete weapons. The most obvious 
examples of this kind of innovation were the mounting of eight Vickers machineguns 
on the back of a flat‑bed truck and using this in broadside offensives against Fapla 
strongpoints29 or mounting machineguns on Land Rovers and using these vehicles as 
armed scout cars.30 Secondly, superior tactical awareness and application negated many 
of the advantages that the Fapla superior weapons and tactically defensive positions 
gave them. It is evident from the organisation of Breytenbach’s column during the 
advance into Angola: the Land Rovers led the way, followed by the machinegun and 
mortar companies. The rifle companies formed the rear of the column.31 In this way, 
Bravo Group was able to bring very heavy fire to bear on any enemies that they 
encountered, in a short space of time. It also positioned the mortars further towards 
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CE of the battle despite their limited range, though endangering the mortar crews in 
the process. Thirdly, Breytenbach did not hesitate to appoint non‑white, anti‑SADF 
personnel in key positions. It was partly due to a shortage of SADF leaders, but astute 
judgement in these appointments gave the FNLA soldiers both a sense of continuity 
and importance. Initial planning had strongly suggested that white South African 
leadership would be essential to achieve success. It was the contention of  both the 
SADF, with Breytenbach stating that: 
… die sukses van die operasie [hang] af van goeie beheer tot op lae vlak, d.w.s. wit 
Suid-Afrikaanse beheer … [… the success of the operation is dependent on good 
control at low level; in other words, white South African control …]32 
and the FNLA, who requested: 
… dat ons hulle moet bystaan, nie alleen met opleiding nie, maar ook met die fisiese 
beplanning en beheer van operasies. [… that we assist them not only with training 
but also with the actual planning and control of operations.]33 
Nonetheless, when it became apparent that enough ‘white, South African’ personnel 
were not available and that elements of the FNLA command structure were, in 
fact, capable leaders, Breytenbach deviated significantly from his planning brief to 
make optimum use of the forces at his disposal. Operation SAVANNAH showed 
the importance of leadership by example, that was absent in the FNLA, and the 
men chosen by Breytenbach formed the nucleus of the permanent leadership of 
32 Battalion.
INTEGRATION AND EARLY DEPLOYMENT
Although Operation SAVANNAH was a tactical success, with South African 
battlegroups advancing more than 3 000 km into Angola in little more than a month,34 
Pretoria’s strategic decision to withdraw to southern Angola left Bravo Group with 
no immediate prospects of employment. A large part of the white leader group, 
already evacuated because of malaria, and Brigadier Schoeman of 1  Military Area 
Headquarters planned to withdraw the remainder and replace them with newly 
arrived South Africans. However, Breytenbach realised that Schoeman’s proposal 
would be problematic because: the FNLA troops were unlikely to take kindly to 
leaders who had not proved themselves and the South Africans would probably 
underestimate the value of the FNLA troops. Fortunately, the bonds, forged during 
Operation SAVANNAH, proved strong enough, and Breytenbach and the remainder 
of his leadership group took a firm stance: if they came back to Namibia, the 
Angolans under their command came with them.35 With the MPLA assuming power 
in Luanda, the future looked bleak for their opponents, who had opposed them as 
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part the FNLA and the SADF. Common sense prevailed, and unofficial arrangements 
were made for the troops of Bravo Group to reconvene at M’pupa and Calais in 
January 1976, following a period of leave for the South Africans.36 By that time, the 
influence of the FNLA had diminished considerably, effectively leaving Unita as the 
only viable opposition force in Angola. It meant that former FNLA supporters had 
nowhere to go within Angola, as Unita was as much an enemy as the MPLA, resulting 
in a large number of refugees trying to enter Namibia. The South Africans made 
the most of this situation, handpicking the best of the former FNLA troops from 
amongst the refugees to join Bravo Group.37 In addition to the soldiers recruited in 
this way, skilled civilians from amongst the refugees were also informally attached 
to Bravo Group.38 Breytenbach then set about getting official SADF recognition for 
his new force. The focus of the SADF had by now returned to a counterinsurgency 
role aimed at combating PLAN infiltrations into Namibia, rather than direct action 
against Fapla. South African intelligence had established that the Angolan government 
was supporting Swapo and PLAN,39 providing them with bases of operation inside 
Angola, and the USSR had promised to provide PLAN with arms and ammunition 
to continue their fight against the SADF.40 Reports of increased PLAN activity in 
southern Angola and Ovamboland had also started coming in from November 1975, 
and South Africa’s Chief of Staff Intelligence (CSI) was under the impression that:
… operasies in S [Suid-] Angola slegs in ’n mindere mate Swapo se operasionele beplanning 
beinvloed [sic] het [… operations in s [Southern] Angola only influenced Swapo’s 
operational planning to a limited extent].41  
Breytenbach, therefore, envisaged that the former FNLA soldiers could be employed 
as a guerrilla force in the south of Angola, recreating something of the cordon sanitaire 
that PLAN forces would have to cross to infiltrate Namibia. To achieve this, he 
requested logistical support from 101 Task Force (101 TF) Headquarters,42 that had 
been established in November 1975 to provide a more effective command structure 
over the increasingly large theatre of operations of the SADF.43 They duly complied 
and authorised for the training of 1 000 men. During Operation SAVANNAH, the 
SADF had repeatedly denied that South African forces were operating in Angola until 
Fapla paraded captured South African prisoners of war (POWs) in front of the media. 
Perhaps in a bid to avoid a repeat of this embarrassment, Bravo Group was to be 
equipped with captured Soviet PPSh SMGs for their new counterinsurgency role, 
rather than the standard SADF FN/R1 rifle that they had used during Operation 
SAVANNAH.44 It added a layer of protection to the SADF, but also made sense for a 
force set to operate inside enemy territory. The Chief of the Army (C Army), Constand 
Viljoen, authorised the withdrawal of Bravo Group, now recognised as a quasi‑South 
African force, as well as that of their families, to Namibia together with the rest of 
the South African forces. The last South Africans were officially set to leave Angola 
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CE in the Caprivi, and later Buffalo, the home of the unit for the next 13  years. The 
first group of Bravo Group soldiers and civilians arrived at Pica Pau on 2 March.46 
Surplus equipment from the Second World War was given a new lease of life, with 
15’ x 15’ tents used as housing for the soldiers.47 Civilians had to make do with what 
they could find. On 2 March 1976, the SADF agreed to start paying salaries to the 
Angolan soldiers, the first sign of formal integration, at an annual rate of R60  for 
riflemen, R120 for lance corporals and R180 for corporals.48 On 15 July, Breytenbach 
requested a review of the salary scale, indicated in Table 11.1.49
TABLE 11.1 Breytenbach’s proposed salary scale for black soldiers






For comparative purposes, it is notable that, earlier in the same year, the Owambo 
Cabinet indicated to 2 Military Area (2 MA) that they were willing to “spend R100 000 
per annum for the employment of 500 Home Guards”,50 that equates to R200 per 
guard per year. Although it is unclear whether this amount was earmarked exclusively 
for salaries, Breytenbach’s proposed salary scale seems to be in greater sync with the 
prevalent socio‑economic climate than the initial SADF allocation. Additionally, the 
fact that Breytenbach refused to rest on his laurels following his successful campaign 
for getting official recognition for his unit appears to indicate a genuine concern for 
the well‑being of his men and their families.
After the rushed training programme at M’pupa, the frenetic pace of Operation 
SAVANNAH and the struggle to get SADF recognition for his former FNLA troops, 
Breytenbach now found time to reflect on the composition of his unit. He realised that 
he had black men from at least seven different tribes as well as white men from vastly 
different backgrounds and cultures under his command.51 Nonetheless, encouraged 
by the potential shown by Bravo Group, he started to foster an esprit de corps amongst 
his soldiers. Recognising that the reasons for which his men had become soldiers 
in the first place – the desire for an independent country in which to live – was no 
longer a motivating factor, Breytenbach embraced the motto of the French Foreign 
Legion: Legio Patria Nostra, The Legion is Our Fatherland. The inherent mentality 
within the unit would not be that black Angolan troops are fighting a white, apartheid, 
South African government’s war, but rather that they are fighting for the unit itself. 
In return, 32 Battalion would provide a haven for them and their families. Because 
the MPLA government in Angola was starting to refuse entry into Angola to refugees 
that wished to return,52 the value of a guaranteed home increased significantly. 
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However, Breytenbach could only achieve this if the white South Africans in the unit 
embraced his philosophy with the same vigour as the blacks. From the outset, the 
white leaders were regarded as part of the unit, rather than elite instructors. At the 
time, the SADF intelligence was concerned about the fact that black Namibians in the 
Caprivi were resigning from the SAP, because of inequality between them and their 
white counterparts.53 Junior white officers of 32 Battalion quickly came to realise that 
their black senior NCOs had a wealth of information and experience to impart to a 
19‑year‑old platoon commander, and the ingrained South African division between 
black and white soon diminished, at least when members were at Buffalo and or 
Pica Pau. A former resident of the Kimbo – the area where civilians associated with 
32 Battalion lived – recalls that he was not aware of any racism at Buffalo, although he 
did experience racism after the unit’s move to South Africa in 1989.54 
Because 32 Battalion Head Quarter’s location at Rundu, the need arose for a transit 
camp there. The construction of this camp indicated that the greater SADF was not 
yet comfortable with the desegregated views of 32 Battalion and in 1979 the General 
Commanding South West Africa Command (SWA Command) specifically instructed 
the SWA Engineer Squadron to pay attention to the construction of segregated 
ablution facilities at Rundu.55 It indicates that SADF members who felt unable to 
embrace the attitude of equality within 32 Battalion would find a more comfortable 
fit in other, more traditional, SADF units, and they were soon reassigned, either by 
their design or that of senior 32 Battalion officers.56 The use of Angolans as NCOs 
filled a manpower void and ensured a measure of continuity, both along the chain of 
command and when SADF officers left.
Bravo Group, destined to become known as 32 Battalion in October, shortly before 
Lieutenant Colonel Gert Nel assumed command, received their official tasking from 
101 TF on 18 May 1976. Their primary task was: 
… om ’n strook van ongeveer 50 km Noord van die SWA grens aan Swapo te ontsê deur 
klandestiene optredes … [… to deny Swapo an area of 50 kilometres north of the 
South West African border using clandestine operations].57 
They were specifically instructed to avoid contact with Fapla and the armed forces 
of other neighbouring countries.58 This directive necessitated two developments: 
establishing a training facility – done at Dodge City in the eastern Caprivi59 – and 
establishing an operational base at Omauni in the east of Ovamboland since Buffalo 
was too far from the theatre of operations. Dodge City was chosen as a training facility 
because the area around Pica Pau was not big enough for the more intensive training 
that was now taking place at 32  Battalion.60 To execute the directive, Breytenbach 
requested more contemporary weapons for Bravo Group, including RPG7s to replace 
the 3.5” rocket launchers and 40 mm grenade launchers, which he considered ideally 
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CE now train his men in its use, he requested equipment, such as camouflage nets, to 
use in training at Dodge City as well as on deployment.61 Following their official 
recognition, Bravo Group was better equipped, though still not to the standard of a 
regular SADF infantry battalion. At least, Second World War equipment had given 
way to more contemporary weaponry. It included captured Soviet AK47s and 
Portuguese FN G3 rifles, FN MAG light machineguns and South African 60 mm and 
81 mm mortars, though the machineguns and mortars were in very short supply and 
the SADF seemingly ignored Breytenbach’s request for RPGs and 40 mm grenade 
launchers.62 Initially, 32 Battalion deployments were similar to those of regular SADF 
infantry units, although 32 Battalion patrols took place inside Angola and over periods 
considerably longer than other SADF patrols, typically lasting six weeks, and were 
led by more junior officers than elsewhere in the SADF. It was an initial cause for 
concern within 101 TF, 63 but the combination of South African training and Angolan 
experience proved sufficient. The nature of the 32 Battalion deployments, in which 
forces were seldom larger than a platoon, led Nel to assign platoon commanders – 
usually white South Africans – and platoon sergeants – normally black Angolans – the 
responsibility for training their platoons.64 Although junior officers and NCOs were 
also responsible for platoon training in the rest of the SADF, the training at 32 Battalion 
was different in the fact that platoon commanders functioned autonomously and did 
not, as in the regular SADF, operate according to a set training plan. It meant that it 
was left to the platoon leaders to decide on which areas of training to focus within 
their particular platoons as well as, if the need arose, develop training methods and 
drills to improve the combat effectiveness of their platoons. Although the SADF 
informally had a culture of decentralised command, with lower‑ranking officers given 
a large degree of freedom in which to operate, in 1977 the idea that black soldiers 
were capable of leading and training South African forces differed radically from the 
views of the apartheid government. 
Nonetheless, this training method nurtured the innovative spirit of 32  Battalion, 
established from necessity during Operation SAVANNAH, and was an effective 
way to increase the level of training and combat effectiveness of the Angolan troops. 
Ironically, the SADF took the diametrically opposite view. The office of C Army 
compiled a document titled “Lesse geleer gedurende Op SAVANNAH [Lessons learnt 
during Op SAVANNAH]” that states:
The command and control structure of the SADF has been designed to function 
efficiently not only during peacetime but also during wartime.  To change this 
organisation and operate on an ad‑hoc basis during an operation not only 
results in confusion among lower formations but, as has been proved during 
SAVANNAH, also causes uncoordinated [sic] action and ineffective control. 
We must stick to our existing organisations and doctrine.65 
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It seems to disregard the successes achieved by units functioning on the very ad hoc 
basis, reviled in the document. Nonetheless, the caveats that C Army issues are 
poignant when viewed in the light of later command and control failures that had 
disastrous results, particularly in the case of 32 Battalion.66
PSEUDO OPERATIONS AND RECONNAISSANCE WING
Driven by the lack of intelligence on Swapo, Breytenbach came up with the idea of 
pseudo‑operations late in 1976. Intelligence gathering was, at the time, a hot topic 
in the SADF, as the realisation started to dawn that South Africa was probably now 
involved in a protracted war in Namibia and Angola. After studies done on both the 
philosophy and praxis of intelligence gathering, in typical army fashion, the SADF 
established guidelines for efficiency.67 They based the concept on the Rhodesian 
Selous Scouts, and the idea was that a group of black 32  Battalion soldiers could 
masquerade as Swapo cadres, hopefully gaining the trust of the local population and 
gathering intelligence from them.68 Breytenbach again exhibited his willingness to 
use the assets at his disposal by appointing an Angolan sergeant, who had undergone 
guerrilla training in the USSR and China while serving in the FNLA, together with 
two other black Angolans and two South Africans as instructors.69 The Battalion 
trained thirty soldiers but selected only ten for the first pseudo‑operation, an 
infiltration of the Opepela area. The group successfully contacted the local population 
who accepted them as Swapo cadres after spending some time amongst them. After 
nearly a month of posing as Swapo insurgents, the group withdrew. Because of a 
communication breakdown between 32 Battalion, 101 Task Force and SADF Army 
HQ, the operation had taken place without the knowledge of the SADF. When they 
became aware of it, further operations of such nature were prohibited.70 Soon after 
that, on 16 February 1977,71 an OC Conference was hosted by 101  TF followed 
by another, on 12 March, at 2 MA HQ, specifically emphasising the importance of 
intelligence gathering as a whole but, to an even greater extent, intelligence gathering 
be done in the prescribed, army way.72 Intelligence Instruction 4/76, discussed at these 
conferences, states explicitly:
Dit is van kardinale belang dat daar die grootste mate van samewerking en vertroue heers 
tussen die onderskeie inligtingstawwe [It is of the utmost importance that the greatest 
degree of cooperation and trust prevails between the different intelligence staffs].73 
It is not a large leap of imagination to envisage 101 TF, chagrined at Breytenbach’s 
independent attempts at intelligence gathering, pre‑empting further such attempts at 
these conferences. Although Breytenbach (or any other delegate from 32 Battalion) 
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CE 32 Battalion activities. Pseudo operations, therefore, only formed a small part of the 
fighting history of 32 Battalion but are indicative of their adaptability and willingness 
to embrace new challenges. The fact that the Battalion effectively implemented the 
concept of pseudo operations without the knowledge of Army HQ also illustrates 
the efficiency of the leadership in conceiving and implementing novel approaches 
to warfare.
The 32  Battalion Reconnaissance (Recce) Wing was also born from the need for 
accurate, uptodate intelligence. SADF intelligence doctrine of the time placed a 
premium on the rapid dissemination of intelligence and information, to the extent 
that it was considered worthless after a sufficient time lapse.74 Nel recognised that the 
Reconnaissance Commandos (Recces) of the SADF would never be a large enough 
group to provide intelligence for the whole of the SADF and set out to provide his 
own.75  The first training of the Recce Wing commenced in 1978 and closely resembled 
that of the existing Recces. As with the Recces, training started with a selection phase, 
designed to eliminate soldiers that lacked either the physical prowess or the mentality 
to become members of the Recce Wing. Those that were selected then embarked on 
an intensive programme that included intensive navigation, bushcraft, tracking and 
minor tactics training in addition to a strenuous physical fitness regime.76 Soldiers that 
completed both the selection phase and the Recce Wing training were then based at 
Omauni, closer to 32 Battalion’s area of operations than Buffalo and therefore quickly 
able to deploy when the need arose. They were organised into teams of five: a white 
team leader (usually a second lieutenant), a white NCO (usually a corporal) as the 
team’s second in command, and three black troops (some of which had the rank of 
corporal). The rigidity of the composition of the teams, when compared to normal 
32  Battalion platoons, was because the Recce Wing training attracted National 
Servicemen (NSM) from outside 32 Battalion. These newcomers could not always 
comprehend the fluidity of the command structures within the unit, and a more 
traditional approach to the Recce Wing went some way to alleviate the concerns of 
some potentially invaluable NSM.77 The ability to gather intelligence from within 
their ranks significantly reduced the time it took for 32  Battalion to act on such 
information. The success and efficiency of the Recce Wing soon led to it acquiring 
something of an elite status within 32 Battalion and it was eventually deployed for 
reconnaissance duties in other SADF units in addition to providing intelligence for 
internal operations.
CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS
By October 1977, 32 Battalion was rapidly gaining experience in the guerrilla warfare 
aspects of patrolling and dominating an area but had not deployed in a conventional 
role since the makeshift days of Operation SAVANNAH. The availability of SADF 
311
The evolution of 32 Battalion: From
 renegade guerillas to tow
nship troopers   
   W
ill G
ordon
officers and NCOs also continued to be a problem, to the extent that 101 TF accused 
32  Battalion of ‘grapping [sic: grabbing]’ two second lieutenants en route to 1  MA 
at Rundu.78 Such unconventional ‘recruiting’ tactics not only did nothing to endear 
32 Battalion to the rest of the SADF but compounded the command and control issues 
that already existed. Operation KROPDUIF, the assault on a Swapo base at Eheke, 
executed in concert with the Recces, was 32 Battalion’s first attempt at conventional 
warfare as formal SADF troops and vividly illustrated their leadership crisis.79 Although 
Swapo forces were successfully engaged, the large number of casualties suffered by 
a casualty‑shy SADF led the operation to fail. The main reason identified for the 
failure of Operation KROPDUIF was a lack of command and control, at all levels 
and at all times.80 Potentially, due to security concerns, little information about the 
operation was given to 32 Battalion during the planning phase. Considering that the 
Angolan soldiers had no formal SADF training in conventional warfare, this lack of 
detail seriously hampered training for Operation KROPDUIF. The Angolan soldiers 
were used to guerrilla patrols, and the warfare needed for this operation differed a 
lot. Also, close cooperation with other units, in this case, the Recces, was alien to 
the 32 Battalion way of war up to that point, which was waged almost exclusively at 
platoon level. To minimise the risk of friendly‑fire casualties, it was custom for different 
32  Battalion platoons on patrol to actively avoid each other’s area of operations. 
Finally, while adhering to a given timetable was key to the success of a conventional 
operation such as KROPDUIF, the patrolling with which 32 Battalion was familiar 
was much less time‑critical. These factors combined in costly fashion to highlight the 
inexperience of 32 Battalion in conventional operations, despite 101 TF attempting 
to improve command and control by transferring soldiers from 32 Battalion to the 
Recces81 and temporarily returning Recce operators, who had been part of Bravo 
Group, to 32 Battalion.82 
Fortunately for the SADF, the men of the unit, though stunned by experiences of 
KROPDUIF, were not deterred from attempting future conventional operations, but 
were rather motivated to improve their capabilities in this regard. The minor part 
in Operation REINDEER,83 the controversial assault on Cassinga, provided some 
more conventional experience, but it was only with the arrival of Colonel Deon 
Ferreira as OC on 9 January 1979 that 32 Battalion became thoroughly proficient 
at conventional warfare. Tasked by Constand Viljoen to “strike a balance between 
Breytenbach, who only wanted to shoot, and Nel, who only wanted to write”, Ferreira 
had an operational focus from the outset.84 He quickly identified several problems in 
his new command, mainly centred around a lack of experience, training and planning. 
To rectify this, Ferreira initiated an intensive eight‑week retraining programme as well 
as an evaluation of the – mostly black – permanent leader group, which had the 
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CE Regardless of whether Ferreira had an inkling of what was to come, or whether he just 
happened to provide the right kind of influence at 32 Battalion at the right time for the 
SADF, his time as OC saw an increase in their conventional deployment. It culminated 
in Operation TIRO‑TIRO, an attack on a Fapla base at Savate in support of Unita 
from 17 to 24 May 1980. Drawing on experience gained from smaller deployments 
since Operation KROPDUIF, as well as Ferreira’s influence on the morale and outlook 
of his troops, planning for Operation TIRO‑TIRO was thorough to a fault.86 The 
Battalion did extensive reconnaissance and intelligence gathering beforehand that, 
although not flawless, was a vast improvement of the confusion during KROPDUIF.87 
32 Battalion suffered heavy casualties during Operation TIROTIRO, but this time it 
could not be attributed to a lack of experience, planning, training or coordination. 
The Unita forces that were supposed to support 32 Battalion did not live up to the 
expectations of the SADF,88 but Ferreira was able to effectively adapt his battle plan, 
and effectively communicate this to his subordinates, to compensate for the Unita lack 
of support. 
In addition to enhancing the conventional capabilities of 32 Battalion, Ferreira also 
introduced ‘air‑mobile sweep operations’ or ‘butterfly operations’, similar to the 
Rhodesian ‘fire‑force’ concept,89 that required the coordination of three or more 
companies and, at times, artillery support, with helicopters from the South African Air 
Force (SAAF). Butterfly operations took place concurrent with the normal COIN 
patrols. Ferreira significantly increased the command and control structures and 
capabilities of 32 Battalion, which in itself gave them a greater conventional capability. 
The soldiers’ conventional combat effectiveness had increased dramatically coupled 
with the increased standards of training and experience gained during smaller parts 
in operations. At the end of Ferreira’s tenure as OC at 32 Battalion, training of black 
leaders was a firmly established priority at the unit. Specialised courses, specifically for 
black platoon sergeants and section leaders, were officially acknowledged as one of the 
key goals that would contribute to future success,90 culminating in the commissioning 
of black members of 32 Battalion as some of the first black officers in the SADF.91 
LATE WAR
Colonel Eddie Viljoen, who had taken over command from Ferreira in 1982, had seen 
the typical deployment of 32 Battalion change from patrols to deny Swapo access to 
southern Angola to the support of Unita against Fapla. The MPLA was giving ever 
greater support to Swapo, and the distinction between Fapla and PLAN combatants 
was becoming less clear. Pretoria also increasingly realised that it was impossible for 
the SADF and South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF) to effectively patrol 
the whole of the Angolan/Namibian border and that they needed Unita as a buffer 
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between Namibia and Fapla/PLAN. Unfortunately for the South African strategists, 
Unita was not able to offer effective resistance to Fapla on their own and had to 
rely heavily on South African support. South Africa was able to provide Unita with 
equipment, but international political pressure made it difficult to intervene directly 
on their behalf. Because the majority of the soldiers of 32 Battalion was black and 
spoke Portuguese, they became the natural choice when a direct intervention was 
deemed essential. Pretoria was better able to deny involvement when confronted with 
evidence of black SADF troops aiding Unita than with whites. As a result, 32 Battalion 
took on an increasingly conventional role and, by April  1986, Viljoen was able to 
assess the role of the unit in a letter to SWATF HQ as:
… die voer van ops konvensioneel sowel as TEIN in SWA en transgrens [… performing 
operations, conventional as well as COIN, in SWA and cross‑border].92 
Major General M.J. du Plessis from the office of C Army, two brigadiers, nine colonels, 
two lieutenant colonels and a major met at Army HQ on 3 April 1986.93  The meeting 
directly resulted in the attachment of Ratel 90 and Ratel ZT3 anti‑tank IFVs, Ystervark 
anti‑air vehicles and multiple rocket launchers to the unit, in anticipation of a Fapla 
offensive against Unita whom South Africa would support. The unwillingness of the 
SADF, in 1977, to change the name of the unit from Bravo Group to 32 Battalion 
Group, on the grounds that the addition of the word ‘group’ implied the attachment 
of artillery, armour and other fighting elements,94 now only served to illustrate to 
what a great extent 32  Battalion had outstripped the role originally envisaged for 
them. They were the first unit to deploy the Ystervark operationally, and their ability 
to adapt and innovate, put to good use in developing the most effective drills to use 
on this type of weapon system. They were also able to suggest modifications to the 
system, such as the use of a different type of radio antenna, to the SADF to increase 
operational effectiveness95 and point out shortcomings, such as the susceptibility of 
South African manufactured ammunition links to stoppages.96
For the rest of the war, 32 Battalion was, in some capacity, involved in the majority of 
SADF operations. They had established their competence in unconventional warfare 
and intelligence gathering and reconnaissance early in the war and had expanded 
their conventional capabilities under Ferreira and Viljoen. The SADF was, therefore, 
able to use them, in piecemeal fashion or otherwise, to fill the myriad of gaps that 
the increasing intensity of the war brought about. Although the 32 Battalion of 1989 
was almost unrecognisable from the Bravo Group of 1975, the spirit of camaraderie 
that Breytenbach initiated, and subsequent OCs had fostered, had stood the test of 
time. Censor reports for 1988 indicate that the vast majority of 32 Battalion soldiers 
had positive experiences of the morale within the unit. Notably, most of these letters 
would have been written by white members, resulting in a somewhat distorted image, 
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CE TABLE 11.2 Frequency of reference to morale in letters from 32 Battalion soldiers







March97 367 21 316 5.72%
June98 338 66 215 19.53%
July99 268 17 88 6.34%
August100 230 12 40 5.21%
September101 291 22 128 7.56%
October102 289 23 64 7.96%
November103 198 12 134 6.06%
Total 1 981 173 985 8.73%
The unusually high percentage of negative comments about morale in the unit 
during June can probably be attributed to 32 Battalion’s involvement in Operation 
PACKER, the finale of the contentious MODULAR/HOOPER/PACKER trilogy 
of operations around Cuito Cuanavale, ending on 30 April 1988.104 Soldiers would, 
therefore, have had time to reflect on the operations and the indecisive outcome 
would undoubtedly have galled a unit that had become used to unequivocal results, if 
not successes. Even taking this into account, an average of one negative comment in 
more than 11 letters does not seem excessive.
TOWNSHIP OPERATIONS
With the withdrawal of the SADF from Namibia in 1989, they relocated 32 Battalion 
to Pomfret, in the north‑western part of the Cape Province. The unit’s perennial 
leadership problem now suddenly evaporated. From very few white South Africans 
willing to join the unit during the Border War, the availability of white leaders now 
outstripped vacancies.105 It seemed that white South Africans was more willing to 
join a racially integrated unit, not almost continuously deployed in a combat capacity. 
This new influx of white officers and NCOs created some tension within the ranks of 
32 Battalion, with the black soldiers loath to accept untried white newcomers and the 
existing leadership group also viewing them with suspicion. Internal matters such as 
these did not influence the operational readiness of the unit and, although the SADF 
planned to initially deploy them to the South African borders with Zimbabwe and 
Botswana, urban warfare training started soon after their arrival at Pomfret.106 The 
SADF rightly recognised that rural COIN operations, such as those undertaken on 
South Africa’s borders, would be a natural continuation of the northern‑Namibian 
COIN operations in which 32  Battalion excelled. Despite the enmity of white 
farmers in the area, border operations were generally successful, but on the other 
hand, urban deployments were a greater challenge. The SADF reasoned that the 
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Portuguese speaking, Angolan soldiers of 32 Battalion would be ideal for township 
duty because they were black but did not share the political views of the majority of 
black South Africans. The men of 32 Battalion were, indeed, less politically motivated 
than the rest of South Africa, including the other SADF units and the SAP, and were 
successfully deployed – effectively as a police force – to curb unrest on many occasions 
between 1989 and 1992.107 During initial deployments, the SADF was at pains to 
establish whether 32 Battalion was effective and efficient in their new role. For the 
most part, the feedback was positive and seemed to underscore the SADF thinking in 
their deployment of 32 Battalion on township duty. The Greytown Municipality, for 
example, reported that:
Die meerderheid inwoners verwelkom blykbaar die teenwoordigheid van 32-Bataljon 
aangesien dit die enigste effektiewe manier is om die onrus in die woongebied te beheer. 
My raad het geen klagtes ontvang dat die lede van 32-Bataljon nie onpartydig is in die 
uitvoering van hul pligte nie [The majority of the inhabitants welcome the presence 
of 32 Battalion, as it is the only effective way of controlling unrest in the area. My 
council did not receive any complaints about members of 32 Battalion not being 
impartial in the discharge of their duties].108 
But the fact that 32 Battalion was, to a large extent, used to operate by their own 
rules in a context somewhat isolated from society was bound to haunt them. While 
stationed at Buffalo, enforced discipline punished the transgressor, without limiting 
combat effectiveness. Corporal punishment and hard labour were key components 
of a ‘punish and move on’ mentality that was no longer suitable to a more structured, 
and sensitive, South African society.109 The change of disciplinary procedures led to 
several charges being brought against members of 32  Battalion, though very few 
were ever prosecuted. For the most part, South African society seemed to echo the 
thoughts of the Greytown inhabitants, though on occasion enquiries about the actions 
of 32 Battalion escalated. Understandably, South African politicians were concerned 
about the actions of, essentially, a foreign force within their borders and occasional 
ministerial enquiries were justifiable. The continued escalation of charges against 
members of 32 Battalion to this level, after some of the initial enquiries successfully 
defended, still seems excessive, though.110 It is, therefore, perhaps not a pure coincidence 
that the final withdrawal of 32 Battalion from township duties, and therefore from a 
role of useful contribution to South African society, was due to an investigation into 
the Phola Park incident, where charges of brutality were brought against 32 Battalion 
members.111 Although no criminal proceedings were initiated against them, the SADF 
decided to accept the advice of the Goldstone Commission, who investigated the 
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From the earliest moments of 32 Battalion, when Breytenbach started to train the 
FNLA troops at M’pupa, improvisation was necessary to achieve success. After 
Operation SAVANNAH, Breytenbach recognised that he needed a focal point for 
the loyalty of the men under his command. He, therefore, consciously and actively 
fostered a culture of loyalty towards the unit, rather than the political or military 
structures controlling it. Less apparent, though, was the evolution of the culture of 
innovation that had germinated during Operation SAVANNAH.  Aided by the attitude 
of decentralised command prevalent within the SADF,  32 Battalion became adept at 
rapidly adapting to the changing nature of the Border War. In some cases, they started 
to address problems that the SADF had not yet recognised as such and put invaluable 
resources at the disposal of the SADF, such as the Recce Wing. 
In addition, the unusual, from a SADF perspective, circumstances and experiences of 
32 Battalion added valuable expertise to the SADF repertoire. By way of example, 
in July  1977, 101  TF was able to request that WO  Pep van Zyl be detached to 
Windhoek for 14 days to assist with the training of (presumably white) instructors 
for six non‑white companies. With this request, 101  TF tacitly acknowledged that 
32 Battalion was the prime authority of the SADF on the “… metodiek van opleiding 
van swartes [… training methodology for black soldiers]”.113 32 Battalion continually 
adapted existing and developed new ways of soldiering to increase effectiveness as a 
fighting force, making optimum use of the resources at their disposal.
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OPEN FOR BUSINESS 
Soldiers get up to all kinds of mischief. Whether on a campaign or in the barracks, 
there are accusations of alleged looting and scrounging, of illicit sexual encounters, 
and even murder. Leisure-time programmes are now designed to keep young men, 
adventurous and emboldened by a sense of power endowed by the profession of arms, 
in camp and under military discipline. For millennia, the physical and emotional 
well-being of the soldier was no specific organisation’s official concern. Loot and 
plunder all too often supplemented inadequate or non-existent rations, while soldiers 
also fell victim to traders – the sutlers immortalised by Bertolt Brecht in Mother 
Courage – who followed armies and adjusted prices according to the intensity of the 
campaign and the temperature of battle. Things changed gradually. Regular pay and 
embryonic medical and chaplain services were instituted in most European armies 
from the  Thirty Years War, although the improvement of living conditions for soldiers 
and the provision of comforts, refreshments and small luxuries – to supplement those 
sparse and mediocre rations – would wait at least another two hundred years. The 
canteen organisations created during the latter half of the nineteenth century were 
dependent on the goodwill of senior officers and the raising of public awareness. Their 
chequered history in the British Army continued until 1900, when Lord Roberts, the 
British Commander-in-Chief in South Africa during the Second Anglo-Boer War, 
established the South African Garrison Institute (SAGI) as a unified canteen facility to 
offer goods and services at reasonable prices to Imperial troops on campaign in South 
Africa. The Union Defence Force Institute (UDFI) and the South African Defence 
Force Institute (SADFI) (Afrikaans: Suid-Afrikaanse Weermaginstituut – SAWI) were 
direct successors to SAGI and aspired from 1916 to continue this tradition in service 
of the South African armed forces.1
The British canteens have been the focus of ongoing work, often by men and women 
long associated with SAGI and the Navy Army Air Force Institute (NAAFI) of the 
British armed forces. Sir John Fortescue, historian of the British Army and Royal 
Librarian at Windsor, wrote the first history of the British canteens. He approached 
this from the early sutlers through to the reforms, undertaken by his brother, that 
led to the creation of the Canteen and Mess Society and its successors, SAGI (1900) 
and NAAFI (1921). Fortescue’s book, published in 1928, was followed by several 
publications at different intervals during the twentieth century.2 Much less has 
been done in terms of the canteens in the South African armed forces.3 Fransjohan 
Pretorius analysed the questions of supply and leisure within the Boer Commandos 
during the Second Anglo-Boer War4 and James Bourhill has done the same for the 
6th South African Armour Division in Italy during the Second World War.5 Neil 
Roos, working on the same period, reasoned that leisure, sex and the social control 
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CE Pretoria, highlighting the close relationship between recreation, canteen and military 
discipline.6 The entertainment units of the Second World War have been the separate 
focus of two journal articles and an MA thesis.7 However, despite the wealth of 
archival material on funds and institutions related to the SADF, there has been little, 
deeper-level historical analysis of these issues. This chapter seeks to fill something of 
the historiographic gap, by analysing the role and function of SAWI – known better 
by the Afrikaans acronym – and examining the measures taken to provide canteen and 
shopping facilities and leisure activities to South African troops and military families 
during the Border War era. 
MILITARY EFFICIENCY, THE ‘TROEPIE’ AND SOCIAL CONTROL
The watchword in all armed forces is military effectiveness.8 This refers to the 
combat readiness of the soldier individually and within the organisation as a whole. 
Anything that compromises that effectiveness is combatted through regulation and the 
application of firm military discipline. Nevertheless, soldiers historically have presented 
their commanders with a complexity of problems. Military service – and conscription, 
introduced in South Africa in 1967 – served as a rite of passage into adulthood. It 
brought freedom from the parental home, uncertainty but the promise of hardship, and 
initiation into the military as experienced by older relatives and friends. Geographical 
remoteness and social isolation introduced an unnatural environment, with often 
empty hours. The SADF organised leisure activities, laid on sporting equipment and 
games, and supplemented rations in a variety of ways.
There has been very little historical analysis on leisure and consumption in the South 
African armed forces; with the regimental histories tending to follow the battle and 
emphasising camaraderie and deeds of valour.9 There are a small, but growing number 
of references in the recent Border War memoirs, which can be supplemented by the 
vast archives generated by the SADF on institutions and funds, canteens, and sport. 
The SADF faced several unfavourable factors on ‘The Border’. A low ratio of force 
to space facilitated breakthroughs in the battlespace but imposed severe logistical 
problems, made worse by the climate and the nature of the terrain. Large river systems 
and flooding in the semi-arid south of Angola during the rainy season (February 
to April) combined with the poverty of the country, fewer bridges and roads, more 
unpaved tracks, and less cleared growth and thicker vegetation, exacerbated these 
supply difficulties.10 Food was a factor, the bush of the war zone offered little, and all 
requirements had to be brought forward by the SADF. 
Notwithstanding, complaints – about the quantity, quality and lack of variety of food 
– regularly feature in the writings of soldiers. Food, Richard Holmes argues, has a 
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men hungry, dispirited and increasingly ineffective’.11 However, battle rations could 
be improved and varied and might include chocolates and cigarettes, and supplies and 
small luxuries might also be bought from a SAWI whenever one was in the area.
But canteens play other roles too. Healthy young men, removed from the normal 
female company and home surroundings, are housed in a barracks environment. 
Whether in training camps or combat zones, they are often limited to female 
contact that may verge on promiscuity if not professional prostitution. This comes 
as no surprise. Throughout the history of armed forces, sexual liaisons, ranging from 
romantic passion to cold commerce, was widespread and entailed rapture and abuse 
on both sides of the gender divide. Casual sex and prostitution, and corresponding 
bouts of sexually transmitted diseases, flourish during times of conflict, when sexual 
behaviour is freer and pleasure-seeking and intemperance is fostered by the horror 
of war and notions, often very real, about the brevity of life. The rate of admission 
for venereal diseases in the Dominion armies during the First World War was 24 per 
thousand troops in France and 32 per thousand in Egypt.12 The Second World War 
presented similar statistics, but in Korea, the South African rate per thousand shot 
up to 130 per thousand in March 1953.13 Regular medical inspection of personnel; 
lectures on STDs and preventative measures; the running of prophylactic centres (the 
‘Blue Light Depots’); and abundant well-organised sporting and recreational facilities, 
all removed from the influences of local towns, formed part of the military solution. 
Primarily, it remains a hidden history, “an aspect perhaps best forgotten”, and no 
statistics are presently available for the SADF troops during the Border War.
The South African involvement in the broader war for Southern Africa lasted 
from 1966 to 1989. It would be naïve to presume that the near half-million young 
men conscripted from 1967, as well as the older Permanent Force personnel of 
the SADF, had no sexual contact over this 23-year period along a “Border” that 
was geographically, logistically, and psychologically a long way from home.14 The 
recent writings of former National Servicemen sometimes reveal sordid tales: of 
alleged rapes,15 group sex,16 and heavy drinking,17 the feeding of prostitution, and 
the circulation of Scope, a soft-porn magazine,18 and screening of ‘blue movies’.19 
Some units were more affected than others. A National Service Medical Officer 
records that nearly all the soldiers of 32  Battalion had a venereal disease: “… the 
gonococcus has found a home here in Ovamboland, the chaos of war offering the 
perfect environment.”20 This “Border”, and military service more generally, was a 
rite of passage into manhood. Rituals might involve the consumption of alcohol and 
drugs, exposure to pornographic material, and perhaps sexual behaviour and even 
violence that would be frowned upon or deemed unacceptable at home. The need to 
contain and control the troops, and so minimise any mischief, perhaps particularly on 
the part of young National Servicemen, enjoyed paramount importance. The SADF 
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CE They provided sporting equipment, distributed games, dug swimming pools, built 
tennis courts, revitalised ‘rat packs’, and opened shops and canteens on military bases 
and in military towns. Soldiers were thereby encouraged to spend leisure time within 
unit lines, removed from the allure of neighbouring suburbs and towns, and remained 
safely under military discipline. SAWI was the primary organisation that managed 
these shops and canteens, ran the mobile canteens in the operational area, and, from 
the proceeds of the business so conducted, sponsored the building and maintenance of 
recreational facilities.
PUTTING THE RIGHT FOOT FORWARD:  
STRUCTURE, MANAGEMENT 
SAWI has had something of a chequered history. Starting as the UDFI in 1916 it 
performed this task, for the most, quite adequately, supplying members of the Union 
Defence Force (UDF) with canteen facilities in South West Africa (SWA) during the 
First World War and then serving South African and Allied servicemen and women 
in no fewer than five theatres during the Second World War. Fragmentation of the 
business within South Africa during the interwar years led to the emergence of local 
institutes, in the form of the Pretoria Garrison Institute, the Cape Peninsula Garrison 
Institute, and the Algoa Bay Garrison Institute, until re-amalgamation and a name 
change in 1957 to SADFI.
The organisation underwent far-reaching changes from 1916, changing from a 
mainly civilian organisation into a military unit. However, poor management and a 
lack of business acumen led to an extremely pitiable public image. Several inquiries 
into the affairs of the Institute followed – in December 1939, September 1952, and 
February  1961 – and, on each occasion, insufficient remedial action compounded 
matters. The Institute was at times charged with the abuse of its credit system, 
condemned as a social evil, and for making victims of the military families buying 
goods on credit. Customers accused the Institute of inflating prices to cover losses, 
maintaining an inadequate stock, having an officer-preferential policy and delivering 
a generally poor, often-grudging service. As a result, many members of the UDF 
who could afford to take their custom elsewhere did so. Opinion gauged during the 
inquiries (perhaps at best a perception within only a small portion of the military 
community) was that the Institute no longer justified its existence as it no longer 
fulfilled the function of supplying the soldier cheaply and expeditiously. Such negative 
threads were not continuous or ubiquitous, and the Institute cannot be judged solely 
from the ‘negative overload’ in the archival ‘residue’ of the Institute, which was of 
course the result of SADFI’s specific documentary process. It is also true that few 
businesses would have survived the vicissitudes of the five decades preceding 1968 
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However, this is only part of a complex story. The 1952 board of inquiry found 
that the convenience of a nearby shop for married members of the UDF living on 
military bases where they could not obtain necessities at reasonable prices justified the 
continued existence of the Institute. During the implementation of several changes and 
an improvement in the finances of the organisation, the Institute remained burdened 
with the most significant problem which had been haunting it since 1916. It was the 
fact that the Institute remained an attempt to run a civilian shopping organisation 
inside the SADF for members of the SADF. In 1968, the General Staff decided to take 
the whole structure out of the purely business arena and adapt it to suit the military 
environment. South Africa was slowly being drawn into a war on her borders and, 
as a result thereof, the Institute’s activities were re-evaluated with a view towards the 
growing need for an effective field canteen system. This involved a shift on the part of 
SADFI from retail trade to operational trade. 
Massive changes followed in 1968, the year of the first National Service intake. 
Brigadier Larry Hopkins was appointed as general manager, with a new Permanent 
Force management team to run the Institute, under the overall control of the 
Quartermaster General.21 In peacetime, SADFI, confined to the Republic of South 
Africa, was divided into two regions for effective control: the Cape and the Transvaal. 
For the first time in the history of the Institute, the managers formed a management 
team, and the different branches were run as one organisation. Militarisation brought 
about an immediate re-assessment and a reorientation of attitude by many senior 
officers. Hopkins’s appointment gave SADFI new status and authority both within 
the Defence Force and in negotiations with trading associates. SADFI now was no 
ordinary trading concern, but an integral and vitally important part of the SADF, 
promising enormous benefits if adequately supported.22  “For the first time”, according 
to Brigadier Brian Slater, who would succeed Hopkins in 1976, “the soldier felt that 
the soldier was controlling SADFI to the benefit of the soldier”.23 Militarisation 
brought other benefits. The entry of a large number of civilians and delivery vehicles 
to units and military bases was averted. All problems regarding institutions and funds, 
such as the non-payment of accounts, could be settled within the organisation so as 
not to tarnish the image of the SADF. And, with time, SADFI established itself as the 
sole supplier of all commodities required by units. It not only introduced uniform 
prices but saved the individual institutions money and manpower. By the end of the 
1970s, the Institute had established a productive Citizen Force element able to supply 
canteen services at isolated places at short notice.
The condition of SADFI improved dramatically after 1968. Between June and 
November 1968, the Institute achieved an overall price reduction of approximately 
17.5% throughout the Transvaal, with smaller reductions in the Cape. ‘Sticking stocks’ 
were disposed of in the Transvaal and replaced by a wider variety and a greater range 
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CE between August and November 1968 and soon adverse criticism was almost entirely 
restricted to factors arising from the struggle to offer a modern shopping service in 
obsolete shops and stores. Relationships with military units also improved given a 
growing understanding of and increasing support for the new SADFI based on the 
NAAFI model. While the Institute could not meet all unit requirements at better 
prices than elsewhere, the average prices level per unit was unquestionably lower. 
Army units as far afield as Kimberley, Bloemfontein, Potchefstroom, Middelburg and 
Nigel began to purchase many of their requirements from SADFI Voortrekkerhoogte 
voluntarily.24 The trading accounts for the six months ending on 31 August 1968 
reflected, for the first time in two years, a small profit in the Transvaal. With growing 
support and increasing turnover, the Institute rehabilitated to such an extent that 
the Director General of General Administration could report to the Defence Staff 
Council: “There is no way in which a meaningful comparison can be made between 
the disreputable and bankrupt SADFI of early 1968 and new SADFI.”25 As activities 
of SADFI expanded, and beyond official expectation, Hopkins held the hope that 
SADFI might develop as NAAFI of the SADF and that all unit institutions would 
become SADFI outlets.26
SADFI, as an enterprise, achieved some stability by 1974. Surplus assets, excluding 
buildings and major equipment, exceeded R650 000 and was invested in stock that 
realised an average turnover of R500 000 per month. Although sufficient for wholesale 
buying, this fell far short of the amount needed to finance long-term development 
programmes essential for future growth. The reversal of inherited debt, the reduction 
of loans, and the financing of growth of about 475% between 1968 and 1974 largely 
absorbed trading profits. The financial problem, compounded by the late payment 
of credit sales, in April 1974 caused the Chief of the SA Defence Force to instruct 
all formations, units and sections to pay their SADFI accounts within 30  days. 
Furthermore, and much to Hopkins’s indignation, the assets of the SADFI Trust Fund, 
that would have settled all outstanding loans, were instead spent on a residence for the 
commanding officer of SWA Command.27 The lack of trading capital was certainly 
slowing growth.28
Hopkins won other battles. On one front were the shops and canteens run by individual 
units for their benefit. They represented a motley crew, and no real improvement had 
taken place since the introduction of National Service. The reasons for this were 
equally multifarious: some unit commanders showed little interest and gave little 
direction and guidance, others did not have the time to set aside for the unit shop, 
and all battled with small ranges and erratic supply. Importantly, these unit shops did 
not keep pace with the needs of large numbers of National Servicemen.29 As a result, 
SADFI became the preferred wholesaler, and all units were instructed to purchase all 
goods and services from the Institute. In August 1973, Admiral Hugo Biermann, the 
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do likewise. Biermann accepted the position that SADFI would not always be able to 
quote the lowest price but would be the lowest most of the time. Moreover, whereas 
civilian suppliers were in business for profit, SADFI was an integral part of the SADF, 
ploughing back profits to improve and extend services for the benefit of military units 
and members of the SADF and their families.30 Notwithstanding, he and Magnus 
Malan, then Chief of the Army, and others believed that the Institute ought to obtain 
support through persuasion rather than compulsion.31 In this, they were seemingly 
proved correct. Units, at first somewhat cautiously, later wholehearted gave support 
to SADFI.32
Hopkins consolidated matters before his retirement. A difficult process, he had listed 
several ‘demands for continued service’ in a letter to the Chief of the SA Defence 
Force. It resulted in the provision of additional trading capital and the review of the 
management and control structure. As general manager of SADFI, Hopkins now 
also became Director of Institutions on the Quartermaster General’s staff, while an 
assistant general manager was appointed and additional Permanent Force personnel 
were allotted to the Institute.33 Liaison between the general manager and senior 
representatives of the Arms of Service became more effective and more frequent 
following the disbandment of the old SADFI Board of Control and the creation of 
a liaison committee comprising representatives from all of the Services.34 Trading 
restrictions were relaxed to allow unit shops to supply all of the needs of National 
Servicemen confined to their respective military areas and lacking the freedom to buy 
from the shops in town during business hours.35 These steps enhanced the status of 
SADFI and SADFI interests, and vastly improved the service given by direct SADFI 
outlets as well as unit shops. They also confirmed the important place the shopping 
facilities and field services of SADFI had assumed in the SADF.36 These functions – 
the larger shopping facilities and the mobile field service – will be dealt with in turn.
SHOPPING FACILITIES:  
MILITARY TOWNS, GARRISONS, UNITS
By 1974, growth had taken place at such a rate that reference in policy to ‘branches’ of 
SADFI had become mostly meaningless.37 SADFI was initially permitted to provide 
services where it had a shop or a ‘branch’. However, in preparation for possible 
wartime mobilisation and in compliance with the direction to ‘provide a service to 
units and troops under arms anywhere within or outside the Republic wherever they 
may be’, SADFI developed a network of approved suppliers throughout South Africa. 
With this, the Institute met the needs of units it could not, for practical reasons, serve 
directly. These ‘approved suppliers’ became SADFI ‘branches’.38 
At first, SADFI mainly restricted attention to the Transvaal. This region and Pretoria, 
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CE In fact, during the ‘rescue years’, the management, facing the genuine possibility of 
liquidation, had little choice. Having to convince higher authorities that the position 
of SADFI was redeemable and that the Institute was capable to make a profit,39 
Hopkins focused on the only region capable of rapid growth. “Nothing”, he noted, 
“was expected from the Cape other than they keep their heads above the water.”40 
However, once he consolidated the Institute’s position and the Transvaal had enjoyed 
the incredible growth of 1973/74, the growing demand for SADFI services elsewhere 
could not be satisfied. The most significant problem facing the Cape business was 
the dispersion of the few training bases for National Servicemen situated in the 
Cape province, the largest element being the Navy – the smallest of the Services 
– and Naval Headquarters moved from Simon’s Town up to Pretoria in 1977.41 
Although the situation improved to a limited extent with the opening of the Da 
Gama Park branch and the expansion of the shop and area depot at Wynberg, there 
was no military complex in the Cape comparable to Voortrekkerhoogte. Growth was, 
therefore, much more expensive and contained the prospect of far smaller returns. 
Distance complicated advertising, limited personal client contact, and delayed the 
delivery of goods.42 The Cape regional manager, a civilian until 1972, seemingly added 
to the difficulties.43 The Cape repeatedly yielded to the needs of Pretoria, the seat of 
Defence Headquarters since the establishment of the Union Defence Force in 1912, 
and the hub of all SADF activity. The Institute’s growth in the Transvaal was therefore 
not replicated in the south.
By the end of the 1970s, business was slowing down across the country. Supermarkets, 
just getting off the ground when the SADFI militarised in 1968, were new competition 
and SADFI was not ‘supermarket’ orientated. The buildings were not conducive to 
modern trading and most of its shops were corner cafés, that traditionally only had 
to compete with corner cafés. The task of repositioning SADFI in terms of buildings 
and infrastructure and client base mostly fell to Brigadier Brian Slater, who succeeded 
Hopkins in August 1976. He implemented two critical measures. The first was the 
decision taken in 1978 to create facilities that were modern and offered an engaging 
shopping experience. Secondly, steps were taken to make SADFI more competitive in 
terms of price.44 
The physical infrastructure remained a problem. The Institute had no property rights 
to any of their buildings, owned or hired, all of which had been erected on state 
property. Alterations or renovations led to growing debt to the UDFI Trust Fund,45 
while the Institute remained hesitant to invest in accommodation it did not own.46 
Most of the premises where SADFI conducted business were ineffective or inadequate 
to carry on modern business.47 Although SADFI, over the previous ten years, procured 
more than 50% of the buildings occupied by the Institute in 1954, these buildings 
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Ten of the twenty-eight buildings occupied by the Institute in that year were of wood, 
or wood and iron construction.48 The Wynberg shop, for example, was housed in an 
old timber and iron bungalow taken over from the Imperial Government in 1921 and, 
back in August 1930, had been condemned as rodent-infested. 
Notwithstanding, converted to a general dealer’s store, it was still in a fair state of repair 
in 1944 despite bad light, insufficient ventilation and inadequate storage.49 The position 
was similar elsewhere. The wood and iron building used as the Voortrekkerhoogte 
dairy, also gifted by the Imperial Government in 1921, had been condemned by the 
Surgeon General in 1957.50
TABLE 12.1  Classification of UDFI premises according to the year of construction and the year of 
occupation by the Institute
Year Pre‑1925 1925‑34 1935‑44 1945‑54 unknown
Construction 8 6 5 2 5
Occupation 2 7 3 14 -
Successive inquiries into the Institute’s affairs raised the issue of the state of the 
buildings. In 1961, the Peat, Marwick and Mitchell team found that the “premises 
[were] poorly planned, dull in appearance and in a bad state of repair”.51 Five years 
later, the Groenewald Investigation recommended that immediate steps be taken to 
provide suitable premises and services at state cost.52 Renovations were a matter of 
urgency, and there had been some positive developments. In May 1966, for example, 
SADFI entered an agreement with Mobil Oil Southern Africa to build a modern 
service centre and shopping centre at Voortrekkerhoogte.53 The first petrol was sold 
on 29 July 1968.54 Four new branches were added to the existing ten between 1968 
and 1975, although, in all four cases, existing buildings and temporary accommodation 
had to be used (Table 12.2). The recommendations made by Hopkins regarding new 
developments in Voortrekkerhoogte, to cater for the growing residential complexes 
and the first National Service intake, received a mixed reception.55 Reduced liquidity 
delayed renovations and new constructions. The Institute had to stabilise its finances 
and repay loans before they could undertake major development.
TABLE 12.2 New SADFI branches, 1968-1975
Branch Date opened Form of accommodation
Eersterivier 20 Mar 1970 Converted bungalow at 2 SACC Bn
Da Gama Park 01 Oct 1972 Converted bungalow
Grootfontein 1974 (exact unknown) Tent
Naval Dockyard Simon’s Town 01 Aug 1975 Old NAAFI canteen
A reassessment of SADFI policy came in 1974, including guidelines for expansion. 
SADFI may not have had the capital, but expansion could also not take place at the 
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CE where the private sector could not provide a service. And, as far as deployability and 
expansibility went, the family shopping service had to be on such a scale and manner 
that the organisation, trade experience and contracts could be extended to ensure 
that SADFI was able to deliver an effective shopping service to troops in the field 
after mobilisation.56 Growing insecurity on the northern borders and the impending 
deployment of troops proved to be a lifeline. 
An expansion programme was planned to meet increasing demands. SADFI erected 
a new, modern supermarket in 1974 at Langebaan Road at the cost of R167 000; the 
project had been in the pipeline for almost ten years. The new dairy and warehouse 
complex for Voortrekkerhoogte, requested in 1967 and delayed due to site problems, 
was completed in September  1975.57 The unit canteen at SAS Saldanha was taken 
over in  1975. They upgraded and extended other facilities and introduced a milk 
service from Voortrekkerhoogte to canteens and families in units deployed in the 
north-eastern Transvaal. SADFI opened a new café or restaurant in Voortrekkerhoogte 
in October  1975 and constructed similar facilities in the Naval Dockyard, Simon’s 
Town. They modernised the family shop at Dunottar and erected a new shop and 
warehouse at Grootfontein. This period, on the other hand, also saw the closure, after 
five consecutive years of losses, of the family shop at Port Elizabeth.58 Rapid expansion 
marked the thirteen years after 1975. SADFI established no less than 31 branches. The 
number of branches doubled between 1983 and 1989. Predictably, most of the growth 
took place in the Transvaal and SWA (Table 12.3).
TABLE 12.3 Geographical location and date of opening of SADFI branches, 1968-1989
Date Transvaal Orange Free State Cape South West Africa Totals %
Pre-1968 4 - 6 - 10 19.6
1969-1975 - - 3 1 4 7.8
1976-1982 8 - - 1 9 17.7
1983-1989 12 - 3 7 22 43.1
Unknown 2 2 2 - 6 11.8
Totals 26 2 14 9 51 100
% 51 3.9 27.5 17.6 100 -
The Northern Transvaal area, particularly, experienced much growth. In  1984, a 
canteen in the Liberty Life Building, in Vermeulen Street, Pretoria was opened,59 
and this service to the ‘soldier in the office’ was extended to the Hallmark Building 
on 5 April  1988.60 A new shop, far larger than the existing facility, was opened at 
Potchefstroom on 8  April  1986.61 Given this tremendous growth, the Northern 
Transvaal area was divided with effect from 1  July  1988 with the appointment of 
a Captain Jooste as area manager of the new Far Northern Transvaal Area.62 The 
enterprise in SWA (Namibia) commenced in 1974 with two mobile canteens and a 
small shop initially housed in a tent at Grootfontein. By 1989, there were no fewer 
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The  Windhoek operation was taken over from SWADFI (the short-lived SWA 
Defence Force Institute) in 1982.63 This is a clear reflection of the increased demand 
placed on SADFI by the military community.
Much depended as well on the image of the Institute and loyalty of its customers. 
Clearly, by the late 1970s, SADFI had changed from an enterprise relatively unpopular 
with the military community to one that had obtained their respect and confidence. 
Notwithstanding dramatic improvements in the benefits and facilities offered, some 
servicemen remained critical.64 Colonel François Dannhauser, who became assistant 
general manager on 1  January 1983, found that poor market orientation brought a 
breakdown in communication between Institute and customers. Customers, unaware 
of various discounts, felt prices were higher than what they were. Market research 
confirmed that some customers did not understand the complicated price structure, 
and the widespread perception remained that SADFI was still very expensive.65 
A  survey conducted in 1979 confirmed the notion that the military community 
were not giving their maximum support to SADFI. Residents of Voortrekkerhoogte 
spent approximately 64% of their monthly grocery budget at SADFI, while service 
personnel resident in neighbouring areas, such as Valhalla, where competition existed, 
tended to support SADFI considerably less. As a result, the discounts were done away 
in  1980, and SADFI reduced all prices by an average of 10%.66 SADFI was now 
becoming more competitive in terms of price.
The same survey in 1979 found that National Servicemen and junior ranks tended to 
support SADFI better than senior ranks.67 To a greater or lesser extent, this phenomenon 
can be ascribed to several factors, the first of which was the geographic problem faced 
by SADFI. Residential patterns reflected that senior officers, concentrated in the 
neighbouring suburbs, supported SADFI less than members of lower rank, who were 
concentrated in and around the training camps of  Voortrekkerhoogte and hence had 
a greater opportunity to buy from the conveniently situated SADFI.68 The market 
SADFI catered for was a second factor. In the past, SADFI tended to concentrate on 
National Servicemen. This confirmed in the minds of many Permanent Force families 
that their needs could better be met by the supermarkets, hypermarkets, and family 
stores which mushroomed in South African suburbs from the end of the sixties.69 
A  third factor, public perception, was equally important. The junior ranks were 
relatively new in the SADF and were therefore only acquainted with the ‘new’ SADFI 
of the post1968 era. They were not aware of the previously poor reputation that, for 
years, remained implanted in the minds of many members of the Permanent Force.70
SADFI launched a massive advertising campaign in the 1980s to reach the military 
community, who remained the Institute’s only customer base. SADFI introduced new 
innovative ideas and implemented a marketing strategy and began to set competitive 
prices.71 ‘New-look’ shops gradually replaced older facilities; they extended services 
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CE under controlled circumstances. Considerable sums of money were diverted to provide 
facilities for the military community, including two kindergartens in Voortrekker hoogte.72 
SADFI had become a dynamic and profitable organisation capable of delivering real 
benefits to servicemen.
SADFI had a growing presence in the military towns and on military bases. Many 
units now had smaller SADFI outlets. These shops, cafés and canteens offered 
groceries, personal items, and additional rations, perhaps mostly fast foods, to resident 
military families and the large biannual influxes of National Servicemen. Complaints 
regarding official rations, perhaps mainly by National Servicemen, extended from the 
large training bases to deployment in the operational area. “Anthony”, an 18-year-old 
National Service chef, relates:
They taught me to cook, but it’s different when you are cooking for over 1 000 
guys. Everything’s boil and oil. Catering in the army was about good quality food 
fucked up.73 
The sister of two National Servicemen and girlfriend of another stated:
Really – those rat packs! For a guy who’s eighteen, there was not enough food in 
them for one proper lunch, let alone a day or longer. They didn’t even get given 
those often, either, when they were out in the bush – at least, not every day.74 
Food and culinary experience differed vastly.75 And then there was the omnipresent 
SADFI seeking to fill the need. François Verster, a National Serviceman in the late 
1980s, describes the general dealer role played by SADFI at the time:
Ons koop baie by die SAWI, want die armykos is maar min en nie altyd lekker nie. Die 
ouens sê ons sal sien as die voorrade opraak, kry ons net pap. … Ons koop ook Themde 
en onderbroeke by die SAWI. Jy kan omtrent enigiets daar kry, maar ons soek meestal 
kos. [We buy many things at the SADFI, because army rations are meagre and 
not always pleasant. The chaps here say that we will notice when the supplies 
run short. Then we get porridge. … We also buy Tshirts and underpants at the 
SADFI. You can get anything there, but we mostly look for food.]76
Besides, while SADFI met the demand for additional rations and other items, there 
were also notions that SADFI emptied the pockets of servicemen. Verster, who served 
as a National Service teacher on the Omega base, describes the SADFI there as a 
“… massiewe weermagswinkel wat soos ’n vliegtuigloods gelyk het”. National Servicemen 
and the teachers with bigger salaries spent their salaries and danger pay here.
Ons danger pay is in kontant uitbetaal. Dit was altyd welkom, hoewel die meeste van ons 
ons geld in die SAWI gaan mors het en die geld dus net weer terug na die weermag se 
koffers is. Veral die Boesmans het seker omtrent elke sent van hul salarisse in die SAWI 
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in cash.  This was always welcome, although we mostly wasted our money in the 
SADFI and the money in this way returned to the army coffers. The Bushmen 
(sic), particularly, probably ‘ploughed back’ every cent of their salaries in the 
SADFI. Where else? There was only the one shop.]77 
In 1984, South Africa entered the worst recession since 1933. Despite an increase 
of 15.5% in the Institute’s turnover, net profit dropped by 1.7%. The cost of repairs to 
and the maintenance of the buildings increased from R206 636 to R314 502. Salaries 
increased by 23%, of which 10% was attributable to the employment of additional staff 
for the new outlets.78 No less than 36% of the SADFI outlets operated at a loss. Certain 
of the smaller outlets, often situated in isolated places, were run at a calculated loss to 
deliver a service to the local military communities.79 Under these circumstances, any 
civilian organisation would probably have closed these branches. A large amount of 
stock shrinkage compounded the difficult financial situation.80
The later 1980s saw something of a renaissance.  The activities of SADFI had quadrupled 
since 1976. This was due to the growth of the trade in SWA as well as the establishment 
and expansion of SADFI services to isolated bases.81 SADFI opened new malls 
and shops at Voortrekkerhoogte  (1979), Bloemfontein  (1982), Bloemspruit  (1983), 
Potchefstroom (1986), Port Elizabeth (1986) and Windhoek (1987). Prices were visibly 
competitive. A comparison of 400 grocery items carried out by Dannhauser in 1986, 
reflected a benefit for SADFI customers that varied between  5.16% and  7.14%.82 
Although SADFI was normally 4% to 5% cheaper than other supermarket chains, the 
Institute was as much as 8.49% cheaper than its cheapest opposition in July 1989.83
Despite calls for greater privatisation and complaints from the private sector that they 
could not compete with SADFI, an investigation in 1986 found compelling arguments 
against privatisation. There was no way to privatise SADFI if the Institute was still 
to offer a service. The principle of low prices with minimum profit (as a benefit to 
servicemen) would be lost. 
Moreover, the question arose as to which large firm would be willing to operate 
small shops in bungalows at isolated places for small communities (in  1986, 
approximately 50% of SADFI branches operated with no profit). And then, profit-
driven organisations would not be willing to divert funds from financially secure 
branches to subsidise non-profit branches as a service. Private firms could not offer 
a service in the operational areas. These same firms would also not be willing to pay 
rent for the dilapidated buildings and operate in isolated areas where it would have to 
increase prices drastically to cover overheads. Perhaps most of the criticism directed by 
the private sector was based on a poor understanding of the SADFI enterprise. Local 
chambers of commerce stressed the use of state accommodation, state transport in the 
operational area, and some state-paid Permanent Force personnel. However, as far as 
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CE Force element was kept to a minimum and concentrated on the command and 
control, and the operational trade. As such, SADFI did not compete with the private 
sector. Advertising campaigns were limited to the military community and civilians 
were turned away at SADFI outlets. A strict application of the regulations dissipated 
the tremendous amount of opposition from commercial quarters.84
In  1989, the end of the Border War, SADFI had almost 100  outlets across South 
Africa and SWA. The Institute offered diverse services to the military community, 
from convenient outlets for groceries and clothing to petrol, sports goods, furniture, 
household appliances, and vehicle financing. During the 1988/89 financial year, 
SADFI had a turnover of R145  million and engaged approximately 1 200 employees. 
It was no small enterprise.
FIELD SERVICE: OPERATIONAL ROLE, 1968-1989
The Institute’s other role, the delivery of a mobile canteen services under battle 
conditions, saved SADFI in 1968. Until the changes that had followed militarisation 
took effect, the military community had viewed SADFI with much suspicion and 
disregard. The Institute, which did not accompany the South African contingent to 
Korea, had last seen operational deployment in 1945.85 Over the following years, the 
Institute suffered from its poor image. Even Major General P.H. Grobbelaar, then 
Army Chief of Staff, had objected in 1956 to ‘the presence of UDFI vehicles within 
the tactical area, even on exercise’.86 Grobbelaar arranged for unit canteens to supply 
non-ration items to his exercising troops during Operation ORANJE. As a result 
of this kind of opposition, the SADFI mobile field element was still non-existent 
by 1968.87
The first steps taken to provide the field services followed the militarisation of the 
Institute in 1968. The Army Order of Battle then provided for a mobile SADFI to 
form on mobilisation. They ordered the first of a series of mobile canteens and a 
Permanent Force post for a ‘Mobile Shop Manager’ was created for the permanent 
establishment of the Institute.88 Militarisation, and then growing SADF involvement 
in the Border War reinstated the idea of a unified canteen system and led to the 
acceptance of the principle of an operationally capable and active Institute.
SADFI practised their mobile field function for the first time in May 1972 during 
exercise BROLLY TREE, a simulated defence of South Africa. It introduced a new 
primary role. Until then, the Institute had concentrated on what was its secondary 
role, namely the provision of static shopping facilities to the military community 
in South Africa. During this exercise, which lasted from 5 to 27 May 1972, SADFI 
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mobile, war-simulated conditions. During the first ten days of the exercise, they sold 
approximately 16 800  tins of cool drink, almost 88 000 packets of twenty cigarettes, 
seven dozen (84)  electric razors, twenty-three boxes of shoe polish, numerous 
souvenirs, and crates of sweets.89 The reaction was tremendous and in sharp contrast 
to the sentiments expressed after Operation ORANJE. The Commanding Officer 
of North-Western Command requested a SADFI presence at the next exercise.90 
SADFI teams operated in the field on every major exercise between 1972 and 1990, 
while providing a service in one form or another to many Citizen Force units and 
Commandos during training camps.91
The real test came soon with operational deployment to the northern borders. 
From 1969, military personnel might have experienced a minimum of six months 
service in the operational area and, as a result, soldiers were away from home for 
reasonably extensive periods. Military bases in South West Africa were situated in 
distant, isolated areas, the climate was one of extremes, and servicemen often worked 
and lived under trying circumstances. There were no mobile canteens or cinemas, as 
the UDFI had operated during the Second World War, and opportunities for effective, 
quality, leisure programmes were limited, although the Director General Personnel did 
organise entertainment groups and provide film shows to a limited extent. Grass sports 
fields were practically non-existent, and it was not uncommon for a rugby match to 
be temporarily stopped when the ball was lost in the swirl of dust churned up by the 
players’ bare feet.92  The need for an institute able to meet the canteen and recreational 
needs of the troops was evident.
The first SADFI shop opened in SWA in 1974. It first operated from a tent at 
Grootfontein.93 During Operation SAVANNAH, a bulk trade section was established 
at Grootfontein. Orders placed by bases and units in the operation area were dispatched 
from this depot and, from January 1976, two mobile canteens ploughed through 
the day to service units in transit in the Grootfontein area.94 Overnight SADFI was 
presented with an operational task, conducted under combat conditions.
However, several factors constrained the SADFI operational service. Misunderstanding 
about where SADFI fitted into the command and control structure during operations 
remained. SADFI also did not have the necessary personnel, vehicles and equipment 
to handle the mobilisation task. This led to an inefficient distribution of commodities 
from the base area (Grootfontein) to the front. Some units travelled from as far 
as Calueque and Moçâmedes, some 700  kilometres away, to collect supplies at 
Grootfontein. Canteen facilities were lacking at some centres, including Rundu, while 
SADFI retail facilities were inadequate at Grootfontein. Problems were compounded 
by an ineffective pay system that limited the buying power of the troops.95 All in all, 
in 1976, SADFI was able to deliver a praiseworthy service as far as Grootfontein and 
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CE A committee, to investigate the role of SADFI in the operational areas, was appointed 
on 24 March 1976.96 Chaired by Major General W.A. Lombard, this committee found 
that a decentralised system supplying services directly to frontline troops and based 
on the NAAFI ideal, could not exist in the SADF.  The supply of canteen facilities to 
small, highly mobile forces operating over a vast area in the African bush was too costly 
and personnel intensive.97 The same lessons had to be learnt again: the old UDFI (V) 
was largely unable to render a service to the frontline during the mobile periods of 
the North African campaign and even battled to do so during the static months of 
the Italian campaign in 1944. The Lombard Committee recommended that, under 
conventional circumstances, the final wholesale distribution point of SADFI be in the 
Brigade Administrative Area (BAA) and other more fixed bases. From these points, 
units were to undertake the distribution of commodities through the normal echelon 
system. The final point-of-provision would, therefore, be through the unit canteens 
and not the SADFI mobiles. This released the latter canteens for service in fixed bases, 
BAAs and on return routes where they expected amassing of troops, such as in the 
demobilisation areas.98
Adjusting rapidly to the circumstances, SADFI became increasingly proficient and, 
from 1981, participated in all SADF operations. During Operation DOLFYN, canteen 
supplies were transported from the SADFI depot in Oshakati to the SADFI element 
in the front maintenance area, from where provisions were supplied by road, air and 
parachute to combat groups at the front. During this operation and its successor, 
ASKARI (1983), SADFI suffered losses in transport. However, improved security, the 
presence of SADFI personnel, and the optimum use of the echelon system vastly 
diminished the incidence of theft.99 The SADFI bulk stores that operated during all 
operations since PROTEA (1981) fulfilled the dual function of wholesale provision 
to unit canteens and the Institute’s mobiles, which as a rule did not operate in 
competition with unit facilities.100
This extract from a letter written by Major F. Eckhardt, the second-in-command of 
the Cape Town Highlanders, reflects the appreciation operational troops had for the 
services offered by SADFI in the operational area:
Our meeting with you on our recent tour of operational duty was truly a 
Godsend, and it certainly was a great boost to our sagging morale. Not only 
were you directly responsible for coming to our aid with SADFI necessities and 
allowing us the sole use of one of your trucks, but in so doing you ensured that 
an important aspect of life on the border was able to be carried out and made 
life that little bit easier.101
However, SADFI support largely took place on an ad hoc basis.102 No policy directives 
or procedures existed save a broad outline in the General Regulations. This had a 
detrimental effect on the service provided.103 SADFI only reached an agreement with 
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content of this agreement was included in the Army’s Report on the Logistic System 
and provided a foundation for a number of policy documents: a policy directive 
or ‘philosophy and doctrine of the SADFI’; a logistics pamphlet regarding SADFI 
activities; and a directive in respect of the tasks of the general manager, SADFI.104 
They implemented these procedures during Operations MODULER (1  July to 
15 December 1987), and HOOPER (15 December 1987 to March 1988) and SADFI 
played a key role in supplying troops when and where canteen support was needed. 
For the first time, they made night drops where this was the only way of getting 
supplies to the troops in forward positions. Great appreciation was expressed, with an 
emphasis on the SADFI ability to offer its services from the outset of the operation.105
Operation PACKER was launched early in 1988, with a view to a tactical disengage-
ment of the South African forces involved in the repulsion of the Fapla offensive of 
1987.106 Supplies were forwarded from the SADFI depots in South Africa by road 
and rail to the SADFI depot in Grootfontein. SADFI bulk trucks distributed these 
provisions to the various bulk stores scattered along the length of northern SWA, from 
Oshakati in the west to Mpacha in the east. These provisions were sold in wholesale to 
the local units and also provided the local SADFI shops with goods for retail trade to 
the local military community. Operation PACKER was executed through Rundu; and 
this boosted the turnover of the small shop, opened barely twenty months before, to 
over R1  million per month.107 Supplies were forwarded from the bulk store at Rundu 
by convoys of 3 Maintenance Unit to the brigade administrative and demobilisation 
areas. The mobile field depot deployed in the BAA consisted of two wholesale 
trucks (Samil 100 6x6 insulated vehicles) and two mobile canteen trucks (Samil 100 
6x6 vehicles equipped with large fridges). This mobile field depot netted an average 
turnover of R262 800 per month.108 At the demobilisation or transit area, three SADFI 
canteens served approximately two thousand troops throughout Operation PACKER. 
These mobiles stocked all necessities from toiletries and chocolates to wines, malts 
and tinned mussels. However, the buying power of troops moving north was greatly 
restricted as they did not have their first pay. It was, however, made up by those troops 
moving south, who had many months’ pay and several ‘Victory Vouchers’ (or ‘Bakgat 
Bewyse’) that they could exchange for beers or cool drinks. These three canteens 
produced a turnover of R90 000 between 28 February and 28 March 1988.109
In May  1988, events in SWA took a new turn when negotiations between South 
Africa, Angola and Cuba commenced in London. This culminated in the signing 
of two accords on 22  December  1988, and the implementation of the negotiated 
peace settlement plan for SWA on 1 April 1989. The withdrawal of South African 
troops from Namibia and the closure of all SADFI outlets in the country ended 
an interesting phase in the Institute’s history. The Institute managed to execute its 
operational task with exceptional efficiency despite the changes brought about by 
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CE Unlike the liquidation of the UDFI in 1921, the SADFI had no organisation to which it 
could transfer the canteen infrastructure. An SWA Defence Force Institute (SWADFI) 
had been established in 1978 to meet the eventuality of Namibian independence and 
the withdrawal of the SADF. However, because of bad management and imminent 
bankruptcy, SADFI took over SWADFI, accepting all the losses, and turned it into a 
flourishing and profitable trade.111 The final curtain dropped on the Institute’s business 
in Namibia with the closure of most of the branches on 6 June 1989. The remaining 
facilities closed towards the end of 1989. While these developments left a feeling of 
melancholy with the people who were acquainted with SADFI facilities in Namibia, 
it was certainly true that there were new challenges and new horizons facing the 
management and staff of a much-reduced Institute.
Following the implementation of Resolution 435 and the withdrawal of South African 
troops from Namibia, the SADF estimated that the turnover of SADFI reduced 
by 30%.112 The management made an effort to grasp the challenge of a lower turnover 
by promoting productivity, streamlining the management and providing a better 
service.113 However, as the Institute could not open branches on existing bases if this 
placed them in competition with the local commercial infrastructure, there was no 
way in which SADFI could expand its business on a large scale within South Africa.114 
Two avenues remained: the extension of existing facilities and the replacement of 
certain old buildings; and the establishment of new branches simultaneously with the 
inauguration of new bases.115
In May 1988, SADFI opened a temporary shop on the new Air Force Base at Louis 
Trichardt. This service started in a mobile canteen but soon expanded. Shortly after, 
the construction of a new, modern shop. Another success story was the new store 
that opened in Pomfret when 32  Battalion was transferred there from Buffalo in 
Namibia.116 This shop had to open its doors at short notice as SADFI was called in 
at the last minute to provide the service. The facility was already too small, and plans 
were soon underway once more to double the size of the existing building. Perhaps 
the most significant success came with the new shopping complex, erected in 1990, 
which housed the SADFI head office, a furniture shop, a sports shop, a supermarket, 
a bakery, a café and branches of Absa and First National Bank. This complex was 
planned to allow for at least ten years of expansion.117 In these ways, SADFI attempted 
to mitigate the loss of the South West enterprise and a shrinking clientele, following 
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CONCLUSION: CLOSING SHOP 
“It is the dramatic and momentous events at the sharp end of the war”, Keegan 
and Holmes remind us, “that jostle for our attention. But the inexorable advance of 
armoured columns … depend upon logistics.”118 Logistics, or the sinews of war, is a 
complex if often hidden subject. Ponderous columns of logistics vehicles have to bring 
ammunition and equipment and, of course, food forward. Where this fails, soldiers 
might live off local resources and ruin the hopes of farmers and local townspeople. 
Many modern armed forces now have regimented canteen systems. These may vary in 
nature and structure, but most are embedded within the armed forces, utilising some 
military personnel. These canteen systems can operate shopping malls on military 
bases as well as mobile canteens, and provide recreational facilities for servicemen 
from small permissible profits margins.
The SADFI (or SAWI) fulfilled this function in the SADF between 1957 and 1994. 
SADFI and its predecessors did not have an easy history. They were the subject of 
several inquiries and investigations. It led to the militarisation of the Institute in 1968, 
a time when National Service and the development of a war on the northern borders 
were a lifeline. However, withdrawal from SWA (soon to become Namibia) in 1989 
and the concomitant rationalisation of the SADF, ushered in a new round of challenges. 
The extent to which the Institute accommodated these changes is perhaps an area for 
future research into a floundering business. The Border War brought rapid growth, not 
sustainable after the ending of the war followed by the abolition of National Service 
and the rationalisation of the armed forces. It ushered in a new era in more than one 
sense. The Institute had to settle down to retail and wholesale trade, within a much 
smaller, peacetime Defence Force. How the Institute adjusted to these changes is a 
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